Agcaoili vs. Enrile

A petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic once the detainee has been released from custody; the Court will not resolve the constitutional issues raised therein.

Fidel V. Agcaoili was a detainee held under Arrest, Search and Seizure Order No. 3225 and one of the accused in a rebellion case before Special Military Commission No. 1. His continued detention was governed by martial law-era military commission procedures, under which no sentence of a military commission could be executed unless approved and ordered executed by the President, who was empowered to reverse, confirm, increase, or otherwise modify the commission’s decision. After Martial Law was lifted by Proclamation No. 2045, Letter of Instructions No. 1125-A allowed detainees to be released on bail where no commitment order had been issued by the President. The petitioners were Fidel V. Agcaoili, his wife Lourdes Agcaoili, and his parents Alfonso V. Agcaoili and Rosario Agcaoili; the respondents included Minister of National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile and various military officials.

Fidel V. Agcaoili was one of several accused in Criminal Case No. MG-1-92 before Military Commission No. 1, later renumbered and reassigned to Special Military Commission No. 1, in the case entitled People vs. Jose Maria Sison, et al., involving two crimes of rebellion. An Amended Charge Sheet was afterwards filed, reducing the accusation to a single crime of rebellion under Article 134 in relation to Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code. Agcaoili was arrested on May 12, 1974 by elements of the Philippine Constabulary pursuant to Arrest, Search and Seizure Order (ASSO) No. 3225, and thereafter remained under continuous incarceration in various detention areas, the last being Camp Bagong Diwa, Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila.

After Martial Law was lifted by Proclamation No. 2045, the President issued Letter of Instructions No. 1125-A declaring that in every case where no commitment order was issued by the President, the accused under detention may be released on bail in accordance with the Constitution and applicable laws. Agcaoili filed with the Military Commission an application for bail dated February 13, 1982 invoking LOI No. 1125-A. No action was taken on the application. Treating the inaction as a presumed denial, he filed with the Supreme Court on April 14, 1984 a petition for mandamus to compel the Military Commission, among others, to release him on bail; the case was docketed as G.R. No. L60190.

On June 8, 1984, the Minister of National Defense wrote to the President recommending that Agcaoili be temporarily released on bail without prejudice to the continuation of his trial before the Military Commission. The Minister forwarded Mrs. Rosario S. Agcaoili’s letter dated February 21, 1984 requesting her husband’s temporary release, alleging that he had been in detention for more than nine years and nine months for rebellion, which at the time of its alleged commission carried a penalty of six years minimum to twelve years imprisonment; that with time off for good behavior he would have already served more than his possible sentence; that more than forty of his co-accused had long been granted temporary release or amnesty, including some facing another charge of subversion, leaving only four accused in detention, namely Jose Ma. Sison, Victor Corpuz, Saturnino Ocampo, and Agcaoili; and that the forced separation from his family had been painful and cruel to their children. Records showed that Agcaoili was arrested on May 12, 1974 at Balloon Subdivision, Calasiao, Pangasinan by elements of the 5th CSU by virtue of ASSO No. 3225; that he was one of the principal accused in People vs. Jose Ma. Sison and 90 others (MV Karagatan and MN Dona Andrea II) for rebellion then being tried by Special Military Commission No. 1; and that at the time of his arrest and prior thereto he was Chairman of the Finance Committee, CPP, a member of the Executive Committee, CPP, and figured prominently in the purchase in Japan of the M/V Karagatan, used by the CPP/NPA to surreptitiously land military hardware from the People’s Republic of China at Digoyo Point, Palanan, Isabela, in July 1972, and of the M/V Dona Andrea II, used in the 1974 aborted landing of firearms in La Union and Pangasinan.

