Alarilla vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan

The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the information, and an offense is deemed committed in relation to a public officer's office when the office is an element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of the accused. The denial of a demurrer to evidence is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on certiorari absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Petitioner Eduardo A. Alarilla was the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan. Complainant Simeon G. Legaspi was a municipal councilor of the same municipality. The case arose from an incident during a public hearing concerning pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory, a matter within the mayor's concern as local chief executive. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office was governed by Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 7975, which took effect on May 16, 1995.

Petitioner Eduardo A. Alarilla was the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, and complainant Simeon G. Legaspi was a municipal councilor. On December 1, 1995, the Office of the Ombudsman, acting through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, filed two informations with the Sandiganbayan against petitioner: Criminal Case No. 23069 charging him with grave threats under Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code, and Criminal Case No. 23070 charging him with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019. Criminal Case No. 23070 was raffled to the Second Division, while Criminal Case No. 23069 was assigned to the First Division.

Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation in Criminal Case No. 23070, and the Office of the Special Prosecutor subsequently filed a motion to withdraw the information, which the Sandiganbayan granted on July 16, 1996, on the ground that the crime charged was not "office-related." Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 23069, petitioner also filed a motion for reinvestigation. On November 8, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an ex-parte motion for the admission of an amended information alleging that on or about October 13, 1982, petitioner, a public officer being then the Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, "committing the crime herein charged in relation to and taking advantage of his official functions," did "wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously level and aim a .45 caliber pistol at and threaten to kill one Simeon G. Legaspi, during a public hearing about the pollution from the operations of the Giant Achievers Enterprises Plastic Factory and after the said complainant rendered a privilege speech critical of the abuses and excesses of the administration of said accused." The Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information on January 30, 1997.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, arguing that since Criminal Case No. 23070 had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the same ruling should apply to Criminal Case No. 23069. The Sandiganbayan denied the motion, holding that jurisdiction is determined by the facts alleged in the information, and that the amended information sufficiently alleged an office-related crime. The Sandiganbayan reasoned that petitioner was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended the public hearing, and that his violent act was precipitated by complainant's criticism of his administration. The Sandiganbayan distinguished Criminal Case No. 23070, noting that the offense there required that the act be done in the course of the discharge of official functions, whereas grave threats only requires that the felony be committed "in relation to his office."

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court questioning these resolutions, docketed as G.R. No. 130231, but the Court dismissed it on September 22, 1997 for failure to show grave abuse of discretion. Trial then proceeded in Criminal Case No. 23069. On May 19, 1998, after the prosecution completed its evidence, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence on the grounds that the prosecution failed to prove the crime charged and that the act complained of took place while he was performing his official functions. The Sandiganbayan denied the demurrer on July 28, 1998, stating that there was evidence that the acts were indeed committed, and that the pointing of a firearm at a person in a hostile manner demonstrates an intent to inflict harm. The Sandiganbayan further held that whether petitioner was in the performance of his proper duties was not a proper issue of jurisdiction since all illegal acts are never proper acts of one's public office. The motion for reconsideration was denied on December 17, 1998, with the Sandiganbayan explaining that the question is whether the acts were performed in the occasion of the performance of duties or assertion of authority.

Petitioner then filed the present petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court, seeking to set aside the July 28, 1998 and December 17, 1998 resolutions and to dismiss Criminal Case No. 23069, and praying for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

• Denial of Demurrer to Evidence: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying his demurrer to evidence because the prosecution failed to prove the elements constituting the crime of grave threats, insisting that his act of pointing a gun at complainant, assuming it occurred, did not constitute grave threats.
• Lack of Jurisdiction: Petitioner argued that the Sandiganbayan erroneously assumed jurisdiction over the case because the crime was not committed in relation to his office, contending that it was not established that the crime was committed while he was in the discharge of or as a consequence of his official functions as municipal mayor.
• Public Office Not an Element: Petitioner claimed that public office is not an essential ingredient of the crime of grave threats, which may be committed by a public officer and a private individual alike with the same facility.
• Injunctive Relief: Petitioner prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan from further proceeding with the case until the petition is resolved.

• Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence: The Sandiganbayan found that the prosecution's evidence, standing unrebutted by any opposing evidence, sufficiently established the crime charged, and that the pointing of a firearm at a person in a hostile manner is an act demonstrating an intent to inflict harm.
• Office-Related Character of the Crime: The Sandiganbayan held that the question is whether the acts attributed to the accused were performed by him in the occasion of either the performance of his duties or of his assertion of his authority to do so, and that were the rule otherwise, the Sandiganbayan would never have jurisdiction of criminal acts of public officers.

• Denial of Demurrer to Evidence: Whether the First Division of the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner's demurrer to evidence.
• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: Whether the First Division of the Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 23069 falls within its jurisdiction.
• Injunctive Relief: Whether petitioner should be granted injunctive relief.

• Denial of Demurrer to Evidence: No. The denial of a demurrer to evidence is addressed to the sound judicial discretion of the trial court, and the Sandiganbayan's finding that the prosecution's evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged was not shown to be tainted with grave abuse of discretion.
• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: No. The Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case because the amended information alleged that the crime was committed in relation to petitioner's office, the offense being intimately connected with the discharge of his official functions as municipal mayor.
• Injunctive Relief: No. Since the petition for certiorari was dismissed, the prayer for injunctive relief was necessarily denied.

