Aggabao vs. Commission on Elections

Once a winning candidate for the House of Representatives has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications; COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends, and certiorari in the Supreme Court is not the proper remedy. The alleged nullity of the proclamation does not divest the HRET of jurisdiction.

Georgidi B. Aggabao and Anthony Miranda were rival congressional candidates for the 4th District of Isabela in the May 10, 2004 elections. Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution establishes the Senate and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunals and makes each the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. The dispute required the Court to delineate the jurisdiction of the COMELEC from that of the HRET after a congressional candidate has been proclaimed and has assumed office.

Georgidi B. Aggabao and Anthony Miranda were rival congressional candidates for the 4th District of Isabela in the May 10, 2004 elections. During the canvassing of the certificates of canvass (COCV) for the municipalities of Cordon and San Agustin, Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on the grounds that it was tampered with, prepared under duress, differed from other authentic copies, and contained manifest errors. Aggabao objected, arguing that the grounds raised by Miranda were proper only for a pre-proclamation controversy, which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House of Representatives.

On May 22, 2004, the reconstituted Provincial Board of Canvassers (PBC) excluded from canvass the contested COCVs and used instead the 4th and 7th copies. Based on the results, Miranda garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Congressman. Aggabao appealed to the COMELEC, docketed as SPC No. 04-219 and raffled to the Second Division. In that appeal, he asserted that the PBC acted without jurisdiction when it heard Miranda’s Petition for Exclusion and that, even assuming jurisdiction, the PBC erred in excluding the contested COCVs because they appeared regular and properly authenticated.

On June 6, 2004, Miranda filed a Very Urgent Motion for Proclamation. Aggabao opposed it, contending that the pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC Second Division was a bar to Miranda’s proclamation. In a Memorandum dated June 8, 2004, Commissioner Mehol K. Sadain, commissioner in-charge for Regions II and III, approved the proclamation of the remaining winning candidates for the province of Isabela. On June 9, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc issued Resolution No. 7233 likewise directing the proclamation of the remaining winning candidates in Isabela. On the same day, Aggabao filed with the COMELEC an Urgent Motion to Set Aside the Notice of Proclamation with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order.

On June 14, 2004, Miranda was proclaimed as the duly elected Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela. It is undisputed that he had been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office on that date. Two days after the proclamation, Aggabao filed this petition assailing Resolution No. 7233, claiming that the COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered Miranda’s proclamation because the Second Division had not yet resolved the appeal. Miranda moved for dismissal in his Comment, arguing that the issue was best addressed to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. On August 27, 2004, Aggabao filed a Consolidated Motion for Early Resolution, Manifestation that the COMELEC Second Division Issued a Resolution Sustaining the Appeal of the Petitioner, and Reply to the Comment; he manifested that on August 16, 2004, the COMELEC Second Division gave due course to his pending appeal and bewailed the failure of the COMELEC Second Division to annul the proclamation.

• Pre-Proclamation Controversy: Aggabao objected that the grounds raised by Miranda were proper only for a pre-proclamation controversy, which is not allowed in elections for Members of the House of Representatives.
• Jurisdiction of the Provincial Board of Canvassers: Petitioner asserted that the PBC acted without jurisdiction when it heard Miranda’s Petition for Exclusion.
• Regularity of the Contested COCVs: Petitioner maintained that, even assuming the PBC had jurisdiction over the petition, it still erred in excluding the contested COCVs because they appeared regular and properly authenticated.
• COMELEC En Banc Jurisdiction: Petitioner claimed that the COMELEC En Banc acted without jurisdiction when it ordered Miranda’s proclamation considering that the COMELEC Second Division had not yet resolved his appeal.
• Pendency of Appeal as Bar to Proclamation: Petitioner contended that the pendency of his appeal with the COMELEC Second Division was a bar to Miranda’s proclamation.
• Failure to Annul Proclamation: Petitioner bewailed the failure of the COMELEC Second Division to annul the proclamation.

• Exclusion of COCV: Respondent Miranda moved for the exclusion of the 1st copy of the COCV on grounds that it was tampered with, prepared under duress, differed from other authentic copies, and contained manifest errors.
• HRET Jurisdiction: Respondent Miranda moved for dismissal of the petition, contending that the issue raised by Aggabao is best addressed to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.

• Cognizance of the Petition: Whether the Supreme Court can take cognizance of the petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 7233 and the proclamation of Anthony Miranda as Congressman for the 4th District of Isabela.
• Certiorari Requisites: Whether certiorari lies given the availability of an electoral protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal as a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.
• Jurisdiction over the Congressional Election Contest: Whether, after Miranda was proclaimed, took his oath, and assumed office, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications, to the exclusion of the COMELEC.
• Effect of Alleged Null and Void Proclamation: Whether the allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab initio divests the HRET of jurisdiction.

