Air Line Pilots Association of the Philippines (Gaston Group) vs. The Court of Industrial Relations

A certification proceeding, though non-adversarial and fact-finding, allows the industrial court sufficient discretion to inquire into matters relevant to employee representation, including union leadership and entitlement to union office and funds; however, it may not invalidate a union constitutional amendment or authorize one faction to take over the union’s office and funds absent legal basis. Mass resignation/retirement intended to abort return-to-work orders in a certified labor dispute is not protected concerted activity and does not entitle employees to reinstatement.

ALPAP was a labor organization of airline pilots, with one faction led by Captain Felix C. Gaston and another by Captain Ben Hur Gomez. PAL employed the pilots whose representation was disputed. PAL and ALPAP were parties to a collective bargaining agreement and a labor dispute certified by the President to the CIR, docketed as Case 101-IPA(B), involving union economic demands. The dispute implicated the CIR’s certification powers, union membership and funds, and the consequences of a mass retirement/resignation by ALPAP members from PAL.

ALPAP was a labor organization of airline pilots, with one faction led by Captain Felix C. Gaston and another by Captain Ben Hur Gomez. PAL employed the pilots whose representation was disputed. On October 3, 1970, the President certified a labor dispute between ALPAP and PAL to the CIR, docketed as Case 101-IPA(B) and assigned to Judge Ansberto P. Paredes. On October 7, 1970, after two days of conferring with the parties, Judge Paredes issued a return-to-work order directing PALEA and ALPAP, their officers and members, and employees who joined the strike to call off the strike, lift picket lines, and return to work not later than October 9, 1970; PAL was ordered to admit them under the same terms and conditions existing before the strike and not to suspend, dismiss, or lay off any employee as a result of the strikes. The order warned that failure to comply would constitute contempt and that an employee failing or refusing to work by October 9 without justifiable cause would be replaced and could not be reinstated without prior court order and justifiable grounds. On October 10, 1970, Judge Paredes issued another order directing the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work, explaining that the October 7 order partook of a mandatory injunction under PAFLU vs. Salvador. The strike continued until the CIR en banc denied ALPAP’s motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1970. On October 22, 1970, the strikers returned to work except, according to PAL, two pilots, one of them Felix C. Gaston, who allegedly refused to take assigned flights; PAL terminated Gaston’s services on October 27, 1970 and reported the dismissal to the CIR on October 29, 1970. The CIR set the validity of Gaston’s dismissal for hearing, but Gaston refused on several occasions to submit his side before the hearing examiner, claiming his case would be prosecuted in the proper forum at the proper time.

On October 30, 1970, a general ALPAP membership meeting was held at which 221 out of 270 members adopted a resolution amending ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws. The new section provided that any active member forced to retire or forced to resign or otherwise terminated for union activities, as solely determined by the Association, would have the option to continue as an active member in good standing or to resign in writing his active membership. According to ALPAP (Gaston), the amendment was adopted in anticipation that members might be forced to resign or retire because of their union activities, at a time when PAL and ALPAP were locked in the labor dispute certified to the CIR. On November 24, 1970, PAL filed an urgent ex parte motion to enjoin ALPAP members from proceeding with their intention to retire or resign en masse. On November 26, 1970, Judge Paredes issued an order commanding ALPAP members not to strike or in any way cause any stoppage in PAL’s operation and service, under pain of dismissal and forfeiture of rights and privileges, and ordering PAL not to lockout any ALPAP members or officers under pain of contempt and cancellation of its franchise. ALPAP moved for reconsideration, claiming the order subjected them to involuntary servitude, but the CIR denied the motion on December 11, 1970. On December 12, 1970, a substantial majority of ALPAP members staged a mass resignation and/or retirement from PAL, stating it was in vigorous protest against harassment, unfair labor tactics, the contemptuous lockout of co-members, and the illegal termination of Gaston. PAL accepted the individual letters on December 14, 1970, with the caveat that the pilots would not be entitled to any benefit or privilege by reason of their employment with PAL because their acts violated the November 26, 1970 order.

