Aguiling vs. People of the Philippines

A trial court does not commit grave abuse of discretion in overruling the prosecution's objection to a plea bargaining proposal that conforms to the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, where the objection is based solely on the proposal's inconsistency with an internal DOJ guideline rather than on substantive grounds such as recidivism, strong evidence of guilt, or the accused's character.

Petitioner Jan Michael B. Aguiling was charged with violations of Article II, Sections 5, 11, and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) before Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City. Two parallel regulatory regimes governed plea bargaining in drug cases: the Supreme Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases (A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC), issued on April 10, 2018, and the Department of Justice's own guidelines (DOJ Circular No. 27, dated June 26, 2018, later amended by DOJ Circular No. 18, dated May 10, 2022). A conflict existed between the two frameworks regarding the acceptable lesser offense for plea bargaining from a Section 5 charge: the Court's framework allowed Section 12 as the lesser offense for quantities of shabu ranging from 0.01 to 0.99 gram, while DOJ Circular No. 27 limited the lesser offense to Section 11. This inconsistency became the crux of the prosecution's objection to Aguiling's plea bargaining proposal.

Jan Michael B. Aguiling was charged in three separate Informations, all dated October 10, 2016, before Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Sixth Judicial Region. The charges pertained to violations of Article II, Sections 5, 11, and 12 of Republic Act No. 9165: the illegal sale of 0.0131 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu); the illegal possession of two heat-sealed transparent sachets containing 0.0094 gram and 0.0110 gram, respectively, of the same dangerous drug; and the illegal possession of drug apparatus and paraphernalia. When arraigned on March 2, 2017, Aguiling pleaded not guilty to all offenses charged, and trial ensued.

During the presentation of the prosecution's evidence, Aguiling filed a Proposal for Plea Bargaining dated May 29, 2018. Citing A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, he asserted that he may be allowed to plead guilty to the lesser offense of violating Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165 in lieu of his violations of Sections 5 and 11 in Criminal Case Nos. C-474-16 and C-475-16. He likewise sought to plead guilty to violating Section 15 of the same law in substitution for his Section 12 violation in Criminal Case No. C-476-16. On July 25, 2018, the prosecution filed a Comment/Objection, contending that DOJ Circular No. 27 provides that in cases involving a violation of Section 5, the accused may only plead guilty to a lesser offense under Section 11. Because Aguiling proposed to plead guilty to a violation of Section 12, which was not permitted under DOJ Circular No. 27, the prosecution maintained that it could not consent to the proposed plea bargain.

In an Order dated April 15, 2019, the RTC granted Aguiling's Proposal for Plea Bargaining despite the prosecution's opposition. Aguiling was re-arraigned for the downgraded offenses of violations of Sections 12 and 15 of Republic Act No. 9165. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied in an Order dated April 26, 2019. Thereafter, in its Decision dated May 6, 2019, the RTC cited A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and the ruling in Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo as bases for allowing the plea bargain, and found Aguiling guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the lesser offenses. The People, through the Office of the Solicitor General, elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Certiorari, arguing that the public prosecutor's consent is required in plea bargaining and that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the proposal over the prosecution's objection. The CA granted the petition, reversing the RTC's orders and decision and ordering the trial court to proceed with trial. Aguiling's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting the present petition.

• CA's Broad Ruling on Consent: Aguiling asserted that the CA gravely erred in broadly ruling that a plea bargain entered into without the consent of the prosecution is void, as this contradicts the Court's position set forth in A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.
• DOJ Circular No. 18 as Cure: Aguiling contended that the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 18 has effectively addressed and cured the issue of lack of prosecutorial consent, since the amended circular now conforms to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC regarding the acceptable plea bargain from Section 5 to Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9165.

