Alcantara vs. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems

A party who actively participates in proceedings before a quasi-judicial body by filing pleadings and seeking affirmative relief is estopped from later impugning that body's jurisdiction, and COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over critical and explosive land disputes between occupants and pasture lease agreement holders pursuant to Executive Order No. 561, Section 3(2)(a).

Petitioner Nicasio Alcantara held Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542), granted by the DENR in 1993, covering 923 hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City, for a 25-year term expiring on 31 December 2018. Private respondent Rolando Paglangan, together with members of the B'laan and Maguindanaoan tribes, claimed the same area as ancestral land occupied since time immemorial. The Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), created under Executive Order No. 561, was empowered to assume jurisdiction over critical and explosive land disputes, including those between occupants and pasture lease agreement holders. The Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8371) subsequently created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), but the dispute between the parties antedated the NCIP's creation.

Sometime in 1993, petitioner Nicasio Alcantara was granted Forest Land Grazing Lease Agreement No. 542 (FLGLA No. 542) by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). Under the agreement, Alcantara was allowed to lease 923 hectares of public forest land at Sitio Lanton, Barrio Apopong, General Santos City for grazing purposes for a period of twenty-five years, to expire on 31 December 2018.

As early as 1990, however, private respondent Rolando Paglangan, together with Esmael Sabel and Lasid Acop, had already filed a letter-complaint with the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) seeking the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and the reversion of the entire 923 hectares to the B'laan and Maguindanaoan tribes. The case was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 98-052. Petitioner filed his Answer questioning the jurisdiction of COSLAP over the case, contending that the dispute involved a claim for recovery of ancestral land and should have been filed with the DENR, which has jurisdiction to administer and dispose of public lands, including grazing lands.

Notwithstanding petitioner's objection, COSLAP continued the hearings. Petitioner alleged that COSLAP did not conduct formal hearings and that he was neither notified of nor given the opportunity to participate in the field interviews and ocular inspections conducted by the body. On August 3, 1998, COSLAP issued a Decision ordering the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals by petition for review on certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition in its Decision dated June 22, 2000, and denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in a Resolution dated October 16, 2000.

On April 6, 2001, the Heirs of Datu Abdul S. Pendatun, the Heirs of Sabal Mula, and the Gawan Clan filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to File Complaint-in-Intervention with the Supreme Court, followed by an Amended Motion on May 24, 2001. They alleged that the parcels of land in dispute form part of their ancestral lands, and that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession under claim of ownership of the same. They further stated that Rolando Paglangan acts only as agent of the Mula clan and not of the other intervenors. The Court of Appeals, on the basis of the records, found that the land area being claimed by private respondents belongs to the B'laan indigenous cultural community, which has been in possession of, occupying, and cultivating the same since time immemorial — a fact not disputed by petitioner. The appellate court likewise declared that FLGLA No. 542 violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410, which declares unappropriated agricultural lands occupied and cultivated by members of national cultural communities as part of their ancestral lands.

• Estoppel and Jurisdictional Recognition: Petitioner contended that the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that he had earlier recognized the jurisdiction of COSLAP over the case, arguing that he had objected to COSLAP's jurisdiction from the outset by filing his Answer.
• Lack of COSLAP Expertise: Petitioner argued that COSLAP does not possess the historical, genealogical, and anthropological expertise to act on ancestral land claims, and that the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), created under the Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8371), has jurisdiction over such claims.
• Void COSLAP Decision: Petitioner submitted that COSLAP's decision ordering the cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 and declaring the area as ancestral land is void for having been issued by a body without jurisdiction over the matter.

• Timeliness of Petition: Private respondent Rolando Paglangan argued that the petition should be dismissed since the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the Court of Appeals was filed out of time.
• COSLAP Jurisdiction: Respondent contended that COSLAP has the power to entertain cases involving indigenous cultural communities when the DENR or the NCIP fails or refuses to act on a complaint or grievance brought before them.
• Antedating NCIP Creation: Respondent alleged that the dispute between petitioner and the B'laan tribe antedated the creation of the NCIP, justifying the filing of the petition for cancellation of FLGLA No. 542 with COSLAP.

• Estoppel from Questioning Jurisdiction: Whether petitioner is estopped from questioning COSLAP's jurisdiction after actively participating in the proceedings before it.
• COSLAP Jurisdiction over Land Disputes: Whether COSLAP had jurisdiction over the dispute between occupants and a pasture lease agreement holder under Executive Order No. 561.
• Validity of FLGLA No. 542 vis-à-vis Ancestral Land Claims: Whether FLGLA No. 542 violated Presidential Decree No. 410, which declares unappropriated agricultural lands occupied by national cultural communities as ancestral lands.

• Estoppel from Questioning Jurisdiction: Yes. Petitioner is estopped from questioning COSLAP's jurisdiction, having actively participated in the proceedings by filing an Answer, a Motion for Reconsideration, and a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration — raising the jurisdictional objection only when he realized the appeal period had lapsed.
• COSLAP Jurisdiction over Land Disputes: Yes. COSLAP properly assumed jurisdiction under Section 3(2)(a) of Executive Order No. 561, which authorizes it to resolve land disputes between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders that are critical and explosive in nature.
• Validity of FLGLA No. 542 vis-à-vis Ancestral Land Claims: No, FLGLA No. 542 was invalid. The Court of Appeals found that the disputed land belongs to the B'laan indigenous cultural community by virtue of immemorial possession, and that the lease violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410; these factual findings are binding and conclusive on the Supreme Court.

