Aguilar vs. People

A trial court may overrule the prosecution's objection to an accused's plea bargaining proposal in drugs cases where the objection rests solely on alleged inconsistency with internal Department of Justice rules but the proposal conforms to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases, unless disqualification is shown because the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known drug addict, relapsed rehabilitee, repeatedly charged, or the evidence of guilt is strong.

Edwin Aguilar y Duron was prosecuted by the State for alleged violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The Supreme Court had adopted a Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases under A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, upheld in Estipona vs. Lobrigo, permitting specified lesser pleas based on drug quantity. The Department of Justice maintained its own internal guidelines on acceptable plea bargains, creating the question of precedence addressed on review.

On July 23, 2018, two Informations were filed before the Regional Trial Court of Roxas City, Capiz against Edwin Aguilar y Duron for alleged violations of Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. In Criminal Case No. C-238-18, Aguilar was accused of selling and delivering on or about July 6, 2018 in Roxas City to PO2 Mark Durana, a police poseur-buyer, one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet marked BB-EDA containing 0.1510 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride for P1,000.00 without authority. In Criminal Case No. C-239-18, he was accused of having in his possession, control and custody on the same date and place seven heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets marked P-EDA-2 to P-EDA-8, weighing 0.0235 grams, 0.0151 grams, 0.0228 grams, 0.0428 grams, 0.3381 grams, 0.1477 grams and 0.1776 grams, respectively, with a total weight of 0.7676 grams, without legal authorization.

Upon arraignment on September 9, 2018, Aguilar pleaded not guilty, but manifested an intention to file a motion for plea bargaining. On August 9, 2018, he filed his Proposal for Plea Bargaining stating willingness, in consonance with A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, to plead guilty to violation of Section 12 of R.A. No. 9165, punishable by six months and one day to four years and a fine of P10,000.00 to P50,000.00, with discretion to impose a straight penalty within six months and one day to one year. On August 16, 2018, the prosecution filed its Comment/Objection registering objection because the proposal was not consistent with Department of Justice guidelines.

The trial court granted the proposal and, in its Decision dated December 11, 2018, found Aguilar guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 12 in both cases, imposing six months and one day to three years and P10,000.00 fine in C-238-18 and six months and one day to one year and P10,000.00 fine in C-239-18. The factual record noted that the drug dependency evaluation conducted upon Aguilar showed he was not drug dependent and did not need treatment and rehabilitation.

• Grave Error by the Court of Appeals: Petitioner maintained that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in granting the People's Petition for Certiorari and thereby nullifying and setting aside the trial court's Decision dated December 11, 2018 and Order dated January 25, 2019.

• Prosecution Consent as Condition Precedent: Respondent countered that the prosecution's consent to an accused's plea bargaining proposal is a condition precedent before the trial court can grant any plea bargaining agreement.
• No Blanket Authority Under Estipona and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC: Respondent argued that Estipona and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC did not give trial courts blanket authority to grant plea bargaining despite the prosecution's objection thereto.
• Consistency of DOJ Circular No. 027: Respondent maintained that DOJ Circular No. 027 is consistent with the spirit of Estipona and A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC.

• Consent and Judicial Discretion in Plea Bargaining: Whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in granting plea bargaining over the prosecution's objection based on inconsistency with DOJ guidelines.
• Remand for Disqualification Determination: Whether the cases must be remanded to determine if plea bargaining should be disallowed because the accused falls within enumerated disqualifying circumstances or the evidence of guilt is strong.

• Consent and Judicial Discretion in Plea Bargaining: No grave abuse was committed in overruling the objection, since an objection based solely on inconsistency with DOJ internal rules may be overruled when the proposal conforms to the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework, now reconciled with DOJ Circular No. 18.
• Remand for Disqualification Determination: Yes, remand is required, the record being bereft of evaluation whether Aguilar is a recidivist, habitual offender, known drug addict, relapsed rehabilitee, repeatedly charged, or whether evidence of guilt is strong.

• Consent and Judicial Discretion in Plea Bargaining: As a rule plea bargaining requires mutual agreement and remains subject to court approval, with acceptance to a lesser offense addressed to sound judicial discretion rather than demandable as a matter of right. Applying People vs. Montierro, DOJ Circular No. 18 reconciled any inconsistency by making Section 12 the acceptable plea for Section 5, consistent with the Court's Framework. Because the prosecution's objection rested solely on supposed inconsistency with DOJ guidelines, the trial court correctly overruled it pursuant to the rule permitting judges to do so when the proposal accords with the Court-issued framework.
• Remand for Disqualification Determination: Plea bargaining shall not be allowed when a valid objection supported by evidence shows the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known drug addict and troublemaker, relapsed after rehabilitation, or repeatedly charged, or when evidence of guilt is strong, in which case continuation of proceedings is mandated if the objection is meritorious. The records contained no indication that such evaluation was made, apart from the finding that Aguilar was not drug dependent, thus precluding final affirmance of the plea and requiring remand for determination of (a) disqualifying character/history and (b) strength of evidence.