• Prosecutorial Consent Required: The OSG averred that under the Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence, the public prosecutor's consent is required in plea bargaining, and the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the plea bargaining proposal over the prosecution's objection.
• Inconsistency with DOJ Circular No. 27: The prosecution contended that DOJ Circular No. 27 provides that in cases involving a violation of Section 5, the accused may only plead guilty to a lesser offense under Section 11, and since Aguiling proposed to plead guilty to a violation of Section 12, which is not permitted under the circular, the prosecution could not consent to the proposal.
• Consensus Not Reached: The prosecution maintained that the parties failed to reach a consensus on the plea bargain, as the prosecution rejected Aguiling's proposals for contravening DOJ Circular No. 27, and that the matter of consent to a plea of guilty to a lesser penalty is solely within the prosecution's discretion.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it accepted Aguiling's plea bargaining proposal despite the prosecution's objection.
• Validity of Prosecution's Objection: Whether the prosecution's objection, based solely on the inconsistency between DOJ Circular No. 27 and the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework, is a valid ground to deny plea bargaining.
• Necessity of Remand: Whether the case should be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings to assess the strength of the prosecution's evidence and the character of the accused.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The RTC did not act with grave abuse of discretion in allowing the plea bargain, as it exercised its sound discretion in accordance with the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases rather than the prosecution's stance anchored on DOJ Circular No. 27.
• Validity of Prosecution's Objection: No. The prosecution's objection, based solely on the inconsistency between DOJ Circular No. 27 and the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework, was properly overruled; all other possible grounds not raised by the prosecution are deemed waived under the Omnibus Motion Rule principle adopted in Aquino vs. People.
• Necessity of Remand: No. No remand is necessary because the prosecution's objection was based solely on a ground that the trial court correctly overruled, and the remaining grounds were deemed waived, in faithful adherence to the supplementary guidelines in Aquino vs. People.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: A Petition under Rule 65 imposes a stringent standard, requiring a showing that the assailed act is marred by grave abuse of discretion — a capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power so blatant and egregious as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a legal obligation. Certiorari is designed to rectify errors of jurisdiction, not mere errors of law. When assessed against this standard, the RTC's Decision and Order permitting Aguiling to enter into a plea bargain were not tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The RTC adhered to the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases rather than the prosecution's stance that DOJ Circular No. 27 prohibits the plea bargain. The RTC simply exercised its discretion and resolved the matter in accordance with the law and applicable rules. There was no showing that the RTC was motivated by any desire to abuse its power or to prejudice the parties arbitrarily or despotically. While plea bargaining necessitates the agreement of both parties, Section 2 of Rule 116 grants the trial court discretion in determining whether to permit the accused to enter such a plea; the final approval rests within the sound discretion of the court.

• Validity of Prosecution's Objection: The proposed plea bargain aligns with the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases. Aguiling was charged with a violation of Section 5 for the sale of 0.0131 gram of shabu, and the RTC permitted him to plead guilty to the lesser offense under Section 12, as the framework explicitly provides that when the charge involves a Section 5 violation and the quantity of shabu seized ranges from 0.01 to 0.99 gram, the appropriate lesser offense is Section 12. The trial court properly overruled the prosecution's objection, which was based solely on the argument that the proposal was inconsistent with DOJ Circular No. 27, despite being fully compliant with the Court's framework. In any event, the prosecution's objection is deemed withdrawn with the issuance of DOJ Circular No. 18, which explicitly recognizes Section 12 as the appropriate lesser offense. Under People vs. Montierro, courts have the authority to dismiss the prosecution's objections to plea bargain proposals in drug-related cases when the objections are based solely on the assertion that the proposal does not align with DOJ internal rules or guidelines, although it adheres to the Court's framework. Furthermore, under the supplementary guidelines in Aquino vs. People, where the prosecution's objection is anchored only on one or a few — but not all — grounds for opposing the proposal, all other possible grounds not raised shall be deemed waived, applying the principle behind the Omnibus Motion Rule in Rule 15, Section 8 of the Rules of Court.

• Necessity of Remand: In previous cases, the Court resolved similar issues by remanding to the court of origin under the Montierro guidelines, which led to further delays, particularly where matters already adjudicated with sentences imposed were required to be revisited to reassess the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence and the character of the accused, notwithstanding the absence of any objection on these grounds. This inordinate delay was addressed in Aquino vs. People, which promulgated supplementary guidelines providing that where the prosecution's objection is based solely on a ground the trial court correctly overruled, all other grounds not raised are deemed waived. Because the prosecution's objection here was based solely on the inconsistency between DOJ Circular No. 27 and the Court's framework — a ground the trial court correctly overruled — the Court found no necessity to remand. The RTC's Orders and Decision were reinstated.

