Ajeno vs. Inserto

Under Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, subsidiary imprisonment may be imposed only for non‑payment of a fine, not for non‑payment of civil indemnity awarded to the offended party. The constitutional prohibition that “no person shall be imprisoned for debt” applies exclusively to obligations of a contractual nature (ex contractu) and does not extend to civil liabilities arising from a crime (ex delicto); therefore, the judge’s error consisted in failing to apply the amendatory statute, not in violating the Constitution.

Judge Sancho Y. Inserto of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo City convicted Ludovico Ajeno of less serious physical injuries (the original charge was frustrated murder) and sentenced him to four months of arresto mayor, to indemnify the victim Solomon Banagua, Jr. in the sum of P200.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. The criminal judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals. Ajeno subsequently filed the present verified administrative complaint, asserting that the subsidiary imprisonment for the P200.00 indemnity amounted to imprisonment for debt and contravened the 1973 Constitution.

• The Criminal Sentence: Complainant Ludovico Ajeno was tried for frustrated murder but was convicted by respondent Judge Inserto of less serious physical injuries only. The judgment imposed a penalty of four months of arresto mayor, ordered Ajeno to indemnify the offended party Solomon Banagua, Jr. in the amount of P200.00 (for alleged medical expenses), and further decreed that Ajeno would suffer subsidiary imprisonment of forty days in case of insolvency to pay the indemnity, plus the costs of suit. The case was then appealed to the Court of Appeals.

• Complainant’s Allegation: Ajeno charged that the sentence of subsidiary imprisonment for non‑payment of the P200.00 indemnity violated the constitutional provision that “no person shall be imprisoned for debt” (Article IV, Section 13 of the 1973 Constitution) and demonstrated the judge’s ignorance of Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by Republic Act No. 5465. He prayed for the judge’s removal on grounds of incompetence and lack of the intellectual responsibility required by the office.

• Respondent Judge’s Admission and Defense: Respondent Judge Inserto admitted the error, stating that he realized his oversight when the case was appealed. He disclaimed any intention to oppress and explained that, at the time he rendered judgment, he relied on the doctrine that the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt protects only obligations arising from contracts (ex contractu) and does not encompass damages arising from crimes (ex delicto), citing People v. Cara, 41 Phil. 828. He also pointed out that counsel for complainant could have moved for reconsideration, which would have allowed him to correct the error immediately.

• Good‑faith Error and Constitutional Doctrine: Respondent Judge admitted the mistake but insisted it was an honest error of judgment, not motivated by ill will. He submitted that the constitutional prohibition invoked applies solely to contractual debt (ex contractu) and not to civil liability ex delicto, a doctrine he claimed remained unchanged.

• Lack of Opportunity to Correct: Respondent pointed out that had complainant’s counsel filed a motion for reconsideration or otherwise called the court’s attention to the error, it would have been rectified without need for an administrative complaint. He relied on the availability of appeal as the proper remedy for judicial errors.

• Absence of Corrupt Motive: Respondent underscored his 36 years of government service, the absence of any prior administrative infraction, and his full support for the settled constitutional doctrine, characterizing the mistake as an isolated oversight.

• Administrative Liability for Imposition of Subsidiary Imprisonment: Whether respondent Judge can be administratively held liable for imposing subsidiary imprisonment for non‑payment of a civil indemnity, despite the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465.

• Constitutional Prohibition on Imprisonment for Debt: Whether the imposition of subsidiary imprisonment for the P200.00 indemnity violated the constitutional injunction that no person shall be imprisoned for debt.

• Administrative Liability for Imposition of Subsidiary Imprisonment: The imposition was erroneous. Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465, provides that subsidiary personal liability attaches only for non‑payment of a fine; it does not authorize subsidiary imprisonment for non‑payment of civil indemnity. The amount of P200.00 was explicitly meant to answer for indemnity to the offended party, not a fine. The judge therefore failed to apply the controlling statutory amendment, which constituted negligence, but the error did not warrant removal. For serious misconduct or ignorance of the law to support administrative liability, there must be reliable evidence that the act was corrupt, inspired by an intention to violate the law, or committed in persistent disregard of well‑known legal rules (citing In re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212). No such evidence was presented; the judge’s mistake was an honest error of judgment, promptly admitted, committed without ill motive, and the first infraction in a 36‑year judicial career. Under these circumstances, admonition with a warning sufficed.