The Judge Advocate General, AFP commented that the maximum penalty imposable for rebellion at the time the offense was committed by Agcaoili, as provided under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, was twelve years; that Agcaoili had been in detention for nine years, nine months, and five days as of February 17, 1984 (ten years as of the writing), excluding allowance for good conduct; that the correct policy was to release detainees who had been detained for a period equivalent to or longer than the maximum imposable penalty; and that Agcaoili’s release may be considered on humanitarian grounds subject to the approval of the President. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, J-2, AFP, as Director for Security Investigation, CAD, stated that for humanitarian considerations and in the context of the national reconciliation policy, it interposed no objection to Agcaoili’s temporary release. The Chief of Constabulary, however, through the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, C-2, objected to the request on the premise of the absence of any guarantee that Agcaoili had reformed. The Defense Minister nevertheless recommended provisional liberty because Agcaoili was similarly situated to his co-accused already released, was the breadwinner of a family of four growing children, and should be given a chance to return to the fold of the law under the government’s policy of national reconciliation, without prejudice to the continuation of his trial. No action was taken on the recommendation, and the trial of Criminal Case No. SMC-NR-1-1 before the Military Commission continued.

On July 5, 1984, after the prosecution had rested its case, Agcaoili waived his right to present evidence, submitted his case for decision, and prayed for immediate judgment independently of his co-accused. The Commission declared his case submitted for resolution and, after deliberation, found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of specification 1 and specification 2 of the charge and of the charge itself. Under Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, the imposable penalty for rebellion was prision mayor, or imprisonment for six years and one day to twelve years, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances; the proper penalty was prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years. Considering the stance continuously exhibited by Agcaoili and his preventive confinement since his capture in May 1974, the Commission ordered that he be credited with full time of his preventive imprisonment. The prosecution was directed to furnish copies of the decision to the convening authority and to the military custodian of Agcaoili.

On July 16, 1984, the Minister of Defense indorsed to the President the Report of Result of Trial in Criminal Case No. SMC-NR-1-1. In his indorsement, the Minister reiterated his earlier recommendation for Agcaoili’s provisional liberty, this time pending final disposition of his case by the President, evidently in accordance with Presidential Decrees Nos. 566 and 1042-A. He noted that the Report showed Agcaoili was sentenced to suffer eight years and one day to ten years and was credited with the full time of his preventive detention dating back to his capture on May 12, 1974; that Agcaoili would have been in detention for ten years and two months as of that writing, compared with the recommended sentence; and that, pending final disposition by the President and review by the Board of Military Review, which review was contingent on the conclusion of the trial of all his co-accused and the transcription of the records, he recommended Agcaoili’s temporary release, having served more than the sentence imposed. The recommendation again went unheeded.

On October 22, 1984, Fidel V. Agcaoili, his wife Lourdes V. Agcaoili, and his parents Alfonso V. Agcaoili and Rosario Agcaoili filed a petition for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. The petition postulated that Agcaoili’s continued detention, notwithstanding that the sentence imposed on him by the Military Commission on July 5, 1984 of imprisonment of eight years and one day to ten years of prision mayor was deemed fully served because the Commission had credited him for the entire period of his preventive detention, which as of October 22, 1984 had already lasted for ten years and five months, had no constitutional warrant and violated his constitutional right to due process and to equal protection of the law, as well as his right to be subjected to cruel or unusual punishment, all enshrined in the Bill of Rights. On October 22, 1984, the President, acting as review authority, approved and ordered executed the penalty of prision mayor medium, or a prison term of eight years and one day to ten years, imposed by Special Military Commission No. 1, and, adopting the Commission’s ruling crediting Agcaoili with the entire period of his detention, ordered his release. Agcaoili was released from Camp Bagong Diwa Detention Center on October 24, 1984. On October 25, 1984, the Solicitor General filed the Return of the Writ advising of the release and praying that the petition be dismissed on the ground of mootness. At the hearing that afternoon, counsel confirmed the release, a copy of the release order of President Ferdinand E. Marcos dated October 22, 1984 was submitted, and the case was considered submitted for resolution. The Court found that the issue had ceased to be justiciable upon Agcaoili’s release, which rendered the petition moot and academic.