• Plea Bargaining in Drug Cases — Plea bargaining is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of a case subject to court approval. In drug cases, the Supreme Court issued A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC establishing a uniform framework for plea bargaining, which all trial courts must implement. While plea bargaining requires mutual agreement of the parties, the final approval rests within the sound discretion of the court. Courts may overrule the prosecution's objection if it is based solely on the ground that the proposal is inconsistent with DOJ internal guidelines, provided the proposal conforms to the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion Standard in Certiorari — Grave abuse of discretion refers to a capricious, arbitrary, or whimsical exercise of power, so blatant and egregious as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a legal obligation, or where power is wielded arbitrarily and despotically, driven by passion or hostility. A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is designed to rectify errors of jurisdiction, not mere errors of law. The RTC's adherence to the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework instead of the prosecution's stance did not constitute grave abuse of discretion.

• Omnibus Motion Rule Applied to Prosecution Objections in Plea Bargaining — Under the supplementary guidelines in Aquino vs. People, where the prosecution's objection to a plea bargaining proposal is anchored only on one or a few — but not all — grounds for opposing such proposal, all other possible grounds not raised shall be deemed waived, applying the principle behind the Omnibus Motion Rule in Rule 15, Section 8 of the Rules of Court. This prevents inordinate delay from requiring trial courts to determine the existence and propriety of grounds for objection that the prosecution itself did not raise.

• Aquino vs. People Supplementary Guidelines on Plea Bargaining in Drug Cases — The Court promulgated fourteen guidelines supplementing those in Montierro, including: (1) offers must be initiated in writing by formal motion; (2) the lesser offense must necessarily be included in the offense charged; (3) drug dependency assessment must be administered upon receipt of a compliant proposal; (4) plea bargaining requires mutual agreement but remains subject to court approval and is not demandable as a matter of right; (5) grounds not raised by the prosecution are deemed waived under the Omnibus Motion Rule principle; (6) plea bargaining shall not be allowed if the objection is valid and supported by evidence showing the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known drug addict or troublemaker, has relapsed after rehabilitation, has been charged many times, or when evidence of guilt is strong; (7) plea bargaining shall not be allowed when the proposal does not conform to the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework; (8) judges may overrule objections based solely on inconsistency with DOJ internal guidelines; (9) if the prosecution objects on grounds in item 6, the trial court must hear and rule on the merits; (10) probation law applies for offenses other than illegal drug trafficking under Section 5 in relation to Section 24; (11) where the prosecution raises multiple grounds but the trial court rules on only one, the appellate court or Supreme Court shall direct the trial court to rule on pending issues; (12) where records are incomplete, the trial court shall be directed to rule again; (13) if the trial court or appellate court ruled correctly, the correct judgment shall be reinstated or affirmed; (14) where both ruled incorrectly, a new judgment shall be entered directing the trial court to allow plea bargaining and render a guilty verdict.

• "Forcing a trial court to make a determination as to the existence and propriety of grounds for objecting to a plea bargaining proposal where the prosecution itself did not even bother to propound such grounds in the first place is akin to arrogating upon such court the power to determine whether to interpose an objection, what ground to use for such objection, both of which are highly critical determinations reserved solely for the Executive." — This passage, quoted from Aquino vs. People, articulates the rationale for applying the Omnibus Motion Rule principle to prosecution objections in plea bargaining, preventing courts from having to supply grounds the prosecution itself did not raise.

• "In effect, where the prosecution's objection is anchored only on one or a few—but not all—grounds for opposing such proposal, all other possible grounds not thus raised shall be deemed waived." — This states the operative rule adopted from the Omnibus Motion Rule, establishing that the prosecution waives all unraised grounds when it objects to a plea bargaining proposal on only some grounds.

