Aguinaldo vs. Santos

A public official who is re-elected to the same office cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, as re-election operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor.

Petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having won the local elections on January 17, 1988, for a four-year term. The Secretary of Local Government exercised disciplinary authority over elective local officials under Sections 60 to 67, Chapter 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, the then-existing Local Government Code, which remained in force despite the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution pending enactment of a new local government code. The constitutional basis for the Secretary's power derived from the President's power of control over executive departments and general supervision over local governments, with the Secretary acting as the President's alter ego.

Petitioner Rodolfo E. Aguinaldo was the duly elected Governor of the province of Cagayan, having won the local elections held on January 17, 1988, to serve a four-year term. He took his oath sometime around March 1988. The events giving rise to this case occurred in the aftermath of the December 1989 coup d'état.

Shortly after the coup was crushed, respondent Secretary of Local Government Luis Santos sent a telegram and a letter, both dated December 4, 1989, requiring petitioner to show cause within forty-eight hours from receipt why he should not be suspended or removed from office for disloyalty to the Republic. On December 7, 1989, a sworn complaint for disloyalty to the Republic and culpable violation of the Constitution was filed by Veronico Agatep, Manuel Mamba, and Orlino Agatep—respectively the mayors of the municipalities of Gattaran, Tuao, and Lasam, all in Cagayan—against petitioner for acts he committed during the coup. Petitioner was required to file a verified answer to the complaint.

On January 5, 1990, the Department of Local Government received a letter from petitioner dated December 29, 1989, in reply to the Secretary's December 4 letter. In his reply, petitioner denied being privy to the planning of the coup or actively participating in its execution, though he admitted that he was sympathetic to the cause of the rebel soldiers. The Secretary considered this reply as petitioner's answer to the complaint and, on the basis thereof, suspended petitioner from office for sixty days pending the outcome of the formal investigation.

During the hearing conducted on the charges, complainants presented testimonial and documentary evidence to prove the charges. Petitioner neither presented evidence nor cross-examined the complainants' witnesses, choosing instead to move that the Secretary inhibit himself from deciding the case—a motion that was denied. Thereafter, the Secretary rendered the questioned decision finding petitioner guilty as charged and ordering his removal from office. Vice-Governor Melvin Vargas was installed as Governor in the process.

While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Governor of Cagayan for the May 11, 1992 elections. Three separate petitions for his disqualification were filed, all based on the ground that he had been removed from office by virtue of the Secretary's March 19, 1990 resolution. The Commission on Elections granted the petitions by way of a resolution dated May 9, 1992, but clarified on the same day that, since its resolutions become final and executory only after five days from promulgation, petitioner could still be voted upon pending the final outcome of the disqualification cases. Petitioner won by a landslide margin, garnering 170,382 votes against his nearest rival's 54,412. On June 9, 1992, the Court annulled the COMELEC's May 9 resolution on the ground that the Secretary's decision had not yet attained finality, paving the way for petitioner's eventual proclamation as Governor.

• Repeal of Disciplinary Power: Petitioner argued that the power of the Secretary of Local Government to suspend or remove local government officials under Section 60, Chapter IV of B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, and that such power is now vested in the courts.
• Invalidity of Vargas's Appointment: Petitioner maintained that since the Secretary no longer had the power to suspend or remove him, the Secretary could not have appointed respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan.
• Quantum of Proof: Petitioner contended that the alleged act of disloyalty should be proved by proof beyond reasonable doubt, not by mere preponderance of evidence, because it is an act punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.

• Continuing Validity of Disciplinary Authority: Whether the power of the Secretary of Local Government to suspend or remove local government officials under B.P. Blg. 337 was repealed by the 1987 Constitution.
• Validity of Succession: Whether the Secretary of Local Government had authority to appoint respondent Melvin Vargas as Governor of Cagayan upon petitioner's removal.
• Quantum of Proof in Administrative Proceedings: Whether proof beyond reasonable doubt is required in administrative proceedings for disloyalty to the Republic, given that the same act is punishable as rebellion under the Revised Penal Code.
• Mootness by Re-election: Whether the administrative case was rendered moot and academic by petitioner's re-election to the position of Governor of Cagayan.