On December 18-22, 1970, an election of ALPAP officers was held, resulting in the election of Felix C. Gaston as President by 180 votes. On December 23, 1970, about 45 pilots who had not tendered retirement or resignation gathered at the house of Atty. Morabe and elected Ben Hur Gomez as ALPAP President. On January 2, 1971, ALPAP, represented by Gomez as President, filed a petition with the CIR praying for certification as the sole and exclusive collective bargaining representative of all pilots under employment by PAL and on active flight and/or operational assignments. The petition was docketed as Case 2939-MC before Judge Joaquin M. Salvador. Gaston opposed it, arguing that the CIR had no jurisdiction because a certification proceeding was not the proper forum to adjudicate who was the lawful president of a legitimate labor organization. On May 29, 1971, Judge Salvador rendered a decision certifying ALPAP composed only of PAL-employed pilots with Gomez as president as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all PAL pilots on active flight and/or operational assignments, entitled to all rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization, including the right to its office and union funds. Judge Salvador cited, among other circumstances, that no certification election had been held within 12 months before the petition; that PAL had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with ALPAP for pilots in PAL’s employ from February 1, 1969 to January 31, 1972; that Gaston-group pilots retired or resigned en masse in defiance of court orders in Case 101-IPA(B); that they tried to withdraw deposits and other funds from the ALPAP Cooperative Credit Union on the ground that they had retired or resigned; that some joined another airline; that they claimed the injunction against retirement or resignation violated the prohibition against involuntary servitude; and that their claim of involuntary protest was not borne out by the evidence, as they even filed a civil complaint against PAL expressing cessation of employment. On June 3, 1971, ALPAP (Gaston) filed an opposition in Case 101-IPAB to PAL’s urgent ex parte motion to enjoin ALPAP members from retiring or resigning en masse, claiming that their resignations and retirements were bona fide, that PAL had accepted them, and that the action was a legitimate exercise of legal and constitutional rights, so that deprivation of earned benefits would impair the obligation of contracts. On June 15, 1971, the CIR en banc denied ALPAP (Gaston)’s motion for reconsideration in Case 2939-MC, and the matter was appealed to the Supreme Court as L-33705.

In Case 101-IPA(B), Ben Hur Gomez, alleging that he had been elected President of ALPAP by members who did not join the mass resignation and retirement, filed a motion on December 28, 1970 praying that he be allowed to represent ALPAP because the pilots who retired or resigned ceased to be PAL employees and no longer had any interest in the case; the motion was later converted into a motion to intervene on February 9, 1971. On September 1, 1971, Felix Gaston filed a motion for contempt against PAL, stating that his dismissal on October 27, 1970 was without just cause and violated the October 7, 1970 order and Section 19 of C.A. 103, and praying for reinstatement. On October 23, 1971, twenty-one pilots who had filed their retirement from PAL filed a petition in the CIR praying that they be readmitted to PAL or, failing that, allowed to retire with benefits under the PAL Retirement Plan or given separation pay. They alleged that they had resigned or retired en masse after being led to believe in good faith by Gaston, then the uncontested president of the union, and their counsel that the mass resignation or retirement was a valid exercise of their right to protest Gaston’s dismissal in the certified dispute; that they later learned the mass resignation was enjoined under pain of dismissal and forfeiture of rights and privileges; and that they did not deliberately disregard the injunction, but failed to comply within a reasonable time because they were misled and assured by their leader, the full consequences were not explained by counsel, and they were told that those who returned would be expelled from the union and suffer the corresponding penalty. Other similarly situated pilots later joined. ALPAP (Gomez) opposed the petitions. On August 20, 1971, 89 of the pilots who retired en masse filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Manila, Case 15084, for recovery of retirement benefits under the PAL Retirement Plan; the complaint was dismissed on PAL’s motion, although the records did not disclose the reason. On December 23, 1971, Judge Paredes issued an order deferring action on the motion to dismiss the reinstatement petitions because the matters alleged required submission of proof. ALPAP (Gomez) moved for reconsideration, but the CIR en banc denied it as pro forma. On February 1, 1972, ALPAP (Gaston) joined and consolidated the reinstatement petitions, which both PAL and ALPAP (Gomez) opposed. On March 24, 1972, ALPAP (Gomez) filed a motion to suspend proceedings in Case 101-IPA(B) until the prejudicial question of who should prosecute the main case was resolved. On April 18, 1972, Judge Paredes deferred the hearing of the main case until the Supreme Court decided L-33705 but allowed other matters, including the consolidated petition for reinstatement, to be heard. On May 5, 1972, ALPAP (Gomez) filed another motion to suspend the hearing on the reinstatement petition on the ground that the Supreme Court’s decision in L-33705 should be awaited. ALPAP (Gaston) opposed it. On May 15, 1972, Judge Paredes denied the motion to suspend unless a countermanding order was issued by a higher court. On May 18, 1972, ALPAP (Gomez) filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the employee status of those who resigned or retired en masse was an issue in Case 2939-MC, whose decision was pending in L-33705. On June 19, 1972, the CIR en banc reversed Judge Paredes’ order and suspended the hearing on the reinstatement petition until the Supreme Court decided L-33705, finding that the question of employee status had already been raised and resolved in Case 2939-MC and that the pilots had lost their employee status as a consequence of their accepted resignations and/or retirements.

