Agustin vs. COMELEC

A person who, after executing an affidavit of renunciation of foreign citizenship and filing a valid certificate of candidacy, subsequently uses a foreign passport reverts to dual-citizen status and is disqualified from running for any elective local position under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code; where such disqualification attains finality before election day, the votes cast for the disqualified candidate are stray and may not be counted, and the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of votes should be proclaimed.

Petitioner Arsenio A. Agustin was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America in 1997. He later sought to re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 (the Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003), which requires naturalized Filipinos who wish to run for elective office to execute a personal and sworn renunciation of all foreign citizenship at the time of filing their certificate of candidacy. Respondent Salvador S. Pillos was a rival mayoralty candidate in the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte for the May 13, 2013 local elections. The dispute arose within the framework of two distinct remedies under election law: a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, which requires a false material representation made with intent to deceive, and a petition for disqualification, which may be based on statutory ineligibility without regard to the validity of the certificate of candidacy itself.

Petitioner Arsenio A. Agustin was naturalized as a citizen of the United States of America in 1997. On October 5, 2012, he filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte, to be contested in the May 13, 2013 local elections. As the official candidate of the Nacionalista Party, he declared in his CoC that he was eligible for the office, that he was a natural-born Filipino citizen, and that he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years. Prior to filing his CoC, he had taken his Oath of Allegiance on March 9, 2012 before the Consulate General of the Philippines in Honolulu, Hawaii, and executed his Affidavit of Renunciation of U.S. citizenship on October 2, 2012. He was issued a Philippine passport on August 23, 2012.

On October 10, 2012, respondent Salvador S. Pillos, a rival mayoralty candidate, filed a Petition to Deny Due Course and/or to Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Arsenio A. Agustin, docketed as SPA No. 13-023 (DC), alleging that Agustin had made a material misrepresentation by stating he had been a resident of the Municipality of Marcos for 25 years despite having registered as a voter therein only on May 31, 2012. In his answer, Agustin countered that the one-year requirement referred to residency, not voter registration, and that residency was not dependent on citizenship; he attached a copy of his Affidavit of Renunciation to bolster his claim of Philippine citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division denied the petition on January 28, 2013, holding that voter registration was distinct from the residency requirement and that Pillos had adduced no evidence that Agustin was a resident or citizen of another country.

Pillos moved for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc, emphasizing that Bureau of Immigration records showed Agustin had voluntarily declared in his travel documents that he was a U.S. citizen, and that when he travelled to Hawaii on October 6, 2012, he still used his U.S. passport despite having renounced his U.S. citizenship on October 2, 2012 and having filed his CoC on October 5, 2012. Agustin opposed the motion. On April 23, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc granted Pillos' motion and cancelled Agustin's CoC, finding that while Agustin had presented an Affidavit of Renunciation, he had failed to furnish the Commission with a copy of his Oath of Allegiance, and thus had not sufficiently shown compliance with the provisions of RA 9225.

On May 3, 2013, Agustin filed a Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration with Leave of Court, attaching copies of the Order of Approval dated February 12, 2012 and his Oath of Allegiance dated March 9, 2012, both issued by the Consulate General of the Philippines in Honolulu, along with certifications from Election Officers in Ilocos Norte attesting that the documents had been received by the COMELEC. He explained that the documents had not been presented during the proceedings because the sole issue raised by Pillos' petition had involved only the one-year residency requirement. On May 8, 2013, Pillos submitted a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Execution, praying that a writ be issued to implement the cancellation of Agustin's CoC. On election day, May 13, 2013, Agustin's name remained on the ballot, and he was proclaimed the duly elected Municipal Mayor for obtaining 5,020 votes, the highest among the contending parties. On May 24, 2013, Agustin withdrew his Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and, on May 28, 2013, filed the present petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. On June 18, 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a writ of execution, noting that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of an En Banc resolution was not allowed under the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure and that the April 23, 2013 resolution was deemed final and executory.

