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Aguilar vs. Court of Appeals

The Supreme Court granted the petition, reversing the Court of Appeals and reinstating the trial court's decision with modification. The Court upheld the trial court's declaration of private respondent as in default for his and his counsel's non-appearance at a pre-trial conference, finding the counsel's reason for postponement insufficient. On the merits, the Court affirmed the order to sell the co-owned property and divide the proceeds equally, and modified the award of rentals to commence from the date of the trial court's decision ordering ejectment, as the co-ownership was deemed terminated from that point.

Primary Holding

A trial court does not abuse its discretion in declaring a party in default for non-appearance at a pre-trial conference when the party's counsel fails to appear without meritorious justification and the party himself does not attend. Furthermore, a co-owner who, through continued occupancy, prevents the sale of common property after a court orders partition and sale is liable to pay rent to the other co-owner for the use of the latter's share from the date of the order to vacate.

Background

Petitioner Virgilio Aguilar and private respondent Senen Aguilar are brothers who co-owned a house and lot in Parañaque. They initially agreed on a 2/3-1/3 share in favor of Virgilio, but later executed a written memorandum in 1970 stipulating equal shares, with Senen assuming the remaining mortgage in exchange for possession and care of their father. The title was placed in Senen's name due to Virgilio's temporary disqualification for an SSS loan. After their father's death in 1974, Virgilio demanded the sale of the property and division of proceeds, but Senen refused.

History

  1. On 12 January 1979, petitioner filed an action for partition and sale of the co-owned property before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City.

  2. On 26 April 1979, after respondent's counsel's motion to cancel pre-trial was denied, neither respondent nor his counsel appeared. The trial court declared respondent in default and received petitioner's evidence ex parte.

  3. On 26 July 1979, the trial court rendered a default judgment ordering the sale of the property, division of proceeds equally, and respondent to vacate and pay rentals.

  4. On 16 October 1986, the Court of Appeals set aside the default order and judgment, finding the counsel's reason for postponement satisfactory, and remanded the case for pre-trial.

  5. Petitioner filed the present petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court.

Facts

  • Nature of the Action: Petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of a co-owned house and lot and to partition the proceeds.
  • The Co-ownership Agreement: The brothers initially agreed on a 2/3-1/3 share. A 1970 written memorandum changed this to equal shares, with Senen assuming the mortgage and caring for their father in exchange for possession.
  • Post-Father's Death Demand: After their father died in 1974, petitioner demanded sale and division. Respondent refused, leading to the lawsuit.
  • The Pre-trial Incident: Counsel for respondent moved to cancel the pre-trial set for 26 April 1979, citing a need to accompany his wife to a wedding in Dumaguete. The trial court denied this motion on 23 April 1979. On the scheduled date, neither respondent nor his counsel appeared.
  • Default Judgment: The trial court declared respondent in default, received evidence ex parte, and on 26 July 1979, ordered the property sold, proceeds divided equally, and respondent to vacate and pay P1,200.00 monthly rentals from January 1975.
  • Appellate Court Intervention: The Court of Appeals reversed, finding the counsel's reason satisfactory and holding the default improper.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Dilatory Motive: Petitioner argued that respondent's motion to cancel pre-trial was dilatory in character.
  • Propriety of Default: Petitioner maintained that the trial court correctly declared respondent in default for his non-appearance and that the Court of Appeals erred in remanding the case.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • Justifiable Absence: Respondent, through the Court of Appeals' reasoning, contended that counsel's explanation for seeking postponement was satisfactory and devoid of intent to delay.
  • Improper Default: The implicit argument was that the trial court should have granted the postponement and that declaring default for counsel's absence was error.

Issues

  • Default for Non-appearance at Pre-trial: Whether the trial court correctly declared respondent in default for his and his counsel's failure to appear at the pre-trial conference.
  • Validity of Default Judgment: Whether the trial court correctly rendered a default judgment ordering the sale of the co-owned property and payment of rentals.