• Plea bargaining in drugs cases — mutuality, judicial approval, and discretion — As a rule, plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of the court; even with agreement, acceptance of a guilty plea to a lesser offense is not demandable as a matter of right but lies entirely within the sound discretion of the court, taking into account relevant circumstances including the character of the accused. Applied to overrule automatic approval and to require judicial assessment despite party agreement.
• Plea bargaining — requisites of written offer, included offense, conformity, and dependency assessment — Offers must be initiated in writing by formal motion; the lesser offense proposed must necessarily be included in the offense charged; the proposal must conform to the Court-issued Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases; and upon receipt of a compliant proposal the judge shall order drug dependency assessment with treatment, crediting, or release consequences as prescribed. Applied as the framework for determining the validity of Aguilar's proposal to plead to Section 12.
• Plea bargaining — overruling DOJ-based objection vs. meritorious objections — Judges may overrule a prosecution objection based solely on inconsistency with DOJ internal rules or guidelines though the proposal accords with the Court framework; but the court shall not allow plea bargaining if objection is valid and supported by evidence that the offender is a recidivist, habitual offender, known drug addict and troublemaker, relapsed after rehabilitation, or repeatedly charged, or when evidence of guilt is strong, and must hear and rule on such objections, ordering continuation if meritorious. Applied to sustain the overruling of the sole DOJ-inconsistency objection while remanding for inquiry into disqualifying circumstances and evidentiary strength.

• "As a rule, plea bargaining requires the mutual agreement of the parties and remains subject to the approval of the court. Regardless of the mutual agreement of the parties, the acceptance of the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense is not demandable by the accused as a matter of right but is a matter addressed entirely to the sound discretion of the court." — States the controlling rule on mutuality and judicial discretion that qualifies prosecutorial consent and frames the Montierro guidelines.
• "Judges may overrule the objection of the prosecution if it is based solely on the ground that the accused's plea bargaining proposal is inconsistent with the acceptable plea bargain under any internal rules or guidelines of the DOJ, though in accordance with the plea bargaining framework issued by the Court, if any." — Defines the precise limit of prosecutorial veto and justifies sustaining the trial court's overruling of the DOJ-based objection.
• "The court shall not allow plea bargaining if the objection to the plea bargaining is valid and supported by evidence to the effect that:" — Introduces the enumerated disqualifications and strong-evidence bar that required remand for factual determination.

• People vs. Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974, A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022 — Controlling precedent prescribing the comprehensive guidelines on plea bargaining in drugs cases, reconciliation through DOJ Circular No. 18, and the rules on overruling DOJ-based objections and disqualifying circumstances; directly applied to resolve the controversy.
• Estipona vs. Lobrigo, 816 Phil. 789 (2017) — Cited by the trial court as adopting the Court's Plea Bargaining Framework and its prevalence over DOJ guidelines; foundational authority for the framework's validity.
• Sayre vs. Xenos, 871 Phil. 86 (2020) — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the proposition that plea bargaining requires consent of the accused, offended party, and prosecutor and that the lesser offense be necessarily included; basis for the appellate nullification, later qualified by Montierro.
• People vs. Reafor, G.R. No. 247575, November 16, 2020 — Cited by the Court of Appeals in denial of reconsideration for the proposition that absent mutual agreement the proper course is continuation of proceedings; appellate authority not followed as to DOJ-only objections after Montierro.

• Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 — Section 5 punishes sale and distribution and Section 11 punishes possession of dangerous drugs as charged; Section 12 punishes possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and paraphernalia and served as the lesser offense to which plea was proposed and accepted, with penalty of six months and one day to four years and fine of P10,000.00 to P50,000.00.
• A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC (Plea Bargaining Framework in Drugs Cases) — Court-issued framework allowing an accused charged with Section 5 and Section 11 involving less than one gram and five grams of shabu or marijuana, respectively, to plea-bargain to Section 12; applied as the prevailing standard for conformity of Aguilar's proposal.
• DOJ Circular No. 18 (Revised Amended Guidelines on Plea Bargaining for R.A. No. 9165), May 10, 2022 — Provides that the acceptable plea bargain for violation of Section 5 is now Section 12, reconciling DOJ guidelines with the Court Framework; relied upon to hold that inconsistency no longer justified the prosecution's objection.

Caguioa (Chairperson), Inting, Dimaampao, and Singh, JJ., concur.