Albert vs. Sandiganbayan

After arraignment, an information may be amended in form with leave of court; replacing “gross neglect of duty” with “gross inexcusable negligence” in a Section 3(e) of RA 3019 charge is an amendment in form because the modes of committing the offense are deemed included in the accusation, and the deletion of “gross neglect of duty” is allowable even if substantial because it is beneficial to the accused. The right to a speedy trial is not violated by delays caused by co-accused’s motions and by a reinvestigation conducted for the accused’s protection.

Petitioner Ramon A. Albert was then President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation (NHMFC); his co-accused Favio D. Sayson was Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc., and Arturo S. Asumbrado was President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc. The offense charged was violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which penalizes causing undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The case tests the amendment of an information after arraignment and the constitutional right to speedy trial.

On 24 March 1999, the Special Prosecution Officer II of the Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao charged petitioner Ramon A. Albert, Favio D. Sayson, and Arturo S. Asumbrado before the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 in Criminal Case No. 25231. The Information alleged that in or about May 1990 and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Davao City, Albert, then President of the National Home Mortgage and Finance Corporation occupying a salary grade above 27, while in the performance of his official function, committing the offense in relation to his office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring with Sayson, then Project Director of CODE Foundation Inc., and Asumbrado, then President of the Buhangin Residents and Employees Association for Development, Inc., acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross neglect of duty, caused undue injury to the government and public interest by making it appear in Tax Declaration Nos. D-3-1-7691 and D-3-1-7692 that two parcels of real property particularly described in Certificate of Titles Nos. T-151920 and T-151921 are residential lands when they were agricultural, and by reason of the misrepresentation the NHMFC released ₱4,535,400.00, higher than the loanable amount the land could command being agricultural.

On 26 March 1999, a Hold Departure Order was issued by the Sandiganbayan against petitioner and his co-accused. On 25 May 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss Criminal Case No. 25231 on the grounds that he was denied due process, that the Office of the Ombudsman did not acquire jurisdiction over his person, that his constitutional rights to a speedy disposition of cases and to a speedy trial were violated, and that the resolution dated 26 February 1999 finding him guilty of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was not supported by evidence. On 18 December 2000, pending the resolution of the Motion to Dismiss, petitioner filed a Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel; the prosecution did not object on the condition that petitioner would be “provisionally” arraigned. On 12 March 2001, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Amend Motion to Lift Hold Departure Order and to be Allowed to Travel. The following day, 13 March 2001, the Sandiganbayan arraigned petitioner, who entered a plea of “not guilty.” The Minutes of the Sandiganbayan Proceedings dated 13 March 2001 stated that the “[a]ccused when arraigned entered a plea of not guilty. The Motion to Travel is granted subject to the usual terms and conditions imposed on accused persons travelling (sic) abroad.” In the Resolution dated 16 April 2001, the Sandiganbayan mentioned the arraignment and granted petitioner’s Urgent Motion, setting conditions limited to petitioner’s itinerary abroad, the setting up of additional bailbond, the required appearance before the clerk of court, and written advice to the court upon return to the Philippines.

On 26 November 2001, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation of the case with respect to petitioner. In a Memorandum dated 6 January 2003, the SPO who conducted the reinvestigation recommended to the Ombudsman that the indictment against petitioner be reversed for lack of probable cause. The Ombudsman, in an Order dated 10 March 2003, disapproved the Memorandum and directed the Office of the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of the criminal case. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s Order. In a Resolution promulgated on 16 May 2003, the Sandiganbayan scheduled petitioner’s arraignment on 24 July 2003, but because of the pending motion for reconsideration, the arraignment was reset to 2 October 2003. In a Manifestation dated 24 September 2003, the SPO informed the Sandiganbayan of the Ombudsman’s denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. On even date, the prosecution filed an Ex-Parte Motion to Admit Amended Information. During the 2 October 2003 hearing, the prosecution withdrew the ex-parte motion with the intention of filing a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information, and the scheduled arraignment was reset to 1 December 2003.

On 7 October 2003, the prosecution filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Information. The Amended Information alleged that petitioner acted with “evident bad faith and manifest partiality and/or gross inexcusable negligence,” replacing the original allegation of “gross neglect of duty.” Petitioner opposed the motion, alleging that the amendment made on the information is substantial and, therefore, not allowed after arraignment.

