Agbayani vs. Court of Appeals

The Department of Justice does not gravely abuse its discretion in ordering the withdrawal of an information for grave oral defamation where the evidence shows only slight oral defamation and the complaint failed to comply with the mandatory Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation requirement; the procedural requirements of DOJ Circular No. 70 are not absolutely mandatory and may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.

Agbayani and Genabe were co-employees at the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, serving as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II, respectively. Their dispute implicated the Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation procedure under Republic Act No. 7160, which generally requires prior barangay settlement for disputes between residents of the same city or municipality, and the appeal procedure under DOJ Circular No. 70 for review of prosecutor resolutions. The penal classification of oral defamation under Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code supplied the legal backdrop for determining whether the offense fell within an exception to barangay conciliation.

Leticia B. Agbayani and Loida Marcelina J. Genabe were both employees of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 275, Las Piñas City, serving as Court Stenographer and Legal Researcher II, respectively. On December 29, 2006, Agbayani filed a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation against Genabe before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City, docketed as I.S. No. 07-0013. The complaint alleged that on the morning of December 27, 2006, while Agbayani was going about her usual duties at work and in the presence of their fellow court employees, Genabe uttered against her the statements: “ANG GALING MO LETY, SINABI MO NA TINAPOS MO YUNG MARVILLA CASE, ANG GALING MO. FEELING LAWYER KA KASI, BAKIT DI KA MAGDUTY NA LANG, STENOGRAPHER KA MAGSTENO KA NA LANG, ANG GALING MO, FEELING LAWYER KA TALAGA. NAGBEBENTA KA NG KASO, TIRADOR KA NG JUDGE. SIGE HIGH BLOOD DIN KA, MAMATAY KA SANA SA HIGH BLOOD MO.”

Agbayani maintained that the utterances were grave and insulting, made with malice aforethought, and not in the heat of anger; she denied giving provocation and asserted that her version was corroborated by several witnesses who were their officemates. The Department of Justice, however, found that the subject utterances constituted only slight oral defamation because they were made in the heat of anger. According to Undersecretary Pineda, on the morning of December 27, 2006, Genabe was about to punch in her time card when she was informed that she had been suspended for failing to meet her deadline in a case, and that it was Agbayani who informed the presiding judge that Genabe had missed her deadline when she left to attend a convention in Baguio City, leaving Agbayani to finish the task herself. The confluence of these circumstances was found to be the immediate cause of Genabe’s emotional and psychological distress.

The Court of Appeals concurred that the utterances constituted only slight oral defamation, having been said in the heat of anger and with perceived provocation from Agbayani. It noted that Genabe was of a highly volatile personality prone to throw fits (sumpongs), and that she shared a hostile working environment with her co-employees, particularly with her superiors, Agbayani and Hon. Bonifacio Sanz Maceda, the Presiding Judge of Branch 275, whom she claimed had committed against her “grievous acts that outrage moral and social conduct.” The long-standing animosity between Agbayani and Genabe was not denied.

Both Agbayani and Genabe were residents of Las Piñas City and both worked at the Regional Trial Court, and the incident subject of the case happened in their workplace. Agbayani’s complaint-affidavit did not show that the case had been referred to the barangay for conciliation under Sections 408 and 409(d) of the Local Government Code of 1991, nor did it show that the case fell under any of the exceptions to the mandatory barangay conciliation procedure.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Agbayani argued that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that the Department of Justice did not abuse its discretion when it reversed and set aside the City Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause for grave oral defamation.
• Classification of Oral Defamation: She maintained that Genabe’s utterances constituted grave oral defamation, not slight oral defamation; that the DOJ disregarded the investigating prosecutor’s finding of probable cause; that her version was corroborated by witnesses; that she gave no provocation; and that Genabe acted with malice aforethought, not in the heat of anger.
• Non-Compliance with DOJ Circular No. 70: She argued that Genabe’s petition for review should have been dismissed outright under Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70 because it failed to state the name and address of the petitioner, lacked proof of service, and lacked required attachments.
• Extrinsic Fraud and Suppression: She alleged that her comment was disregarded and suppressed in the DOJ records, and that 36 documents were surreptitiously inserted after the petition was filed, including Document Nos. 40 and 41 dated after the petition, constituting extrinsic fraud and grave misconduct.
• Katarungang Pambarangay: She challenged the Court of Appeals’ affirmance of the DOJ’s dismissal of the complaint for non-compliance with the Local Government Code of 1991.
• Mandatory Nature of DOJ Circular No. 70: She insisted that the requirements under DOJ Circular No. 70 are mandatory and that non-compliance should result in dismissal.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the Department of Justice did not commit grave abuse of discretion in reversing and setting aside the City Prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause for grave oral defamation.
• Classification of Oral Defamation: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the DOJ’s finding that the utterances constituted only slight oral defamation.
• Katarungang Pambarangay Compliance: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the DOJ’s dismissal of the complaint for non-compliance with the Local Government Code of 1991 on barangay conciliation.
• DOJ Circular No. 70 Requirements: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the requirements under DOJ Circular No. 70 (2000 NPS Rules on Appeal) are not mandatory.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: No. The Court of Appeals correctly found no grave abuse of discretion; the DOJ resolution was in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
• Classification of Oral Defamation: No. The DOJ’s determination that the utterances were made in the heat of anger with perceived provocation, and thus constituted only slight oral defamation, is beyond the ambit of review absent grave abuse.
• Katarungang Pambarangay Compliance: No. Dismissal was proper because the complaint failed to comply with the mandatory barangay conciliation under Sections 408 and 409(d) of Republic Act No. 7160, and no exception was shown.
• DOJ Circular No. 70 Requirements: No. The requirements are not absolutely mandatory; substantial compliance and liberal construction apply, and the Secretary of Justice has wide latitude of discretion under DOJ Circular No. 70.