The CIR found that the mass retirement and resignation action was intentionally planned to abort the effects of the October 7, 10, and 19, 1970 return-to-work orders, which the pilots had ignored for more than a week, by placing themselves beyond the jurisdictional control of the industrial court through the umbrella of the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude, thereby enabling them to pursue their main pressure objective of grounding most, if not all, PAL flight operations. It also found that the pilots’ actuations after retirement and resignation—retrieving deposits and other funds from the ALPAP Cooperative Credit Union on the ground that they had retired or resigned, obtaining employment with another airline, filing a civil suit for recovery of retirement pay invoking involuntary servitude, and repeatedly manifesting before the industrial court that their retirement and resignation were not sham but voluntary and intentional—were indubitable indications that they retired or resigned with full awareness of the likely consequences. The Supreme Court agreed with these findings and concluded that their later protestations of good faith appeared as a late and regrettable rationalization.

• Jurisdiction over Union Leadership and Funds: ALPAP (Gaston) maintained that the CIR acted without jurisdiction in passing upon, in a certification proceeding, which set of officers—those elected by the Gaston group or those elected by the Gomez group—was the duly elected set of ALPAP officers, and which group was entitled to the name, office, and funds of ALPAP.
• Validity of the Amendment: ALPAP (Gaston) argued that the amendment to ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws was validly adopted and that the CIR erred in invalidating it on the grounds of non-compliance with procedure and inclusion of non-employees.
• Validity of Elections: ALPAP (Gaston) maintained that Felix C. Gaston was elected President by the required majority of ALPAP members and that Ben Hur Gomez’s election by only 45 members was not valid and binding.
• Takeover of ALPAP: ALPAP (Gaston) disputed the authorization given by the CIR to ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the corporate name, office, and funds of ALPAP, although it did not question PAL’s recognition of ALPAP (Gomez) as bargaining agent or its right to manage and negotiate collective bargaining agreements with PAL.
• Suspension of Reinstatement Hearings: In L-35206, the individual petitioners and ALPAP (Gaston) argued that the CIR acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the June 19, 1972 resolution suspending the hearing of their plea for reinstatement or return to work, or alternatively payment of retirement and/or separation pay, until the Supreme Court decided L-33705.
• Mass Resignation as Concerted Activity: Petitioners argued that their retirement or resignation was a legitimate concerted activity under Section 2(1) of the Industrial Peace Act, which defines a strike as a temporary stoppage of work by concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial dispute, and that they should be reinstated or paid benefits.

