Agustin-Se vs. Office of the President

A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 may only raise questions of law, not questions of fact involving the examination of the probative value of evidence or the appreciation of facts by lower courts, absent any of the recognized exceptions; accordingly, where the Office of the President and Court of Appeals correctly found no substantial evidence supporting charges of grave misconduct, violation of confidentiality rules, or malicious prosecution against a Deputy Ombudsman and prosecutor, and where petitioners were afforded due process through adequate opportunities to be heard, the dismissal of the administrative complaint was affirmed.

Petitioners Jennifer A. Agustin-Se and Rohermia J. Jamsani-Rodriguez served as Assistant Special Prosecutors III in the Office of the Ombudsman, assigned to prosecute cases against Lt. Gen. (Ret.) Leopoldo S. Acot, Bgen. (Ret.) Ildelfonso N. Dulinayan, and others before the Sandiganbayan for alleged ghost deliveries of supplies to the Philippine Air Force valued at approximately P89,000,000.00. In 1995, the Judge Advocate General’s Office filed a complaint against these military officials, which underwent multiple layers of review and modification over fourteen years, including a 1998 resolution by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dismissing the charges, and a subsequent 2009 reversal and filing of informations approved by Casimiro after discovery that the case records had gone missing. When the accused filed motions to quash citing prescription and violation of the right to speedy disposition, petitioners investigated the procedural history and attributed lapses to Casimiro, submitting a memorandum to their superiors calling for an investigation of Casimiro rather than filing the required pleadings with the Sandiganbayan.

• The AFP Ghost Delivery Investigation (OMB-AFP-CRIM-94-0218): In early 1995, the Judge Advocate General’s Office filed a complaint against Acot, Dulinayan, and others for alleged ghost deliveries. On 12 April 1996, Ombudsman Investigators Rainier C. Almazan and Rudifer G. Falcis II recommended filing informations for violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019 and/or malversation through falsification, which Casimiro (then Director of the Criminal and Administrative Investigation Division) concurred with and indorsed to his superior. On 10 July 1996, Special Prosecution Officer III Reynaldo L. Mendoza recommended modifying the charges to only Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019. On 12 January 1998, Special Prosecutor Leonardo Tamayo recommended dismissal for lack of evidence, which Ombudsman Desierto approved on 2 March 1998, modifying the 12 April 1996 Resolution accordingly.
• Discovery of Missing Records and Reinvestigation: On 29 April 2005, record officers discovered the main folder containing the 12 April 1996 Resolution could not be located despite records having been returned in March 1998. This was discovered when co-respondents Col. Proceso I. Sabado and Ltc. Jose R. Gadin applied for Ombudsman clearance. On 7 July 2005, Almazan and Falcis recommended a thorough review. Casimiro, now Deputy Ombudsman for MOLEO (appointed 16 December 1999), forwarded the matter to Ombudsman Simeon V. Marcelo, who directed the Office of Legal Affairs (OLA) to study the records. The OLA opined on 25 June 2007 that the 12 April 1996 Resolution had "no force and effect because it was never promulgated" and recommended filing informations. On 3 March 2009, Casimiro approved the OLA recommendation and the Informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan.
• Motions to Quash and Petitioners' Actions: Acot and Dulinayan filed motions to quash/dismiss and defer arraignment on grounds of prescription and violation of the right to speedy disposition. To verify Dulinayan's claim of having been issued a clearance, and to determine events after the 1998 modification, petitioners requested certified machine copies of docket entries. Due to delays in obtaining these records, petitioners filed several motions for extension of time to file comment/opposition. Instead of filing the required comments, petitioners submitted a Memorandum dated 5 January 2010 to Special Prosecutor Dennis M. Villa-Ignacio (submitted to Turalba as Officer-in-Charge) containing findings against Casimiro regarding procedural lapses.
• Administrative Complaints and Counter-Complaints: Turalba attached the 5 January 2010 Memorandum to the records and relieved petitioners from the cases for failure to file the necessary comments. He filed his own comment/opposition with the Sandiganbayan. Turalba furnished Casimiro with the 5 January 2010 Memorandum. Casimiro required petitioners to explain why they should not be held liable for insubordination and gross neglect. Petitioners responded with a Memorandum dated 20 January 2010 addressed to Villa-Ignacio instead of replying to Casimiro. On 4 February 2010, Casimiro filed a complaint against petitioners with the Internal Affairs Board (IAB) for libel, Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, and administrative charges including grave misconduct and insubordination. Petitioners were placed under preventive suspension. On 3 November 2010, petitioners filed their complaint with the Office of the President against Casimiro and Turalba for grave misconduct, gross negligence, oppression, violation of confidentiality rules (Office Order No. 05-18 and 05-13), and violation of Section 35 of RA No. 6770 (malicious prosecution).

