Albetz Investments, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

A demolition order issued in an ejectment case under Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court does not become a nullity for failure to implement it within a specific period, as the law does not fix any such period and any delay in implementation accrues to the benefit of the deforciant; however, the prevailing party remains liable for damages under Article 19 of the Civil Code when the demolition is carried out in an indiscriminate and unconscionable manner that destroys the occupants' personal properties without affording them a reasonable opportunity to remove their belongings.

The Calma spouses were lessees of a lot owned by Albetz Investments, Inc. located at No. 816 Prudencio Street, Sampaloc, Manila. Albetz, needing the premises to construct a new building, demanded delivery of the lot and, upon the Calma spouses' refusal, initiated unlawful detainer proceedings. The statutory framework governing the dispute includes Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court on the removal of improvements on property subject of execution, derived from Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 39, which requires a special court order before a sheriff may demolish improvements constructed by the judgment debtor, and Article 19 of the Civil Code on Human Relations, which requires every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of rights and performance of duties.

The Calma spouses were lessees of a lot described as Lot No. 27 pt., Block No. BP-52, located at No. 816 Prudencio Street, Sampaloc, Manila, owned by Albetz Investments, Inc. Needing the premises for the construction of a new building, Albetz demanded delivery of the lot and, upon the Calma spouses' refusal, filed an unlawful detainer action against Vicenta Calma in the Municipal Court of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 119712. Judgment by default was rendered on March 30, 1964, ordering Vicenta Calma and all persons claiming under her to vacate the premises and pay the corresponding rentals. The judgment became final and executory.

Atty. Macario S. Meneses, director and lawyer of Albetz, filed a motion for execution, which was granted. On July 1, 1964, the Municipal Court issued a writ of execution commanding the Sheriff to remove the defendants from the premises and collect damages. The Sheriff's return of September 12, 1964 reported that the defendant had not yet demolished her house or vacated the lot. Meanwhile, on September 7, 1964, Vicenta Calma and others filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction in the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Civil Case No. 58246. Counsel for Vicenta Calma also filed a motion on September 8, 1964 in the unlawful detainer case praying that all proceedings be suspended until the certiorari petition was resolved. The Municipal Judge suspended proceedings on September 17, 1964. The certiorari petition was denied by the CFI, and Vicenta Calma appealed to the Supreme Court on December 19, 1964.

Atty. Meneses then filed a motion for demolition on February 9, 1965, which was opposed by Vicenta Calma. On April 29, 1965, the Municipal Judge granted the Calma spouses thirty days from receipt to vacate and remove their house, otherwise a demolition order would issue. The Calma spouses failed to comply, and on June 21, 1965, the Municipal Court issued an order authorizing and ordering the Sheriff to destroy, demolish, or remove the house. The Calma spouses' appeal in the certiorari case was dismissed by the Supreme Court. Thereafter, on December 2, 1965, the Calma spouses filed an action for specific performance with injunction against Albetz, docketed as Civil Case No. 63549, praying that Albetz be ordered to sell the lot to them at a reasonable price. This complaint was dismissed by the CFI on February 15, 1966.

Four days later, on February 19, 1966, the Sheriff, at the instance of Albetz through its lawyer Atty. Meneses, demolished the house of the Calma spouses without any new writ or order for demolition having been issued, relying solely on the order of June 21, 1965. The demolition was carried out with approximately thirty-five laborers, and the occupants were notified only that morning. According to the evidence for the plaintiffs, the demolition was indiscriminate: personal properties were carelessly placed between the house and the fence, some were left inside and damaged by falling debris, and many were lost because no one was present to take care of them. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found that the demolition was indiscriminate and without due regard for the safety of the personal properties belonging to the Calma and Umengan spouses, resulting in their destruction, and that the extent of damage was not contested by petitioner.