• Due Process Violation: Petitioner maintained that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion in resolving Pillos' motion for reconsideration based on a ground — citizenship and compliance with RA 9225 — that was neither the basis of nor raised in the original Petition to Deny Due Course, and that the COMELEC should have at least held a clarificatory hearing to ascertain and confirm the matters regarding his compliance.
• Compliance with RA 9225: Petitioner argued that he duly complied with the requirements for the re-acquisition of his Philippine citizenship pursuant to RA 9225, and that proof of such compliance had been submitted to the Election Officers in Ilocos Norte, including his Oath of Allegiance dated March 9, 2012 and the Order of Approval dated February 12, 2012.
• Sole Issue Was Residency: Petitioner insisted that the non-presentation of his Oath of Allegiance should not be fatal to his right to run for public office because the sole ground for Pillos' petition in the COMELEC had dealt only with the one-year residency requirement, and Pillos could have included citizenship as a ground by amendment but did not move for that purpose.
• Erroneous Appreciation of Facts, Law, and Evidence: Petitioner alleged grave erroneous appreciation of the facts, law, and evidence by the COMELEC En Banc.

• Finality Before Elections: Respondent Pillos submitted that the April 23, 2013 resolution was already deemed final and executory as of May 4, 2013, that the writ of execution was issued on June 18, 2013, and that the petitioner's disqualification thus attained finality prior to the May 13, 2013 elections.
• Use of U.S. Passport: Respondent Pillos underscored that Bureau of Immigration records reflected that the petitioner had voluntarily declared in his travel documents that he was a citizen of the USA, and that when he travelled to Hawaii on October 6, 2012, he still used his USA passport despite his renunciation of USA citizenship on October 2, 2012 and after filing his CoC on October 5, 2012.
• Material Misrepresentation: Respondent Pillos argued that the petitioner's declaration of his eligibility in his CoC constituted material misrepresentation because of his failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirements.

• Eligibility/Dual Citizenship: Whether the petitioner, who had renounced his U.S. citizenship and filed a valid CoC, was disqualified from running for local elective office by virtue of his subsequent use of his U.S. passport, which reverted him to dual-citizen status.
• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings: Whether the COMELEC En Banc violated the petitioner's right to due process by resolving the motion for reconsideration on a ground (citizenship) different from the sole ground raised in the original petition (residency).
• Effect of Disqualification Before Elections: Whether the votes cast in favor of the petitioner should be counted, given that his disqualification attained finality before election day.
• Proper Recipient of the Office: Whether respondent Pillos, as the qualified candidate obtaining the next highest number of votes, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor.

• Eligibility/Dual Citizenship: Yes. The petitioner was disqualified from running for local elective office because his use of his U.S. passport after renouncing his U.S. citizenship repudiated his affidavit of renunciation and reverted him to dual-citizen status, which is a disqualification under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.
• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings: No. Administrative due process was observed, the petitioner's citizenship having come to the fore through his own assertions in his answer to Pillos' petition, and he having been afforded the opportunity to oppose the motion for reconsideration.
• Effect of Disqualification Before Elections: No. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner were stray and should not be counted, because his disqualification attained finality on May 4, 2013, before the May 13, 2013 elections, pursuant to Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646.
• Proper Recipient of the Office: Yes. Respondent Pillos, being the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of votes, should be proclaimed duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte.

• Eligibility/Dual Citizenship: The petitioner took his Oath of Allegiance on March 9, 2012 and executed his Affidavit of Renunciation on October 2, 2012, thereby reverting to the status of an exclusively Filipino citizen. On October 5, 2012, when he filed his CoC, he was exclusively a Filipino citizen and eligible to run for public office; his CoC was valid because he made no material misrepresentation therein. However, on October 6, 2012 — one day after filing his CoC — he travelled abroad using his U.S. passport, thereby representing himself as a citizen of the USA. He continued using his U.S. passport in subsequent travels despite having already been issued a Philippine passport on August 23, 2012. This use of the U.S. passport effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation, reverting him to dual-citizen status. Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code expressly disqualifies "[t]hose with dual citizenship" from running for any elective local position. The Court relied on Maquilang vs. Commission on Elections for the proposition that continued exercise of rights as a foreign citizen after renunciation reverts a person to dual-citizen status. Although the COMELEC could not properly cancel the CoC for material misrepresentation — because no deliberate attempt to mislead was found — it could still declare the petitioner disqualified for not meeting the requisite eligibility under the Local Government Code.

• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings: The petitioner's citizenship came to the fore because he himself asserted his Philippine citizenship in his answer to Pillos' petition to cancel his CoC, in order to bolster his allegation of compliance with the one-year residency requirement. Having introduced the issue himself, he could not credibly complain of being denied due process, especially since he was able to file an opposition to Pillos' motion for reconsideration. The Court reiterated that due process in administrative proceedings does not always require a trial-type proceeding; the demand of due process is met whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself, and is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The same rule applies in election cases.

• Effect of Disqualification Before Elections: The effect of the petitioner's disqualification depended on when it attained finality. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646 (the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) provides that "[a]ny candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted." The Court in Cayat vs. Commission on Elections expounded that this provision covers two situations: first, when disqualification becomes final before the elections (first sentence), and second, when it becomes final after the elections (second sentence). The present case fell under the first situation. Although the petitioner filed a Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on May 3, 2013, such filing did not impede the April 23, 2013 resolution from becoming final and executory, because Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure expressly disallows motions for reconsideration of En Banc rulings. Under Section 13, Rule 18 and Section 3, Rule 37 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the resolution became final and executory on May 4, 2013 — five days from its promulgation — without a restraining order from the Supreme Court. Because the disqualification attained finality before the May 13, 2013 elections, the petitioner was rendered a non-candidate, and the 5,020 votes cast in his favor were stray.

• Proper Recipient of the Office: With the petitioner's votes rendered stray, respondent Pillos, being the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of votes among the remaining candidates, was entitled to proclamation as duly elected Mayor of the Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos Norte in the May 13, 2013 elections, pursuant to the Court's ruling in Cayat vs. Commission on Elections.

• Distinction Between Petition for Disqualification and Petition to Cancel CoC — A petition for disqualification under Section 12 or 68 of the Omnibus Election Code or Section 40 of the Local Government Code merely prohibits a person from continuing as a candidate. A petition to deny due course to or cancel a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, on the other hand, treats the person as if he never filed a CoC, and requires a finding that the candidate made a material representation that is false, made with intent to deceive the electorate as to his qualifications. The Court applied this distinction to hold that while the petitioner's CoC was valid (no material misrepresentation existed), he could still be declared disqualified under the Local Government Code for being a dual citizen.

• Repudiation of Renunciation by Use of Foreign Passport — A person who has executed an affidavit of renunciation of foreign citizenship and re-acquired Philippine citizenship under RA 9225 reverts to dual-citizen status if he subsequently uses his foreign passport, thereby effectively repudiating his renunciation. The Court held that the petitioner's use of his U.S. passport on October 6, 2012 — four days after his renunciation on October 2, 2012 — constituted such repudiation, disqualifying him under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code.

• Effect of Disqualification by Final Judgment Before Elections (Section 6, RA 6646) — A candidate who has been declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision. The disqualification must have attained finality before election day for this rule to apply. The Court found that the COMELEC En Banc resolution became final on May 4, 2013, nine days before the May 13, 2013 elections, rendering the 5,020 votes cast for the petitioner stray.

• Finality of COMELEC En Banc Resolutions — Under Section 1(d), Rule 13 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure, a motion for reconsideration of an En Banc ruling is not allowed (except in election offense cases). Under Section 13, Rule 18 and Section 3, Rule 37, decisions in petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy become final and executory after five days from promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. The filing of a prohibited motion for reconsideration does not toll the period of finality.

• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings — Due process in administrative proceedings does not always require a trial-type proceeding. The demand of due process is met whenever a person, being notified, is afforded the opportunity to explain or defend himself, and is satisfied by giving the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The same rule applies in election cases.

• "A person of dual citizenship is disqualified from running for a public office in the Philippines." — This is the opening declarative statement of the decision, articulating the fundamental rule that animates the entire ruling.