• Amendment After Arraignment: Petitioner argued that under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, only a formal amendment may be made after a plea; the rule does not distinguish between a “provisional” and a “permanent” arraignment, and since he entered a plea of “not guilty” on 13 March 2001, the Information could be amended only in form.
• Substantial and Prejudicial Amendment: Petitioner maintained that replacing “gross neglect of duty” with “gross inexcusable negligence” is a substantial amendment prejudicial to his rights, because under the amended Information he would have to present evidence that he did not act with “gross inexcusable negligence,” evidence he was not required to present under the original Information; he cited the Sandiganbayan’s 10 February 2004 Resolution stating that the change “constitutes substantial amendment considering that the possible defense of the accused may divert from the one originally intended.”
• Speedy Trial: Petitioner contended that the complaint-affidavit was filed on 15 June 1992 but resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao only on 26 February 1999, after almost seven years; that four years later the SPO recommended dismissal for lack of probable cause but the Ombudsman denied it; and that it took twelve years from the 1992 complaint-affidavit to charge him under the Amended Information, violating his right to a speedy trial.

• Amendment of Information: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in admitting the Amended Information.
• Speedy Trial: Whether the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in further proceeding with the case despite the violation of the right of the accused to a speedy trial.

• Amendment of Information: No. The Sandiganbayan did not gravely abuse its discretion; the replacement of “gross neglect of duty” with “gross inexcusable negligence” was an amendment in form, and the deletion of “gross neglect of duty” was allowable even after arraignment because it was beneficial to the accused.
• Speedy Trial: No. The delays were not vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified; they were caused by the co-accused’s motions and by a reinvestigation conducted for petitioner’s protection.

• Amendment of Information: Section 14, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that before a plea, a complaint or information may be amended in form or substance without leave of court; after the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may be made with leave of court and without prejudice to the accused. The SC noted that the Sandiganbayan’s practice of conducting “provisional” or “conditional” arraignments is not sanctioned by its Revised Internal Rules or the Rules of Court, but People vs. Espinosa recognized it if the conditions are “unmistakable, express, informed and enlightened” and expressly stated in the order; otherwise the arraignment is simple and unconditional. Here, the Minutes of 13 March 2001 merely recorded the not guilty plea and the grant of the travel motion subject to usual terms, while the 16 April 2001 Resolution set conditions limited to petitioner’s itinerary abroad, additional bailbond, appearance before the clerk of court, and written advice upon return; nothing showed a provisional or conditional arraignment. The arraignment was therefore simple and unconditional. The amendment deleted “gross neglect of duty” and replaced it with “gross inexcusable negligence”; the SC noted that “gross neglect of duty” falls under Section 3(f) while “gross inexcusable negligence” falls under Section 3(e) of RA 3019. The test for prejudice is whether a defense under the original information would no longer be available after the amendment and whether evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the amended information. The deletion may be considered substantial, but it is allowable even after arraignment and plea because it is beneficial to the accused. The replacement is an amendment in form: Section 3(e) has the elements of a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; acting with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and causing undue injury or giving unwarranted benefits. Under Uriarte vs. People, the offense may be committed by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence; the SC defined manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence. Under Sistoza vs. Desierto, where the Information alleged only manifest partiality and evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence is deemed included in the accusation; Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, by analogy, held that an accused charged with willful malversation may be convicted of malversation through negligence because the greater includes the lesser offense. Thus, the inclusion of “gross inexcusable negligence” was an amendment in form.
• Speedy Trial: Section 16, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies. The SC held that this right is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. A simple mathematical computation of the period involved is not sufficient. The delays in resolving the complaint-affidavit and in filing the original Information were raised in petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss and were addressed by the Sandiganbayan; they were caused by numerous motions for extension of time to file various pleadings and to reproduce documents filed by petitioner’s co-accused, and no actual preliminary investigation was conducted on petitioner. The Sandiganbayan ordered a reinvestigation as to petitioner; although the reinvestigation resulted in further delay, it could not have been dispensed with because it was done for the protection of petitioner’s rights. The SC held that an investigation may hold back the progress of a case but is necessary so that the accused’s right will not be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of expediency. The succeeding events were part of a valid and regular course of judicial proceedings not attended by delays that were vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified. Petitioner’s speedy trial claim therefore failed.