Ruling

  • Default for Non-appearance at Pre-trial: The trial court did not abuse its discretion. The law mandates the appearance of parties at pre-trial, and a party failing to appear may be declared in default. The grant or denial of a motion for postponement is discretionary, based on the reason's merit and the case's merits. The counsel's reason—attending a social function—was insufficient. The motion was denied three days prior, and respondent could have appeared personally but did not.
  • Validity of Default Judgment: The default judgment was largely correct. The parties are co-owners in equal shares. Either may demand partition, and under Art. 498 of the Civil Code, an indivisible property like a house and lot must be sold and proceeds distributed if co-owners cannot agree on allotment. A co-owner may use the property without compensation, but once a court orders partition and sale, the co-ownership is terminated. From that point, the occupying co-owner's continued stay prejudices the other, justifying the imposition of rent for the use of the latter's share.

Doctrines

  • Mandatory Pre-trial Appearance and Default — Under the Rules of Court, the appearance of parties at a pre-trial conference is mandatory. A party who fails to appear may be non-suited or considered as in default. The trial court has discretion to grant or deny postponements, exercised by evaluating the reason for the request and the merits of the movant's case. A frivolous or socially-motivated reason is insufficient.
  • Co-owner's Right to Demand Partition and Sale — Under Article 494 of the Civil Code, no co-owner is obliged to remain in the co-ownership; each may demand partition at any time. Under Article 498, when the common property is essentially indivisible and co-owners cannot agree on its allotment to one of them, it shall be sold and the proceeds distributed. This is the proper remedy when partition is sought but the property cannot be physically divided without prejudice.
  • Liability for Rent After Termination of Co-ownership — A co-owner has the right to use the common property without paying rent, provided it is in accordance with its purpose and not injurious to co-owners' interests. However, when a court orders the sale of the property and ejectment of the occupying co-owner, the co-ownership is deemed terminated. From that point, the continued occupancy becomes prejudicial to the other co-owner's interest, and the occupying co-owner becomes liable to pay rent for the use of the other's share.

Key Excerpts

  • "Certainly, to warrant a postponement of a mandatory process as pre-trial would require much more than mere attendance in a social function. It is time indeed we emphasize that there should be much more than mere perfunctory treatment of the pre-trial procedure. Its observance must be taken seriously if it is to attain its objective, i.e., the speedy and inexpensive disposition of cases." — This passage underscores the strict enforcement of pre-trial rules to achieve procedural efficiency.
  • "When petitioner filed an action to compel the sale of the property and the trial court granted the petition and ordered the ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the possession jointly also ceased." — This articulates the legal effect of a final judicial order for partition and sale on the co-ownership relationship and the rights flowing from it.

Precedents Cited

  • Jungco v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 78051, 8 November 1989, 179 SCRA 213 — Cited for the principle that pre-trial appearance is mandatory.
  • Insular Veneer v. Plan, G.R. No. L-40155, 10 September 1976, 73 SCRA 1 — Cited for the rule that a party failing to appear at pre-trial may be considered in default.
  • Pacweld Steel Corp. v. Asia Steel Corp., G.R. No. L-26325, 15 November 1982, 118 SCRA 229 — Cited for the authority of a trial court to declare a party in default for non-appearance at pre-trial.
  • Guzman v. Elbinias, G.R. No. 57395, 17 April 1989, 172 SCRA 240 — Cited for the two-factor test in ruling on motions for postponement: the reason for the postponement and the merits of the movant's case.
  • Ravelo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-40111, 27 October 1983, 125 SCRA 366 — Cited for the propriety of a default order when a party fails to appear despite a denied motion for postponement.
  • Reyes v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 56550, 1 October 1990, 190 SCRA 171 — Cited as an example where the Court upheld a public sale of co-owned property pursuant to Art. 498 of the Civil Code.
  • Pardell v. Bartolome, 23 Phil. 450 (1912) — Cited for the principle that a co-owner may use and enjoy the whole property pro indiviso without paying compensation, provided he does not injure the interests of his co-owners.

Provisions

  • Article 486, Civil Code — Provides that each co-owner may use the thing owned in common, provided he does so in accordance with its purpose and without injury to the interest of the co-ownership.
  • Article 494, Civil Code — Provides that no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership and that each may demand partition at any time.
  • Article 498, Civil Code — Provides that when the thing owned in common is essentially indivisible and the co-owners cannot agree that it be allotted to one with indemnity, it shall be sold and its proceeds distributed.
  • Section 2, Rule 20, Rules of Court (1964) — Mandates the appearance of parties at the pre-trial conference.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., and Justice Jose C. Quiason.