• Estoppel from Questioning Jurisdiction: The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals that petitioner's active participation in the COSLAP proceedings — through the filing of an Answer, a Motion for Reconsideration of the COSLAP's decision, and a Supplement to the Motion for Reconsideration — was tantamount to recognition of COSLAP's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by its resolution. The Court noted the appellate court's observation that petitioner began questioning COSLAP's jurisdiction only when he realized that his period to appeal had already lapsed. It has been repeatedly held that active participation in proceedings before a court or quasi-judicial body bars a party from later impugning that body's jurisdiction.

• COSLAP Jurisdiction over Land Disputes: Executive Order No. 561, the law prevailing when private respondents filed their complaint, provides in Section 3(2)(a) that COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over land disputes between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders where the disputes are critical and explosive in nature. The dispute between the B'laan tribe members and petitioner, as holder of FLGLA No. 542, fell squarely within this provision. COSLAP's resolution of the case was therefore within its statutory mandate.

• Validity of FLGLA No. 542 vis-à-vis Ancestral Land Claims: The Court of Appeals found, based on the records, that the land area claimed by private respondents belongs to the B'laan indigenous cultural community, which has been in possession, occupation, and cultivation of the same since time immemorial — a fact not disputed by petitioner. The appellate court further declared that FLGLA No. 542 violated Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 410, which declares all unappropriated agricultural lands occupied and cultivated by members of national cultural communities as part of their ancestral lands, alienable and disposable, and to be distributed exclusively among the members of the indigenous cultural group concerned. The Supreme Court found no reason to depart from these findings, applying the settled rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive absent any showing that they are unsupported by the evidence on record.

• Estoppel from Questioning Jurisdiction — The active participation of a party in proceedings before a court or quasi-judicial body, through the filing of pleadings and seeking affirmative relief, is tantamount to recognition of that body's jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by its resolution. Such participation bars the party from later impugning the body's jurisdiction. In this case, petitioner filed an Answer, a Motion for Reconsideration, and a Supplement thereto before COSLAP, and only raised the jurisdictional objection after the appeal period had lapsed.

• Binding Nature of Court of Appeals Factual Findings — Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court absent any showing that such findings are not supported by the evidence on record. The Court applied this doctrine to affirm the CA's findings that the disputed land belongs to the B'laan indigenous cultural community by virtue of immemorial possession and that FLGLA No. 542 violated Presidential Decree No. 410.

• "It has been repeatedly held by this Court that the active participation of a respondent in the case pending against him before a court or a quasi-judicial body is tantamount to a recognition of that court's or body's recognition and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later on impugning the court's or body's jurisdiction." — This passage articulates the canonical formulation of the estoppel doctrine as applied to jurisdictional challenges before quasi-judicial bodies, and constitutes the ratio decidendi on the estoppel issue.

• "The Court finds no reason to depart from such finding by the appellate court, it being a settled rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court absent any showing that such findings are not supported by the evidence on record." — This passage states the controlling doctrinal basis for the Court's deference to the Court of Appeals' factual determinations regarding ancestral land claims and the invalidity of FLGLA No. 542.

• Spouses Virgilio and Josie Jimenez vs. Patricia, Inc., G.R. No. 134651, September 18, 2000 — Cited to support the doctrine that active participation in proceedings before a court or quasi-judicial body estops a party from later questioning that body's jurisdiction.
• ABS-CBN Supervisors Employees Union Members vs. ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, 304 SCRA 489 (1999) — Cited as additional authority for the estoppel-by-participation doctrine.
• Maneja vs. National Labor Relations Commission, 290 SCRA 603 (1998) — Cited as further support for the proposition that active participation bars subsequent jurisdictional challenges.
• Security Bank and Trust Company vs. Triumph Lumber and Construction Corporation, 301 SCRA 537 (1999) — Cited in support of the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
• Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 362 (1999) — Cited alongside Security Bank as authority for the binding nature of CA factual findings.

• Section 3(2)(a), Executive Order No. 561 — Empowers COSLAP to assume jurisdiction over land disputes between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires when such disputes are critical and explosive in nature. The Court applied this provision to sustain COSLAP's jurisdiction over the dispute between the B'laan tribe members and petitioner as FLGLA holder.
• Section 1, Presidential Decree No. 410 — Declares all unappropriated agricultural lands forming part of the public domain, occupied and cultivated by members of national cultural communities for at least ten years, as part of the ancestral lands of these communities, alienable and disposable, to be distributed exclusively among their members. The Court of Appeals found that FLGLA No. 542 violated this decree, and the Supreme Court affirmed that finding.
• Republic Act No. 8371 (Indigenous Peoples' Rights Act of 1997) — Created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). Petitioner argued that NCIP, not COSLAP, has jurisdiction over ancestral land claims, but the Court found that the dispute antedated the NCIP's creation and that COSLAP's jurisdiction was properly invoked under Executive Order No. 561.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concurred.