• "He thereby effectively repudiated his oath of renunciation on October 6, 2012, the first time he used his USA passport after renouncing his USA citizenship on October 2, 2012. Consequently, he could be considered an exclusively Filipino citizen only for the four days from October 2, 2012 until October 6, 2012." — This passage establishes the ratio decidendi on the repudiation-of-renunciation doctrine, pinpointing the exact date on which the petitioner reverted to dual-citizen status.

• "The law expressly declares that a candidate disqualified by final judgment before an election cannot be voted for, and votes cast for him shall not be counted. This is a mandatory provision of law." — This quotation from Cayat vs. Commission on Elections, adopted by the Court, articulates the mandatory character of Section 6 of RA 6646 as applied to the petitioner's situation.

• "While a person who is disqualified under Section 68 is merely prohibited to continue as a candidate, the person whose certificate is cancelled or denied due course under Section 78 is not treated as a candidate at all, as if he/she never filed a CoC." — This passage from Fermin vs. Commission on Elections distinguishes the two remedies and explains why the validity of the CoC and the disqualification of the candidate are analytically separate questions.

• Fermin vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 179695 and G.R. No. 182369, December 18, 2008, 574 SCRA 782 — Controlling authority cited to distinguish a petition for disqualification from a petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the OEC, and to define the nature of a Section 78 proceeding as requiring a false material representation made with intent to deceive.

• Mitra vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 191938, July 2, 2010, 622 SCRA 744 — Followed for the requirement that the false representation under Section 78 must be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact that would otherwise render a candidate ineligible, and that the misrepresentation cannot be the result of a mere innocuous mistake.

• Cayat vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 163776 and G.R. No. 165736, April 24, 2007, 522 SCRA 23 — Controlling authority on the effect of disqualification by final judgment before elections under Section 6 of RA 6646, holding that votes cast for a candidate whose disqualification became final before election day are stray and that the qualified candidate obtaining the highest number of votes should be proclaimed.

• Maquilang vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, 696 SCRA 420 — Cited for the proposition that continued exercise of rights as a foreign citizen, such as using a foreign passport after renunciation, reverts a person to dual-citizen status.

• Salcedo II vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 135886, August 16, 1999, 312 SCRA 447 — Cited in support of the principle that a candidate is ineligible if disqualified, and disqualified if he lacks any of the qualifications for elective office.

• Office of the Ombudsman vs. Reyes, G.R. No. 170512, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 626 — Cited for the principle that due process in administrative proceedings does not always require a trial-type proceeding, and is satisfied by the opportunity to explain or defend oneself and to seek reconsideration.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code (BP 881) — Governs petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy, exclusively on the ground that a material representation in the CoC is false. Applied to determine that the petitioner's CoC was valid because he made no material misrepresentation at the time of filing.

• Section 5(2), Republic Act No. 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003) — Requires those seeking elective public office in the Philippines to meet the qualifications for holding such office and, at the time of filing the CoC, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. Applied to determine that the petitioner had complied with this requirement as of October 5, 2012, the date of filing his CoC.

• Section 40(d), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Disqualifies "[t]hose with dual citizenship" from running for any elective local position. Applied to disqualify the petitioner after his use of his U.S. passport reverted him to dual-citizen status.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 (Electoral Reforms Law of 1987) — Provides that any candidate declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Applied to render the 5,020 votes cast for the petitioner stray, because his disqualification attained finality on May 4, 2013, before the May 13, 2013 elections.

• Section 1(d), Rule 13, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Disallows motions for reconsideration of En Banc rulings, resolutions, orders, or decisions (except in election offense cases). Applied to hold that the petitioner's Verified Urgent Motion for Reconsideration did not toll the finality of the April 23, 2013 resolution.

• Section 13, Rule 18 and Section 3, Rule 37, 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure — Provide that decisions in petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy become final and executory after five days from promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court. Applied to fix the date of finality at May 4, 2013.

Sereno, C.J.; Carpio; Velasco, Jr.; Leonardo-De Castro; Del Castillo; Villarama, Jr.; Perez; Reyes; Perlas-Bernabe; and Leonen, JJ., concurred.