Alangdeo vs. City Mayor of Baguio

A summary demolition order issued by a City Mayor has no legal basis when the occupants are not new squatters, professional squatters, or members of squatting syndicates under the Summary Eviction IRR, and when none of the situations enumerated in Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279 are present. The mere fact that a structure was constructed without a building permit does not authorize summary demolition; under the National Building Code, the Building Official must first find or declare the building or structure to be dangerous or ruinous before ordering its abatement or demolition.

The petitioners were occupants and claimants of a parcel of land situated at Barangay Atok Trail, Baguio City, which was covered by Proclamation No. 414, series of 1957, declaring the area as a mineral reservation for Baguio City. Because of this proclamation, the petitioners were unable to obtain titles over the subject property despite their long possession thereof. Respondent Ernesto Lardizabal claimed ownership over the subject property through his father, Juanito Lardizabal, and co-claimant Mariano Pangloy. A related case involving the possession and ancestral claims over the subject property was pending before the DENR and the NCIP at the time the demolition complaint was filed.

On November 13, 2003, respondent Ernesto Lardizabal filed a complaint for demolition before the City Engineer's Office of Baguio City, questioning the ongoing construction of a residential structure and garage extension by petitioners Leoncio Alangdeo, Arthur Verceles, and Danny Vergara on a parcel of land situated at Barangay Atok Trail, Baguio City, allegedly owned by Mariano Pangloy and Ernesto's father, Juanito Lardizabal. Upon investigation, the City Engineer's Office found that the construction had no building permit. Consequently, the City Mayor issued, through the Secretary to the Mayor, Demolition Order No. 05, series of 2005, directing the City Demolition Team to summarily demolish the structures in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 2.5(a) of the implementing rules and regulations governing summary eviction jointly issued by the DILG and the HUDCC pursuant to Section 44, Article XII of RA 7279.

Aggrieved, petitioners moved for reconsideration of DO No. 05, but the City Mayor denied the motion. Petitioners then filed a complaint for injunction and prohibition with the RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 6007-R, seeking to enjoin the implementation of the order. The RTC granted their application for a temporary restraining order and subsequently issued a writ of preliminary injunction pending the final determination of the merits of the case.

During trial, Verceles testified that he has a Tax Declaration and a pending application for Ancestral Land Claim over the subject property filed before the NCIP, and that he has been paying taxes therefor and occupying the same since 1977. He also testified that Ernesto had previously filed a case with the DENR-CAR questioning his possession and seeking the cancellation of his tax declaration, which the DENR-CAR dismissed in his favor, but which Ernesto appealed to the Office of the DENR Secretary. At the time the appeal was pending, Ernesto filed the complaint for demolition before the City Engineer's Office. Verceles further testified that Barangay Atok Trail is covered by Proclamation No. 414, series of 1957, which declared the same as mineral reservation for Baguio City, for which reason he was unable to get a title over the subject property despite his possession thereof. Punong Barangay Stephen T. Aligo testified that by Resolution No. 386, series of 1995, the City Council requested the release of the vast area covered by Proclamation 414 for housing purposes to be awarded to the occupants of Barangay Atok Trail, and that a 2003 census found two hundred thirty houses in the barangay, none of which had building permits. Respondents' witnesses, Antonio O. Visperas, Robert Albas Awingan, and George Addawe, Jr., all testified that the structures of petitioners on the subject property were not covered by any building permit. Ernesto testified that the issue of possession over the property was the subject of an appeal pending before the Office of the DENR Secretary.

The RTC enjoined the City Government of Baguio and its agents from implementing DO No. 5 until and after the resolution of all the cases/issues involving the subject property, finding that Proclamation 414 declared the entire area of Barangay Atok Trail as a buffer zone for the mining industry and that all structures constructed thereon were not covered by building permits, such that allowing the demolition of petitioners' structures while leaving untouched the other structures in the area would violate the equal protection clause. The CA reversed, relying on the Decision rendered on August 31, 2006 by then DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes in DENR Case No. 5625, which recognized and respected the ancestral and preferential rights of Mariano Pangloy and the Heirs of Juanito Lardizabal over the subject property pending the final determination by the NCIP of their ancestral claim. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, raising the Decision of the NCIP Regional Hearing Office dated May 18, 2012, which ruled that between petitioners and Ernesto, the former have a better right to the issuance of ancestral land titles over the portions they are claiming to be their ancestral lands. The CA denied the motion, maintaining that petitioners have no right in esse and that, considering the absence of building permits, the public respondents have the right to demolish the subject structures.