• Due Process: Petitioners maintained that their right to due process was violated when the Office of the President failed to consider the evidence they presented during administrative adjudication and when it issued its decision without the recommendation of the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) as required by Executive Order No. 13, effectively rendering the decision the product of a single person rather than a collegial body.
• Substantial Evidence: Petitioners argued that substantial evidence supported their allegations that Casimiro caused the inordinate delay in the disposition and preliminary investigation of OMB-AFP-CRM-94-0218, and that both Casimiro and Turalba violated Office Order No. 05-18 (whistleblower protection), Office Order No. 05-13 (confidentiality), Section 35 of RA No. 6770 (malicious prosecution), and Section 3(k) of RA No. 3019 (divulging confidential information) by furnishing Casimiro with the 5 January 2010 Memorandum.
• Preventive Suspension: Petitioners contended that the preventive suspension was unjustified and actually motivated by their filing of the complaint against Casimiro, not by any delay in filing comments with the Sandiganbayan.
• Stare Decisis: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals erred in failing to take judicial notice of its prior decision in CA-G.R. No. 114210 (Jennifer Agustin-Se et al. vs. Internal Affairs Board et al.), where the court found petitioners were not remiss in performing their duties, thus constituting a violation of stare decisis and res judicata.

• Question of Fact: Respondents countered that the petition raised questions of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence, which are not proper for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
• Absence of Delay: Respondents argued that the delay in filing the informations could not be attributed to Casimiro, as it was necessitated by multiple layers of preliminary investigation and reviews under different Ombudsmen, and because the 12 April 1996 Resolution was modified in 1998 to dismiss charges, leaving nothing to file until the 2007 OLA recommendation.
• Confidentiality: Respondents maintained that the 5 January 2010 Memorandum was not a "protected disclosure" under Office Order No. 05-18 because it was not executed under oath and did not contain confidential or classified information, but merely allegations verifiable from existing records.
• Malicious Prosecution: Respondents argued that Casimiro had probable cause to file the administrative complaint against petitioners based on their failure to file required pleadings and their submission of the 5 January 2010 Memorandum instead, negating the element of legal malice required for malicious prosecution.
• ODESLA's Role: Respondents asserted that under Executive Order No. 13, ODESLA is merely a fact-finding and recommendatory body, and its recommendation is not required to validate the Office of the President's decision.

• Nature of Review: Whether the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 properly raises questions of law or questions of fact regarding the appreciation of evidence by the Office of the President and Court of Appeals.
• Due Process: Whether the Office of the President violated petitioners' right to due process by allegedly failing to consider their evidence and by rendering a decision without the recommendation of ODESLA under Executive Order No. 13.
• Substantial Evidence on Delay: Whether substantial evidence supports the finding that Casimiro was responsible for inordinate delay in the preliminary investigation and disposition of the military graft cases.
• Confidentiality and Whistleblower Protection: Whether Casimiro and Turalba violated Section 3(k) of RA No. 3019, Section 7(c) of RA No. 6713, Office Order No. 05-13, and Office Order No. 05-18 regarding the disclosure of the 5 January 2010 Memorandum.
• Malicious Prosecution: Whether Casimiro is liable for malicious prosecution under Section 35 of RA No. 6770.
• Stare Decisis: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the doctrine of stare decisis or res judicata by not taking judicial notice of its prior decision in CA-G.R. No. 114210.

