Agrifina Dultra Vda. de Canada vs. Cresencia Baclot

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, co-ownership between cohabitants not covered by Article 147 arises only for properties acquired through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry; absent proof of actual contribution, no co-ownership arises and no presumption of equal shares applies. The provision governed the cohabitation because Sancho Canada was incapacitated to marry, and the claimant's failure to prove his actual contribution to properties registered in Cresencia Baclot's name defeated the claim.

Spouses Sancho and Agrifina Canada were legally married on September 4, 1937 in Cagayan de Oro City and had six children. Sancho left the conjugal abode in 1952 and thereafter entered a common-law relationship with Cresencia Baclot, with whom he begot seven children. At the time the cohabitation began, the Civil Code was in effect, but the Family Code's Article 148 later supplied the rule for cohabitations not falling under Article 147. The dispute concerns properties acquired during that cohabitation, which petitioner later sought to recover as part of Sancho's intestate estate.

Spouses Sancho and Agrifina Canada were legally married on September 4, 1937 in Cagayan de Oro City. Their union produced six children: Elsa, Norma, Estrella, Yolanda, Rogelio, and Anacleta. Fifteen years into the marriage, Sancho left the conjugal abode in 1952. Not long thereafter, Sancho entered into a common-law relationship with Cresencia Baclot, with whom he begot seven children: Sanchito, Roberto, Alfreda, Renato, Ronaldo, Ronel, and Rizalino, all surnamed Canada.

Sancho died intestate on February 10, 1973. The feud between Cresencia and petitioner aggressively materialized after his death. As appointed Administrator of Sancho's intestate estate, petitioner filed a complaint on May 16, 1994 for recovery of ownership and possession of properties, accounting, and damages with application for injunction against Cresencia. The complaint sought to recover six parcels of land alleged to be owned by Sancho: (a) commercial land acquired by Sancho from Maria Gurro in 1957, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-2190 in Cresencia's name; (b) cocoland with improvements in Cabinti-an, Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17678; (c) cocoland with improvements in Cabinti-an, Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17677; (d) cocoland with improvements in Kitobao, Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17676; (e) cocoland with improvements in Mingcawayan, Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, covered by Tax Declaration No. 17675; and (f) agricultural land with improvements in Malang Camay, Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental. Petitioner later filed an Amended Complaint to include her children and a Second Amended Complaint to recover five additional properties: (a) agricultural land in Mahayahay, Talisay, Gingoog City, covered by Tax Declaration No. 14881 in Cresencia's name; (b) agricultural land in Barangay 17, National Highway, Gingoog City, covered by Tax Declaration No. 14282; (c) Lot No. 11, Cad. 295, in Talisay, Gingoog City; (d) Lot No. 4, Cad. 295, in Talisay, Gingoog City, declared in Cresencia's name; and (e) Lot No. 10, Cad. 295, in Talisay, Gingoog City, declared in Cresencia's name.

Cresencia filed an Answer with Special/Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaim, essentially denying that the subject properties were owned by Sancho; she claimed that she bought them through diligence, industry, and effort. On July 27, 2004, Cresencia died. She was substituted by her heirs, Roberto, Sanchito, Alfreda, Renato, Ronel, Ronaldo, and Rizalino Canada, as defendants.

Seventeen years and nine months after the complaint, the RTC of Gingoog City, Misamis Oriental, Branch 27 rendered a Decision dated March 13, 2012. Relying on the testimony of Estrella Canada Saguit, daughter of the Spouses Canada, the RTC found that the subject properties rightfully belonged to Sancho's intestate estate because there was insufficient evidence that Cresencia had the capacity to acquire them.

On appeal, the CA recognized as undisputed that Sancho and Cresencia cohabited while Sancho's first marriage was still subsisting. It found that the subject properties were actually not 11 in number but only nine. None of the nine was proven by petitioner as owned by Sancho; the documentary evidence failed to show that the properties were owned by Sancho and Cresencia in common as a result of their actual contribution. The properties were all registered in Cresencia's name, except for one in the name of Sanchito.

• Ownership and Financial Capacity: Petitioner argued that she and Sancho's legal heirs owned the subject properties because Cresencia's financial means as a dressmaker made it impossible for her to acquire them.
• Recovery for Intestate Estate: Petitioner maintained that the subject properties belonged to Sancho's intestate estate and should be recovered for his lawful heirs.

• Ownership and Absence of Contribution: Respondents insisted on their ownership over the properties in the absence of proof that Sancho actually contributed in their acquisition.
• Registration in Cresencia's Name: Respondents argued that the subject properties were all registered in the name of Cresencia, hence their delivery to Sancho's intestate estate was erroneous.