• Improper Appeal to the CA: Petitioners argued that the CA should have dismissed respondents' appeal because it involved pure questions of law, which should have been brought directly to the Supreme Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, not to the CA under Rule 41.

• Lack of Legal Basis for Demolition: Petitioners maintained that DO No. 05 had no legal basis because they were not new squatters, professional squatters, or members of squatting syndicates under the Summary Eviction IRR, and none of the situations enumerated under Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279 allowing eviction or demolition were present.

• Right to be Protected: Petitioners argued that they have a right to be protected by injunction, as they have occupied the subject property since 1977, have a Tax Declaration, and have a pending application for Ancestral Land Claim before the NCIP, which subsequently ruled in their favor.

• Lack of Right in Esse: Respondents argued that petitioners failed to show any right to be protected, relying on the DENR Secretary's Decision dated August 31, 2006 which recognized the ancestral and preferential rights of Mariano Pangloy and the Heirs of Juanito Lardizabal over the subject property.

• Absence of Building Permits: Respondents contended that since petitioners' structures were not covered by any building permit, the public respondents have the right to demolish the subject structures.

• City Mayor's Authority: Respondents invoked the City Mayor's authority under Section 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code to order the demolition or removal of illegally constructed houses, buildings, or structures within the period prescribed by law or ordinance.

• Propriety of the Appeal to the CA: Whether the CA should have dismissed respondents' appeal as it involved pure questions of law and/or for lack of merit.

• Warrant for Injunction: Whether the issuance of a writ of injunction is warranted.

• Propriety of the Appeal to the CA: Yes. The appeal involved pure questions of law that should have been brought directly to the Supreme Court, and the CA should have dismissed respondents' appeal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court. However, the Court proceeded to review the substantive merits of the case.

• Warrant for Injunction: Yes. The issuance of the writ of injunction is warranted because DO No. 05 had no legal basis, and the two requisites for injunction — a right to be protected and acts violative of that right — are present.

• Propriety of the Appeal to the CA: Rule 41 of the Rules of Court provides three modes of appeal from the RTC's decision: (a) an ordinary appeal to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (b) a petition for review to the CA in cases decided by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (c) a petition for review on certiorari directly filed with the Court where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented. In this case, the CA was called upon not to examine the probative value of the evidence presented, but to determine whether the legal conclusions made based on the recorded evidence were correct. With none of the factual circumstances contested, the appeal involved pure questions of law that should have been brought directly to the Court. Consequently, on a technical note, the CA should have dismissed respondents' appeal for having been filed with the wrong tribunal pursuant to Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules. Nevertheless, a review of the substantive merits warranted the grant of the petition.

• Warrant for Injunction: DO No. 05 stated on its face that it was issued in accordance with Section 3, paragraph 2.5(a) of the Summary Eviction IRR, which provides that for on-going construction, no notice shall be served and dismantling of the structures shall be immediately enforced by the LGU or the concerned agency to demolish. The Summary Eviction IRR was issued pursuant to Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279, which provides for the situations wherein eviction or demolition is allowed as crafted exceptions to the moratorium on eviction under Section 44, Article XII of the same law. Section 28 allows eviction or demolition only: (a) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (b) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or (c) when there is a court order for eviction and demolition. Section 2 of the Summary Eviction IRR provides that only new squatter families whose structures were built after the effectivity of RA 7279, and squatter families identified by the LGU as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates, shall be subject of summary eviction. Petitioners could not be considered new squatters because, although their structures were built after March 28, 1992, they or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied, and were claimants of, the subject property long before the said date. Neither had they been identified by the LGU as professional squatters nor members of a squatting syndicate. Thus, since petitioners did not fall under the coverage of the said IRR, the issuance of DO No. 05 had no legal basis at the onset. More significantly, none of the three situations enumerated under Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279 were shown to be present: it was not shown that the structures are in danger areas or public areas; that a government infrastructure project is about to be implemented; or that there is a court order for demolition or eviction.

