Alejandrino vs. Quezon

The writ of mandamus will not issue from the judiciary to a coordinate legislative department to compel the performance of duties that are purely legislative in character or to direct the reinstatement of a member expelled or suspended by the legislative body, even if the legislative action was unconstitutional, because neither department is inferior to the other and the Court lacks the power of coercion to enforce such a mandate against the Senate.

Jose Alejandrino was a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the Twelfth Senatorial District under the authority of the Organic Act (Jones Law), which empowered the Governor-General to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent non-Christian regions. The respondents were Manuel L. Quezon, President of the Philippine Senate, together with the other sitting senators and certain Senate officers—the Secretary, Sergeant-at-Arms, and Paymaster. The Organic Act allocated the power to remove appointive senators exclusively to the Governor-General, while granting each House the power to punish its members for disorderly behavior and, with a two-thirds concurrence, to expel an elective member. The dispute arose from the interplay between these constitutional provisions when the Senate undertook to discipline an appointive member by a penalty that functioned as a suspension.

Jose Alejandrino was a Senator appointed by the Governor-General to represent the Twelfth Senatorial District of the Philippine Islands. On February 5, 1924, the Philippine Senate adopted a resolution declaring Alejandrino guilty of disorderly conduct and flagrant violation of the privileges of the Senate for having treacherously assaulted Senator Vicente de Vera during a debate regarding Alejandrino's credentials. The resolution deprived Alejandrino of all prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments as Senator for one year from January 1, 1924, and directed that a copy be furnished to the Governor-General for his information.

Alejandrino filed an original proceeding in the Supreme Court seeking mandamus and injunction against the Senate President, the respondent senators, and Senate officers—the Secretary, Sergeant-at-Arms, and Paymaster. He prayed for a preliminary injunction enjoining execution of the resolution, a declaration that the resolution was null and void, and a final writ of mandamus compelling the respondents to recognize his rights as Senator and to permit him to exercise all prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments of his office. The Attorney-General, representing the respondents, objected to the Court's jurisdiction by special appearance and subsequently pressed the same point by demurrer.

The alleged disorderly conduct consisted of an assault upon Senator de Vera that occurred outside the legislative halls and at a time when the Senate was not in session. The act did not take place in or near the Senate chamber, nor did it cause any disorder, disturbance, or impediment to the orderly procedure of any Senate session. At the time of the alleged misconduct, Alejandrino's admission as a member of the Philippine Senate was still under discussion.

On the merits, the Court observed that the Organic Act authorized the Governor-General to appoint senators to represent non-Christian regions, and that such appointive senators "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." While each House could punish its members for disorderly behavior and, with a two-thirds concurrence, expel an elective member, neither House was granted the power to expel an appointive member. The Court further noted that the power to "suspend" was neither included in the power to "punish" granted to the Legislature nor in the power to "remove" vested in the Governor-General, and that the Organic Act had purposely withheld the power to suspend an appointive member from both branches.

• Unconstitutionality of the Resolution: Petitioner maintained that the Senate resolution was unconstitutional and entirely of no effect for five reasons, principally that the Senate lacked authority to suspend or remove an appointive member whose removal was vested exclusively in the Governor-General.
• Ex Post Facto Punishment: Petitioner argued that the punishment imposed by the resolution was quasi-criminal and ex post facto, in that his acts were declared illegal by the resolution long after they had been committed, and that no punishment for his acts had been prescribed under the substantive law of the Philippine Islands.
• Disorderly Behavior Not Shown: Petitioner contended that the alleged misbehavior was committed outside the legislative halls during a period when the Senate was not in session, did not interfere with the orderly procedure of the Senate, and therefore could not constitute "disorderly behavior" within the meaning of the Organic Act.
• Deprivation of Constitutional Rights: Petitioner asserted that the resolution deprived him and the approximately one million citizens of his district of representation and participation in legislative affairs, a right guaranteed under the Organic Law, and that he retained his rights as a citizen notwithstanding his membership in the Senate.

• Immunity from Judicial Review: Respondents argued that the courts had no power or authority to inquire into the acts of the legislative branch of the government, however clear it might be made to appear that the Legislature did not possess the power or authority exercised.
• Suspension Distinguished from Removal: Respondents strenuously argued that the resolution depriving petitioner of all prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for one year was not a removal from office but a mere suspension, and therefore fell within the Senate's power to punish its members for disorderly behavior.
• Absolute Departmental Independence: Respondents defended on the ground that they were absolutely immune from judicial inquiry, maintaining that under the separation of powers doctrine the judicial department could not control, direct, or restrain the legislative department in the exercise of its functions.

• Jurisdiction over the Senate: Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction by mandamus and injunction to annul the suspension of a Senator and compel the Philippine Senate to reinstate him.
• Validity of the Suspension Resolution: Whether the Senate resolution depriving an appointive Senator of all prerogatives, privileges, and emoluments for one year was a valid exercise of the power to punish for disorderly behavior, or whether it constituted an unconstitutional usurpation of the Governor-General's exclusive power to remove appointive members.
• Mandamus Against Senate Officers: Whether the writ of mandamus could issue against subordinate officers of the Senate—the Secretary, Sergeant-at-Arms, and Paymaster—even if it could not run against the Senate itself.