• Continued Custody Despite Full Service: Petitioners acknowledged that the Commission’s judgment was subject to review by the Board of Military Review and by the President, but argued that such review could not justify further custody of Agcaoili because he had already served the maximum period of the sentence imposed upon him.
• Urgent Review: Petitioners argued that the unusual circumstances, particularly the fact that Agcaoili had already served the maximum period of the sentence, constituted urgent and compelling reason to complete the review of his case as soon as possible; the review could not await completion of the trial of his co-accused, as such delay would unduly violate his constitutional rights.
• Constitutional Violations: The petition postulated that Agcaoili’s continued detention despite full service of sentence had no constitutional warrant and violated his rights to due process, equal protection, and to be subjected to cruel or unusual punishment under the Bill of Rights.
• Defense Minister’s Recommendation: Petitioners pointed out that even the Defense Minister had taken cognizance of the facts and recommended Agcaoili’s temporary release.

• Mootness: The Solicitor General filed the Return of the Writ advising that, by order of the President, Agcaoili had been released from Camp Bagong Diwa Detention Center on October 24, 1984, and prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground of mootness.
• Presidential Action: The Return stated that on October 22, 1984 the President, acting as review authority, approved and ordered executed the penalty and, adopting the Military Commission’s ruling crediting the entire period of detention, ordered Agcaoili’s release.

• Mootness: Whether the petition for habeas corpus became moot and academic upon Agcaoili’s release from military custody by order of the President.
• Constitutional Rights: Whether Agcaoili’s continued detention after full service of the sentence imposed by the Military Commission violated his constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and to be subjected to cruel or unusual punishment.

• Mootness: Yes. The petition became moot and academic because Agcaoili was released from military custody on October 24, 1984 by order of the President dated October 22, 1984; the petition was dismissed with costs de oficio.
• Constitutional Rights: Not resolved. Because the release mooted the petition, the Court did not adjudicate the claims of due process, equal protection, or cruel or unusual punishment.

• Mootness: Although Agcaoili was deemed to have fully served the prison sentence because the Military Commission credited the entire period of his preventive confinement, the case could not be deemed terminated because, as the Defense Minister stated, it remained subject to the final disposition of the President after review by the Board of Military Review, which review was contingent on the conclusion of the trial of all co-accused and the transcription of the records. Sub-paragraph c(2), Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 39, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 566, provided that no sentence of a military commission shall be executed unless approved and ordered executed by the President, and that the President shall have the power to reverse, confirm, increase, or otherwise modify any decision of the military commission. Petitioners acknowledged this review but contended that it could not justify further custody. The issue, however, ceased to be justiciable upon Agcaoili’s release from military custody on October 24, 1984 by Order of the President dated October 22, 1984. His release rendered the petition moot and academic, and the petition was dismissed with costs de oficio.
• Constitutional Rights: Because the release removed the custody that was the object of the habeas corpus petition, the Court did not reach the merits of the alleged violations of due process, equal protection, or the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. The constitutional claims remained unresolved.

• Mootness of Habeas Corpus — A petition for habeas corpus becomes moot and academic when the detainee is released from custody, because the relief sought—release—has already been obtained. The Court applied this doctrine after Agcaoili was released by presidential order, dismissing the petition without reaching the constitutional issues.
• Presidential Approval of Military Commission Sentences — Under Sub-paragraph c(2), Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 39, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 566, no sentence of a military commission shall be executed unless approved and ordered executed by the President; the President may reverse, confirm, increase, or otherwise modify the decision. The Court cited this to explain why Agcaoili’s sentence was not executed until the President acted, and why his case remained subject to presidential review.
• Non-adjudication of Constitutional Issues in Moot Cases — When a case becomes moot and academic, the Court will not resolve the constitutional questions raised, because there is no longer a justiciable controversy. The Court declined to rule on the due process, equal protection, and cruel or unusual punishment claims after Agcaoili’s release.