• Amendment of information after plea — Under Section 14, Rule 110, before a plea, a complaint or information may be amended in form or substance without leave; after the plea and during trial, a formal amendment may be made with leave of court and without prejudice to the accused. In this case, the SC held that the replacement of “gross neglect of duty” with “gross inexcusable negligence” was an amendment in form, while the deletion of “gross neglect of duty” was allowable even if substantial because it was beneficial to the accused.
• Provisional or conditional arraignment — The practice is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or the Rules of Court, but People vs. Espinosa recognized it if the conditions are unmistakable, express, informed, and enlightened and expressly stated in the order; otherwise the arraignment is simple and unconditional. Applied: no record showed a provisional or conditional arraignment, so petitioner’s arraignment was treated as simple.
• Test of prejudice in amendment — The rights of an accused are prejudiced when a defense under the original information would no longer be available after the amendment and when evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the amended information. Applied: the replacement of “gross neglect of duty” with “gross inexcusable negligence” did not prejudice petitioner because the modes of committing Section 3(e) are deemed included in the accusation.
• Modes of committing Section 3(e), RA 3019 — The elements are: (1) the accused is a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or official functions; (2) the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence; and (3) the action caused undue injury to any party, including the Government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The offense may be committed by dolo (evident bad faith or manifest partiality) or culpa (gross inexcusable negligence); an information alleging one mode includes the others. Applied: inclusion of “gross inexcusable negligence” was an amendment in form.
• Right to speedy trial — The right is violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured; or when, without cause or justifiable motive, a long period is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. A mathematical computation is not sufficient. Applied: delays caused by co-accused’s motions and a reinvestigation for petitioner’s protection did not violate the right.
• Gross neglect of duty vs. gross inexcusable negligence — “Gross neglect of duty” falls under Section 3(f) of RA 3019, while “gross inexcusable negligence” falls under Section 3(e). Applied: the SC considered the deletion of the former and the inclusion of the latter in the amendment.

• "An arraignment is that stage where in the mode and manner required by the rules, an accused, for the first time, is granted the opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him." — The SC used this definition to stress that arraignment is an indispensable due process requirement and cannot be treated lightly.
• "The practice of the Sandiganbayan of conducting "provisional" or "conditional" arraignments is not sanctioned by the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan or by the regular Rules of Court." — The SC acknowledged the practice is unsanctioned but then recognized it in People vs. Espinosa only if the conditions are unmistakable, express, informed, and enlightened.
• "The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended." — This is the controlling test the SC applied to hold that the replacement of "gross neglect of duty" with "gross inexcusable negligence" did not prejudice petitioner.
• "This right, however, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried." — The SC used this standard to reject petitioner's speedy trial claim.

• People vs. Espinosa, 456 Phil. 507 (2003) — Recognized the practice of provisional or conditional arraignment only if the conditions are unmistakable, express, informed, and enlightened and expressly stated in the order; otherwise the arraignment is simple and unconditional. The SC applied it to treat petitioner’s arraignment as simple.
• Uriarte vs. People, G.R. No. 169251, 20 December 2006, 511 SCRA 471 — Explained that Section 3(e) of RA 3019 may be committed by dolo (evident bad faith or manifest partiality) or culpa (gross inexcusable negligence) and defined the modes. The SC relied on it in characterizing the amendment.
• Sistoza vs. Desierto, 437 Phil. 117 (2002) — Held that where the Information alleges only manifest partiality and evident bad faith, gross inexcusable negligence is deemed included in the accusation. The SC applied it to hold the inclusion of gross inexcusable negligence was an amendment in form.
• Cabello vs. Sandiganbayan, 274 Phil. 369 (1991) — Held that an accused charged with willful malversation may be convicted of malversation through negligence because the greater includes the lesser offense. The SC applied it by analogy to support the inclusion of gross inexcusable negligence.
• People vs. Montenegro, G.R. No. L-45772, 25 March 1988, 159 SCRA 236 — Cited for the test of prejudice in amendments: whether a defense under the original information would no longer be available and whether evidence the accused might have would be inapplicable to the amended information.
• Fronda-Baggao vs. People, G.R. No. 151785, 10 December 2007, 539 SCRA 531 — Cited for the rule that a substantial amendment may be allowed even after arraignment and plea when it is beneficial to the accused.
• Lumanlaw vs. Peralta, Jr., G.R. No. 164953, 13 February 2006, 482 SCRA 396 — Cited for the standard that the right to speedy trial is violated only by vexatious, capricious, oppressive, or unjustified delays, and that a mathematical computation is not sufficient.
• United States vs. Alabot, 38 Phil. 698 (1918) — Cited for the rule that an amendment which merely states with additional precision something already contained in the original information, adding nothing essential for conviction, is an amendment to form that can be made at any time.

• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — Defines the offense charged and its modes; applied to hold that gross inexcusable negligence is one of the modes of committing the offense and is deemed included in an information alleging manifest partiality and evident bad faith.
• Section 3(f), Republic Act No. 3019 — Identified as the provision under which “gross neglect of duty” falls; applied to distinguish it from “gross inexcusable negligence” under Section 3(e) in the amendment.
• Section 14, Rule 110, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs amendment or substitution of a complaint or information; before plea, amendment in form or substance without leave; after plea and during trial, formal amendment with leave and without prejudice; applied to allow the amendment.
• Section 16, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees the right to a speedy disposition of cases before judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies; applied to reject petitioner’s speedy trial claim.
• Rule 65, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The petition for certiorari filed by petitioner; the SC dismissed it and affirmed the Sandiganbayan Resolutions.