Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.

A judgment that has attained finality becomes immutable and unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect, and a party cannot reopen proceedings to relitigate issues that were already available and could have been raised during the pendency of the case before the tribunals that rendered the final judgment.

ALPAP is the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of respondent PAL. Claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice, ALPAP filed a notice of strike with the DOLE on December 9, 1997, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97. Because PAL's continued operation was impressed with public interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, enjoining all strikes and lockouts. Despite a reiterated prohibition, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998, prompting the DOLE to issue a return-to-work order on June 7, 1998, with which ALPAP officers and members complied only on June 26, 1998. PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order, precipitating further litigation.

ALPAP is the legitimate labor organization and exclusive bargaining agent of all commercial pilots of respondent Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL). On December 9, 1997, ALPAP filed a notice of strike against PAL with the DOLE, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, claiming that PAL committed unfair labor practice. Because PAL's continued operation was impressed with public interest, the DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute on December 23, 1997 pursuant to Article 263(g) of the Labor Code, prohibiting all strikes and lockouts and directing the parties to submit position papers. A subsequent Order dated May 25, 1998 reiterated the prohibition. Despite such reminder, ALPAP went on strike on June 5, 1998, constraining the DOLE, through then Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano, to issue a return-to-work order on June 7, 1998. It was only on June 26, 1998, however, when ALPAP officers and members reported back to work, as shown in a logbook signed by each of them. PAL refused to accept the returning pilots for their failure to comply immediately with the return-to-work order.

On June 29, 1998, ALPAP filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal lockout against PAL, contending that its counsel received a copy of the return-to-work order only on June 25, 1998, which justified their non-compliance until June 26, 1998. On PAL's motion, the illegal lockout case was consolidated with the strike case pending before the DOLE Secretary, a consolidation sustained by the NLRC in a Resolution dated January 18, 1999. Through then DOLE Secretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, a Resolution dated June 1, 1999 was rendered declaring the strike of June 5, 1998 illegal for being procedurally infirm and in open defiance of the return-to-work order, and pronouncing the loss of employment status of ALPAP officers and members who participated in the strike. The complaint for illegal lockout was dismissed for lack of merit. ALPAP's motion for reconsideration was denied on July 23, 1999.

ALPAP elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 54880. The CA affirmed and upheld the DOLE Resolutions in a Decision dated August 22, 2001. ALPAP sought review before the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152306, but the petition was dismissed on April 10, 2002 for failure to show that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion or reversible error. The Resolution attained finality on August 29, 2002. Meanwhile, several ALPAP members had separately filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal and non-payment of monetary benefits against PAL with the Labor Arbiters of the NLRC.

On January 13, 2003, after the Supreme Court's Resolution had become final, ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLE Secretary a Motion in NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, requesting the conduct of an appropriate legal proceeding to determine who among its officers and members should be reinstated or deemed to have lost their employment, arguing that not all members participated in the strike—some were on official leave or abroad—and that some who joined the strike and returned to work were asked to sign new contracts abrogating their earned seniority. A Supplemental Motion was filed on January 28, 2003, asking the DOLE Secretary to resolve all issues relating to entitlement to employment benefits. PAL opposed, arguing that the DOLE Secretary had no authority to reopen or review a final judgment of the Supreme Court, that the NLRC had jurisdiction over the motions as they partook of a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims, and that all money claims were suspended due to PAL's receivership. Acting Secretary Imson, in a letter dated July 4, 2003, merely noted the motions, concluding that the case had been resolved with finality by the Supreme Court and that the DOLE was bereft of authority to reopen the issue. Secretary Sto. Tomas, in a letter dated July 30, 2003, likewise merely noted ALPAP's motion for reconsideration, reiterating the DOLE's stand to abide by the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court. ALPAP then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which dismissed the petition on December 22, 2004 and denied reconsideration on May 30, 2005, giving rise to the present petition.

