Aguinaldo vs. Aguinaldo

A final and executory judgment may be executed against the heirs or legal representatives substituted for a deceased defendant under Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court, and the defendant’s counsel’s failure to comply with the duty to inform the court of the death and furnish their names and residences cannot be used as a technicality to defeat execution.

Victoria and Simeona Aguinaldo are the plaintiffs-appellees, while the defendants-appellants are the legitimate children and granddaughter of Segundo Aguinaldo. The dispute concerns the enforcement of a judgment over property and annual payments in favor of Victoria and Simeona. The procedural backdrop is Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which requires a party’s attorney to inform the court promptly of the party’s death, incapacity, or incompetency and to give the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian, or other legal representative.

On March 31, 1958, the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, Branch II rendered a decision in favor of plaintiffs Victoria and Simeona Aguinaldo, requiring defendant Segundo Aguinaldo to reconvey one-fourth pro-indiviso of the property in litigation and to pay P300.00 yearly beginning 1955. The decision was appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed it on May 23, 1965. On January 14, 1965, the CFI issued a writ of execution reciting that as far back as March 31, 1958 it had rendered the decision, that the decision was affirmed by the CA on May 23, 1965, and that on January 5, 1965 a motion for execution was granted.

On February 13, 1965, Cecilio Aguinaldo filed an urgent ex parte manifestation and motion to quash the writ, based primarily on the allegation that Segundo Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the pendency of the appeal. On February 25, 1965, plaintiffs opposed the motion, invoking Sec. 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, which requires the attorney of a party to a pending case to inform the court promptly of the party’s death and to give the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian, or other legal representative. They alleged that counsel failed to comply with this provision and prayed that the motion be denied and that counsel for defendants be ordered to furnish the names and residences of the heirs or legal representatives of the deceased so that the final and executory decision would not be rendered nugatory.

On March 4, 1965, the lower court, presided by Judge Ricardo C. Puno, gave counsel of record until March 22, 1965 to submit the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian, or other legal representative of deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. On March 23, 1965, the counsel manifested that he had ceased to be counsel as of May 31, 1956 and asked that the pleading be considered sufficient compliance with the order.

Because of this turn of events, plaintiffs moved on April 7, 1965 to substitute the heirs of deceased Segundo Aguinaldo—Cecilio, Anastacia, Simplicio, and Domingo Aguinaldo, his legitimate children, and Felicitas Bagawisan, a granddaughter—as defendants. On October 5, 1965, the lower court, presided by Judge Andres Sta. Maria, granted the motion and substituted the defendants in place of deceased Segundo Aguinaldo. Defendants appealed to the CA, which by resolution of February 17, 1969 certified the matter to the SC because the question involved was one of law.

• Death of Defendant: Defendants-appellants, through Cecilio Aguinaldo, moved to quash the writ of execution on the ground that Segundo Aguinaldo died on August 7, 1959 during the pendency of the appeal.

• Duty Under Sec. 16, Rule 3: Plaintiffs-appellees countered that Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court required the attorney of a party to a pending case to inform the court promptly of the party’s death and to give the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian, or other legal representative; that counsel for defendants failed to comply; and that the motion to quash should be denied and counsel ordered to furnish the names and residences of the heirs or legal representatives so that the final and executory decision would not be rendered nugatory.

• Substitution of Deceased Defendant: Whether the lower court properly ordered the substitution of the deceased defendant’s heirs/legal representatives under Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court so that a final and executory judgment could be executed.

• Substitution of Deceased Defendant: Yes. The lower court properly ordered substitution under Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court; the death of Segundo during the pendency of the appeal did not prevent execution of the final and executory judgment, and counsel’s failure to comply with the rule could not be used to defeat it.

• Substitution of Deceased Defendant: The SC held that the lower court did not err in embodying in its order what is set forth in Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court: whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it is the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative. Had the defendant, thereafter deceased, seen to it that a new counsel was appointed, then upon his death there could be compliance with the provision. The SC said it would be the height of unreason to impute error to the lower court for applying the Rules and to cause plaintiffs to suffer for counsel’s neglect. The judgment had become final and the stage of execution reached; defendants could not be heard to allege that it was too late to apply the rule. The SC relied on Amor vs. Jugo, Li Kim Tho vs. Sanchez, and Villaflor vs. Reyes for the principle that once a judgment becomes final, the winning party must not be deprived of its fruits through a mere subterfuge, and courts should frown upon attempts to prolong litigation. The appeal was predicated on an insubstantial objection; procedural rules are designed to render justice, and attempts to pervert their ends deserve condemnation.

• Finality of Judgment / Execution of Final and Executory Judgment — Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the winning party is entitled to execution; courts must guard against schemes or technicalities that delay or defeat enforcement. The SC applied this where the defendant died during the appeal and counsel failed to comply with Sec. 16, Rule 3; the final judgment could be executed against substituted heirs/legal representatives.
• Substitution of Deceased Party under Sec. 16, Rule 3 — Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated, or incompetent, the attorney has the duty to inform the court promptly and give the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian, or other legal representative. The SC held the lower court properly ordered substitution of the deceased defendant’s heirs/legal representatives to allow execution.
• Technicalities and Procedural Rules — Procedural rules are designed to accomplish justice; attempts to pervert their ends deserve condemnation. The SC rejected the appeal as an insubstantial technical objection.

• “Any effort on the litigant to delay, if not to defeat, the enforcement of a final judgment, executory in character, by raising an objection that at best hardly rises to the level of a technicality is not likely to elicit the sympathy of this Court or any court for that matter.” — The SC opened with this principle to frame the appeal as an attempt to delay enforcement of a final judgment through a technicality.
• “Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated or incompetent, it shall be the duty of his attorney to inform the court promptly of such death, incapacity or incompetency, and to give the name and residence of his executor, administrator, guardian or other legal representative.” — This is the Sec. 16, Rule 3 rule that the SC held the lower court merely embodied in its substitution order.
• “Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party be not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the fruits of the verdict.” — The SC quoted this from Li Kim Tho vs. Sanchez to support the finality and execution principle.
• “The aim of a lawsuit is to render justice to the parties according to law. Procedural rules are precisely designed to accomplish such a worthy objective.” — The SC used this to reject the appeal’s reliance on a technical objection.

• Amor vs. Jugo, 77 Phil. 703 (1946) — Relied on for the rule that a court cannot refuse to issue a writ of execution, or quash it or order its stay, when the judgment has been reviewed and affirmed by an appellate court.
• Li Kim Tho vs. Sanchez, 82 Phil. 776 (1949) — Relied on for the principle that litigation must end and that a winning party must not be deprived of the fruits of a final judgment through a mere subterfuge.
• Villaflor vs. Reyes, L-23702, January 30, 1968, 22 SCRA 385 — Relied on for the warning that the judiciary’s time should not be wasted by efforts to evade the operation of a final and executory decision.
• Alonso vs. Villamor, 16 Phil. 315 — Relied on for the SC’s disapproval of attempts to pervert procedural rules through technicalities.

• Sec. 16, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Whenever a party to a pending case dies, becomes incapacitated, or incompetent, the attorney must inform the court promptly and give the name and residence of the executor, administrator, guardian, or other legal representative. The SC applied it to uphold the order requiring counsel to furnish the names/residences and the substitution of heirs/legal representatives to allow execution.