• Denial of Demurrer to Evidence: The resolution of a demurrer to evidence should be left to the exercise of sound judicial discretion. A lower court's order of denial shall not be disturbed unless the accused has established that such judicial discretion has been gravely abused, thereby amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction. Mere allegations of such abuse will not suffice. For certiorari to lie, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative. The Court was not prepared to rule that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it denied petitioner's demurrer to evidence, as public respondent found that the prosecution's evidence satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged, and there was nothing in the records or pleadings showing otherwise. When there is no showing of grave abuse, certiorari is not the proper remedy; the appropriate recourse from an order denying a demurrer to evidence is for the court to proceed with trial, after which the accused may appeal from the judgment rendered after such trial.

• Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan: The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. The applicable law was Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 7975, which took effect on May 16, 1995. Section 4 of PD 1606, as amended, provides that the Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in cases involving violations of RA 3019 and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. An offense is deemed committed in relation to the accused's office when such office is an element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused. Citing Cunanan vs. Arceo, the Court explained that in Sanchez vs. Demetriou, the principle in Montilla vs. Hilario was that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused's office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime." In People vs. Montejo, the Court recognized an exception: although public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that the offense charged is intimately connected with the accused's respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information. In this case, the amended information contained allegations that petitioner took advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor when he committed the crime of grave threats against complainant, a municipal councilor, during a public hearing after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner's administration. Based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of petitioner's official functions. The Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case.

• Offense committed in relation to office — An offense is deemed committed in relation to the accused's office when such office is an element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of the accused. The Court applied this doctrine in determining that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the grave threats case, as the amended information alleged that the crime was committed during a public hearing and was precipitated by complainant's criticism of petitioner's administration, showing an intimate connection between the offense and petitioner's official functions.

• Jurisdiction determined by allegations in the information — The jurisdiction of a court in criminal cases is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint or information. The Court applied this rule in holding that the Sandiganbayan correctly assumed jurisdiction based on the allegations in the amended information, which sufficiently showed that the crime was office-related.

• Grave abuse of discretion in denying demurrer to evidence — For certiorari to lie against an order denying a demurrer to evidence, there must be a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power, the very antithesis of judicial prerogative. The Court applied this standard in declining to disturb the Sandiganbayan's denial of petitioner's demurrer, as the prosecution's evidence was found to have satisfactorily established the elements of the crime charged.

• "An offense is deemed to be committed in relation to the accused's office when such office is an element of the crime charged or when the offense charged is intimately connected with the discharge of the official functions of accused." — This passage states the controlling doctrine for determining when the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by public officers, and was the basis for affirming the Sandiganbayan's assumption of jurisdiction in this case.

• "The jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information." — This passage articulates the rule that the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is assessed based on the facts alleged in the information, which in this case sufficiently alleged an office-related crime.

• "Although public office is not an element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract, the facts in a particular case may show that the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused's] respective offices and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions." — This passage, quoted from People vs. Montejo through Cunanan vs. Arceo, establishes the exception to the Montilla principle and was applied to find that the grave threats charge was intimately connected with petitioner's office as mayor.

• Cunanan vs. Arceo, 242 SCRA 88 (1995) — Controlling precedent cited for the doctrine that an offense is committed in relation to office when the office is an element of the crime or when the offense is intimately connected with the discharge of official functions.
• Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 (1993) — Cited for elaborating on the scope of "offense committed in relation to office" by referring to the principle in Montilla vs. Hilario and the exception in People vs. Montejo.
• Montilla vs. Hilario, 90 Phil 49 (1951) — Cited for the principle that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused's office if the offense cannot exist without the office, such that the office is a constituent element of the crime.
• People vs. Montejo, 108 Phil 613 (1960) — Cited for the exception that although public office is not an element of the crime in the abstract, the facts may show that the offense is intimately connected with the accused's office and perpetrated while in the performance of official functions.
• Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 283 SCRA 18 (1997) — Cited for the rule that the denial of a demurrer to evidence is addressed to sound judicial discretion and will not be disturbed absent grave abuse.
• Gamboa vs. Cruz, 162 SCRA 642 (1988) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion as a capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power.
• People vs. Cawaling, 293 SCRA 267 (1998) — Cited for the rule that jurisdiction is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action and by the allegations in the information.

• Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Republic Act No. 7975 — This provision grants the Sandiganbayan original jurisdiction over violations of RA 3019 and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office. The Court applied this provision in determining that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over the grave threats case.
• Article 282, Revised Penal Code — This provision defines the crime of grave threats with which petitioner was charged. The Court considered whether the prosecution's evidence established the elements of this crime in evaluating the denial of the demurrer to evidence.
• Section 3(e), Republic Act No. 3019 — This provision defines the offense charged in Criminal Case No. 23070, which was dismissed by the Sandiganbayan for lack of jurisdiction. The Court distinguished this case from the grave threats case, noting that the former requires that the act be done in the course of the discharge of official functions.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima, JJ., concurred.