Aguirre Jr. vs. De Castro

The power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline; thus, a city legal officer has no disciplinary authority over an official appointed by the DECS regional director, even if the official's salary is sourced from city funds. Because the DECS regional director appointed the respondent and exercised supervision over her work, the power to discipline her remained with the DECS, not the city mayor or the city legal officer.

Respondent Evangeline C. De Castro served as the Chief of the Legal Affairs and Complaint Services of the Division of City Schools of Manila, a position to which she was appointed by the DECS regional director. Her salary was sourced entirely from the funds of the City of Manila, and her position was included in the city's plantilla. Petitioner Atty. Angel Aguirre Jr., the City Legal Officer of Manila, initiated administrative proceedings against the respondent for grave misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer.

• Respondent's Position: Evangeline C. De Castro was the Chief of the Legal Affairs and Complaint Services of the Division of City Schools of Manila, appointed by the DECS regional director. Her primary duty was to conduct investigations involving teaching and nonteaching personnel, and her reports were submitted for final evaluation to the DECS regional director.
• Administrative Complaint: On February 1, 1996, City Legal Officer Angel Aguirre Jr. sent respondent a letter with copies of complaints against her, requiring her to explain within 72 hours why no administrative sanctions should be imposed for gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming a public officer.
• Motion to Dismiss: Respondent filed an answer-affidavit and subsequently a motion to dismiss, arguing that she was a subordinate of the DECS Secretary and that the City Legal Officer had no jurisdiction over DECS personnel.
• Denial of Motion: The City Legal Officer denied the motion to dismiss, citing Sections 455(b)(1)(v) and (x) of the Local Government Code. The officer reasoned that because respondent was included in the city plantilla and her salary was derived from city funds, she was subject to the city's disciplinary authority.
• Referral to Court: After the CLO panel denied respondent's subsequent motions for reconsideration, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.

• Petitioners maintained that respondent was a city employee under the supervision of the city mayor because her salary was paid by the City of Manila.
• Petitioners argued that Section 455(b)(1)(v) of the Local Government Code authorized the mayor to appoint employees paid out of city funds, and Section 455(b)(1)(x) authorized the mayor to institute administrative proceedings against erring city employees.
• Petitioners cited Section 2(a), paragraph 12 of Executive Order No. 503, contending that devolved personnel are automatically reappointed by the local chief executive, thereby subjecting them to the mayor's disciplinary authority.

• Respondent countered that she was a subordinate of the DECS Secretary and regional director, and therefore subject exclusively to their disciplinary authority.
• Respondent argued that neither the City Charter (Republic Act No. 409) nor the Local Government Code conferred jurisdiction upon the City Legal Officer to investigate DECS personnel.

• Procedural Issues: N/A
• Substantive Issues:
  • Whether the Office of the City Legal Officer of Manila has jurisdiction to investigate the complaint for grave misconduct filed against the respondent.

• Procedural: N/A
• Substantive:
  • The Court held that the City Legal Officer lacked jurisdiction over the respondent. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the power to appoint and discipline first-level DECS employees resides with the regional director. The Local Government Code did not expressly or impliedly repeal this provision. The mayor's power to appoint under the LGC does not extend to the respondent's position, and the mayor's power to institute administrative proceedings is not incompatible with the regional director's disciplinary authority. Furthermore, the source of an employee's salary is not the sole criterion for determining disciplinary jurisdiction; the control test is paramount. Because the DECS regional director appointed the respondent and exercised supervision over her work, the power to discipline resides with the DECS. The provision in Executive Order No. 503 regarding the automatic reappointment of devolved personnel serves as a safeguard against termination, not a grant of disciplinary power to the local chief executive.

• Power to Appoint Carries the Power to Remove or Discipline — Absent any contrary statutory provision, the authority to appoint an official inherently includes the authority to remove or discipline that official. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that because the DECS regional director appointed the respondent, the power to discipline her remained with the DECS, not the city mayor or city legal officer.
• Control Test in Employer-Employee Relationship — In determining whether an employer-employee relationship exists for purposes of disciplinary jurisdiction, the most important factor is who has the power to supervise and direct the work of the employee, rather than merely who pays the salary. The Court applied this test to find that the DECS regional director, who evaluated and approved the respondent's work, exercised control over her, notwithstanding that her salary was sourced from city funds.
• Implied Repeals Not Favored — Implied repeals of prior laws by subsequent legislation are not lightly presumed and require a clear and unmistakable showing of legislative intent. The Court relied on this principle to hold that the Local Government Code did not impliedly repeal the Administrative Code provisions vesting disciplinary authority in the DECS regional director.

• "Absent any contrary statutory provision, the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or to discipline." — The Court used this principle to anchor its ruling that the appointing authority (DECS Regional Director) retains disciplinary jurisdiction over the respondent.
• "The mere fact that her salary is sourced from city funds does not ipso facto place her under the city legal officer's disciplinary jurisdiction, absent any clear statutory basis therefor." — This clarifies that the source of compensation, standing alone, does not determine disciplinary authority.
• "As to petitioners' argument that respondent's salary is wholly or mainly paid out of city funds, suffice it to say that the source of the wages is not the only criteria in determining whether the payor may be deemed the employer. In fact, the most important factor is the control test; that is, who has the power to supervise and direct the work of the employee concerned?" — The Court emphasized the primacy of the control test over the source-of-funds criterion in determining disciplinary jurisdiction.

• Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation, Inc., 234 SCRA 255 (1994) — Followed for the proposition that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of legislative intent.
• Bagatsing v. Herrera, 65 SCRA 434 (1975) — Followed for the doctrine that the power to appoint carries with it the power to remove or discipline.
• Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil 740 (1949) — Followed alongside Bagatsing for the same doctrine regarding the power to appoint and remove.

• Section 455(b)(1)(v), Local Government Code — Authorizes the city mayor to appoint officials and employees whose salaries are wholly or mainly paid out of city funds. The Court held this provision inapplicable because the respondent's position in the Division of City Schools was not among those the mayor was authorized to appoint.
• Section 455(b)(1)(x), Local Government Code — Authorizes the city mayor to cause the institution of administrative or judicial proceedings against erring city officials or employees. The Court held this provision not incompatible with the DECS regional director's disciplinary authority, as the mayor may file complaints before the DECS.
• Section 7(4), Book IV, Chapter V, Administrative Code of 1987 — Vests the power to appoint first-level employees and exercise disciplinary actions over them in the DECS regional director. The Court held this provision retained its force and barred the city legal officer from exercising disciplinary authority over the respondent.
• Section 47(2), Book V, Administrative Code of 1987 — Grants department secretaries and heads of agencies jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. The Court cited this to reinforce that disciplinary authority resides with the DECS.
• Section 32, Rule XIV, Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 — Reiterates the disciplinary jurisdiction of secretaries and heads of agencies over their subordinate personnel.
• Section 2(a), par. 12, Executive Order No. 503 — Provides that devolved permanent personnel shall be automatically reappointed by the local chief executive. The Court clarified this provision serves as a safeguard against termination and does not divest the DECS regional director of disciplinary authority.

Melo, Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ.