Alberto vs. Court of Appeals

An action for acknowledgment and partition brought by an alleged natural child against the heirs of a deceased putative father is barred by prior judgment, prescription, and laches where the estate has already been distributed in intestate proceedings (which are in rem and binding on all interested persons), where the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1100 of the Civil Code has lapsed, and where the claimant unreasonably delayed in asserting his rights despite having knowledge of facts warranting action.

Antonio C. Alberto was the common link between the parties: the private respondent Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. claimed to be his natural child by Andrea Jongco, while petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto was his surviving spouse and the judicial guardian of their two minor children, Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr. Antonio C. Alberto allegedly lived with Andrea Jongco as husband and wife in 1941, and the respondent was born on September 10, 1942. Around 1944, Alberto and Jongco separated, and Alberto married Natividad del Rosario, with whom he had two children. Antonio C. Alberto died on July 3, 1949. On July 17, 1949, Natividad instituted intestate proceedings (Special Proceedings No. 9092) for the settlement of his estate before the Court of First Instance of Manila. The estate was valued at ₱74,963.81. The intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953, with the estate adjudicated and partitioned among Natividad and her two children, without inclusion of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr.

Antonio C. Alberto and Andrea Jongco allegedly lived together as husband and wife beginning in 1941, both being single and without legal impediment to marry. On September 10, 1942, Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. was born of this union. According to the private respondent, his father continued living with and supporting him and his mother, introducing him to the public as his natural child, and even the father's family recognized him as such. Around 1944, Alberto and Jongco separated. Alberto subsequently married Natividad del Rosario, with whom he had two children: Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr. Despite the separation, Alberto allegedly continued supporting and recognizing Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as his own child.

On July 3, 1949, Antonio C. Alberto died. Fourteen days later, on July 17, 1949, Natividad instituted intestate proceedings (Special Proceedings No. 9092) before the Court of First Instance of Manila for the settlement of his estate, valued at ₱74,963.81. In these proceedings, Natividad and her two children were adjudicated as the sole heirs, and the estate was partitioned among them. The intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953, by an order of distribution. Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. was deliberately omitted from the proceedings and claimed to have had no knowledge of them.

On September 8, 1960, Antonio J. Alberto, Jr., then eighteen years old and assisted by his mother Andrea Jongco as natural guardian, filed a complaint for acknowledgment and partition against Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto in her individual capacity and as judicial guardian of the minors Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr. He prayed that he be acknowledged as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto, that his one-fourth share of the estate be delivered to him, and that petitioners be ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 as attorney's fees and costs. Petitioners moved to dismiss on the grounds of bar by prior judgment and prescription, but the motion was denied on November 11, 1960. After trial, the Court of First Instance of Manila, on August 10, 1964, dismissed the complaint, finding Andrea Jongco's testimony inherently improbable and the respondent guilty of laches. The trial court found that the deceased's siblings — Jose, Zoilo, and Pilar Alberto — who had no pecuniary interest in the case, testified that during the period Andrea Jongco claimed to have lived with Antonio Alberto, Sr., the deceased in fact lived with his mother and brothers at the family residence. The trial court also found that Andrea Jongco had five children with four different men, undermining the definiteness of paternity for any particular child.

The private respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals, which on August 31, 1968 reversed the trial court, declaring Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. an acknowledged natural child and owner pro indiviso of one-fifth of the estate. The Court of Appeals gave more credence to the testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta, and relied on the birth and baptismal certificates of Alberto, Jr. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on October 14, 1968, prompting the instant petition.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioners contended that because the case was filed on September 8, 1960 — almost five years after the enactment of Republic Act No. 1401 creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court — questions of paternity and acknowledgment fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of that court, not the Court of First Instance of Manila. They argued that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter cannot be waived and may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.
• Bar by Prior Judgment: Petitioners argued that the intestate proceedings (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had been terminated on November 9, 1953, with an order of distribution declaring the heirs of the deceased, and that the present action seeking recognition and inheritance rights was therefore barred by prior judgment, regardless of the respondent's claimed lack of knowledge of those proceedings.
• Prescription: Petitioners maintained that the action had prescribed, the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1100 of the Civil Code having commenced from the approval of the partition on November 9, 1953 and expired on November 9, 1957, well before the complaint was filed on September 8, 1960.
• Laches: Petitioners asserted that the respondent was guilty of laches, Andrea Jongco having learned of Antonio Alberto's marriage to Natividad around 1944 yet taking no steps to protect her child's interests, and having allowed more than ten years to elapse after Alberto's death in 1949 before filing the action in 1960.
• Misapprehension of Facts: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals committed grave error in reversing the trial court's factual findings, which were entitled to great weight, by giving credence to testimonies found by the trial court to be inherently improbable, inconsistent, and deliberately invented, and by disregarding petitioners' evidence without cogent justification.