The Court further held that while respondents made much ado of petitioners' lack of building permits, under the National Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096), the mere fact that a structure is constructed without a building permit, as well as non-compliance with work stoppage order, without more, will not call for a summary demolition, but subjects the violator to an administrative fine under Section 212 or a criminal case under Section 213 of the same law. While Section 301, Chapter III of the NBCP states that no person shall erect, construct, alter, repair, move, convert or demolish any building or structure without first obtaining a building permit, the remedy of summary abatement against the bare absence of a building permit was not provided for. Section 215 of the NBCP and its corresponding IRR provision state that before a structure may be abated or demolished, there must first be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building/structure is a nuisance, ruinous or dangerous, with written notice served upon the owner and occupant giving at least fifteen days within which to vacate or cause to be vacated, repaired, renovated, demolished and removed. It is the Building Official, and not the City Mayor, who has the authority to order the demolition of structures under the NBCP, as held in Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City. In this case, none of the foregoing requisites were shown to concur: records are bereft of any declaration coming from the Building Official, and it is undisputed that the demolition order was issued by the City Mayor. While respondents invoked the City Mayor's authority under Section 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code, records disclose that the same was not raised before the trial court, and since respondents invoked the said section for the first time in their comment to the instant petition, the argumentation cannot be entertained, it being settled that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court. Besides, DO No. 05 was not issued pursuant to Section 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government Code, but pursuant to the Summary Eviction IRR implementing Section 28, Article VII of RA 7279, the application of which was debunked.

In fine, DO No. 05, which ordered the summary demolition of petitioners' structures, had no legal moorings and perforce was invalidly issued. Accordingly, an injunctive writ to enjoin its implementation was in order. For an injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected; and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. Both requisites were present: there is a right to be protected — petitioners' right over their structures which should be preserved unless their removal is warranted by law; and the act, i.e., the summary demolition of the structures under DO No. 05, against which the injunction is directed, would violate said right. The Court exhorted that absent compliance with the laws allowing for summary eviction, respondents cannot resort to the procedural shortcut of ousting petitioners by the simple expedient of a summary demolition order from the Office of the City Mayor. They have to undergo the appropriate proceeding as set out in the NBCP and its IRR or avail of the proper judicial process to recover the subject property from petitioners.

• Summary Eviction Coverage — Only new squatter families whose structures were built after the effectivity of RA 7279, and squatter families identified by the LGU in cooperation with the PCUP, PNP, and accredited UPOs as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates, shall be subject to summary eviction under the Summary Eviction IRR. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that petitioners, who had occupied and claimed the subject property long before March 28, 1992, and who were not identified as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates, did not fall under the coverage of the IRR, rendering DO No. 05 invalid.

• Requisites for Injunction — For an injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: (1) there must be a right to be protected; and (2) the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right. The Court applied this doctrine by finding that petitioners' right over their structures should be preserved unless their removal is warranted by law, and that the summary demolition under DO No. 05 would violate that right.

• Authority to Order Demolition under the NBCP — The authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official, not the City Mayor. Before a structure may be abated or demolished under Section 215 of the NBCP, there must first be a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building/structure is a nuisance, ruinous or dangerous, with written notice served upon the owner and occupant giving at least fifteen days within which to vacate or cause to be vacated, repaired, renovated, demolished and removed. The Court applied this doctrine by noting that records were bereft of any declaration from the Building Official and that the demolition order was issued by the City Mayor.

• Question of Law vs. Question of Fact — There is a "question of law" when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, and which does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties-litigants. There is a "question of fact" when the doubt or controversy arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. When there is no dispute as to fact, the question of whether or not the conclusion drawn therefrom is correct is a question of law. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that the appeal to the CA involved pure questions of law that should have been brought directly to the Supreme Court.

• "In this case, petitioners cannot be considered as new squatters, since, although their structures were built after March 28, 1992, they or their predecessors-in-interest had occupied, and were claimants of the subject property long before the said date. Neither have they been identified by the LGU as professional squatters nor members of a squatting syndicate. Thus, since petitioners do not fall under the coverage of the said IRR, the issuance of DO No. 05 had no legal basis at the onset." — This passage states the core reason why the demolition order was invalid: petitioners did not fall under the coverage of the Summary Eviction IRR.