• Applicable Property Regime: Whether Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code governs the properties acquired during Sancho and Cresencia's cohabitation.
• Co-ownership Under Article 148: Whether the subject properties were owned in common by Sancho and Cresencia through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry.
• Burden of Proof: Whether petitioner proved Sancho's actual contribution or ownership over the subject properties registered in Cresencia's name.
• Certificate of Title and Ownership: Whether registration of the properties in Cresencia's name, except one in Sanchito's name, precludes petitioner's claim or is conclusive proof of ownership.
• Entitlement to Recovery: Whether petitioner and Sancho's legal heirs are entitled to the subject properties.

• Applicable Property Regime: Article 148 of the Family Code governs. Article 144 of the Civil Code is inapplicable because Sancho was incapacitated to marry; the cohabitation amounted to concubinage. Article 148's retroactive application is sanctioned if vested rights are unimpaired.
• Co-ownership Under Article 148: No. Only properties acquired through actual joint contribution are co-owned; absent proof of actual contribution, no co-ownership arises and no presumption of equal shares applies.
• Burden of Proof: No. The burden rests on the party asserting an affirmative issue; petitioner, as claimant, failed to prove Sancho's contribution or ownership over properties registered in Cresencia's name.
• Certificate of Title and Ownership: No. A certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership, but the claimant must prove title in the concept of an owner; no evidence showed Sancho was a co-owner.
• Entitlement to Recovery: No. Without evidence of Sancho's contribution, petitioner and her children cannot be declared entitled to the properties registered in Cresencia's name.

• Applicable Property Regime: When Sancho and Cresencia cohabited in 1952, the Civil Code was in effect. Article 144 generally provides that property acquired by either or both through work, industry, wages, or salaries in a non-marital cohabitation is governed by co-ownership. But Tumlos vs. Spouses Fernandez held Article 144 applies only where the parties are not incapacitated to marry or their marriage is void from the beginning; it does not apply when the cohabitation amounts to adultery or concubinage. Sancho and Cresencia entered a common-law marriage while Sancho's marriage to petitioner was valid and subsisting, so Sancho was incapacitated to marry. Article 144 was therefore inapplicable. Article 148 of the Family Code, which filled the hiatus in Article 144, governed. Its retroactive application is allowed by Article 256 provided vested rights are not impaired.
• Co-ownership Under Article 148: Article 148 provides that in cohabitations not falling under Article 147, only properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry are owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, contributions and corresponding shares are presumed equal. However, actual contribution is required, unlike Article 147 where efforts in care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions for one without salary, income, work, or industry. If actual contribution is not proved, no co-ownership arises and no presumption of equal shares applies. Agapay vs. Palang was cited for this rule. Here, the properties were registered in Cresencia's name alone, except one in Sanchito's name, and no evidence showed Sancho's actual contribution. The claim that Cresencia, a mere dressmaker, could not afford the properties was a "scorch to her industry and a condescending presumption." Adriano vs. Court of Appeals did not help petitioner; in Adriano, the property was registered in the names of the man and his paramour, and absent proof of the woman's contribution, the man was declared owner. Here, the properties were under Cresencia's name alone, and without proof of Sancho's actual contribution, Cresencia was the exclusive owner.
• Burden of Proof: The burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contrary to petitioner's assertions, she bore the burden of proving her claim over properties registered in Cresencia's name. In the absence of evidence demonstrating Sancho's contribution to the acquisition of those properties, petitioner and her children could not be declared entitled to them. Saguid vs. Court of Appeals was cited on burden of proof.
• Certificate of Title and Ownership: A certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership; its issuance does not foreclose the possibility that the property may be co-owned by persons not named therein. Nonetheless, the claimant must prove title in the concept of an owner. Lee Tek Sheng vs. Court of Appeals was cited. Here, no evidence showed Sancho was a co-owner. The registration of the properties in Cresencia's name, except one in Sanchito's name, negated petitioner's claim.
• Entitlement to Recovery: Because no proof of Sancho's actual contribution existed, the properties registered in Cresencia's name could not be declared part of his intestate estate or delivered to petitioner and his legal heirs. The CA's dismissal of the complaint was therefore affirmed.