• Lack of Notice: The private respondent insisted that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know of them only recently, thereupon making a demand upon the petitioners who refused to give him his share.
• Acknowledgment: The private respondent alleged that his father and mother lived together as husband and wife while both were single and without legal impediment to marry, that he was born on September 10, 1942, that his father supported and publicly recognized him as his natural child, and that even the father's family recognized him as such.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the Court of First Instance of Manila lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, such jurisdiction belonging instead to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court.
• Bar by Prior Judgment: Whether the respondent's cause of action was barred by the prior judgment rendered in the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the estate of Antonio C. Alberto.
• Prescription: Whether the respondent's cause of action had already prescribed under Article 1100 of the Civil Code.
• Laches: Whether the respondent was guilty of laches in failing to assert his rights for an unreasonable length of time.
• Factual Findings: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial court's factual findings and in declaring the respondent an acknowledged natural child entitled to one-fifth of the estate.

• Jurisdiction: No. The jurisdictional objection could not be raised for the first time on appeal, petitioners having voluntarily participated in the trial without objection.
• Bar by Prior Judgment: Yes. The intestate proceedings were proceedings in rem, binding on all persons interested whether notified or not, and the order of distribution had become final.
• Prescription: Yes. The four-year prescriptive period under Article 1100 of the Civil Code commenced from the approval of the partition on November 9, 1953 and expired on November 9, 1957, rendering the complaint filed on September 8, 1960 time-barred.
• Laches: Yes. The respondent's unexplained delay of over eleven years in asserting his rights constituted laches, warranting a presumption of abandonment or declination to assert the right.
• Factual Findings: Yes. The Court of Appeals' findings were contrary to those of the trial court, bringing the case within a recognized exception to the rule that CA factual findings are final, and the trial court's findings were entitled to great weight.

• Jurisdiction: The question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal. A party who has voluntarily participated in the trial cannot later raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction. This principle is reinforced by the fact that the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts no longer exist, their functions having been transferred to the Regional Trial Courts under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Petitioners' active participation in the trial proceedings without objection constituted a waiver of any jurisdictional defect.

• Bar by Prior Judgment: Intestate proceedings for the settlement of a decedent's estate are proceedings in rem, which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter, whether notified or not, are equally bound. The court acquires jurisdiction over all interested persons through publication of the prescribed notice. A final order of distribution vests title in the distributees. The only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, and even then the better practice is to reopen the same case by proper motion within the reglementary period rather than file an independent action. The respondent's independent action would effectively allow another court to throw out a decision already final and executed and reshuffle properties long ago distributed.

• Prescription: Article 1100 of the Civil Code provides that the action for rescission on account of lesion prescribes after four years from the time the partition was made. The intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953, so the four-year prescriptive period expired on November 9, 1957. The complaint filed on September 8, 1960 was therefore time-barred. Article 1104 provides that a partition made with preterition of a compulsory heir shall not be rescinded unless bad faith or fraud is proved, but this does not extend the prescriptive period. The four-year period commences from the approval of the agreement of partition by the court. The general rule that actions for partition among co-owners do not prescribe does not apply because petitioners never recognized the respondent as a co-owner or co-heir. Prescription also runs against minors who have parents, guardians, or legal representatives under Article 1108, and the respondent had a living mother who in fact filed the complaint for him. Even assuming the respondent is a natural child, the action for recognition must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent; if the parent died during the child's minority, the action may be filed within four years from attainment of majority, but where the minor has a guardian, prescription runs even during minority, and the action must be instituted within four years after the death of the natural father. Antonio C. Alberto died on July 3, 1949, and the complaint was filed eleven years later on September 8, 1960.