• Constitutional Prohibition on Imprisonment for Debt: The constitutional prohibition invoked by complainant applies only to obligations arising from contract (ex contractu), not to civil liabilities arising from the commission of a crime (ex delicto). The P200.00 indemnity was a civil liability arising from a crime, hence beyond the scope of the constitutional provision. The error of the judge did not lie in violating the Constitution but in failing to observe Republic Act No. 5465, which limited subsidiary imprisonment to non‑payment of a fine. The doctrine that the constitutional prohibition does not encompass ex delicto debts remains good law, and respondent correctly relied on People v. Cara, 41 Phil. 828, for that principle. His oversight was in failing to notice that the amendatory statute, rather than the Constitution, now precludes subsidiary imprisonment for non‑payment of indemnity.

• Subsidiary imprisonment limited to non‑payment of fine (Art. 39, RPC as amended by R.A. No. 5465) — Under the amended Article 39, subsidiary personal liability is imposable only when the convict fails to pay the fine; it does not extend to civil indemnities or other civil liabilities awarded in the criminal judgment. Thus, a sentence that subjects an accused to subsidiary imprisonment for non‑payment of indemnity is legally erroneous.

• “No imprisonment for debt” applies only to contractual obligations — The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt (Section 13, Article IV, 1973 Constitution) protects only debts arising from contracts (obligations ex contractu). It does not shield an accused from enforcement of civil liabilities originating from a criminal act (obligations ex delicto).

• Standard for administrative liability of judges — For a judge to be administratively liable for ignorance of the law or serious misconduct, there must be reliable evidence demonstrating that the judicial act was corrupt, motivated by an intention to violate the law, or reflected persistent disregard of well‑known legal rules. An honest mistake of judgment, committed without bad faith and promptly acknowledged, does not meet this threshold and warrants only admonition.

• Continuing duty of judges to know the law — A judge must be conversant with the law, including its latest amendments and doctrinal developments, and must exercise the diligence expected of the office. The Canons of Judicial Ethics demand that judges remain alert in their rulings and serve the public interest by administering justice speedily and carefully; judicial service requires continuous study and research from beginning to end.

• “The sum of P200.00 was intended to answer for the indemnity to the offended party. Therefore non‑payment there of can not subject the accused to subsidiary imprisonment because under the amendment introduced by Republic Act No. 5465, it is only for non‑payment of the fine that the accused may be required to serve subsidiary imprisonment.” — This passage encapsulates the ratio decidendi on the scope of subsidiary imprisonment.

• “… the debt contemplated in the constitutional provision refers only to a contractual obligation … and not to an obligation arising from a crime. The obligation of the complainant to pay the sum of P200.00 to Solomon Banagua, Jr. does not arise from a contract but from a crime and is therefore beyond the scope of the constitutional provision mentioned.” — This clarifies the distinction between ex contractu and ex delicto obligations under the prohibition against imprisonment for debt.

• “For serious misconduct to exist, there must be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of well‑known legal rules.” — This reiterates the standard from In re Horilleno that shields judges from administrative liability for mere errors of judgment.

• “Service in the judiciary means a continuous study and research on the law from beginning to end.” — This admonitory statement underscores the ongoing duty of judges to remain abreast of legal developments.

• People v. Cara, 41 Phil. 828 — Correctly invoked by respondent judge for the doctrine that the constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt applies only to obligations of a contractual nature, not to civil liabilities arising from crimes. The ruling remains good law, though it did not resolve the error arising from the amendatory statute.

• In re Horilleno, 43 Phil. 212 — Relied upon by the Court to define the evidentiary requirement for serious misconduct: corruption, intentional violation of law, or persistent disregard of well‑known rules. Applied here to exculpate the respondent from removal.

• Luciano v. Mariano, 38 SCRA 184 — Cited to support the policy that judges should not be disciplined merely for occasional mistakes or errors of judgment, consistent with the disposition of admonition rather than dismissal.

• People v. Ancheta, L‑39993, 19 May 1975 — Referenced for the general principle that a judge must be wholly free to render a just decision and apply the correct law to the facts.

• Article 39, Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 5465 — Provides that subsidiary personal liability at the rate of one day for each eight pesos applies to non‑payment of a fine; specifies that where the principal penalty is prision correccional or arresto mayor and a fine, subsidiary imprisonment shall not exceed one‑third of the sentence nor more than one year. The court held that this provision limits subsidiary imprisonment to fines and excludes indemnity, making the judge’s contrary imposition erroneous.

• Section 13, Article IV, 1973 Constitution — States: “No person shall be imprisoned for debtor non‑payment of a poll tax.” The Court construed “debt” to cover only contractual obligations, thus excluding civil liability ex delicto from its protection.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Esguerra, and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concurred.