• Jurisdiction over the Senate: No. The Court lacks jurisdiction to control the Philippine Senate by mandamus or injunction, the general rule being that mandamus will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, as neither is inferior to the other.
• Validity of the Suspension Resolution: The resolution was unconstitutional. The Organic Act purposely withheld from both the Legislature and the Governor-General the power to suspend an appointive member; the power to punish for disorderly behavior does not include the power to suspend, which is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal.
• Mandamus Against Senate Officers: No. If the Court has no authority to control the Senate, it has no authority to control subordinate employees acting under the Senate's direction, as they are mere agents who cannot act independently of the Senate's will.

• Jurisdiction over the Senate: Under the system of government of the Philippine Islands, each of the three departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another. The power to control is the power to abrogate, and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. While it is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is and to enforce the Constitution, the general rule of mandamus is that the writ will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other. Mandamus will not lie against a legislative body, its members, or its officers to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in character. Where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to issue a mandate compelling reinstatement. The controlling precedent in this jurisdiction is Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, which held that the Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the head of the executive department in the performance of his official acts. The same rules governing the relations of the courts to the chief executive likewise govern the relations of the courts to the legislature. The Court should not pronounce judgments which may be disregarded with impunity, nor create conditions for collision between coordinate departments.

• Validity of the Suspension Resolution: The Organic Act authorizes the Governor-General to appoint senators to represent non-Christian regions, and such appointive senators "hold office until removed by the Governor-General." Each House may punish its members for disorderly behavior and, with a two-thirds concurrence, expel an elective member. Neither House may expel an appointive member for any reason. The power to "suspend" is included neither in the power to "punish" granted to the Legislature nor in the power to "remove" granted to the Governor-General; the Constitution purposely withheld the power to suspend from both. The Congress of the United States has never in its long history suspended a member. Punishment by reprimand or fine vindicates the dignity of the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion vindicates the body's honor while allowing the constituency to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without any means to fill the vacancy. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. It is beyond the power of any branch of the government to exercise its functions in any way other than that prescribed by the Organic Law.

• Mandamus Against Senate Officers: The suggestion that the mandate could run against the Secretary, Sergeant-at-Arms, and Paymaster of the Senate rather than against the Senate itself begs the question. If the Court has no authority to control the Senate, it has no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the Senate's direction. These officers are mere agents of the Senate who cannot act independently of the will of that body. Issuing mandates against them would create the spectacle of the Court ordering the Senate's officers to do one thing while the Senate orders them to do another. The writ of mandamus should not be granted unless it clearly appears that the person to whom it is directed has the absolute power to execute it.

• Separation of Powers — Non-Interference with Coordinate Departments — Under the system of government of the Philippine Islands, each of the three departments is distinct and not directly subject to the control of another. The power to control is the power to abrogate, and the power to abrogate is the power to usurp. Each department may nevertheless indirectly restrain the others. It is peculiarly the duty of the judiciary to say what the law is, to enforce the Constitution, and to decide whether the proper constitutional sphere of a department has been transcended. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that mandamus will not lie from the judiciary to a coordinate legislative branch, as neither department is inferior to the other.

• Mandamus Against Legislative Bodies — The writ of mandamus will not lie against a legislative body, its members, or its officers to compel the performance of duties purely legislative in character, which pertain to legislative functions and over which the legislative body has exclusive control. The courts cannot dictate action in this respect without a gross usurpation of power. Where a member has been expelled by the legislative body, the courts have no power, irrespective of whether the expulsion was right or wrong, to compel reinstatement. The Court relied on this doctrine to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction.

• Limits of Legislative Disciplinary Power — The power to "punish" members for disorderly behavior does not include the power to "suspend" an appointive member. Punishment by reprimand or fine vindicates the House without depriving the constituency of representation; expulsion, when permissible, likewise vindicates the body's honor while allowing the constituency to elect anew; but suspension deprives the electoral district of representation without any means to fill the vacancy. Suspension for one year is equivalent to qualified expulsion or removal. The Organic Act purposely withheld the power to suspend from both the Legislature and the Governor-General.

• "Mandamus will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch, for the very obvious reason that neither is inferior to the other." — This passage articulates the foundational rule governing judicial non-interference with coordinate departments, serving as the ratio decidendi for the dismissal.

• "The Constitution has purposely withheld from the two Houses of the Legislature and the Governor-General alike the power to suspend an appointive member of the Legislature." — This statement defines the Court's view on the merits—that the Senate's resolution was unconstitutional—even though the Court declined to exercise jurisdiction to grant relief.

• "If we have no authority to control the Philippine Senate, we have no authority to control the actions of subordinate employees acting under the direction of the Senate." — This passage resolves the issue of whether mandamus could issue against Senate officers rather than against the Senate itself, establishing that the immunity of the legislative body extends to its subordinate agents.