• Laches: Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert a right has abandoned or declined to assert it. Andrea Jongco learned of Antonio Alberto's marriage to Natividad around 1944 yet took no steps to protect her child's interests. Even after Alberto's death in 1949, she allowed more than ten years to elapse before filing the action in 1960. The delay was prejudicial to petitioners, as the supposed father's lips had been sealed by death and potential witnesses had become too old to give coherent testimony. Minority does not excuse the delay, as prescription runs against minors who have parents or guardians. The law serves those who are vigilant and diligent, not those who sleep when the law requires them to act.

• Factual Findings: While the general rule is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed, recognized exceptions include when the findings of the appellate court are contrary to those of the trial court. This case falls within that exception. The trial court found Andrea Jongco's testimony inherently improbable and contradicted by disinterested witnesses — the deceased's siblings Jose, Zoilo, and Pilar Alberto — who testified that during the period Jongco claimed to have lived with Alberto, the deceased in fact lived with his mother and brothers. The trial court also found that Jongco had five children with four different men, rendering it unjust to state with definiteness that any particular person was the father of any of her children. The testimonies of Eufracia Cailan and Encarnacion Peralta were found to be inherently improbable, inconsistent with human experience, and deliberately invented. A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity. The Court of Appeals' reliance on the absence of a marriage certificate to cast doubt on Natividad's credibility was purely conjectural, given that pre-war records in Pililla, Rizal were destroyed during the war and the marriage was positively confirmed by a sponsor. Trial court findings of fact are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed absent strong and cogent reasons, the trial court being in a better position to examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses.

• Res Judicata in In Rem Proceedings — Intestate proceedings for the settlement of a decedent's estate are proceedings in rem, binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter, whether notified or not, are equally bound. The court acquires jurisdiction over all interested persons through publication of the prescribed notice, and any order entered is binding on all of them. A final order of distribution vests title in the distributees. The only exception is when a party is left out by circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence, and even then the proper remedy is reopening the same case by motion within the reglementary period, not an independent action.

• Prescription of Action for Rescission of Partition — Under Article 1100 of the Civil Code, the action for rescission on account of lesion prescribes after four years from the time the partition was made. The prescriptive period commences from the approval of the agreement of partition by the court. Article 1104 provides that a partition with preterition of a compulsory heir is not rescinded unless bad faith or fraud is proved. The rule on non-prescription of actions for partition among co-owners (Article 494) does not apply where there has been no express or implied recognition of co-ownership.

• Prescription Running Against Minors with Guardians — Under Article 1108 of the Civil Code, prescription runs against minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians, or other legal representatives. Where a minor has a guardian, prescription runs even during minority. The action for recognition of a natural child must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent; if the parent dies during the child's minority, the action may be filed within four years from attainment of majority, but if the minor has a guardian, the action must be instituted within four years after the death of the natural father.

• Laches — Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has abandoned or declined to assert it. Undue delay in the enforcement of a right is strongly persuasive of lack of merit, since it is human nature to assert rights most strongly when threatened or invaded. The doctrine is expressed in the maxim Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites subvenit — equity aids the vigilant, not those who sleep on their rights.

• Birth Certificate as Evidence of Paternity — A birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity. This rule was applied to reject the Court of Appeals' reliance on the birth and baptismal certificates of the respondent, which were not signed by the deceased Antonio C. Alberto.

• Trial Court Findings Entitled to Great Weight — Conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed absent strong and cogent reasons, because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence and observe the demeanor of witnesses. While the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally final, exceptions include when the appellate court's findings are contrary to those of the trial court.