• "This issue however ceased to be justifiable upon the release of Fidel Agcaoili from military custody on October 24, 1984 by Order of the President dated October 22. His release rendered his petition for habeas corpus moot and academic." — This passage states the ratio decidendi for the dismissal: the release of the detainee removed the basis for the habeas corpus petition and rendered it moot.
• "WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed with costs de oficio. SO ORDERED." — This is the dispositive portion of the Resolution.
• "No sentence of a military commission shall be executed unless the same is approved and ordered executed by the President of the Philippines." — This quotation from Presidential Decree No. 39, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 566, explains why Agcaoili’s sentence was not executed until the President approved it.
• "The President shall have the power to reverse, confirm, increase the penalty imposed, or otherwise modify any decision of the military commission." — This quotation states the scope of the President’s review power over military commission decisions, which the Court cited in explaining the status of Agcaoili’s case before his release.

• Renato Canete vs. Brig. Gen. Pedrito de Guzman — Cited in the separate view of Fernando, C.J., recited in the Court’s October 23, 1984 Resolution, for the principle that acquittal is final and executory and that once a sentence is fully served, the detained person must be set free.
• Toyota vs. Hon. Fidel V. Ramos, 139 SCRA 316 (1985) — Cited in Teehankee, C.J.’s separate concurring opinion as illustrative of the deposed regime’s position that a Presidential Commitment Order or Preventive Detention Action could prevent release even after full service of sentence.
• Dr. Aurora Parong, et al. (121 SCRA 472) — Cited in Teehankee, C.J.’s separate concurring opinion as the earlier ruling that upheld the Presidential Commitment Order as an indefinite detention order that no citizen could question through habeas corpus.

• Sub-paragraph c(2), Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 39, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 566 — No sentence of a military commission shall be executed unless approved and ordered executed by the President; the Chief of Staff’s recommendation, the record of trial, and the Board of Review’s opinion are forwarded to the President for final action through the Secretary of National Defense; the President may reverse, confirm, increase, or modify the decision. The Court cited this provision to explain that Agcaoili’s sentence remained subject to presidential approval and review.
• Article 134, Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 125 — The Amended Charge Sheet reduced the accusation against Agcaoili to a single crime of rebellion under these provisions.
• Article 135, Revised Penal Code — The Military Commission applied this provision in sentencing Agcaoili for rebellion to prision mayor, with the proper penalty of prision mayor medium, or eight years and one day to ten years.
• Letter of Instructions No. 1125-A — Issued after Martial Law was lifted, it declared that where no commitment order is issued by the President, an accused under detention may be released on bail in accordance with the Constitution and applicable laws. Agcaoili invoked this in his bail application.
• Presidential Decree No. 1042-A — Governs the appellate review procedures for military commission cases; it was mentioned in the Defense Minister’s indorsement and in the Court’s footnote.
• Bill of Rights — The petition invoked the constitutional rights to due process, equal protection, and the prohibition against cruel or unusual punishment. Because the petition became moot, the Court did not resolve these claims.

Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, and Paras, JJ., concurred. Teehankee, C.J., filed a separate concurring opinion. Fernan, J., took no part.

• Teehankee, C.J. (concurring): The main Resolution faithfully depicted the ordeal of citizens under the deposed regime, where persons could be detained indefinitely by Presidential Commitment Order or Preventive Detention Action despite the lifting of martial law, and the writ of habeas corpus was suspended. He noted that the Court’s earlier ruling in Dr. Aurora Parong, et al. upheld the PCO as an indefinite detention order, and that Toyota vs. Hon. Fidel V. Ramos, 139 SCRA 316 (1985) illustrated the regime’s position that even a convicted person who had fully served sentence could not be freed unless the PCO or PDA was lifted. He wrote to record that the February 7, 1986 snap elections and the bloodless revolution of February 22 to 25, 1986 installed President Corazon C. Aquino, whose Proclamation No. 2 rejected the tools of oppression, revoked Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A, and lifted the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Thus, the critical issues need not await resolution in pending cases.