• Employee Status as Prejudicial Question: ALPAP (Gomez) moved to suspend proceedings in Case 101-IPA(B) until the prejudicial question of who should prosecute the main case was resolved, and later moved to suspend the hearing on the reinstatement petition on the ground that the employee status of those who resigned or retired en masse was an issue in Case 2939-MC pending in L-33705.
• Opposition to Reinstatement: ALPAP (Gomez) opposed the petitions for reinstatement, and PAL likewise opposed their consolidation.
• Caveat on Benefits: PAL accepted the individual letters of retirement/resignation with the caveat that the pilots would not be entitled to any benefit or privilege by reason of their employment with PAL because their acts constituted a violation of the November 26, 1970 order of the industrial court.
• CIR’s Position on Employee Status: The CIR en banc reversed Judge Paredes’ order and suspended the reinstatement hearing, finding that the question of employee status had already been raised and resolved in Case 2939-MC and that the pilots had lost their employee status as a consequence of their accepted resignations and/or retirements.

• Jurisdiction over Union Leadership and Funds: Whether the CIR acted without jurisdiction in a certification proceeding in passing upon which set of officers is the duly elected set of officers of ALPAP and which group is entitled to the name, office, and funds of ALPAP.
• Validity of ALPAP Constitutional Amendment: Whether the CIR erred in holding illegal the amendment to ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws allowing members forced to retire or resign or terminated for union activities to retain active membership, on the grounds that it was not adopted in accordance with procedure and that a labor organization cannot include non-employees of PAL.
• Validity of Elections and Takeover: Whether the CIR gravely abused its discretion in authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the name, office, and funds of ALPAP and in not upholding the election of Felix C. Gaston as President.
• Suspension of Reinstatement Hearings: Whether the CIR acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in promulgating the June 19, 1972 resolution suspending the hearing of the petitioners’ plea for reinstatement or return to work, or alternative retirement/separation pay, until the Supreme Court decided L-33705.
• Reinstatement and Mass Resignation: Whether the mass retirement/resignation was a legitimate concerted activity entitling the pilots to reinstatement or, alternatively, to retirement/separation pay.

• Jurisdiction over Union Leadership and Funds: No. A certification proceeding is a non-adversarial, fact-finding investigation, and the industrial court may inquire into relevant matters, including union leadership and entitlement to office and funds.
• Validity of ALPAP Constitutional Amendment: No. The amendment was validly adopted by substantial compliance, and RA 875 does not limit labor organization membership to employees of a particular employer.
• Validity of Elections and Takeover: Yes. The CIR gravely abused its discretion in authorizing the Gomez group to take over ALPAP’s office and funds; Gaston’s election by 180 of 270 members was valid, while Gomez’s election by 45 members was not binding. The Gomez group retained membership rights, and no exclusive franchise to the ALPAP name was shown.
• Suspension of Reinstatement Hearings: No. The CIR did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion; any non-compliance with the rule that all issues in a certified labor dispute be determined in the same case was procedural error, not jurisdictional.
• Reinstatement and Mass Resignation: No. The mass retirement/resignation was not a protected concerted activity because it was a permanent cutoff of employment, not a temporary stoppage, and was intended to abort the return-to-work orders; reinstatement was denied, but the alternative retirement/separation claims were remanded to the Secretary of Labor.