• Nature of Review: The petition raises questions of fact, not questions of law. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while a question of fact arises when doubt exists as to the truth or falsity of alleged facts. The test is whether the appellate court can determine the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence. Here, petitioners assail the appreciation of evidence by the Court of Appeals regarding the existence of delay, confidentiality violations, and malicious prosecution, which requires examination of the probative value of evidence. Absent any of the recognized exceptions (such as findings grounded on speculation, grave abuse of discretion, or conflicting findings), the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and will not review findings of fact of lower courts.
• Due Process: No violation of due process occurred. The essence of due process in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to be heard and to seek reconsideration, which petitioners were afforded through the filing of pleadings, motions for reconsideration, and appeals. Both the Office of the President and Court of Appeals considered the evidence on record, addressing the issues raised and citing applicable laws. Furthermore, Executive Order No. 13 establishes ODESLA as merely a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not an adjudicatory body; its report is recommendatory in nature, and its absence does not invalidate the Office of the President's decision.
• Substantial Evidence on Delay: No substantial evidence supports the charge of inordinate delay against Casimiro. The delay was occasioned by procedural layers of review conducted under different Ombudsmen (Desierto, Marcelo, Gutierrez) and the 1998 modification dismissing charges against the accused. Casimiro, appointed Deputy Ombudsman only in December 1999, had the right to presume regularity in prior investigations. When record officers discovered the missing folder in 2005, Casimiro acted properly by forwarding the matter for review, leading to the 2007 OLA recommendation and 2009 filing of informations.
• Confidentiality and Whistleblower Protection: No violation of confidentiality rules occurred. The 5 January 2010 Memorandum does not qualify as a "protected disclosure" under Section 7 of Office Order No. 05-18 because, among other requisites, it was not executed under oath. It contained no confidential or classified information under RA No. 3019 or RA No. 6713, as the allegations were verifiable from existing records. Turalba therefore committed no violation in furnishing Casimiro with the memorandum.
• Malicious Prosecution: The elements of malicious prosecution under Section 35 of RA No. 6770 are absent. Casimiro had probable cause to file the administrative complaint against petitioners based on their failure to file required comments with the Sandiganbayan and their submission of the 5 January 2010 Memorandum instead, which the Internal Affairs Board found constituted simple discourtesy. The gravamen of malicious prosecution—deliberate initiation of an action with knowledge that the charges were false and groundless—is absent.
• Stare Decisis: The Court of Appeals did not err in failing to apply stare decisis or res judicata regarding CA-G.R. No. 114210. Decisions of the Supreme Court alone form part of the legal system and are binding precedent; decisions of a division of the Court of Appeals are not binding on co-divisions. Moreover, the subject matter in CA-G.R. No. 114210 (administrative complaint regarding delay in filing Sandiganbayan pleadings) differs from the instant case (administrative complaint regarding delay in preliminary investigation and confidentiality violations).