• Unresolved Issues: ALPAP contended that it was erroneous for Sto. Tomas and Imson to merely note the motions when the issues raised therein sprang from the DOLE Secretary's exercise of authority to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute which had nevertheless remained unresolved, and that there was clear abdication of duty when Acting Secretary Imson refused to properly act on the motions.
• Need for Determination of Participants: ALPAP argued that a proceeding was necessary to determine who actually participated in the illegal strike, since not only the striking workers were dismissed by PAL but all of ALPAP's officers and members, even though some were on official leave or abroad at the time of the strike, and that due process required that it be first established that a union officer or member participated in the strike or committed illegal acts before dismissal.
• No Forum Shopping: ALPAP denied engaging in forum shopping, asserting that the individual complainants who filed cases before the NLRC were separate and distinct from ALPAP and that the causes of action therein were different.
• Nullity of Assailed Letters: ALPAP prayed that the assailed letters dated July 4, 2003 and July 30, 2003 be declared null and void, and sought a conduct of a proceeding to determine who actually participated in the illegal strike and who should be deemed to have lost employment status.

• No Authority to Reopen: PAL argued that the motions could not legally prosper since the DOLE Secretary had no authority to reopen or review a final judgment of the Supreme Court relative to NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97, and that the requested proceeding was unnecessary as neither the CA nor the Supreme Court ordered a remand for such determination.
• Jurisdiction and Forum Shopping: PAL contended that the NLRC rather than the DOLE Secretary had jurisdiction over the motions as they partook of a complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims, that all money claims were suspended due to PAL's receivership, and that ALPAP violated the principles governing forum shopping, res judicata, and multiplicity of suits.
• Finality of Termination Issue: PAL opined that when ALPAP questioned the loss of employment status of all its officers and members and asked for their reinstatement in its appeal to reverse the DOLE Secretary's Decision, the matter of who should be meted out the penalty of dismissal was already resolved with finality by the Supreme Court and could no longer be modified.
• DOLE Officials' Position: Sto. Tomas and Imson argued that the matter of who among ALPAP's members and officers participated in the strike was already raised and resolved by the CA and the Supreme Court, and that by filing the motions, ALPAP effectively initiated a termination case properly cognizable by the Labor Arbiter, engaging in forum-shopping since several ALPAP members had already filed complaints with the Labor Arbiter.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in declaring that the DOLE officials did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they refused to act on ALPAP's motions and merely noted the same.
• Scope of the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution: Whether the Court of Appeals committed grave mistake in declaring that the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution had already taken up and resolved the issue of who among the ALPAP members are deemed to have lost their employment status.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sto. Tomas and Imson in merely noting ALPAP's twin motions, as they acted in due deference to a final and immutable judgment rendered by the Supreme Court, the reopening of which is impermissible under the doctrine of immutability of final judgments.
• Scope of the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution: No grave mistake was committed. The June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution, as affirmed by the CA and the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152306, had already resolved the issue of loss of employment status of ALPAP officers and members who participated in the illegal strike or defied the return-to-work order, and any ambiguity in the dispositive portion could be cured by reference to the body of the decision and the records.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The doctrine of immutability of final judgments provides that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable and can no longer be modified in any respect, subject only to recognized exceptions: (1) correction of clerical errors; (2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice; (3) void judgments; and (4) circumstances transpiring after finality rendering execution unjust and inequitable. None of these exceptions applied. The June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution declaring the strike illegal and pronouncing the loss of employment status of participating ALPAP officers and members was affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880 and by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152306, which attained finality on August 29, 2002. ALPAP's twin motions sought a proceeding to determine who among its members actually participated in the strike, which would entail reopening a final judgment. The DOLE officials correctly refused to conduct such a proceeding, as they were bereft of authority to reopen an issue already passed upon by the Supreme Court. Furthermore, ALPAP's defenses—that some members were on leave or abroad at the time of the strike—were raised at a very late stage, only after the judgment had become final. These defenses were not raised or discussed while the case was pending before the DOLE Secretary, the CA, or the Supreme Court. A proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already available to the parties during the pendency of such proceedings, as this would give way to vicious and vexatious litigation. ALPAP was given all opportunities to present its evidence and arguments and cannot complain of denial of due process.