• Jurisdiction over Union Leadership and Funds: The Court stressed that a certification proceeding is not ordinary litigation but an investigation of non-adversary, fact-finding character where the CIR acts as a disinterested investigator to ascertain employee representation. Because such a proceeding may require inquiry into matters seemingly beyond its purview but relevant and crucial to its purposes, the CIR could inquire into union leadership and entitlement to office and funds where a faction had amended the union constitution to retain membership after termination of employment. However, the Court reviewed the CIR’s conclusions and found error in the legal premises.
• Validity of ALPAP Constitutional Amendment: The Court examined the records and found substantial compliance with ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws: 221 out of 270 members voted in favor of the amendment on October 30, 1970. It rejected the CIR’s restrictive interpretation of “labor organization” under Section 2(e) of RA 875, which defines it as any union or association of employees existing in whole or in part for collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment. The law does not require membership to be limited to employees of a particular employer; Section 2(h) defines “representative” to include a legitimate labor organization or its officer or agent whether or not employed by the employer or employees represented, and Section 2(j) provides that a labor dispute may exist regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. Nothing in ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws restricted membership to PAL pilots alone.
• Validity of Elections and Takeover: The CIR’s fundamental assumptions for authorizing ALPAP (Gomez) to take over the office and funds were erroneous. Since Felix C. Gaston and four other pilots were elected by the required majority of ALPAP members on December 18-22, 1970, and Gaston received 180 votes out of 270, the authorization to the Gomez group to take over the office, funds, and name was grave abuse of discretion. The election of Ben Hur Gomez as President could not be valid and binding because he was elected at a meeting of only 45 ALPAP members one day after Gaston’s election, and under Section 4, Article III of ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws, duly elected officers remain in office for at least one year. Nevertheless, the Gomez group did not lose all rights over ALPAP’s office, funds, and name. A labor organization may authorize a segment to bargain collectively with a particular employer where the segment shares a common and distinguishable interest. Since ALPAP (Gaston) recognized ALPAP (Gomez) to bargain with PAL, it would be unreasonable to disallow the Gomez group a certain use of ALPAP’s office, funds, and name when necessary for its delegated bargaining authority. If the Gomez group preferred a separate office, name, and funds, it could form a separate union, and its vested rights, interest, or participation in ALPAP’s assets, including cash funds, should be liquidated in its favor. On the use of the ALPAP name, no exclusive franchise or right was shown, so there was no basis to correct the CIR’s action on that point.
• Suspension of Reinstatement Hearings: The Court found no merit in the charge that the CIR acted without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the reinstatement hearings until L-33705 was decided. While PFPW vs. CIR held that in a certified labor dispute all issues should be determined in the case where the certified dispute was docketed and parties should not isolate germane issues for other branches, non-compliance is at best an error in procedure, not jurisdiction. The matter of reinstatement had been ventilated fully and adequately in the certification case in all substantive aspects, including the claim that the pilots were merely led to believe in good faith that retiring or resigning was an exercise of concerted activity. The mass retirement and resignation was intentionally planned to abort the effects of the October 7, 10, and 19, 1970 return-to-work orders by placing the pilots beyond the CIR’s jurisdictional control under the umbrella of the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude, enabling them to pursue their pressure objective of grounding PAL operations. The powers given to the industrial court in a certified labor dispute would be meaningless if its jurisdiction could not operate.
• Reinstatement and Mass Resignation: The Court agreed with the CIR that the pilots’ actuations after retirement and resignation—retrieving deposits and funds from the ALPAP Cooperative Credit Union on the ground that they had retired or resigned, employment with another airline, filing a civil suit for recovery of retirement pay invoking involuntary servitude, and repeated manifestations that their retirement and resignation were not sham but voluntary and intentional—were indubitable indications that they retired or resigned with full awareness of the likely consequences. Their later protestations of good faith appeared as a late and regrettable rationalization. Contrary to ALPAP (Gaston)’s argument that the retirement/resignation was a legitimate concerted activity under Section 2(1) of the Industrial Peace Act, which defines “strike” as a temporary stoppage of work by concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial dispute, the pilots contemplated a permanent cutoff of the employment relationship with PAL. In any event, because the dispute had been certified as existing in an industry indispensable to the national interest, the pilots’ disregard for compulsory orders and their venture to disengage from the CIR’s jurisdiction for their economic demands were badges of bad faith. A legitimate concerted activity cannot be used to circumvent judicial orders. Reinstatement was thus denied, but the alternative claims for retirement or separation pay were remanded to the Secretary of Labor to determine whether they were in order, particularly in view of PAL’s caveat.