• "This Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent's estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the bar by prior judgment, establishing that intestate proceedings are in rem and binding on all interested persons regardless of notice.

• "Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it." — This is the canonical formulation of the doctrine of laches as applied in Philippine jurisprudence, defining the elements and the presumption it engenders.

• "The assertion of doubtful claims, after long delay, cannot be favored by the courts. Time inevitably tends to obliterate occurrences from the memory of witnesses, and even where the recollection appears to be entirely clear, the true clue to the solution of a case may be hopelessly lost." — This passage explains the rationale behind the doctrine of laches, emphasizing the evidentiary prejudice caused by unreasonable delay and the equitable principle that stale claims should not be entertained.

• "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity." — This quotation states the rule on the evidentiary value of birth certificates in paternity cases, a principle frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on acknowledgment of natural children.

• Dalman vs. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 (1985) — Cited for the rule that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal.
• Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy, 23 SCRA 29 (1968) — Cited for the principle that a party who voluntarily participated in the trial cannot later raise the issue of the court's lack of jurisdiction.
• Philippine Savings Bank vs. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 (1983) — Cited for the rule that insolvency proceedings and estate settlements are proceedings in rem, binding on all interested persons whether notified or not.
• Ramon vs. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 (1951) — Cited for the rule that a final order of distribution vests title in distributees and that the proper remedy for a party left out is reopening the same case, not an independent action.
• Samson vs. Araneta, 60 Phil. 27 (1936) — Cited for the rule that the four-year prescriptive period under Article 1100 (formerly Article 1076) commences from the approval of the agreement of partition by the court.
• Wenzel vs. Surigao Consolidated Mining, Inc., 108 Phil. 530 (1960) — Cited for the rule that prescription runs against minors who have guardians even during minority.
• Magallanes vs. Court of Appeals, 95 Phil. 795 (1954) — Cited for the rule that where a minor has a guardian, the action for recognition must be instituted within four years after the death of the natural father.
• Buenaventura vs. David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918) — Cited for the principle that undue delay in enforcing a right is persuasive of lack of merit, and for the maxim Vigilantibus non dormientibus equites subvenit.
• Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439 (1985) — Cited for the rule that a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father is not competent evidence of paternity.
• Manlapaz vs. Court of Appeals, 147 SCRA 238 (1987) — Cited for the enumeration of exceptions to the rule that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final, including when such findings are contrary to those of the trial court.

• Article 1100, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that the action for rescission on account of lesion prescribes after four years from the time the partition was made. Applied to hold that the prescriptive period commenced from the approval of the partition on November 9, 1953 and expired on November 9, 1957, rendering the complaint filed on September 8, 1960 time-barred.
• Article 1104, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that a partition made with preterition of a compulsory heir shall not be rescinded unless bad faith or fraud is proved. Applied to confirm that an action for rescission based on preterition is subject to the prescriptive period in Article 1100.
• Article 1108, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that prescription runs against minors and other incapacitated persons who have parents, guardians, or other legal representatives. Applied to hold that the respondent, who had a living mother acting as natural guardian, could not claim exemption from prescription on the plea of minority.
• Article 285(1), Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that the action for recognition of a natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent, and if the parent died during the child's minority, the latter may file within four years from attainment of majority. Applied to hold that the action for recognition must be filed within four years after the death of the natural father where the minor has a guardian.
• Article 494, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that the action for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized. Held inapplicable because petitioners never recognized the respondent as a co-owner or co-heir.
• Articles 1146 and 1149, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provide that actions must be brought within four and five years, respectively, from the time the right of action accrues. Cited as alternative bases for prescription even if Article 1104 did not apply.
• Article 834, Old Civil Code — Referenced in the Court of Appeals' dispositive portion regarding the usufructuary rights of the surviving spouse, though the Supreme Court reversed the CA decision in its entirety.
• Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 — Cited for the abolition of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and the transfer of its functions to the Regional Trial Courts, rendering the jurisdictional objection moot.
• Republic Act No. 1401 — Cited as the statute creating the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, which petitioners argued had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.

Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, and Cortes, JJ., concurred.