• Scope of the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution: While the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution does not specifically enumerate the names of those who actually participated in the strike but only mentions that strikers who failed to heed the return-to-work order are deemed to have lost their employment, this omission cannot prevent effective execution. As held in Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, any ambiguity may be clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision or supplementary to the pleadings previously filed. A judgment shall be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly. A review of the records reveals that the DOLE Secretary declared ALPAP officers and members to have lost their employment status based on either of two grounds: their participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998, or their defiance of the return-to-work order. The logbook with the heading "Return To Work Compliance/Returnees" bears the individual signatures of each returning pilot, signifying their conformity that they were among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998, after the deadline imposed by DOLE. Each of these pilots is thus bound by the judgment. Moreover, the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on behalf of all these returnees, so a finding that there was no illegal lockout would be enforceable against them. Only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution. The pendency of individual illegal dismissal cases before the NLRC and a complaint for recovery of accrued benefits should be resolved in a manner consistent with the present disposition for effective enforcement and execution of the final judgment.

• Immutability of Final Judgments — Once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable and can no longer be modified in any respect. Subject to recognized exceptions—(1) correction of clerical errors; (2) nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; and (4) circumstances transpiring after finality rendering execution unjust and inequitable—the principle of immutability leaves the judgment undisturbed, as "nothing further can be done except to execute it." The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the DOLE Secretary could not reopen the issue of which pilots participated in the illegal strike, because the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution had already been affirmed by the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 152306 and attained finality on August 29, 2002.

• Clarification of Ambiguous Dispositions by Reference to the Body and Record — When the dispositive portion of a judgment is ambiguous, the ambiguity may be clarified by reference primarily to the body of the decision or supplementary to the pleadings previously filed; a judgment shall be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly. The Court applied this principle to hold that although the dispositive portion of the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution did not specifically name the pilots who lost employment status, the ambiguity was cured by reference to the body of the decision and the logbook signed by returning pilots, making a separate proceeding to determine participants unnecessary.

• Prohibition Against Reopening Proceedings on Grounds Available During Pendency — A proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already available to the parties during the pendency of such proceedings; otherwise, it may give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings. The Court applied this principle to reject ALPAP's belated defenses that some members were on leave or abroad during the strike, as these were raised only after the judgment had attained finality and were never presented while the case was pending before the DOLE Secretary, the CA, or the Supreme Court.

• "Settled in law is that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in any respect." — This passage states the controlling doctrine on immutability of final judgments, the ratio decidendi upon which the Court denied ALPAP's petition.

• "There is no necessity to conduct a proceeding to determine the participants in the illegal strike or those who refused to heed the return to work order because the ambiguity can be cured by reference to the body of the decision and the pleadings filed." — This passage articulates the Court's resolution of the second issue, explaining why a separate proceeding was unnecessary and how ambiguity in a dispositive portion may be resolved by reference to the body of the decision and the records.

• "It has been held that a proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already available to the parties during the pendency of such proceedings; otherwise, it may give way to vicious and vexatious proceedings." — This passage establishes the principle barring parties from belatedly raising defenses that were available throughout the litigation, applied here to reject ALPAP's post-finality claims that some members were on leave or abroad.

• Temic Semiconductors, Inc. Employees Union (TSIEU)-FFW vs. Federation of Free Workers (FFW), G.R. No. 160993, May 20, 2008 — Cited as authority for the doctrine of immutability of final judgments and for the enumeration of recognized exceptions to the rule.

• Tamayo vs. People, G.R. No. 174698, July 28, 2008 — Cited for the proposition that under the principle of immutability, "nothing further can be done except to execute" a final judgment.

• Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 61250, June 3, 1991 — Cited as controlling authority for the rule that ambiguity in a judgment's dispositive portion may be clarified by reference to the body of the decision and the pleadings previously filed.

• Filinvest Credit Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100644, September 10, 1993 — Cited for the principle that "a judgment shall be read in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly," especially when there is ambiguity.

• San Pablo Oil Factory, Inc. and Schetelig vs. CIR and Kapatirang Manggagawa Assn., 116 Phil 941 (1962) — Cited for the rule that a proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds already available to the parties during the pendency of such proceedings.

• Article 263(g), Labor Code, as amended — The DOLE Secretary assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute at PAL pursuant to this provision, which authorizes the Secretary to assume jurisdiction over strikes or lockouts in industries indispensable to the national interest and to enjoin all strikes and lockouts.

Chief Justice Renato C. Corona (Chairperson), Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, and Associate Justice Jose Portugal Perez concurred with the decision of Associate Justice Mariano C. del Castillo. No separate concurring opinions were written.