• Certification proceeding as non-adversarial fact-finding — A certification proceeding is not ordinary litigation but an investigation of a non-adversary, fact-finding character in which the CIR acts as a disinterested investigator to ascertain the desires of employees as to representation. The Court applied this to allow the CIR to inquire into union leadership and entitlement to office and funds, but still reviewed and corrected the CIR’s legal conclusions.
• Labor organization membership not limited to employees of a particular employer — Under RA 875, a labor organization is defined by its purposes (collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment), not by a requirement that members be employees of a particular employer. Section 2(h) includes a representative whether or not employed by the employer or employees represented, and Section 2(j) allows a labor dispute regardless of proximate employer-employee relation. The Court used this to uphold ALPAP’s amendment allowing members terminated for union activities to retain membership.
• Substantial compliance in union constitutional amendments — An amendment to a labor organization’s constitution and by-laws is valid where there is substantial compliance with the prescribed procedure; the Court found such compliance where 221 of 270 members voted in favor.
• Majority rule and one-year term in union elections — Duly elected officers of ALPAP remain in office for at least one year under Section 4, Article III of its constitution and by-laws. Gaston’s election by 180 of 270 members was valid, and Gomez’s election by only 45 members one day later could not be valid and binding.
• Rights of withdrawing union members — A labor organization may authorize a segment to bargain collectively with a particular employer where the segment has a common and distinguishable interest. If the segment prefers a separate office, name, and funds, it may form a separate union, and its vested rights, interest, or participation in the association’s assets, including cash funds, must be liquidated in its favor. The Court ordered ALPAP to give withdrawing members whatever right, interest, or participation they had in ALPAP’s assets.
• Mass resignation/retirement is not a protected strike — A strike is defined as a temporary stoppage of work by concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial dispute. A mass retirement or resignation that permanently cuts off the employment relationship is not a protected concerted activity and cannot be used to circumvent judicial orders in a certified labor dispute.
• Jurisdictional vs. procedural error in certified labor disputes — The rule that all issues in a certified labor dispute should be determined in the case where the dispute was docketed is a procedural rule; non-compliance is an error in procedure, not jurisdiction, and does not necessarily invalidate the CIR’s action.

• "This Court has always stressed that a certification proceeding is not a litigation, in the sense in which this term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversary, fact finding character in which the Court of Industrial Relations plays the part of a disinterested investigator seeking merely to ascertain the desires of employees as to the matter of their representation" — This defines the nature of a certification proceeding, which the Court used to permit the CIR to inquire into matters relevant to representation while still reviewing its legal conclusions.
• "The absence of the condition which the court below would attach to the statutory concept of a labor organization, as being limited to the employees of particular employer, is quite evident from the law. The emphasis of Industrial Peace Act is clearly on the pourposes for which a union or association of employees established rather than that membership therein should be limited only to the employees of a particular employer." — This states the Court’s rejection of the CIR’s restrictive interpretation of labor organization membership under RA 875.
• "A legitimate concerted activity is a matter that cannot be used to circumvent judicial orders or be tossed around like a plaything Definitely, neither employers nor employees should be allowed to make of judicial authority a now-youve-got-it-now-you-dont affair." — This articulates the Court’s rationale for denying reinstatement and treating the mass resignation/retirement as an attempt to evade the CIR’s return-to-work orders.
• "Clearly, the powers given to the industrial court in a certified labor dispute will be meaningless and useless to pursue where its jurisdiction cannot operate." — This explains why the CIR could suspend the reinstatement hearings and why the mass resignation could not place the pilots beyond the CIR’s jurisdiction.

