Agcaoili vs. Suguitan

Act No. 3107 cannot be applied to a justice of the peace appointed before March 17, 1923, and a quo warranto action by an officer ousted under that statute is not barred by prescription under the particular facts. The final resolution limited the decision to these two grounds and eliminated the original opinion’s constitutional discussion.

Julio Agcaoili held the office of justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte, having been appointed on March 25, 1916 under Act No. 2041, which provided that justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior. Alberto Suguitan was the auxiliary justice of the peace who took over the office. Act No. 3107, enacted on March 17, 1923, amended the Administrative Code and included a provision that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they reach the age of sixty-five. The Supreme Court had previously held in Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 (1925), that Act No. 3107 could not be applied to justices of the peace appointed prior to March 17, 1923.

Julio Agcaoili was appointed by Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison on March 25, 1916 as justice of the peace of Laoag, Ilocos Norte. His appointment was made under Act No. 2041, section 1, which provided that all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior. Alberto Suguitan was the auxiliary justice of the peace. On March 17, 1923, the Philippine Legislature adopted Act No. 3107, an Act to amend and repeal certain provisions of the Administrative Code relative to the judiciary. Section 203 of the Administrative Code, as amended, provided that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached the age of sixty-five years.

On April 9, 1923, Undersecretary of Justice Luis P. Torres sent a letter to Agcaoili through the Judge of the Court of First Instance of the Third Judicial District, Province of Ilocos Sur. The letter advised that under section 203 of the Administrative Code as amended by Act No. 3107, justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall serve until age sixty-five, and that because the record showed Agcaoili was over sixty-five, he ceased to be a justice of the peace upon receipt. Agcaoili received the letter on April 26, 1923 through the clerk of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte. On April 28, 1923, he protested, arguing that the provision did not include justices already appointed before Act No. 3107, that it could not be given retroactive effect, and that Act No. 2041 had not been repealed.

On July 7, 1923, Provincial Fiscal Buenaventura Ocampo appeared at Agcaoili’s office and showed him a telegram from Undersecretary Torres addressed to the provincial fiscal. The telegram ordered the fiscal to cause Agcaoili to deliver the office and all documents and records to the auxiliary justice of the peace, and to prosecute Agcaoili for violation of article 370 of the Penal Code if he failed to comply. Agcaoili then delivered the office, documents, records, and furniture to Alberto Suguitan, the auxiliary justice of the peace, in the presence of the provincial fiscal. He did so under protest, stating that he had no malicious intention to disobey but desired to study the law, and that he was delivering the office under protest to avoid criminal prosecution and to allow his right to be defined in court. Suguitan acknowledged receipt.

Agcaoili waited for a resolution of his protests, but the Secretary of Justice never replied. On April 23, 1925, he filed a petition for quo warranto in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, which he amended on September 8, 1925. The petition sought restoration to the office and the ouster of Suguitan. Suguitan answered and set up the defense of prescription. The trial court, Judge Fermin Mariano, sustained the defense of prescription and denied the petition. Agcaoili appealed.

• Non-retroactivity of Act No. 3107: Petitioner argued that the age-65 provision did not include justices already appointed before its passage and could not be given retroactive effect; Act No. 2041, under which he was appointed to serve during good behavior, had not been repealed.
• Prescription: Petitioner maintained that his quo warranto action had not prescribed; section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure, especially the Spanish version, applied only to officers of corporations, and he was justified in awaiting a reply to his protests before filing suit.
• Unlawful Ouster: Petitioner contended that he was forced to vacate the office under threat of criminal prosecution and that he did so under protest and without just cause.

• Prescription: Respondent argued that the quo warranto action was barred by the one-year limitation in section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure, because more than one year had elapsed since Agcaoili left office on July 7, 1923 and the filing of the petition on April 23, 1925.

• Retroactive Application of Act No. 3107: Whether Act No. 3107 can be applied to the petitioner, a justice of the peace appointed prior to March 17, 1923 under Act No. 2041 to serve during good behavior.
• Prescription: Whether the petitioner’s quo warranto action is barred by the statute of limitations, particularly section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

• Retroactive Application of Act No. 3107: No. Following Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543, Act No. 3107 cannot be applied to a justice of the peace appointed before March 17, 1923; the final resolution limited the decision to this ground.
• Prescription: No. The defense of limitation or prescription does not apply to the petitioner under the particular facts of this cause.

• Retroactive Application of Act No. 3107: The original ponencia concluded that Act No. 3107 could not be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace appointed prior to March 17, 1923. It reasoned that the age-65 provision should not be given retroactive effect and that the doctrine in Segovia vs. Noel controlled. The February 26, 1926 resolution modified the decision to base it only on this ground, following Segovia vs. Noel, and eliminated the original opinion’s constitutional discussion under the Jones Law. Thus, the final holding rests on non-retroactivity and precedent, not on constitutional invalidity.