• "If it be said that this conclusion leaves the petitioner without a remedy, the answer is that the judiciary is not the repository of all wisdom and all power." — This passage captures the Court's response to the concern that dismissal leaves the petitioner without redress, framing the limits of judicial power within the constitutional scheme.

• Severino vs. Governor-General and Provincial Board of Occidental Negros, 16 Phil. 366 (1910) — Controlling precedent in this jurisdiction. The Court held it had no jurisdiction to interfere with the Governor-General as head of the executive department in the performance of his official acts. The same rule governing relations of the courts to the chief executive was applied to govern relations of the courts to the legislature.

• Mississippi vs. Johnson and Ord, 4 Wall. 475 (1867) — United States Supreme Court decision holding that the President cannot be restrained by injunction from carrying into effect an Act of Congress, as neither the Legislative nor Executive Department can be restrained in its action by the Judicial Department. Relied upon as persuasive authority for the rule of non-interference.

• Sutherland vs. Governor, 29 Mich. 320 (1874) — Decision by Judge Cooley holding that no court can compel the legislature to make or refrain from making laws, or to take any action whatsoever. Cited as supporting the proposition that the exemption of one department from the control of the other is indispensably necessary for any useful apportionment of power.

• French vs. Senate, 146 Cal. 604 (1905) — California proceeding in mandamus by expelled senators seeking to compel the Senate to admit them. The writ was denied, the court holding that the judicial department has no power to revise even the most arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department taken in pursuance of power committed exclusively to it by the constitution.

• Abueva vs. Wood, 45 Phil. 612 (1924) — Petition for mandamus to compel executive and legislative officials to permit examination of vouchers. Denied on the ground that legislative officers, insofar as concerns their purely legislative functions, are beyond the control of the courts by mandamus.

• Concepcion vs. Paredes, 42 Phil. 599 (1921) — The Court held that a legislative attempt to deprive the Chief Executive of his constitutional power of appointment was unconstitutional. Cited on the merits to illustrate that no branch of government may exercise its functions in any way other than prescribed by the Organic Law.

• Sections 16 and 17, Organic Act (Jones Law, Act of Congress of August 29, 1916) — These provisions authorize the Governor-General to appoint two senators and nine representatives to represent non-Christian regions, and provide that appointive senators and representatives "shall hold office until removed by the Governor-General." The Court applied these provisions to hold that the power to remove appointive members resides exclusively in the Governor-General, not in the Legislature.

• Section 18, Organic Act (Jones Law) — Provides that each House may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds, expel an elective member. The Court interpreted this provision as granting the power to punish all members (elective and appointive) for disorderly behavior and to expel elective members only, but withholding the power to suspend or expel appointive members.

• Section 3, Organic Act (Jones Law) — Contains the due process and equal protection clause: "no law shall be enacted which deprives any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law, or deny to person therein the equal protection of the laws." Petitioner invoked this provision to argue that the resolution was ex post facto and deprived him of rights guaranteed by the Organic Law.

• Street, J. — concurred in the majority opinion.
• Villamor, J. — concurred in the majority opinion.
• Romualdez, J. — concurred in the majority opinion.
• Avanceña, J. — concurred in the dispositive portion and the grounds relating to want of jurisdiction, but criticized the majority's insinuation that the Senate's proceeding was illegal as unnecessary and improper given the Court's lack of jurisdiction.

• Johnson, J. — Argued that the Court was unanimously of the opinion that the resolution was illegal and ultra vires, as the power to expel or remove an appointive senator is vested exclusively in the Governor-General. Justice Johnson maintained that the Court has jurisdiction to inquire into the legality or constitutionality of a law or resolution of the legislative department whenever a citizen alleges deprivation of rights, distinguishing between requiring a particular act to be done (which courts cannot do) and pronouncing upon the legality of an act already performed (which courts are sworn to do). He contended that the judiciary, as interpreter of the Constitution, has the duty to declare void any legislative resolution that transgresses the Organic Law, and that a pronouncement of nullity by the highest tribunal would suffice to cause revocation. He rejected the majority's concern about enforceability as unjustified given the Filipino people's respect for law.

• Ostrand, J. — Agreed that the Senate exceeded its powers in suspending the petitioner and that courts will not interfere with discretionary acts within a department's legitimate sphere, but maintained that the majority erred in failing to distinguish between acts within a department's province and acts of clear usurpation of another department's powers. Justice Ostrand argued that the doctrine of non-interference rests on the presumption that each department possesses special qualifications for exercising powers entrusted to it, and therefore does not apply where a department steps outside its legitimate sphere. He contended that the action was not in substance a suit against the Senate as a body but against individual members and officers executing a void resolution, and that mandamus could properly issue against Senate officers whose duties in recognizing a duly appointed senator were purely ministerial. He characterized the majority decision as without precedent and resting on no sound legal principle.