• Continuing Validity of Disciplinary Authority: No. The power of the Secretary of Local Government to remove local government officials was not repealed by the 1987 Constitution, being anchored on both constitutional provisions (Articles VII(17) and X(4)) and the statutory grant in B.P. Blg. 337, which remained in force pending enactment of a new local government code.
• Validity of Succession: No merit. Section 48(1) of B.P. Blg. 337 expressly provides that when a governor is removed from office, the vice-governor shall assume the office for the unexpired term.
• Quantum of Proof in Administrative Proceedings: No. Petitioner was being prosecuted administratively, not criminally; the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt.
• Mootness by Re-election: Yes. Petitioner's re-election rendered the administrative case moot and academic, re-election operating as a condonation of the officer's misconduct committed during a prior term.

• Continuing Validity of Disciplinary Authority: The Court found the power of the Secretary to remove local government officials anchored on both constitutional and statutory bases. The constitutional basis is provided by Articles VII(17) and X(4) of the 1987 Constitution, which vest in the President the power of control over all executive departments and general supervision over local governments, and by the doctrine that acts of the department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected. The statutory grant in B.P. Blg. 337 has constitutional roots, having been enacted pursuant to Article XI, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution, which authorized the legislature to provide for the "qualifications, election and removal" of local government officials. A similar provision is found in Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which likewise authorizes Congress to "provide for the qualifications, election, appointment, and removal" of local officials. Since the authority to enact a local government code providing for removal of local officials is found in both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, B.P. Blg. 337 was not repealed by the present Constitution. The Court cited Bagabuyo vs. Davide, Jr. for the proposition that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution until the proposed Local Government Code of 1991 was approved.

• Validity of Succession: The Court found petitioner's argument devoid of merit by pointing to Section 48(1) of B.P. Blg. 337, which expressly provides that when a permanent vacancy arises because a governor is "removed from office," the vice-governor shall assume the office for the unexpired term. Since the Secretary's power to remove was valid, the succession of the vice-governor followed as a matter of statutory operation.

• Quantum of Proof in Administrative Proceedings: The Court rejected petitioner's claim that proof beyond reasonable doubt was required. Petitioner was not being prosecuted criminally under the Revised Penal Code but administratively, with the end in view of removing him as Governor for acts of disloyalty to the Republic. In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is only substantial evidence, citing Ang Tibay vs. CIT and Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat.

• Mootness by Re-election: The Court found the petition meritorious on this ground. After the canvassing of votes, petitioner garnered the most number of votes among the candidates for governor, winning by a landslide margin. Citing Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija and Lizares vs. Hechanova, the Court applied the rule that offenses committed or acts done during a previous term are generally held not to furnish cause for removal, especially where the Constitution provides that the penalty in removal proceedings shall not extend beyond removal from office and disqualification from holding office for a term. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and re-election operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The Court emphasized that it should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term, as to do otherwise would deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. The condonation doctrine, however, finds no application to criminal cases pending against petitioner for acts he may have committed during the failed coup.

• Condonation Doctrine — A public official cannot be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, because re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor. The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms. When the people elect a man to office, it must be assumed they did so with knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his fault or misconduct. It is not for the court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, to practically overrule the will of the people. The Court applied this doctrine to reverse the Secretary's removal of petitioner, as petitioner's re-election as Governor of Cagayan rendered the administrative case moot and academic. The doctrine does not apply to criminal cases pending against the official for the same acts.

• Substantial Evidence in Administrative Proceedings — In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required is substantial evidence, not proof beyond reasonable doubt, even where the acts charged are also punishable as criminal offenses under the Revised Penal Code. The Court applied this principle to reject petitioner's argument that disloyalty to the Republic, being punishable as rebellion under Article 137 of the Revised Penal Code, required proof beyond reasonable doubt in the administrative context.

• Alter Ego Doctrine — The acts of a department head are presumptively the acts of the President unless expressly rejected by him. The Court relied on this doctrine to establish the constitutional basis for the Secretary of Local Government's power to remove local officials, as the Secretary acts as the President's alter ego in the exercise of the President's power of control over executive departments and general supervision over local governments.

• "The weight of authority, however, seems to incline to the ruled denying the right to remove from office because of misconduct during a prior term to which we fully subscribe." — This passage, quoted from Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, articulates the core principle underlying the condonation doctrine as applied in this case.