• Article 148 Family Code — Actual Joint Contribution Requirement — In cohabitations not falling under Article 147, only properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry are owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, contributions and shares are presumed equal, but actual contribution must first be proved. If actual contribution is not proved, no co-ownership arises and no presumption of equal shares applies. Applied because Sancho and Cresencia's cohabitation did not fall under Article 147 and no proof of Sancho's actual contribution was presented.
• Inapplicability of Article 144 Civil Code to Adulterous or Concubinage Cohabitation — Article 144 of the Civil Code governs property acquired by a man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or whose marriage is void from the beginning, through their work or industry, wages, and salaries under co-ownership rules. It applies only when the parties are not incapacitated to marry each other or the marriage is void from the beginning; it does not apply when the cohabitation amounts to adultery or concubinage. Applied because Sancho's marriage to petitioner was valid and subsisting, making him incapacitated to marry Cresencia.
• Retroactive Application of the Family Code — Article 256 of the Family Code gives the Code retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights under the Civil Code or other laws. Applied to allow Article 148 to govern a cohabitation that began in 1952 under the Civil Code.
• Burden of Proof on Party Asserting an Affirmative Issue — The burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Applied against petitioner, who claimed ownership over properties registered in Cresencia's name but failed to prove Sancho's actual contribution.
• Certificate of Title Not Conclusive Proof of Ownership — A certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership, and its issuance does not foreclose the possibility that the property may be co-owned by persons not named therein. However, a claimant must still prove title in the concept of an owner. Applied because registration in Cresencia's name did not by itself resolve ownership, but petitioner still failed to prove Sancho's co-ownership.
• Presumption of Equal Shares Requires Proof of Actual Contribution — Under Article 148, the presumption that contributions and corresponding shares are equal operates only after actual joint contribution is established. Without proof of actual contribution, there is no co-ownership and no basis for the presumption. Applied because no evidence showed Sancho contributed to the acquisition of the properties.

• "Under Article 148, only the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. It must be stressed that the actual contribution is required by this provision, in contrast to Article 147 which states that efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household, are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary or income or work or industry. If the actual contribution of the party is not proved, there will be no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares." — This passage states the controlling rule under Article 148 and the consequence of failure to prove actual contribution, which was decisive to the denial of the petition.
• "However, as pronounced in Tumlos v. Spouses Fernandez, Article 144 of said law applies only to a relationship between a man and a woman who are not incapacitated to marry each other, or to one in which the marriage of the parties is void from the beginning. In other words, the provision does not apply when the cohabitation amounts to adultery or concubinage." — This passage explains why Article 144 of the Civil Code did not govern Sancho and Cresencia's cohabitation and why Article 148 of the Family Code applied.
• "While it is true that a certificate of title is not a conclusive proof of ownership as its issuance does not foreclose the possibility that such property may be co-owned by persons not named therein, the claimant must nonetheless prove his/her title in the concept of an owner." — This passage states the rule on the limited evidentiary value of a certificate of title and the claimant's burden to prove ownership.
• "In the absence of evidence which would demonstrate that Sancho had contributed in the acquisition of the properties registered in the name of Cresencia, the Court cannot declare petitioner and her children as entitled thereto." — This passage applies the burden-of-proof and actual-contribution rules to the facts and states the ultimate reason for denying recovery.

• Tumlos vs. Spouses Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000 — Controlling precedent cited for the rule that Article 144 of the Civil Code applies only to parties not incapacitated to marry or whose marriage is void from the beginning, and not to adulterous or concubinage cohabitation.
• Agapay vs. Palang, G.R. No. 116668, 276 SCRA 340, July 28, 1997 — Cited for the rule that under Article 148, actual contribution must be proved; if not proved, no co-ownership and no presumption of equal shares arise.
• Adriano vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124118, March 27, 2000 — Distinguished or construed; in Adriano, property registered under the names of an incapacitated man and his paramour was declared owned by the man absent proof of the woman's contribution, but the Court found the present case different because the properties were registered in Cresencia's name alone and no proof of Sancho's contribution was shown.
• Lee Tek Sheng vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 1 15402, July 15, 1998 — Cited for the rule that a certificate of title is not conclusive proof of ownership and does not foreclose co-ownership by persons not named therein.
• Saguid vs. Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 825-838 (2003) — Cited for the rule that the burden of proof rests on the party asserting an affirmative issue.

• Article 144, Civil Code — Provides that when a man and a woman live together as husband and wife but are not married, or their marriage is void from the beginning, property acquired by either or both through work or industry or their wages and salaries is governed by the rules on co-ownership. Held inapplicable because Sancho was incapacitated to marry and the cohabitation amounted to concubinage.
• Article 148, Family Code — In cohabitations not falling under Article 147, only properties acquired by both parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry are owned in common in proportion to their respective contributions; absent proof to the contrary, contributions and shares are presumed equal. If one party is validly married to another, his or her share accrues to the absolute community or conjugal partnership in the valid marriage. Applied because Sancho was validly married to petitioner; no proof of actual contribution meant no co-ownership.
• Article 147, Family Code — Mentioned in contrast: efforts in the care and maintenance of the family and household are regarded as contributions to the acquisition of common property by one who has no salary, income, work, or industry. Article 148, which governed this case, requires actual contribution and does not treat such efforts as sufficient.
• Article 256, Family Code — Provides that the Family Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws. Used to apply Article 148 retroactively to the cohabitation that began in 1952.

Peralta, C.J. (Chairperson); Caguioa; Reyes, J. Jr.; Lazaro-Javier; and Lopez, JJ. concurred.