Aguinaldo vs. Ventus

The 60-day limit for suspension of arraignment under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is mandatory; upon its expiration, the trial court is bound to proceed with the arraignment regardless of the pendency of a petition for review with the Department of Justice. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration or petition for review does not constitute a ground to quash a warrant of arrest, which may be quashed only upon a finding that no probable cause exists.

In March and April 2002, Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson, who claimed to be business partners in financing casino players, parted with P260,000.00 in favor of Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez. The consideration was a pledge of two motor vehicles that petitioners allegedly misrepresented as owned by Aguinaldo. The vehicles were later discovered to be owned by Levita De Castro, the manager/operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car. A complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code ensued.

• Nature: A complaint for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code was filed by Reynaldo P. Ventus and Jojo B. Joson against Felilibeth Aguinaldo and Benjamin Perez.

• The Alleged Fraud: In March and April 2002, petitioners allegedly convinced private respondents to part with P260,000.00 as financing for casino players, in consideration of a pledge over two motor vehicles which petitioners misrepresented as owned by Aguinaldo. The vehicles were subsequently found to be owned by Levita De Castro, operator of LEDC Rent-A-Car.

• Perez’s Involvement: Perez denied the accusation and claimed his participation was limited to introducing Aguinaldo to private respondents. Private respondents countered that Perez showed them photocopies of the registration papers in Aguinaldo’s name and personally took the vehicles from the rent-a-car company.

• Preliminary Investigation: Aguinaldo failed to submit a counter-affidavit despite subpoena. On February 25, 2003, the Assistant City Prosecutor recommended indictment. The Information was filed with the RTC on July 16, 2003. Petitioners later jointly filed a “Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed,” arguing that there was no deceit because private respondents knew Aguinaldo did not own the vehicles.

• Proceedings in the Trial Court: After a series of motions, the case was archived pending resolution of petitioners’ motion for reconsideration with the OCP. The OCP eventually denied the motions, and a petition for review was filed with the DOJ. During its pendency, Levita De Castro moved to reinstate the case and secure a warrant of arrest, attaching a DOJ resolution dismissing a different estafa petition. The trial court granted the motion on May 16, 2005. A certification from the DOJ dated May 27, 2005 confirmed that petitioners’ own petition for review in I.S. No. 02L-51569 remained pending.

• Petitioners’ Objections: Petitioners opposed the reinstatement because De Castro was not a party to Criminal Case No. 03-216182, the motion relied on an unrelated DOJ resolution, and their right to a complete preliminary investigation had been impaired by the premature filing of the Information.

• Motion Filed by a Non-Party: Petitioners argued that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to reinstate and issue a warrant of arrest because it was filed by Levita De Castro, a mere witness, and was grounded on the DOJ’s dismissal of a petition in a case other than Criminal Case No. 03-216182.

• Directory Nature of 60-Day Limit: Petitioners maintained that the 60-day limit for suspension of arraignment under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is merely directory and cannot defeat their procedural right to due process while their DOJ petition for review remains unresolved.

• Premature Filing and Denial of Complete Preliminary Investigation: Petitioners contended that the Information was filed before they could receive a copy of the DOJ resolution and move for its reconsideration, rendering the Information fatally premature. They argued that the right to a preliminary investigation is substantive, and the denial of a complete investigation, including the right to seek reconsideration, violates due process and their constitutional right to liberty.

• N/A — The decision does not detail separate arguments submitted by private respondents at the Supreme Court level. The position of the respondents and the prosecution, as reflected in the lower proceedings, was that petitioners employed false pretenses, the OCP had already denied reconsideration, and the trial court properly ordered trial after the 60-day suspension period expired.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Reinstating the Case: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the motion to reinstate the criminal case and issue a warrant of arrest against Aguinaldo, when the motion was filed by a non-party and relied on a DOJ resolution in a different case.

• Mandatory Nature of the 60-Day Suspension Period: Whether the 60-day limit for suspension of arraignment under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court is merely directory, such that a criminal case cannot proceed until the DOJ resolves a pending petition for review with finality.

• Right to Complete Preliminary Investigation: Whether the filing of the Information without affording petitioners the right to move for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution deprived them of a complete preliminary investigation and violated due process.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion in Reinstating the Case: The trial court erred in granting the motion to reinstate filed by De Castro. Not being a party but a mere witness, her motion should have been treated as a mere scrap of paper. Furthermore, the reinstatement was based on a DOJ resolution in a different case, while petitioners’ own petition for review remained pending. Nevertheless, this error did not vitiate the subsequent order setting arraignment; the CA correctly held that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion in denying the motion to quash the warrant and in setting the arraignment.

• Mandatory Nature of the 60-Day Suspension Period: The 60-day limit under Section 11(c), Rule 116 is mandatory. While the pendency of a petition for review is a recognized ground for suspension of arraignment, the suspension cannot exceed 60 days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. After that period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused. Here, more than one year and one month elapsed from the suspension to the reinstatement order, far beyond the allowable 60 days. The DOJ’s delay did not extend the period, and petitioners themselves contributed to the delay by not promptly complying with DOJ requirements. No compelling reasons warranted relaxation of the procedural rule.

