Albano vs. Ravanes

A motion for reconsideration, even if captioned as a "Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment," is treated as a motion for reconsideration based on its substance and the relief sought, and the 15-day period to appeal is reckoned from receipt of its denial. A second motion for reconsideration, being a prohibited pleading, does not toll the running of the period to appeal, and a petition filed beyond the reglementary period renders the assailed decision final and executory, depriving the Court of jurisdiction.

Petitioners are the heirs of Gamaliel Albano, who purchased a house in 1986 from Mary Ong Dee, standing on a lot owned by respondent Mena Ravanes, married to Roberto Ravanes, in Caniogan, Pasig City. The lot is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57414 in Mena's name. Petitioners leased the property from Mena under an agreement that they would vacate it when she and her family needed to use it. The case involves judicial ejectment under Section 5(c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 877, the Rental Law, which allows ejectment on the ground of the owner's legitimate need to repossess the property for personal or immediate family use, subject to certain requisites.

Respondent Mena Ravanes, married to Roberto Ravanes, is the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57414 in Caniogan, Pasig City. On about thirty-five square meters of the property stands the two-storey residential house of petitioners, whose father, Gamaliel Albano, purchased the house in 1986 from a certain Mary Ong Dee. Petitioners leased the property from Mena with the agreement that they would vacate it, regardless of their rental payments, when she and her family would need to use it.

In March 2000, respondent-spouses informed petitioners that their daughter, Rowena, was getting married and would need the property to build her house. Petitioners refused to vacate, prompting respondent-spouses to file a complaint in the Office of the Barangay Captain of Caniogan. After the failure of amicable settlement, the Barangay issued a certificate to file action on June 22, 2000. On September 14, 2000, respondent-spouses filed a Complaint for Ejectment in the MeTC of Pasig City, citing Section 5(c) of BP 877 as ground. They stated that their daughter needs the property to build her conjugal home, that they do not own any other available residential units within Pasig City or anywhere else, that the lease had lapsed as of December 31, 1999, and that they notified petitioners of their intent to repossess at least three months in advance. They prayed for petitioners to vacate the property, remove the improvements, and pay rent for July 2000 and attorney's fees.

In their Answer dated October 4, 2000, petitioners countered that respondent-spouses and their predecessors-in-interest assured them they could stay as long as they paid the agreed monthly rentals. Petitioners claimed their harmonious relationship changed in February 2000 when respondent-spouses refused to accept rental payments for January to June 2000. They belied the claim that respondent-spouses do not own other lots in Pasig City, attaching photocopies of land titles to their Answer. Petitioners also alleged that the notice to vacate was handed to them only on June 15, 2000, demanding they vacate on or before July 13, 2000 — a 28-day notice, short of the 3-month requirement. By way of counterclaim, they prayed for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, and reimbursement for house repairs.

In their Position Paper dated December 26, 2000, respondent-spouses admitted ownership of several properties in Pasig City but insisted these were not available for their daughter because they were on lease. They explained they chose to eject petitioners rather than their other lessees because petitioners were delinquent in their rental payments. They also alleged compliance with the 3-month notice requirement because they waited 91 days — from June 15, when petitioners received the notice to vacate, until September 14, 2000 — to file the ejectment case. In their Position Paper dated January 2, 2001, petitioners reiterated that respondent-spouses have no legal ground to eject them because they own other available lots and because the 3-month notice requirement was not complied with.

On September 19, 2007, petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion to Stay the Execution of Judgment, manifesting that Roberto entered into a lease contract with petitioner Alexander Albano on September 10, 2007, which meant petitioners were now in lawful occupation of the property. They averred that the Contract of Lease operates as a novation of the previous month-to-month lease and renders inutile the allegations passed upon in the trial courts below. Mena filed a Comment assailing the validity of the lease contract, claiming Roberto has no personality to unilaterally enter into a lease contract because the property is her paraphernal property. The CA denied the manifestation and motion, holding that its Decision attained finality on September 19, 2007 and that the lease contract did not operate as a novation because it was entered into without Mena's express consent. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on March 7, 2008, contending the Contract of Lease is valid and binding upon Mena considering the conjugal nature of the property, which the CA denied on July 7, 2008.

• Error in Reversing the RTC: Petitioners alleged that the CA erred in reversing the RTC's Decision, averring that under BP 877, the lessor should prove that he or his immediate family member is not the owner of any other available residential unit within the same city or municipality.

• Supervening Event: Petitioners reiterated that the execution of the lease contract between Roberto and Alexander on September 10, 2007 is a supervening event that justifies the stay of execution of the CA Decision.

• Paraphernal Property Assertion: Petitioners argued that Mena cannot assert the paraphernal nature of the property for the first time in her Comment before the CA.

• Timeliness of Appeal: Petitioners contended that the Contract of Lease between Roberto and Alexander is valid and binding upon Mena considering the conjugal nature of the property, and that their petition was seasonably filed.