• Validity of Demolition Order: Petitioner argued that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court erred in declaring that an order of demolition issued under Section 13 (now Section 14) of Rule 39, which is not implemented within sixty days, becomes a nullity.
• Summary Nature of Ejectment: Petitioner maintained that the unlawful detainer judgment had long been final and executory, and that a series of delays in execution was occasioned by the moves of the Calma spouses to forestall enforcement, inconsistent with the summary character of ejectment proceedings.
• Sufficiency of Notice: Petitioner contended that the Calma spouses could not have been unaware of the demolition order, given that they had opposed the motion for demolition and had been granted a thirty-day period to vacate before the order issued.

• Lapse of Demolition Order: Respondents argued that the demolition was illegal because it was made eight months after issuance of the demolition order, rendering the order no longer in force.
• Lack of Notice: Respondents maintained that they were not notified of the order of demolition prior to the date of actual demolition, having been informed only on the morning of February 19, 1966, when the Sheriff appeared with laborers.
• Indiscriminate Demolition: Respondents asserted that the demolition was carried out indiscriminately, with personal properties carelessly placed and left exposed to falling debris, resulting in their damage and loss.

• Validity of Delayed Demolition Order: Whether a demolition order issued under Section 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court becomes a nullity if not implemented within sixty days.
• Manner of Demolution: Whether the manner in which the demolition was carried out gives rise to liability for damages.

• Validity of Delayed Demolition Order: No. The demolition order did not become a nullity despite the eight-month delay, the law not specifying any period within which such orders must be carried out and any delay accruing to the benefit of the deforciant.
• Manner of Demolition: Yes, liability for damages attaches. The demolition was carried out in an indiscriminate and unconscionable manner, violating Article 19 of the Civil Code, which requires every person to act with justice and good faith in the exercise of rights.

• Validity of Delayed Demolition Order: The statutory purpose of Section 14, Rule 39, derived from Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 39, is to grant the defeated party a reasonable time to remove improvements from the premises before demolition. The law does not specify the period within which the order of demolition should be carried out, because there may be factors and circumstances justifying deferment. Any delay in implementation accrues to the benefit of the deforciant. The grant of a reasonable period is predicated on fairness, enabling the defeated party to look for another place to transfer improvements and personal effects. In this case, the Calma spouses were given more than sufficient time to comply voluntarily: they opposed the motion for demolition, were granted thirty days to vacate, and the demolition order issued only after their certiorari petition was dismissed and they failed to remove the house. The proceedings in the unlawful detainer case were suspended only until the certiorari action was finally resolved, which occurred when the Supreme Court dismissed the Calma spouses' appeal. The summary nature of ejectment proceedings, intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting possession, further supports immediate execution. As held in Acibo vs. Macadaeg, since the order of demolition was not appealable, there was no point in waiting until it could be served on the adverse party before issuing the corresponding writ. The theory of private respondents that the order lapsed is inconsistent with the special, summary character of unlawful detainer proceedings.

• Manner of Demolition: While Albetz had the legal right to the surrender of the land and the demolition of the house standing thereon, such right should not have been exercised in a manner as to unduly prejudice the owners. The trial court and the Court of Appeals both found that the demolition was indiscriminate, without due regard to the safety of personal properties belonging to the Calma and Umengan spouses, resulting in their destruction. Urged by petitioner's lawyer, the Sheriff, aided by petitioner's laborers, wantonly, maliciously, and indiscriminately demolished the house, destroying many personal properties in the process. The extent of damage was not contested by petitioner. Article 19 of the Civil Code, part of the provisions on Human Relations, provides that every person must, in the exercise of rights and performance of duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The demolition was carried out in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving occupants no time to remove their belongings. No significant damage would have been sustained by Albetz had their men allowed the occupants to remove their personal properties, which would not have taken considerable time.

• Summary Nature of Ejectment Proceedings — Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are summary in character, intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or the right to possession of property. Technicalities or details of procedure that may cause unnecessary delays should be avoided. When judgment is in favor of the plaintiff, it should be executed immediately to prevent further damages caused by loss of possession. The Court applied this doctrine to reject the respondents' theory that the demolition order lapsed, holding that such a theory is inconsistent with the summary character and purposes of ejectment proceedings.