• Right to Complete Preliminary Investigation: The Information was not fatally premature. Petitioners were afforded the right to move for reconsideration: they filed a joint “Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for the Withdrawal of the Information Prematurely Filed” under the NPS Rule on Appeal and the Manual for Prosecutors. Perez submitted his counter-affidavit and rejoinder; Aguinaldo, though not personally notified before the Information was filed, relied on Perez’s pleadings in her motion for reconsideration. Because they were given a fair opportunity to be heard, due process was satisfied. The pendency of a motion for reconsideration or a petition for review does not justify quashing a warrant of arrest, which may be quashed only upon a finding of no probable cause.

• Mandatory 60-Day Limit on Suspension of Arraignment — Under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the suspension of arraignment based on a pending petition for review with the DOJ or the Office of the President cannot exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the petition. The period is mandatory, not directory. Once it expires, the trial court must proceed with the arraignment; the delay of the reviewing office in resolving the petition does not authorize an indefinite suspension. (Citing Samson v. Daway, 478 Phil. 784; Diño v. Olivarez, 608 Phil. 362.)

• Pendency of Review Not a Ground to Quash Warrant of Arrest — A pending motion for reconsideration, motion for reinvestigation, or petition for review is not a cause for the quashal of a warrant of arrest. A warrant may be quashed only upon a judicial finding that no probable cause exists.

• Completion of Preliminary Investigation and Due Process — The right to a preliminary investigation is satisfied when the accused is afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to be heard, whether through oral arguments or pleadings. The filing of a motion for reconsideration of an adverse prosecutor’s resolution is an integral part of due process in preliminary investigation; once that opportunity is given and actually utilized, the subsequent filing of an Information does not violate the right to a complete investigation.

• Strict Application of Reglementary Periods — Rules of procedure, particularly provisions on reglementary periods, are strictly applied to prevent needless delays. Relaxation or suspension of such rules is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it. (Citing Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, 658 SCRA 569.)

• “While they are correct in stating that the right to preliminary investigation is a substantive, not merely a procedural right, petitioners are wrong in arguing that the Information filed, without affording the respondent his right to file a motion for reconsideration of an adverse DOJ resolution, is fatally premature.”

• “With more than eleven (11) years having elapsed from the filing of the petition for review and petitioners have yet to be arraigned, it is now high time for the continuation of the trial on the merits in the criminal case below, as the 60-day period counted from the filing of the petition for review with the DOJ had long lapsed.”

• “Due process simply demands an opportunity to be heard. Due process is satisfied when the parties are afforded a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy. Where an opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.”

• “Relaxation or suspension of procedural rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted only by compelling reasons or when the purpose of justice requires it.”

• Samson v. Judge Daway, 478 Phil. 784 (2004) — Followed. Established the mandatory nature of the 60-day suspension period for arraignment under Section 11(c), Rule 116, and the trial court’s duty to proceed after its expiration.

• Diño v. Olivarez, 608 Phil. 362 (2009) — Followed. Reiterated that indefinite suspension of criminal proceedings pending DOJ review is not sanctioned; the reviewing authority must resolve appeals within the period prescribed by Department Memorandum Order No. 12.

• Sales v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 176 (2001) — Distinguished. In Sales, the accused was denied the right to move for reconsideration before the Information was filed under Ombudsman rules; here, petitioners were afforded and actually filed a motion for reconsideration.

• Heirs of Feraren v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 159328, October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 569 — Followed. Affirmed the strict observance of reglementary periods to prevent needless delays.

• Section 11(c), Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Provides that arraignment may be suspended when a petition for review of the prosecutor’s resolution is pending before the DOJ or the Office of the President, but the suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days from the filing of the petition. Strictly applied to uphold the setting of arraignment after the period had long expired.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(a), Revised Penal Code — Defines estafa committed by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of the fraud. The substantive elements were not at issue; the case concerned interlocutory orders in the criminal proceeding for this offense.

• Section 56, Manual for Prosecutors — Recognizes that a motion for reconsideration is part of due process in preliminary investigation. Relied upon to show that petitioners’ filing of a motion for reconsideration fulfilled the requirement of a complete preliminary investigation.

• Section 3, 2000 NPS Rule on Appeal (Department Circular No. 70) — Prescribes the period to appeal an adverse resolution; referenced to establish that the motion for reconsideration procedure was available and utilized by petitioners.

• Circular No. 38-98 (Implementing Republic Act No. 8493, Speedy Trial Act), Section 9(3) — Excludes from the computation of the time for trial the delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders. The Court directed the trial court to observe this circular strictly upon remand.

Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Bienvenido L. Reyes, Francis H. Jardeleza.

N/A — The decision was unanimous; no dissenting opinions were recorded.