• "While respondents make much ado of petitioners' lack of building permits, it should be underscored that under Presidential Decree No. 1096, otherwise known as the 'National Building Code of the Philippines' (NBCP), the mere fact that a structure is constructed without a building permit, as well as non-compliance with work stoppage order, without more, will not call for a summary demolition, but subjects the violator to an administrative fine under Section 212, Chapter II of the NBCP, or a criminal case under Section 213 of the same law." — This passage articulates the principle that the absence of a building permit alone does not authorize summary demolition under the NBCP.

• "It is well-settled that for an injunction to issue, two requisites must concur: first, there must be a right to be protected; and second, the acts against which the injunction is to be directed are violative of said right." — This passage states the canonical formulation of the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ.

• Gancayco vs. City Government of Quezon City, 674 Phil. 637 (2011) — Cited as controlling authority for the proposition that the authority to order the demolition of any structure lies with the Building Official, not the City Mayor, under the National Building Code.

• Far Eastern Surety and Insurance Co., Inc. vs. People, G.R. No. 170618, November 20, 2013, 710 SCRA 358 — Cited for the modes of appeal from the RTC's decision under Rules 41, 42, and 45 of the Rules of Court.

• Republic vs. Medida, G.R. No. 195097, August 13, 2012, 678 SCRA 317 — Cited for the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact.

• Barayuga vs. Adventist University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 168008, August 17, 2011, 655 SCRA 640 — Cited by the CA for the proposition that where the plaintiff failed to demonstrate an existing right to be protected by injunction, the suit for injunction must be dismissed for lack of cause of action.

• The City of Baguio vs. Niño, 521 Phil. 354 (2006) — Cited for the settled rule that matters, theories, or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.

• Perez vs. Madrona, G.R. No. 184478, March 21, 2012, 668 SCRA 696 — Cited for the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ.

• Chua Huat vs. CA, 276 Phil. 1 (1991) — Cited in relation to the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the NBCP on the procedure for abatement/demolition of dangerous/ruinous buildings.

• Section 28, Article VII, RA 7279 (Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992) — Provides the situations wherein eviction or demolition is allowed: (a) when persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds; (b) when government infrastructure projects with available funding are about to be implemented; or (c) when there is a court order for eviction and demolition. The Court found that none of these situations were present in the case.

• Section 44, Article XII, RA 7279 — Imposes a moratorium on the eviction of all program beneficiaries and on the demolition of their houses or dwelling units for a period of three years from the effectivity of the Act, with exceptions for those who constructed their structures after the effectivity of the Act and for cases enumerated in Section 28. This provision was cited in DO No. 05 as the basis for the summary eviction IRR.

• Section 3, paragraph 2.5(a), Summary Eviction IRR — Provides that for on-going construction, no notice shall be served and dismantling of the structures shall be immediately enforced by the LGU or the concerned agency to demolish. This was the provision cited in DO No. 05, but the Court found its application debunked because petitioners did not fall under the coverage of the IRR.

• Section 2, Summary Eviction IRR — Provides that only new squatter families whose structures were built after the effectivity of RA 7279, and squatter families identified by the LGU as professional squatters or members of squatting syndicates, shall be subject to summary eviction. The Court applied this provision in finding that petitioners did not fall under the coverage of the IRR.

• Sections 212, 213, 215, and 301, Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines) — Section 212 provides for administrative fines for violations of the Code; Section 213 provides penal provisions; Section 215 provides for the abatement of dangerous buildings, requiring a finding or declaration by the Building Official that the building is dangerous or ruinous before ordering its repair, vacation, or demolition; Section 301 requires a building permit before any construction. The Court applied these provisions in holding that the mere absence of a building permit does not authorize summary demolition.

• Section 455(b) 3(vi), RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Empowers the city mayor to require owners of illegally constructed houses, buildings, or other structures to obtain the necessary permit, subject to fines and penalties, or to order the demolition or removal of said structures within the period prescribed by law or ordinance. The Court declined to consider this provision because it was raised for the first time on appeal and because DO No. 05 was not issued pursuant to it.

• Section 2, Rule 50, Rules of Court — Provides that an appeal under Rule 41 taken from the RTC to the CA raising only questions of law shall be dismissed, issues purely of law not being reviewable by said court. The Court applied this provision in holding that the CA should have dismissed respondents' appeal.

• Sereno, C.J. (Chairperson)
• Leonardo-De Castro, J.
• Bersamin, J.
• Perez, J.