Air Transportation Office v. Court of Appeals

An RTC judgment in an ejectment case is immediately executory under Section 21, Rule 70 and is not stayed by a further appeal; the RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution is ministerial. A CA writ of preliminary injunction restraining that execution must be grounded on an actual and existing substantial right, and the CA must state the basis for finding such a right.

The ATO and Miaque had a lease/concession relationship over airport premises in Iloilo: an 800-square-meter refreshment parlor, a 310-square-meter restaurant/gift shop, and areas used for porterage service. The ATO claimed rental and concession privilege fees for these premises. The legal backdrop is the Rule 70 regime governing ejectment, under which an RTC judgment against the defendant is immediately executory and is not stayed by a further appeal.

In May 2001, the ATO filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Miaque in the MTCC of Iloilo City, Branch 3, docketed as Civil Case No. 01 (38). The ATO sought to recover possession of the 800-square-meter Refreshment Parlor fronting the New Terminal Building-Iloilo Airport, the 310-square-meter Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Airport Terminal, and all areas occupied or utilized by Miaque incident to his operation of the Porterage Service within the Iloilo Airport. It also sought payment of not less than ₱1,296,103.10 representing unpaid space rental and concessionaire privilege fees as of October 15, 2000, plus interest and additional rental and fees proven during trial. On May 27, 2002, the MTCC found Miaque to be unlawfully detaining the premises and ordered him, his men, and privies to vacate the refreshment parlor, the restaurant/gift shop, and the porterage area, and to pay rental and concession privilege fees, differential billings, interest charges, tender offer fees, and current monthly fees as specified in the decision, with costs against him.

Miaque appealed the MTCC Decision to the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 24, where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 02-27292. The RTC, in its Decision dated June 7, 2003, affirmed the MTCC Decision in its entirety, and Miaque’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Miaque then filed a petition for review in the CA on September 25, 2003, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 79439. On February 27, 2004, the CA issued a temporary restraining order effective for 60 days and required Miaque to post a bond of ₱100,000.00. After the TRO lapsed, the ATO filed an urgent motion for execution of the RTC Decision under Section 21, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which Miaque opposed. In an Order dated August 2, 2004, the RTC granted the motion and directed the issuance of a writ of execution; Miaque’s motion for reconsideration was denied on August 13, 2004, and a Writ of Execution was issued on August 16, 2004. On August 18, 2004, the CA issued a Resolution ordering a writ of preliminary injunction and enjoining the ATO and all persons acting in its behalf from enforcing the MTCC and RTC Decisions while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 was pending.

The CA later dismissed Miaque’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 in its Decision dated April 29, 2005, affirming the RTC Decision; Miaque’s motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated January 5, 2006. Miaque brought the case to the SC in G.R. No. 171099, but the SC denied the petition in a Resolution dated February 22, 2006 for failure to sufficiently show reversible error, and the motion for reconsideration was denied with finality. After the dismissal of Miaque’s petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO filed another urgent motion for execution, pointing out that the supersedeas bond filed by Miaque had lapsed and was not renewed and that the rental and concession privilege fees had not been paid at all in violation of Section 8, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. Miaque opposed the motion, while the ATO filed a supplemental urgent motion stating that Miaque’s appeal in the CA had been dismissed. In an Order dated June 1, 2005, the RTC granted the ATO’s urgent motion and issued a Writ of Execution dated June 2, 2005; a notice to vacate was given to Miaque.

On June 3, 2005, Miaque filed a motion for reconsideration of the June 1, 2005 Order, with a prayer to set aside the writ of execution and notice to vacate, and also asked the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 to order the RTC judge and sheriffs to desist from implementing the writ. The CA issued a Resolution dated June 14, 2005 ordering the sheriffs to desist from executing the Decisions while CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 was still pending. On June 15, 2005, before the sheriffs received a copy of the June 14, 2005 Resolution, the sheriffs implemented the writ and delivered possession of the Restaurant/Gift Shop inside the Iloilo Terminal Building in the reduced area of 183 square meters and the area Miaque occupied or used incident to his operation of the Porterage Service within the Iloilo Airport to the ATO; the sheriffs filed a return of service and reports of partial delivery of possession. Miaque subsequently regained possession of the premises on the strength of the CA’s June 14, 2005 Resolution.