• Finality of the CA Decision: Respondent-spouses argued that the CA Decision became final and executory on September 20, 2007 because petitioners neither filed a motion for reconsideration nor filed an appeal before the Supreme Court, and that petitioners' right to file the petition had already lapsed.

• Validity of the Lease Contract: Mena assailed the validity of the lease contract between her husband, Roberto, and Alexander, claiming that Roberto has no personality to unilaterally enter into a lease contract with Alexander because the property is her paraphernal property, and questioning the wisdom of the lease because the monthly rental price of ₱2,131.00 is the same rent existing in 1986.

• Finality of Judgment: Whether the CA Decision is already final and executory.
• Supervening Event: Whether the execution of the lease contract is a supervening event that will justify the stay of execution of the CA Decision.
• Compliance with BP 877: Whether the respondent-spouses complied with Section 5(c) of BP 877.

• Finality of Judgment: Yes. The CA Decision became final and executory on March 9, 2008. The Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment was in substance a motion for reconsideration, and the 15-day period to appeal was reckoned from receipt of its denial on February 22, 2008, not from the denial of the second motion for reconsideration.

• Supervening Event: No. The lease contract was executed after the CA Decision was promulgated but before it attained finality, and it partakes of the nature of a compromise that is not binding on Mena because she did not give her specific individual consent.

• Compliance with BP 877: Yes. Respondent-spouses complied with the requisites of Section 5(c) of BP 877: their other residential units were not "available" because occupied by tenants; the lease was deemed month-to-month with a definite period expiring at the end of each month; and the 3-month notice requirement was satisfied by the verbal demand made as early as March 2000.

• Finality of Judgment: The Court held that the petitioners' Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment was, in actuality, a motion for reconsideration of the CA Decision. The relief prayed for — staying the execution of judgment — is the same relief obtained once a motion for reconsideration is filed on time under Rule 52, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. Since the motion was a motion for reconsideration, petitioners' receipt of the resolution denying it on February 22, 2008 triggered the running of the 15-day period to appeal, which lapsed on March 8, 2008. The subsequent Motion for Reconsideration filed on March 7, 2008 partook of the nature of a second motion for reconsideration, being a mere rehash of the arguments raised in the earlier motion. Under Rule 52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and the 1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the CA, a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited, has no legal effect, and does not toll the running of the period to appeal. Citing Securities and Exchange Commission vs. PICOP Resources, Inc. , the Court explained that reckoning the period from the denial of a second motion for reconsideration would allow a party to forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments by filing a prohibited pleading. The petition, filed on August 28, 2008, was 173 days late, rendering the CA Decision final and executory and depriving the Court of jurisdiction. The Court declined to relax the procedural rules, noting that petitioners failed to address the issue of finality when it was raised by respondent Mena in her Comment and in subsequent pleadings.

• Supervening Event: The Court held that a supervening event refers to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory, or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality. Here, the lease contract was executed after the CA Decision was promulgated but before it attained finality — just six days after petitioners received the adverse ruling. Instead of a supervening event, the execution of the lease contract partakes of the nature of a compromise, a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise may be entered into at any stage of the case, but its validity is determined by compliance with the requisites of contracts, including the consent of all the parties. The compromise was wanting of the essential requisite of consent because only Roberto entered into the lease contract; Mena did not sign it and denounced its execution. The Court also held that the compromise was not valid even between petitioners and Roberto because the records show the land is indeed a paraphernal property of Mena, which petitioners themselves admitted in their Answer and Position Paper before the MeTC. Estoppel therefore lies against them. Even assuming the property is conjugally owned, the Court cited Roxas vs. Court of Appeals , holding that consent of the wife is required for lease of a conjugal realty for a period of more than one year, such lease being considered a conveyance and encumbrance under the Civil Code.

• Compliance with BP 877: The Court enumerated the five requisites of Section 5(c) of BP 877: (1) the owner's/lessor's legitimate need to repossess the leased property for his own personal use or for the use of any of his immediate family; (2) the owner/lessor does not own any other available residential unit within the same city or municipality; (3) the lease for a definite period has expired; (4) there was formal notice at least three months prior to the intended date to repossess the property; and (5) the owner must not lease or allow the use of the property to a third party for at least one year. On the second requisite, the Court cited Roxas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court , holding that the keyword is "available" — even if an owner/lessor owns another residential unit, if it is not available because it is occupied or not suitable for dwelling purposes, it is no obstacle to ejectment. Respondent-spouses did not choose to eject petitioners arbitrarily; they asserted that among their tenants, petitioners are delinquent in their rental payments. On the third requisite, the Court cited Arquelada vs. Philippine Veterans Bank , holding that a verbal contract of lease with monthly rental payments is considered to be from month to month under Article 1687 of the Civil Code, and a lease from month-to-month is one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor. On the fourth requisite, the Court cited Garcia vs. Court of Appeals , holding that the "formal notice" requirement under BP 877 does not refer to a written notice only. Petitioners do not dispute that they were verbally informed of respondent-spouses' need of the property as early as March 2000, and barangay conciliation meetings were held regarding the matter.