• Cognizance of the Petition: No. The petition for certiorari is dismissed; after proclamation, oath, and assumption of office, the remedy is an electoral protest before the HRET, not a petition for certiorari.
• Certiorari Requisites: No. Certiorari requires, among others, no appeal nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy; an electoral protest before the HRET was available and adequate.
• Jurisdiction over the Congressional Election Contest: The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction. Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends and the HRET’s jurisdiction begins.
• Effect of Alleged Null and Void Proclamation: The allegation does not divest the HRET of jurisdiction. The issue is best addressed to the HRET to avoid duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies.

• Cognizance of the Petition: Certiorari as a special civil action can be availed of only if there is concurrence of the essential requisites: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power for it to prosper. Here, after Miranda was proclaimed, took oath, and assumed office, petitioner’s remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET. Thus certiorari will not lie.
• Certiorari Requisites: Certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC. After the proclamation, petitioner’s remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET. The resolution of the issues presented in this petition is best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the electoral tribunal.
• Jurisdiction over the Congressional Election Contest: Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution provides that the Senate and House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. In Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives; once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. It is undisputed that Miranda had already been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office on June 14, 2004. As such, petitioner’s recourse would have been to file an electoral protest before the HRET, not this petition for certiorari.
• Effect of Alleged Null and Void Proclamation: The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab initio does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction. In Guerrero vs. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that in an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET; this avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate. In Lazatin vs. Commission on Elections, the Court ruled that upon proclamation of the winning candidate and despite its alleged invalidity, the COMELEC is divested of its jurisdiction to hear the protest. Thus, the allegation of nullity does not restore COMELEC jurisdiction or make certiorari proper.

• HRET’s sole and exclusive jurisdiction over congressional election contests — Under Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of its Members. Once a winning candidate for the House of Representatives has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends and the HRET’s jurisdiction begins. Applied because Miranda had been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office on June 14, 2004; Aggabao’s remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET.
• Certiorari requisites — Certiorari as a special civil action requires concurrence of: (a) the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction; and (b) there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceeding. There must be capricious, arbitrary and whimsical exercise of power. Applied: certiorari did not lie because an electoral protest before the HRET was available and adequate.
• Alleged nullity of proclamation does not divest HRET jurisdiction — Even if a winning candidate’s proclamation is alleged to be null and void ab initio, the issue of its validity is best addressed to the HRET once the candidate has taken oath and assumed office. This avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies. Applied to reject Aggabao’s claim that the alleged nullity of Miranda’s proclamation allowed the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition.
• COMELEC divested of jurisdiction upon proclamation despite alleged invalidity — Upon proclamation of the winning candidate, despite alleged irregularities or invalidity, the COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction to hear the protest. Applied because Miranda’s proclamation, even if allegedly invalid, ended COMELEC jurisdiction and began HRET jurisdiction.

• "The HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns, and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins." — This passage states the controlling jurisdictional rule applied to Aggabao’s petition.
• "The allegation that Miranda’s proclamation is null and void ab initio does not divest the HRET of its jurisdiction." — This is the Court’s direct holding on the effect of the alleged nullity of the proclamation.
• "In this case, certiorari will not lie considering that there is an available and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law for the purpose of annulling or modifying the proceedings before the COMELEC. After the proclamation, petitioner’s remedy was an electoral protest before the HRET." — This passage explains why the petition for certiorari was dismissed.
• "The resolution of the issues presented in this petition is best addressed to the sound judgment and discretion of the electoral tribunal." — This passage reinforces that the HRET, not the Supreme Court, should resolve the election contest.

• Pangilinan vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 105278, 18 November 1993, 228 SCRA 36, 43 — Cited for the rule that the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives, and that COMELEC is bereft of jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House and Senate.
• Guerrero vs. Commission on Elections, 391 Phil. 344, 352 [2000] — Cited for the rule that once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken oath, and assumed office, COMELEC’s jurisdiction ends and the HRET’s begins; also cited for the rule that the validity of a proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken oath and assumed office is best addressed to the HRET.
• Lazatin vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 80007, 25 January 1998, 157 SCRA 337, 338 — Cited for the rule that upon proclamation of the winning candidate, despite its alleged invalidity and pending protests, COMELEC is divested of jurisdiction to hear the protest.
• Garcia vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 134792, 12 August 1999, 312 SCRA 353, 363, citing Suntay vs. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No. 132524, 29 December 1998, 300 SCRA 760 — Cited for the requisites of certiorari as a special civil action, including the requirement that there be no appeal or plain, speedy, and adequate remedy.

• Article VI, Section 17, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the Senate and House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. The provision was applied to hold that once Miranda was proclaimed, took oath, and assumed office, the HRET had sole and exclusive jurisdiction over the contest, divesting the COMELEC of jurisdiction.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, and Garcia, JJ., concur. Callejo, Sr., J., on official leave.