On February 9, 2006, after the CA issued its January 5, 2006 Resolution denying Miaque’s motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439, the ATO filed with the RTC a motion for the revival of the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005. Miaque opposed the motion. After hearing the parties, the RTC issued an Order dated March 20, 2006 granting the ATO’s motion and reviving the writs of execution; Miaque’s motion for reconsideration was denied. On March 28, 2006, Miaque filed a petition for certiorari with prayer for a TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603, assailing the RTC’s March 20, 2006 Order and praying that implementation of the writs of execution be enjoined. The CA issued a Resolution dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO effective for 60 days, and a Resolution dated May 30, 2006 issuing a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the writs of execution dated August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005, subject to Miaque’s posting of a bond of ₱100,000.00. The ATO then filed the present petition, and the SC issued a TRO on August 14, 2006 enjoining the CA, Miaque, and his agents and representatives from implementing the March 29 and May 30, 2006 Resolutions.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion / Final Judgment: The ATO argued that the CA acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction, ignoring the government’s right to possession and payment of rental and concession privilege fees already decided with finality by the SC, and that the RTC acted properly under Section 21, Rule 70 when it issued the writs of execution.
• Accomplished Fact: The ATO asserted that a TRO cannot restrain an accomplished fact because the RTC’s writ of execution dated June 1, 2005 had already been partially implemented.
• Forum Shopping: The ATO argued that Miaque committed forum shopping because he admitted that the issues in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439 and CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603 were exactly the same.
• Public Utility Infrastructure / PD 1818: The ATO contended that the subject premises form part of a public utility infrastructure and that Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits the issuance of a TRO against a public utility infrastructure.
• Novation: The ATO argued that Miaque’s petition introduced a new matter—the alleged novation of the MTCC Decision through his deposit of ₱319,900.00 to the ATO’s Land Bank account in February 2006—and that its tenacity in pursuing execution belied consent to any novation.

• Jurisdiction of the SC: Miaque argued that the SC has no jurisdiction to dismiss a petition still pending with the CA; the SC’s jurisdiction is limited to determining whether the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary injunction.
• CA’s Authority: Miaque insisted that the CA acted well within its jurisdiction in issuing the March 29, 2006 TRO and the May 30, 2006 writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.
• Execution by MTCC: Miaque argued that because the SC had effectively affirmed the MTCC Decision, it is the MTCC, not the RTC, that should have directed execution of the MTCC Decision.
• Loss of RTC Jurisdiction: Miaque maintained that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue the August 16, 2004 and June 1, 2005 writs of execution because it lost jurisdiction when Miaque filed his appeal with the CA on September 25, 2003, which appeal was given due course.
• Possession: Miaque asserted that the ATO’s claim that the RTC’s writ of execution had been partially implemented was not true and that he was in possession of the entire subject premises when the CA issued the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction.
• Novation: Miaque alleged that no writ may issue to enforce the MTCC Decision because it had already been novated by his deposit of ₱319,000.00 to the ATO’s account with the Land Bank of the Philippines in February 2006.

• Mootness of the TRO: Whether the challenge to the CA Resolution dated March 29, 2006 granting a 60-day TRO is moot because its effectivity had already lapsed.
• Preliminary Injunction / Immediate Execution in Ejectment: Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Resolution dated May 30, 2006 granting Miaque’s application for a writ of preliminary injunction in CA-G.R. CEB-SP No. 01603.

• Mootness of the TRO: Yes. The challenge to the March 29, 2006 TRO is moot because its 60-day effectivity had already lapsed.
• Preliminary Injunction / Immediate Execution in Ejectment: Yes. The CA committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the May 30, 2006 writ of preliminary injunction; it disregarded Section 21, Rule 70 and failed to identify a clear legal right in Miaque.

• Mootness of the TRO: The SC noted that the challenge to the Order dated March 29, 2006 granting a TRO effective for 60 days is moot because its effectivity had already lapsed.

• Preliminary Injunction / Immediate Execution in Ejectment: Section 21, Rule 70 provides that the RTC judgment against the defendant in an ejectment case shall be immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal. This is reinforced by Section 21 of the Revised Rule on Summary Procedure, Section 4, Rule 39, and Section 8(b), Rule 42. The SC drew two consequences: the RTC judgment is immediately executory, and it is not stayed by an appeal. The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus; execution under Section 21, Rule 70 is not discretionary execution under Section 2, Rule 39, and is an exception to the general rule that an appeal stays an RTC judgment. The RTC therefore validly issued the August 16, 2004 and June 2, 2005 writs, and it could revive them after the CA denied Miaque’s motion for reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 79439; indeed, the writs continued in effect during the five-year period for enforcement by motion under Sections 6 and 14, Rule 39. The CA’s contrary premise—that the RTC lost jurisdiction to issue execution because the CA gave due course to CA-G.R. SP No. 79439—was mistaken. Although the CA may issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution of an RTC ejectment judgment, it must do so with great caution and only upon a showing of an actual and existing substantial right. Here, the MTCC, RTC, and CA had all recognized the ATO’s right to possession and Miaque’s obligation to vacate, yet the CA asserted that Miaque “appears to have a clear legal right to hold on to the premises” without stating the source or basis of that right. Under Nisce vs. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., the court must state the findings and conclusions based on evidence and law; absent proof of a legal right and injury, the injunction must be nullified, and a doubtful right cannot support a preliminary injunction. Grave abuse of discretion exists when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, law or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. The CA thus acted contrary to Section 21, Rule 70 and jurisprudence, and its May 30, 2006 Resolution was annulled for grave abuse of discretion.