• Substance over form in determining the nature of a pleading — A motion is characterized by its substance and the relief sought, not by its caption. The Court applied this principle in treating petitioners' "Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment" as a motion for reconsideration because the relief prayed for — staying the execution of judgment — is the same relief obtained once a motion for reconsideration is filed on time under Rule 52, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

• Prohibited second motion for reconsideration — Under Rule 52, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 13, Section 3 of the 1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the CA, no second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party shall be entertained. A motion for reconsideration, even if not designated as a second motion for reconsideration, is a disguised second motion if it is merely a reiteration of the movant's earlier arguments. Being a prohibited pleading, it does not have any legal effect and does not toll the running of the period to appeal.

• Finality of judgment and jurisdiction — Perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. A party who fails to question an adverse decision by not filing the proper remedy within the period prescribed by law loses the right to do so, as the decision becomes final and binding. A petition filed beyond the reglementary period renders the assailed decision final and executory and deprives the Court of jurisdiction.

• Supervening event — A supervening event refers to facts which transpire after judgment has become final and executory, or to new circumstances which developed after the judgment has acquired finality, including matters which the parties were not aware of prior to or during the trial as they were not yet in existence at that time. Facts occurring after judgment is promulgated but before it attains finality do not constitute a supervening event.

• Compromise and consent of all parties — A compromise is a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. A compromise agreement cannot bind a party who did not voluntarily take part in the settlement itself and gave specific individual consent. The requisites of a valid compromise are: (1) the consent of the parties to the compromise, (2) an object certain that is the subject matter of the compromise, and (3) the cause of the obligation that is established.

• Lease of paraphernal and conjugal property — A wife's paraphernal property cannot be leased by the husband without her authorization. Even assuming the property is conjugally owned, consent of the wife is required for lease of a conjugal realty for a period of more than one year, such lease being considered a conveyance and encumbrance under the provisions of the Civil Code.

• Month-to-month lease under Article 1687 of the Civil Code — A verbal contract of lease with no specific period for its duration, where rentals are paid monthly, is considered to be from month to month under Article 1687 of the Civil Code. A lease from month-to-month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor.

• "Available" residential unit under Section 5(c) of BP 877 — The keyword in the second requisite of Section 5(c) is "available." Even if an owner/lessor owns another residential unit, if the same is not available — for example, it is occupied or it is not suitable for dwelling purposes — it is no obstacle to the ejectment of a tenant on the ground that the premises is needed for use of the owner or immediate member of his family.

• Formal notice under BP 877 — The "formal notice" requirement under BP 877 does not refer to a written notice only. Compliance with the 3-month notice requirement may be reckoned from a verbal demand to vacate.

• "To rule that finality of judgment shall be reckoned from the receipt of the resolution or order denying the second motion for reconsideration would result to an absurd situation whereby courts will be obliged to issue orders or resolutions denying what is a prohibited motion in the first place, in order that the period for the finality of judgments shall run, thereby, prolonging the disposition of cases. Moreover, such a ruling would allow a party to forestall the running of the period of finality or judgments by virtue or filing a prohibited pleading; such a situation is not only illogical but also unjust to the winning party." — This passage, quoted from Securities and Exchange Commission v. PICOP Resources, Inc. , articulates the rationale for not reckoning the period to appeal from the denial of a prohibited second motion for reconsideration, and is central to the Court's holding on finality of judgment.

• "It is important to stress that even assuming any of petitioners own other residential units, what the law requires is that the same is an available residential unit, for the use of such owner/lessor or the immediate member of his family. Thus even if an owner/lessor owns another residential unit, if the same is not available as for example the same is occupied or it is not suitable for dwelling purposes, it is no obstacle to the ejectment of a tenant on the ground that the premises is needed for use of the owner or immediate member of his family." — This passage from Roxas v. Intermediate Appellate Court defines the "available" requirement in Section 5(c) of BP 877 and was applied to reject petitioners' argument that respondent-spouses owned other residential units in Pasig City.

• "It is admitted that no specific period for the duration of the lease was agreed upon between the parties. Nonetheless, payment of the stipulated rents were made on a monthly basis and, as such, the period of lease is considered to be from month to month in accordance with Article 1687 of the Civil Code. Moreover, a lease from month-to-month is considered to be one with a definite period which expires at the end of each month upon a demand to vacate by the lessor." — This passage from Arquelada v. Philippine Veterans Bank establishes the rule that a verbal lease with monthly rentals is deemed to have a definite period expiring monthly, which the Court applied to uphold the ejectment.