• National Labor Union vs. Go Soc and Sons, 23 SCRA 436 — Cited for the rule that a certification proceeding is a non-adversarial, fact-finding investigation.
• Benguet Consolidated, Inc. vs. Bobok Lumber Jack Ass’n., L-11029, May 23, 1958 — Cited for the same characterization of certification proceedings.
• Bulakena Restaurant and Caterer vs. C.I.R., 45 SCRA 95 — Cited for the same rule.
• LVN Pictures, Inc. vs. Philippine Musicians Guild (FFW) and C.I.R., 1 SCRA 132 — Cited for the same rule.
• Philippine Association of Free Labor Union (PAFLU) vs. Hon. Joaquin M. Salvador, et al., L-29471 and L-29487, September 28, 1968 — Cited for the principle that a return-to-work order partakes of the nature of a mandatory injunction.
• Philippine Federation of Petroleum Workers (PFPW) vs. CIR, 37 SCRA 716 — Cited for the rule that all issues in a certified labor dispute should be determined in the case where the certified dispute was docketed; the Court clarified that non-compliance is procedural error, not jurisdictional.

• Section 2(e), Republic Act No. 875 (Industrial Peace Act) — Defines a labor organization as any union or association of employees existing in whole or in part for collective bargaining or dealing with employers concerning terms and conditions of employment; the Court used it to reject the CIR’s limitation of membership to employees of a particular employer.
• Section 2(h), Republic Act No. 875 — Defines “representative” to include a legitimate labor organization or any officer or agent thereof, whether or not employed by the employer or employees represented; the Court cited it to support ALPAP’s capacity to include non-PAL pilots.
• Section 2(j), Republic Act No. 875 — Provides that a labor dispute can exist regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee; the Court cited it to support a broader concept of labor organization membership.
• Section 2(1), Republic Act No. 875 — Defines “strike” as any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial dispute; the Court used it to distinguish the pilots’ mass retirement/resignation as a permanent cutoff, not a protected strike.
• Section 19, Commonwealth Act No. 103, as amended — Read into Judge Paredes’ return-to-work order for the guidance of the parties and invoked by Gaston in his contempt motion; the Court did not separately construe it beyond its role in the return-to-work regime.
• Article III, Section 1(13), Constitution — Prohibits involuntary servitude except as punishment for crime; ALPAP invoked it against the return-to-work order, but the Court treated the claim as part of the attempt to place the pilots beyond the CIR’s jurisdiction rather than as a valid basis for the mass resignation.
• Section 4, Article III, ALPAP Constitution and By-Laws — Provides that duly elected officers remain in office for at least one year; the Court used it to reject Ben Hur Gomez’s election as binding.

Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Concepcion, Jr., and Martin, JJ., concurred. Fernando, J., concurred in the opinion of the Chief Justice in L-33705 and in the opinion of Justice Teehankee in L-35206. Aquino, J., took no part. Teehankee, J., filed a separate concurring opinion.

In L-33705, Teehankee, J., concurred that the law does not support the CIR’s restrictive interpretation limiting membership in a labor organization to employees of a particular employer, and that ALPAP’s constitution and by-laws did not restrict membership to PAL pilots alone. He agreed that the Court properly upheld the Gaston faction’s election by a clear majority of 180 out of 270 members, recognized Gaston’s election as president, and ruled out the Gomez faction’s takeover of ALPAP’s office, funds, and name as grave abuse of discretion. He noted that only pilots actually in PAL’s employ could participate in the PAL certification election, and that the Gomez faction could separate and form its own union. He interpreted the judgment as ordering ALPAP to liquidate each withdrawing member’s aliquot share in ALPAP’s net assets as of the date of withdrawal, which he fixed as December 23, 1970, with the value of any use made by the Gomez faction of ALPAP’s office and funds after withdrawal to be offset against that share. In L-35206, he concurred in rejecting the pilots’ petition for readmission, but suggested that the question of forfeiture of retirement benefits was one of law: whether the industrial court had power to order forfeiture of earned retirement privileges for violation of its return-to-work order. He doubted such power, noting that dismissal and contempt were available, and suggested guidelines for the National Labor Relations Commission’s consideration.