• Immediate execution of RTC judgments in ejectment cases — Under Section 21, Rule 70, an RTC judgment against the defendant in an ejectment case is immediately executory and is not stayed by a further appeal. The SC applied this to uphold the RTC’s writs of execution and to annul the CA’s writ of preliminary injunction.
• Ministerial duty to issue writ of execution — The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21, Rule 70 is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus; it is not discretionary execution under Section 2, Rule 39. The SC held that the RTC validly issued the writs.
• Two characteristics of an RTC ejectment judgment on appeal — The SC identified: (1) the RTC judgment against the defendant-appellant is immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal; and (2) such judgment is not stayed by an appeal, unless the RTC orders otherwise or the appellate court suspends or modifies it. These characteristics supported the ruling.
• CA power to enjoin execution — Despite immediate execution, the CA may issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution, but only with great caution and upon proof of an actual and existing substantial right. The SC found that the CA failed to justify Miaque’s asserted right.
• Requisites and standards for preliminary injunction — A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights; the court must state findings and conclusions based on evidence and law; absence of proof of legal right and injury nullifies the writ; a doubtful right is not proper; irreparable damage without proof of an actual existing right is not a ground. The SC applied these to annul the CA writ.
• Grave abuse of discretion — Grave abuse of discretion exists when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, law or jurisprudence, or executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias. The SC found the CA’s issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction contrary to Section 21, Rule 70 and jurisprudence.
• Continuity of writ of execution — A writ of execution continues in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion, i.e., within five years from entry of judgment under Section 14, Rule 39 in relation to Section 6, Rule 39. The SC said the writs need not even be revived.

• "The RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21 of Rule 70 is ministerial and may be compelled by mandamus." — The SC characterizes the RTC’s execution power in ejectment cases as non-discretionary, which is central to why the CA could not treat the RTC’s writs as invalid.
• "The judgment of the RTC in an ejectment case is enforceable upon its rendition and, upon motion, immediately executory notwithstanding an appeal taken therefrom." — This states the immediate-execution rule that the CA disregarded when it enjoined the RTC’s writs.
• "A writ of preliminary injunction is an extraordinary event which must be granted only in the face of actual and existing substantial rights." — The SC uses this standard to test the CA’s grant of injunctive relief to Miaque.
• "In the absence of proof of a legal right and the injury sustained by one who seeks an injunctive writ, an order for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction will be nullified." — This is the basis for nullifying the CA’s writ because the CA did not identify the source of Miaque’s claimed clear legal right.

• Teresa T. Gonzales La’O & Co., Inc. vs. Sheriff Hatab, 386 Phil. 88 (2000) — Controlling precedent; cited for the rule that the RTC judgment in ejectment is immediately executory and enforceable despite perfection of an appeal to a higher court.
• City of Naga vs. Hon. Asuncion, 579 Phil. 781 (2008) — Cited to explain that the CA may issue a writ of preliminary injunction to restrain execution of an RTC ejectment judgment, but only with caution; also cited on the absence of a procedure under Section 21, Rule 70 to avert immediate execution.
• Nisce vs. Equitable PCI Bank, Inc., 545 Phil. 138 (2007) — Cited for the requirement that the court state findings and conclusions based on evidence and law in granting or dismissing an injunction; absence of proof of legal right nullifies the writ.
• Uy vs. Hon. Santiago, 391 Phil. 575 (2000) — Cited for the ministerial nature of the RTC’s duty to issue a writ of execution under Section 21, Rule 70 and for the distinction from discretionary execution.
• Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board vs. Antonio-Valenzuela, G.R. No. 184778, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 698 — Cited for the rule that a preliminary injunction rests on sound discretion but must be granted with great caution.
• Palm Tree Estates, Inc. vs. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 159370, October 3, 2012, 682 SCRA 194 — Cited for the rule that where the facts do not bring the matter within the conditions for injunctive relief, the ancillary writ must be struck down for grave abuse of discretion.
• Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs. Commission on Elections, 464 Phil. 173 (2004) — Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion.

• Section 21, Rule 70, Rules of Court — Provides that the RTC judgment against the defendant in an ejectment case is immediately executory, without prejudice to a further appeal; the SC applied it to hold that the RTC validly issued execution and that the CA erred in enjoining it.
• Section 21, Revised Rule on Summary Procedure — Provides that the RTC decision in civil cases governed by the Rule, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer, is immediately executory without prejudice to further appeal; it repealed Section 10, Rule 70; the SC used it to reinforce immediate execution.
• Section 4, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that judgments not stayed by appeal are enforceable after rendition and shall not be stayed by appeal unless otherwise ordered; the SC applied it to the RTC ejectment judgment.
• Section 8(b), Rule 42, Rules of Court — Provides that appeal stays the judgment or final order except in civil cases decided under the Rules on Summary Procedure; the SC held that the RTC ejectment judgment falls within the exception.
• Section 8(a), Rule 42, Rules of Court — Provides that the RTC loses jurisdiction upon perfection of appeal; the CA invoked it, but the SC held that it did not prevent immediate execution under Section 21, Rule 70.
• Section 2, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Defines discretionary execution; the SC distinguished it from the ministerial execution of an RTC ejectment judgment under Section 21, Rule 70.
• Section 14, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that a writ of execution continues in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion; the SC said the writs need not be revived.
• Section 6, Rule 39, Rules of Court — Provides that a final and executory judgment may be executed by motion within five years from entry; the SC related it to the continuing effectivity of the writs.