• Removal of Improvements Under Section 14, Rule 39 — When property subject of execution contains improvements constructed by the judgment debtor, the officer shall not destroy, demolish, or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court, issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. The statutory purpose is to grant the defeated party a reasonable time to remove improvements. The law does not specify the period within which the order of demolition should be carried out, as there may be circumstances justifying deferment. Any delay in implementation accrues to the benefit of the deforciant.

• Article 19, Civil Code — Human Relations — Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The Court applied this provision to hold that while Albetz had the legal right to demolish the house, the exercise of that right in an indiscriminate and unconscionable manner, without affording occupants any opportunity to remove their belongings, gave rise to liability for damages.

• "The law does not specify the period within which the order of demolition should be carried out. The reason is obvious. There may be factors and circumstances which would justify deferment of the implementation of the order of demolition." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the validity of the delayed demolition order, establishing that no fixed period is prescribed for implementation and that delay benefits the deforciant.

• "Therefore, any delay in the implementation of the order of demolition accrues to the benefit of the deforciant. The grant of such a reasonable period to remove the improvements is predicated upon reasons of fairness and justice to enable the defeated party to look for another place wherein he can transfer his improvements and personal effects." — This defines the doctrinal basis for why a demolition order does not lapse with the passage of time, tying the rule to principles of fairness.

• "Certainly, the demolition complained of in the case at bar was not carried out in a manner consistent with justice and good faith. At the instance of petitioner, it was done in a swift, unconscionable manner, giving the occupants of the house no time at all to remove their belongings therefrom." — This passage applies Article 19 of the Civil Code to the facts, establishing the basis for liability for damages notwithstanding the validity of the demolition order itself.

• Acibo vs. Macadaeg, 11 SCRA 446 — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that since an order of demolition is not appealable, there is no need to await service on the adverse party before issuing the corresponding writ of demolition, reinforcing the summary nature of ejectment execution.

• Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672 — Cited through Chief Justice Moran's exposition that forcible entry and detainer cases are summary in nature because they involve perturbation of social order which must be restored as promptly as possible, and technicalities causing unnecessary delays should be avoided.

• Guevara vs. Laico, 64 Phil. 144 — Cited as authority for the rule that a sheriff cannot remove improvements constructed by the defeated party without a special order of the court, issued upon motion of the prevailing party with notice and after hearing, and upon the defeated party's failure to remove the improvement within a reasonable time.

• Section 14, Rule 39, Revised Rules of Court — Governs the removal of improvements on property subject of execution, requiring a special court order issued upon petition of the judgment creditor after due hearing and after the judgment debtor's failure to remove improvements within a reasonable time. The Court applied this provision to confirm the Municipal Court's authority to order demolition and to analyze the statutory purpose of granting the defeated party a reasonable time to remove improvements.

• Section 1, Commonwealth Act No. 39 — The antecedent statute from which Section 14, Rule 39 was derived, providing that the Provincial Sheriff shall not destroy, demolish, or remove improvements in ejectment cases unless expressly authorized by the court, upon petition after due hearing and upon failure of the defendant to remove improvements within a reasonable time. The Court cited this to trace the legislative intent behind the rule.

• Article 19, Civil Code — Part of the provisions on Human Relations (Chapter 2), requiring every person to act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of rights and performance of duties. The Court applied this provision to hold Albetz liable for damages arising from the indiscriminate manner of demolition.

• Section 8, Rule 70, Revised Rules of Court — Cited in footnote as authority for the immediate execution of judgment in ejectment cases to prevent further damages caused by loss of possession.

Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Muñoz Palma, and Aquino, JJ., concurred. Concepcion Jr., J., took no part. Muñoz Palma, J., was designated to sit in the Second Division.