Alfon vs. Republic

The word "principally" in Article 364 of the Civil Code, which provides that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father, is not equivalent to "exclusively," such that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother, to which it is equally entitled.

Petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte is the legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon. Since childhood, she was taken care of by her uncle, Hector Alfon, with whom she has resided at Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three years. She has used the name "Estrella S. Alfon" throughout her schooling from first grade through college at Arellano University, where she earned a Bachelor of Science in Nursing, and in the exercise of her right of suffrage. The petition was filed under Republic Act No. 5440, which provides a procedure for review of orders of the Court of First Instance in change-of-name proceedings.

Petitioner Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte was born on May 15, 1952 at the U.S.T. Hospital and was registered at the local Civil Registrar's Office under that name. On June 15, 1952, she was baptized as Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte at the St. Anthony de Padua Church, Singalong, Manila. Her parents are Filomeno Duterte and Estrella Alfon. Since childhood, petitioner has been taken care of by Mr. and Mrs. Hector Alfon, and she and her uncle Hector Alfon have resided at 728 J.R. Yulo Street corner Ideal Street, Mandaluyong, Metro Manila for twenty-three years.

When petitioner started schooling, she used the name Estrella S. Alfon. She attended first grade through fourth year high school at Stella Maris College under that name, and after graduating from high school, she enrolled at Arellano University and finished a Bachelor of Science in Nursing, again registered under the name Estrella S. Alfon. All her scholastic records from elementary to college reflect this name. She has also exercised her right of suffrage under the same name and has not committed any felony or misdemeanor.

On April 28, 1978, petitioner filed a verified petition through counsel praying that her name be changed from Maria Estrella Veronica Primitiva Duterte to Estrella S. Alfon. The notice of hearing was published in the Times Journal in its issues of July 28, August 5, and 11, 1978, and copies were furnished the Office of the Solicitor General. At the hearing on December 14, 1978, the Deputy Clerk of Court was appointed commissioner to receive evidence. The evidence showed that petitioner had continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since infancy, that all her friends and acquaintances knew her by this name, and that she had graduated and received her college diploma under this name. The lower court found the change of first name proper but denied the change of surname, reasoning that the birth certificate showed her father to be Filomeno Duterte and that Article 364 of the Civil Code requires legitimate children to principally use the surname of the father. The lower court authorized the change only to "Estrella Alfon Duterte."

• Long and Continuous Use: Petitioner argued that she has been using the name Estrella Alfon since childhood, has been enrolled in grade school and college under the same name, has continuously used the name Estrella S. Alfon since infancy, and that all her friends and acquaintances know her by this name.
• Exercise of Suffrage: Petitioner maintained that she has exercised her right of suffrage under the name Estrella S. Alfon, further demonstrating that this is the name by which she is publicly known.
• Avoidance of Confusion: Petitioner contended that the change of name is not whimsical but based on solid and reasonable ground, i.e., to avoid confusion, given that all her records and public interactions have been under the name Estrella S. Alfon.

• Use of Father's Surname: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, contended that as a legitimate child of Filomeno Duterte, petitioner should principally use the surname of her father, invoking Article 364 of the Civil Code, and that the fact that petitioner has been using a different surname does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to legally authorize the change.
• Remedy for Carrying Uncle's Surname: Respondent argued that if petitioner's purpose is to carry the surname "Alfon" because her uncle who reared her has that surname, then the remedy is not a petition for change of name.

• Interpretation of Article 364: Whether the word "principally" in Article 364 of the Civil Code, requiring legitimate children to principally use the surname of the father, is equivalent to "exclusively," thereby barring a legitimate child from using the mother's surname.
• Proper and Reasonable Cause: Whether the petitioner's continuous use of the name Estrella S. Alfon since childhood constitutes proper and reasonable cause warranting the full grant of the petition for change of name, including the surname.

• Interpretation of Article 364: No. The word "principally" is not equivalent to "exclusively," so there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother, to which it is equally entitled.
• Proper and Reasonable Cause: Yes. The petitioner's continuous use of the name Estrella S. Alfon since childhood — in school records, in the exercise of suffrage, and among friends and acquaintances — constitutes proper and reasonable cause for the change, as it is necessary to avoid confusion.

• Interpretation of Article 364: The lower court denied the change of surname solely on the ground that as a legitimate child, petitioner should principally use the surname of her father under Article 364 of the Civil Code. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the word "principally" as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to "exclusively." This interpretation means there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother, to which it is equally entitled. The lower court's restrictive reading of Article 364 was therefore erroneous, as it treated "principally" as if it were "exclusively," thereby foreclosing any discretion in the choice of surname.

• Proper and Reasonable Cause: The Court applied the framework articulated in Haw Liong vs. Republic, which identified proper and reasonable causes for change of name, including when the change is necessary to avoid confusion. The evidence showed that petitioner had, since childhood, borne the name Estrella S. Alfon; she was enrolled in schools from the grades through college under that name; all her friends called her by this name; she finished her Nursing course and received her diploma under this name; and she exercised the right of suffrage under the same name. The petition was therefore not whimsical but grounded on a solid and reasonable basis — the avoidance of confusion between her registered name and the name by which she has been known throughout her life. The Court found ample justification to grant the petition in full.

• Proper and Reasonable Causes for Change of Name — The following may be considered, among others, as proper or reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimated; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion. In this case, the Court applied the third ground, finding that petitioner's lifelong use of a name different from her registered name necessitated the change to avoid confusion.

• Interpretation of "Principally" in Article 364 of the Civil Code — The word "principally" in Article 364, which provides that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father, is not equivalent to "exclusively." A legitimate or legitimated child may choose to use the surname of its mother, to which it is equally entitled. The Court relied on this interpretation to hold that the lower court erred in denying the change of surname on the sole ground of Article 364.

• "The word 'principally' as used in the codal provision is not equivalent to 'exclusively' so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled." — This is the ratio decidendi of the case, establishing that Article 364 of the Civil Code does not bar a legitimate child from adopting the mother's surname.

• "There is therefore ample justification to grant fully her petition which is not whimsical but on the contrary is based on a solid and reasonable ground, i.e. to avoid confusion." — This passage articulates the Court's application of the "avoidance of confusion" ground for change of name, tying the doctrine to the specific facts of the case.

• Haw Liong vs. Republic, G.R. No. L-21194, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 677 — Followed. The Court cited this case for the enumeration of proper and reasonable causes that may warrant a grant of a petition for change of name, specifically the ground that the change is necessary to avoid confusion. The framework was applied to the facts of the present case to justify the full grant of the petition.

• Article 364, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that "[l]egitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father." The Court interpreted the word "principally" as not equivalent to "exclusively," holding that a legitimate child may also use the mother's surname.
• Section 5, Rule 103, Rules of Court — Governs the grant of petitions for change of name, providing that upon satisfactory proof of publication and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall adjudge the change if proper and reasonable cause appears. The Court found proper and reasonable cause in the petitioner's lifelong use of the name Estrella S. Alfon.
• Republic Act No. 5440 — Provides the procedural vehicle for review of orders of the Court of First Instance in change-of-name proceedings. The petition was filed pursuant to this statute.

Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concurred.