Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC

Preventive suspension is not an effective interruption of an elective local official's term for purposes of the three-term limit rule because it involves only a temporary incapacity to discharge the functions of the office and does not divest the official of title to the office.

Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms (1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007). During his third term, in September 2005, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in connection with a criminal case. The Supreme Court subsequently lifted the suspension order after 37 days, allowing Asilo to resume his duties and finish his term. Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position in the 2007 elections. Petitioners sought to deny due course to his candidacy on the ground that he had already served three consecutive terms, violating the three-term limit rule.

• Asilo's Consecutive Terms: Wilfredo F. Asilo was elected and served as councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
• Preventive Suspension: In September 2005, during his 2004-2007 term, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended Asilo for 90 days in connection with a criminal case.
• Lifting of Suspension: The Supreme Court lifted the Sandiganbayan's suspension order after 37 days, and Asilo resumed performing the functions of his office, finishing the remainder of his term.
• 2007 Candidacy: Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for councilor in the 2007 elections.
• Petition for Disqualification: Petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong sought to deny due course to or cancel Asilo's certificate of candidacy, arguing that he had been elected and served three consecutive terms and thus violated the three-term limit rule.
• COMELEC Ruling: The COMELEC Second Division and En Banc ruled in Asilo's favor, reasoning that the three-term limit rule did not apply because the preventive suspension prevented him from rendering complete service for his 2004-2007 term.

• Interruption of Term: Petitioners argued that preventive suspension of an elected local official does not constitute an interruption of the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution.
• Involuntary Renunciation: Petitioners maintained that preventive suspension cannot be considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated under Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

• Incomplete Service: Respondent COMELEC countered that the three-term limit rule did not apply because Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term due to the Sandiganbayan-imposed preventive suspension.
• Involuntary Severance: Respondent argued that the preventive suspension constituted an involuntary severance from office that effectively interrupted the continuity of service for the full term.

• Preventive Suspension as Interruption: Whether preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule.
• Preventive Suspension as Involuntary Renunciation: Whether preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160.

• Preventive Suspension as Interruption: Preventive suspension does not interrupt an elective official's term. An effective interruption requires the involuntary loss of title to office or an effective break from holding office, such as removal by operation of law. Preventive suspension merely involves a temporary incapacity to exercise the functions of the office; the official retains title, does not vacate the position, and no permanent replacement is appointed.
• Preventive Suspension as Involuntary Renunciation: Preventive suspension is not akin to voluntary or involuntary renunciation. Renunciation connotes abandonment or loss of title to office, whereas preventive suspension is temporary and does not sever the official from office. Equating preventive suspension with an interruption of term would allow circumvention of the constitutional mandate, as it is easier to fabricate administrative charges for preventive suspension than to voluntarily renounce office.

• Three-Term Limit Rule — The constitutional prohibition under Section 8, Article X limiting elective local officials to three consecutive terms is an inflexible rule that must be strictly construed in favor of limitation. Voluntary renunciation of office is expressly not an interruption of service.
• Interruption of Term — An effective interruption of a term requires the involuntary loss of title to office. The official must involuntarily leave the office and cease to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction, becoming a private citizen for a length of time, however short.
• Nature of Preventive Suspension — Preventive suspension is an interim remedial measure that temporarily bars an official from performing the functions of the office without vacating the position or losing title to it. It does not constitute an effective interruption of a term for purposes of the three-term limit rule.

• "The 'interruption' of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective interruption to occur."
• "Preventive suspension, by its nature, is a temporary incapacity to render service during an unbroken term; in the context of term limitation, interruption of service occurs after there has been a break in the term."
• "To allow a preventively suspended elective official to run for a fourth and prohibited term is to close our eyes to this reality and to allow a constitutional violation through sophistry by equating the temporary inability to discharge the functions of office with the interruption of term that the constitutional provision contemplates."

• Borja v. Commission on Elections — Mentioned as having cited preventive suspension as an example of interruption, but ruled not to be a controlling precedent on the specific issue of preventive suspension.
• Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections — Established that involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term amounts to an interruption of continuity of service, emphasizing that loss of title is the determining factor.
• Ong v. Alegre and Rivera v. COMELEC — Followed to reinforce the principle that the three-term limitation must be strictly interpreted in favor of limitation rather than its exception, even where the election requisite was not technically present.
• Adormeo v. Commission on Elections and Socrates v. Commission on Elections — Followed to establish that recall elections constitute an interruption because the official lived as a private citizen for an intervening period.
• Latasa v. Commission on Elections — Followed to highlight that no three-term limit violation results if a rest period or break in the service intervened, where the official steps down and ceases to exercise power over the same territorial jurisdiction.
• Montebon v. Commission on Elections — Followed as an example of an effective interruption where the official lost title to the original office by succession to a higher post by operation of law.

• Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution — Provides that no elective local official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms, and that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term. Applied to rule that preventive suspension does not involve loss of title and thus does not interrupt the term.
• Section 43(b), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Reiterates the constitutional three-term limit rule. Applied in conjunction with the constitutional provision to disqualify Asilo from a fourth term.

Leonardo-De Castro, J., Abad, J.

Leonardo-De Castro, J., concurred with additional reflections on the effect of acquittal or conviction, arguing that even if the preventively suspended official is convicted, the commission of the crime is akin to voluntary renunciation of the term during which the crime was committed, not a future term, and preventive suspension remains a non-interruption regardless of the case's outcome. Abad, J., concurred, emphasizing that "renunciation" is inherently voluntary and that preventive suspension does not end an official's term by operation of law, unlike the succession in Montebon.