• Prescription: The original opinion held that the defense of prescription did not bar the action. It reasoned that quo warranto for a public right is generally not subject to ordinary statutes of limitation; that section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure, particularly its Spanish version, referred to officers of corporations; and that even if section 216 applied, the one-year period had not begun or run because Agcaoili was justified in awaiting a reply to his protests, which never came. The final resolution limited the ruling to the particular facts, stating that the defense of limitation or prescription did not apply to petitioner under those facts.

• Non-retroactivity of Act No. 3107 — Act No. 3107, which imposed an age-65 limit on justices and auxiliary justices of the peace, cannot be applied to those appointed before March 17, 1923. The final resolution expressly followed Segovia vs. Noel and limited the decision to this ground.
• Prescription in quo warranto — Ordinary statutes of limitation do not apply to quo warranto proceedings brought to enforce a public right. Section 216 of the Code of Civil Procedure’s one-year limitation for ouster actions was construed as referring to corporate officers, especially in the Spanish text. Even if applicable, the period did not run while the officer awaited a reply to his protest. The final resolution held that prescription did not apply under the particular facts.

• "(a) That said act No. 3107 can have no application to the petitioner herein, following the doctrine heretofore announced in the case of Segovia vs. Noel (47 Phil., 543); and, (b) That the defense of the limitation or prescription contended for by the respondent does not apply to the petitioner under the particular facts of this cause." — The final resolution limited the Supreme Court’s decision to these two grounds and thereby defined the operative holding.
• "In our opinion even granting that section 216 is applicable to the appellant, the period of prescription had not begun and run at the time of the commencement of the present action. He was justified in delaying the commencement of his action until an answer to his protest had been made." — This passage states the majority’s rationale for rejecting the prescription defense under the particular facts.
• "that said law (3107) cannot be applied to justices and auxiliary justices of the peace who were appointed prior to the 17th day of March, 1923" — This is the original opinion’s non-retroactivity holding, later retained by the final resolution as one of the two grounds of decision.
• "Modifying the decision heretofore announced, as herein indicated, and basing the decision upon the two grounds above-mentioned only the eliminating all remarks made about the action and conduct of the Acting Secretary of Justice, said motions are hereby denied." — The resolution modified the original decision, eliminated the constitutional discussion and remarks about the Acting Secretary of Justice, and denied reconsideration.

• Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 (1925) — Controlling precedent; held that Act No. 3107 could not be applied to justices of the peace appointed prior to March 17, 1923. The final resolution expressly followed it.
• Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624 — Cited in the original opinion; the Court said it was not binding on the question of whether section 216 applies to public officers because that issue was not raised or passed upon. Street, J., relied on it in dissent.
• Central Capiz vs. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883 — Cited in the original opinion for the rule that the Jones Law’s one-subject/title requirement is mandatory and its violation fatal; the final resolution eliminated the constitutional discussion.
• McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil. 563 — Cited for the principle that a question passed sub silentio is not binding precedent.
• McPhail vs. People ex rel. Lambert, 160 Ill. 77 — Cited for the rule that ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to quo warranto proceedings brought to enforce a public right.
• Catlett vs. People ex rel. State’s Attorney, 151 Ill. 16 — Cited for the maxim nullum tempus occurrit regi, that lapse of time is no bar to quo warranto by the state.

• Section 1, Act No. 2041 — Provided that all justices of the peace and auxiliary justices shall hold office during good behavior; Agcaoili’s appointment was made under this provision.
• Section 203, Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3107 — Provided that justices and auxiliary justices of the peace shall be appointed to serve until they have reached age sixty-five; this provision was invoked to oust Agcaoili.
• Section 216, Code of Civil Procedure (Act No. 190) — Provided a one-year limitation for an action against an officer to be ousted from office; the Court held it did not bar Agcaoili under the particular facts. The Spanish version referred to “la persona que ejerza un cargo en una corporacion.”
• Section 3, Jones Law (Act of Congress, August 29, 1916) — Required that no bill embrace more than one subject, expressed in the title; discussed in the original opinion but eliminated by the final resolution.
• Article 370, Penal Code — Mentioned in the telegram as the basis for threatened prosecution if Agcaoili did not vacate the office.

Villamor, Romualdez, and Villa-Real, JJ., concurred. Johns, J., concurred in the result. On the resolution, Avanceña, C.J., and Ostrand, J., concurred; Street, J., while adhering to his dissenting opinion, concurred in the resolution.

• Malcolm, J. — Concurred in the result on prescription and reinstatement but dissented from the constitutional discussion, arguing it was unnecessary, not submitted, and not raised. He agreed that Act No. 3107 should not be retroactive per Segovia vs. Noel; that section 216 applied only to corporate officers; and that even if applicable, the one-year period had not elapsed.
• Street, J. — Dissented, would hold the action prescribed under section 216. He argued that the English version controls and applies to public officers; that the Spanish phrase “en una corporacion” was a mistake; that the title of Act No. 3107 was broad enough to include the amendment; and that the constitutional question was not called for.