• "Thus, by adhering to the Plea Bargaining Framework in Drug Cases instead of the prosecution's stance that DOJ Circular No. 27 prohibits plea bargaining in Aguiling's case, the RTC simply exercised its discretion and resolved the matter in accordance with the law and the applicable rules." — This passage explains why the RTC's acceptance of the plea bargain did not constitute grave abuse of discretion, distinguishing between a trial court's exercise of sound discretion and an arbitrary or despotic act.

• Estipona vs. Judge Lobrigo, 816 Phil. 789 (2017) — Controlling precedent. The Court expressly recognized the permissibility of plea bargaining in illegal drugs cases, leading to the issuance of A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC. The RTC cited this ruling as a basis for allowing the plea bargain.

• People vs. Montierro, 926 Phil. 430 (2022) — Controlling precedent. The Court En Banc determined that courts have the authority to dismiss the prosecution's objections to plea bargain proposals in drug-related cases when the objections are based solely on inconsistency with DOJ internal guidelines, provided the proposal conforms to the Court's framework. This case established the baseline guidelines supplemented by Aquino.

• Aquino vs. People, G.R. No. 259094, January 28, 2025 — Controlling precedent. The Court promulgated supplementary guidelines to those in Montierro, applying the Omnibus Motion Rule principle to prosecution objections in plea bargaining and establishing a fourteen-point framework. The Court applied these guidelines to find that no remand was necessary because the prosecution's unraised grounds were deemed waived.

• Tresvalles vs. People, G.R. No. 260214, April 17, 2023 — Followed. Cited for the definition of grave abuse of discretion and the standard for certiorari under Rule 65, and for the proposition that a Section 5 charge involving 0.01 to 0.99 gram of shabu permits plea bargaining to Section 12 under the Plea Bargaining Framework.

• Sayre vs. Judge Xenos, 871 Phil. 86 (2020) — Cited for the definition of plea bargaining as a process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a mutually satisfactory disposition subject to court approval.

• People vs. Vianzon and San Pedro, G.R. No. 255031, January 17, 2023 — Cited for the distinction between A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC and DOJ Circular No. 27 regarding the acceptable lesser offense for Section 5 violations.

• Section 2, Rule 116, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure — Governs plea of guilty to a lesser offense, providing that the accused, with the consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court to plead guilty to a lesser offense necessarily included in the offense charged. The Court interpreted this provision as granting the trial court discretion in determining whether to permit the accused to enter such a plea, while acknowledging that the final approval rests within the court's sound discretion.

• A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC (Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases) — Issued April 10, 2018, establishing a uniform framework for plea bargaining in drug-related cases. It provides that a violation of Section 5 involving 0.01 to 0.99 gram of shabu may be plea-bargained to Section 12 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus, and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs). The Court held that Aguiling's proposal conformed to this framework.

• DOJ Circular No. 27 — Dated June 26, 2018, providing prosecutors with guidelines for evaluating plea bargaining proposals. It limited the acceptable lesser offense for Section 5 violations to Section 11, creating a conflict with the Court's framework. The Court held that objections based solely on this circular were properly overruled.

• DOJ Circular No. 18 — Dated May 10, 2022, amending DOJ Circular No. 27 to conform to A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, specifically recognizing Section 12 as the appropriate lesser offense for Section 5 violations. The Court noted that this circular effectively withdrew the prosecution's objection.

• Rule 15, Section 8, Rules of Court (Omnibus Motion Rule) — Provides that a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not included shall be deemed waived. The Court applied this principle to prosecution objections in plea bargaining, holding that grounds not raised are deemed waived.

• Article II, Sections 5, 11, 12, and 15, Republic Act No. 9165 — The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Section 5 penalizes the sale of dangerous drugs; Section 11 penalizes possession of dangerous drugs; Section 12 penalizes possession of drug paraphernalia; and Section 15 penalizes use of dangerous drugs. Aguiling was originally charged under Sections 5, 11, and 12, and was convicted after plea bargaining of violations of Sections 12 and 15.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, and Dimaampao, JJ., concurred. Singh, J., was on leave.