• Question of Law vs. Question of Fact — A question of law exists when the doubt concerns the correct application of law on given facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt concerns the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. The test is whether the appellate court can resolve the issue without examining or evaluating the evidence; if it can, it is a question of law, otherwise it is a question of fact. Questions regarding the probative value of evidence, weight of evidence, or analysis of records are questions of fact not reviewable under Rule 45, absent recognized exceptions.
• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings — The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard, which in administrative proceedings means an opportunity to explain one's side or to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. As long as parties are afforded these opportunities, the requirement of due process is sufficiently met.
• Nature of ODESLA — Under Executive Order No. 13, the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs (ODESLA) is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases. Fact-finding is not adjudication and cannot be likened to the judicial function; it involves receiving evidence and ascertaining facts without the authority to apply the law to decide the controversy authoritatively and definitively.
• Protected Disclosure under Whistleblowing Rules — Under Office Order No. 05-18 (Rules on Internal Whistleblowing and Reporting), for a disclosure to be "protected," the following requisites must concur: (a) the disclosure is made voluntarily, in writing, and under oath; (b) the disclosure pertains to a matter not yet the subject of a complaint already filed with or investigated by the IAB or other concerned office (unless necessary for prosecution); (c) the whistleblower assists and participates in proceedings; and (d) the information contains sufficient particulars and is supported by other material evidence. Failure to meet these requisites, particularly the requirement of being under oath, removes the disclosure from whistleblower protection.
• Malicious Prosecution — To recover damages for malicious prosecution under Section 35 of RA No. 6770, the plaintiff must prove: (1) the prosecution occurred and the defendant was the prosecutor or instigator; (2) the criminal action finally ended with an acquittal; (3) the prosecutor acted without probable cause; and (4) the prosecution was impelled by legal malice (improper or sinister motive). The gravamen is the deliberate initiation of an action with knowledge that the charges were false and groundless, not merely filing under the wrong provision of law.
• Stare Decisis and Res Judicata — The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents established by the Supreme Court. Decisions of the Court of Appeals, even if rendered by one of its divisions, do not establish binding precedent on co-divisions of the same court. Res judicata requires a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, and applies only where the subject matter is identical to a previous case.

• "A question of law arises when there is a doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."
• "The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard – as applied to administrative proceedings, it is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of."
• "Fact-finding is not adjudication and it cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or office. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function. To be considered as such, the act of receiving evidence and arriving at factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to the factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law."
• "The gravamen of malicious prosecution is not the filing of a complaint based on the wrong provision of law, but the deliberate initiation of an action with the knowledge that the charges were false and groundless."

• Heirs of Nicolas Cabigas v. Limbaco, 670 Phil. 274 (2011) — Cited for the definition of questions of law versus questions of fact.
• Republic of the Philippines v. Malabanan, 646 Phil. 631 (2010) — Cited for the test in determining whether an issue is one of law or fact.
• Angeles v. Pascual, 673 Phil. 499 (2011) — Cited for the principle that questions on the probative value of evidence or analysis of records are questions of fact not reviewable by the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
• Pichay, Jr. v. ODESLA-IAD, 691 Phil. 624 (2012) — Cited for the ruling that ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having adjudicatory powers.
• Magbanua v. Junsay, 544 Phil. 349 (2007) — Cited for the elements of malicious prosecution.
• Quasha Ancheta Pena Nolasco Law Office v. Court of Appeals, 622 Phil. 738 (2009) — Cited for the principle that decisions of a division of the Court of Appeals are not binding on co-divisions.

• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Limits review under petitions for certiorari to questions of law only.
• Executive Order No. 13 (Series of 2010) — Abolished the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission and transferred its investigative, adjudicatory, and recommendatory functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary; established ODESLA as a fact-finding and recommendatory body.
• Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e) and (k) — Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; provisions on causing undue injury to any party and divulging confidential information.
• Republic Act No. 6713, Section 7(c) — Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees; prohibition on disclosure and misuse of confidential information.
• Republic Act No. 6770, Section 35 — The Ombudsman Act of 1989; penalizes malicious prosecution initiated with malice or gross bad faith.
• Office Order No. 05-18 (Series of 2005) — Rules on Internal Whistleblowing and Reporting; defines protected disclosure and whistleblower, and sets conditions for protected disclosure.
• Office Order No. 05-13 — Prohibits disclosure of confidential information acquired in the course of employment.

Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, Jose Catral Mendoza (on leave), Marvic M.V.F. Leonen