• Tagaytay City vs. Sps. De Los Reyes, G.R. No. 166679, January 27, 2010 — Controlling precedent for the rule that a motion for reconsideration, even if not designated as a second motion for reconsideration, is a disguised second motion if it is merely a reiteration of the movant's earlier arguments.

• Securities and Exchange Commission vs. PICOP Resources, Inc., G.R. No. 164314, September 26, 2008, 566 SCRA 451 — Controlling precedent for the rule that a second motion for reconsideration does not toll the running of the period to appeal, and that reckoning the period from its denial would allow a party to forestall the running of the period of finality of judgments.

• Tagle vs. Equitable PCI Bank, G.R. No. 172299, April 22, 2008, 552 SCRA 424 — Followed as illustrative of the rule that the 15-day period to appeal is reckoned from receipt of the denial of the first motion for reconsideration, not the second, and that failure to file within that period renders the decision final and executory.

• Roxas vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92245, June 26, 1991, 198 SCRA 541 — Followed for the rule that consent of the wife is required for lease of a conjugal realty for a period of more than one year, such lease being considered a conveyance and encumbrance under the Civil Code.

• Roxas vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. Nos. L-74279 & 74801-03, January 20, 1988, 157 SCRA 166 — Followed for the definition of "available" residential unit under Section 5(c) of BP 877, holding that an occupied or unsuitable unit is no obstacle to ejectment.

• Arquelada vs. Philippine Veterans Bank, G.R. No. 139137, March 31, 2000, 329 SCRA 536 — Followed for the rule that a verbal lease with monthly rentals is deemed to be from month to month under Article 1687 of the Civil Code, with a definite period expiring at the end of each month upon demand to vacate.

• Garcia vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88632, March 22, 1993, 220 SCRA 264 — Followed for the rule that the "formal notice" requirement under BP 877 does not refer to a written notice only, and compliance may be reckoned from a verbal demand to vacate.

• Dula vs. Maravilla, G.R. No. 134267, May 9, 2005, 458 SCRA 249 — Cited by the CA and relied upon for the enumeration of the requisites of Section 5(c) of BP 877.

• Rivera vs. Florendo, G.R. No. L-60066, July 31, 1986, 143 SCRA 278 — Cited by the CA for the rule that a lease agreement without a fixed period is deemed to be from month to month if the rentals are paid monthly.

• Section 5(c), Batas Pambansa Blg. 877 — The Rental Law provision allowing ejectment on the ground of the owner/lessor's legitimate need to repossess the property for his own use or for the use of any immediate member of his family as a residential unit, subject to the requisites that the owner or immediate member does not own any other available residential unit within the same city or municipality, that the lease for a definite period has expired, that the lessor has given formal notice three months in advance, and that the owner is prohibited from leasing the unit or allowing its use by a third party for at least one year. The Court applied this provision in upholding the ejectment of petitioners.

• Article 1687, New Civil Code — Provides that a lease with no fixed period is deemed to be on a month-to-month basis where rentals are paid monthly. The Court applied this provision in holding that the verbal lease between the parties was one with a definite period expiring at the end of each month.

• Article 2028, Civil Code — Defines a compromise as a contract whereby the parties, by making reciprocal concessions, avoid litigation or put an end to one already commenced. The Court applied this provision in characterizing the lease contract executed by Roberto alone as a compromise.

• Article 1318, Civil Code — Lists the requisites of a valid contract: consent of the contracting parties, object certain which is the subject matter of the contract, and cause of the obligation which is established. The Court applied this provision in holding that the compromise was wanting of the essential requisite of consent because Mena did not participate in its execution.

• Rule 45, Section 2, Rules of Court — Provides that a petition for review should be filed within 15 days from notice of the judgment appealed from or from notice of the denial of the petitioner's motion for new trial or reconsideration. The Court applied this provision in determining that the petition was filed 173 days late.

• Rule 52, Section 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Prohibits a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution by the same party. The Court applied this provision in holding that petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was a prohibited pleading that did not toll the running of the period to appeal.

• Rule 52, Section 4, Rules of Court — Provides that a motion for reconsideration filed on time stays the execution of the judgment sought to be reconsidered. The Court applied this provision in determining that the Manifestation and Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment was in substance a motion for reconsideration.

• Rule 13, Section 3, 1999 Internal Rules of the Procedure of the CA — Prohibits a second motion for reconsideration from the same party, with an exception where the decision or resolution is reconsidered or substantially modified. The Court applied this provision in holding that the second motion for reconsideration was prohibited.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Diosdado M. Peralta, Jose Portugal Perez, and Bienvenido L. Reyes concurred in the decision. The attestation was signed by Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. as Chairperson of the Third Division, and the certification was signed by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno.

N/A — no dissenting opinions are provided in the case text.