• "The underlying theory is that each term is separate from other terms, and that the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the officer's misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." — This is the canonical formulation of the condonation doctrine's rationale, quoted from American jurisprudence and adopted by the Philippine Supreme Court.

• "The Court should ever remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprive the people of their right to elect their officers." — This passage states the democratic rationale for the condonation doctrine: the people's electoral will should not be overridden by courts removing an official for prior-term misconduct.

• "Clear then, the rule is that a public official can not be removed for administrative misconduct committed during a prior term, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of the officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him therefor." — This is the Court's own synthesis of the condonation doctrine as the dispositive rule in this case, with the important qualification that it does not apply to criminal cases.

• Pascual vs. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, L-11959, October 31, 1959 — Controlling precedent for the condonation doctrine. The Court quoted extensively from this case to establish the rule that a public official cannot be removed for misconduct during a prior term, as re-election operates as condonation.
• Lizares vs. Hechanova, 17 SCRA 58 (1966) — Followed. Cited within the Pascual quotation for the proposition that the court should never remove a public officer for acts done prior to his present term, as to do so would deprive the people of their right to elect their officers.
• Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163 (1974) — Followed. Cited alongside Lizares as additional authority supporting the condonation doctrine.
• Bagabuyo vs. Davide, Jr., G.R. No. 87233, September 21, 1989 — Followed. Cited for the proposition that B.P. Blg. 337 remained in force despite the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution until the new Local Government Code was approved.
• Santos vs. Villacete, G.R. No. 91522, January 25, 1990 — Followed. Cited in a footnote for the proposition that the validity of the Secretary's action in treating petitioner's reply as his answer to the complaint was upheld by the Court.
• Aguinaldo vs. Comelec, G.R. Nos. 105128-30, June 9, 1992 — Related case. The Court's resolution in this companion case annulled the COMELEC's disqualification resolution on the ground that the Secretary's removal decision had not attained finality, paving the way for petitioner's proclamation as Governor.
• Ang Tibay vs. CIT, 69 Phil. 635 — Followed. Cited for the principle that substantial evidence is the quantum of proof required in administrative proceedings.
• Air Manila, Inc. vs. Balatbat, 38 SCRA 489 — Followed. Cited alongside Ang Tibay for the substantial evidence standard in administrative cases.
• Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451 (1951) — Followed. Cited for the alter ego doctrine, supporting the constitutional basis for the Secretary's power as the President's alter ego.
• Federation of Free Workers vs. Inciong, 161 SCRA 295 (1988) — Followed. Cited for the alter ego doctrine and presidential power of control.

• Section 60, Chapter IV, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) — Provides the grounds for suspension or removal of elective local officials, including disloyalty to the Republic, culpable violation of the Constitution, dishonesty, oppression, misconduct in office, neglect of duty, commission of any offense involving moral turpitude, abuse of authority, and unauthorized absence for three consecutive months. The Court held that this provision remained in force under the 1987 Constitution and was the basis for the Secretary's power to remove petitioner.
• Section 48(1), Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 — Provides that when a permanent vacancy arises because a governor is removed from office, the vice-governor shall assume the office for the unexpired term. Applied to uphold the validity of Vargas's succession as Governor.
• Article VII, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Vests in the President the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus, and offices. Cited as constitutional basis for the Secretary's disciplinary authority as the President's alter ego.
• Article X, Section 4, 1987 Constitution — Vests in the President the power of general supervision over local governments. Cited alongside Article VII(17) as constitutional basis for the Secretary's power.
• Article X, Section 3, 1987 Constitution — Directs Congress to enact a local government code providing for the qualifications, election, appointment, and removal of local officials. Cited to show that the 1987 Constitution, like the 1973 Constitution, authorizes the legislature to provide for removal of local officials, thus B.P. Blg. 337 was not repealed.
• Article XI, Section 2, 1973 Constitution — Authorized the National Assembly to enact a local government code providing for the qualifications, election, and removal of local government officials. Cited as the original constitutional basis for B.P. Blg. 337.
• Article 137, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes disloyalty to the Republic as rebellion. Petitioner argued this required proof beyond reasonable doubt; the Court rejected this, holding that the administrative case required only substantial evidence.

Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, and Bellosillo, JJ., concurred. Melo, J., took no part.