• Grave Abuse of Discretion: The standard for grave abuse of discretion requires a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. It is not enough that a tribunal abused its discretion; the abuse must be grave. The Court of Appeals cited Punzalan vs. Dela Peña for this standard. The DOJ’s reversal of the City Prosecutor’s probable-cause finding was not shown to meet this standard. The Secretary of Justice has authority to review prosecutors’ findings, and courts generally do not interfere in preliminary investigations absent grave abuse. The alleged extrinsic fraud—suppression of Agbayani’s comment and insertion of documents—required clear and convincing evidence; Agbayani’s bare claim, denied in her motion for reconsideration, did not suffice. The additional documents were not shown to be fabricated or never furnished; at least seven were her own submissions, and the DOJ could require additional documents for a fuller consideration. This supported the finding of no grave abuse.

• Classification of Oral Defamation: Article 358 of the Revised Penal Code defines oral defamation; it is grave slander when it is of a serious and insulting nature, otherwise it is slight. Villanueva vs. People teaches that gravity depends on the expressions used, the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and the special circumstances, antecedents, or relationship between the offended party and the offender, which may tend to prove the intention of the offender at the time. Uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party, constitutes only a light felony. The DOJ found that Genabe’s utterances were made in the heat of anger, with perceived provocation from Agbayani, based on the circumstances: Genabe was about to punch in when informed of her suspension for missing a deadline, and Agbayani had informed the presiding judge, leaving Agbayani to finish the task. Undersecretary Pineda found this confluence caused Genabe’s emotional and psychological distress. The Court of Appeals concurred, noting Genabe’s volatile personality and the long-standing animosity with Agbayani. The determination that the offense was of lesser gravity because it was made in extreme excitement or in a state of passion and obfuscation, rather than with cold and calculating deliberation, is beyond the ambit of review.

• Katarungang Pambarangay: Sections 408 and 409(d) of Republic Act No. 7160 require barangay conciliation for disputes between parties residing in the same city or municipality, including those arising at the workplace, before filing a complaint in court or any government office, except in enumerated cases. Administrative Circular No. 14-93 lists the exceptions, including offenses with a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one year or a fine of over ₱5,000, and offenses where there is no private offended party. Agbayani and Genabe both resided in Las Piñas City and worked at the Regional Trial Court; the incident occurred at their workplace. Agbayani’s complaint-affidavit did not show prior referral to the barangay, nor that the case fell under an exception. She did not show that the oral defamation was so grave as to merit a penalty of more than one year. Under Article 358, grave oral defamation is penalized by arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, while slight oral defamation is penalized by arresto menor or a fine not exceeding ₱200. The DOJ found probable cause only for slight oral defamation. Under Morato vs. Go, where the complaint did not state that it is an excepted case, did not allege prior availment of conciliation, or did not have a certification that no conciliation had been reached, the case should be dismissed. Thus, dismissal was proper.

• DOJ Circular No. 70 Requirements: Sections 5 and 6 of DOJ Circular No. 70 require certain contents and attachments; Section 6 states that failure to comply with any requirement shall constitute sufficient ground for dismissal. However, the word “shall” is not an absolute and inflexible criterion. DOJ Circular No. 70 is a tool designed to facilitate, not obstruct, the attainment of justice through appeals taken with the National Prosecution Service. There was substantial compliance: Genabe mentioned Agbayani’s name and address; service was shown by Agbayani’s filing of her comment and its receipt by the Prosecution Staff; and a computer verification showed the prosecutor received the comment. As to the additional documents, Agbayani did not claim she was never furnished copies or that they were fabricated; at least seven were her own submissions. Document Nos. 40 and 41 were dated after the petition, but a motion to defer arraignment was required if an Information had been filed. In Guy vs. Asia United Bank, a motion for reconsideration filed beyond the non-extendible period was allowed, and the Secretary of Justice’s authority to review and order the withdrawal of an Information was held not time-barred, subject to court approval if jurisdiction over the accused had attached. Sections 7 and 10 (and the quoted Section 12) of DOJ Circular No. 70 give the Secretary of Justice wide latitude to dismiss outright or motu proprio or upon motion for non-compliance. Yao vs. Court of Appeals holds that procedural rules of the most mandatory character may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice; strict adherence resulting in absurdity or manifest injustice, or where the merit of a party’s cause outweighs non-compliance, requires liberal construction. Thus, no reversible error was committed.

• Grave abuse of discretion — A capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or an arbitrary or despotic exercise of power by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty. It is not enough that a tribunal abused its discretion; the abuse must be grave. The Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court found no such abuse in the DOJ’s reversal of the City Prosecutor’s probable-cause finding.
• Substantial compliance and liberal construction of procedural rules — Procedural rules are instruments to facilitate justice, not to obstruct it; they are not applied with severity and rigidity when such application would defeat their rationale. Under this principle, the requirements of DOJ Circular No. 70, including Section 6’s “sufficient ground for dismissal,” are not absolutely mandatory; substantial compliance and the Secretary’s wide discretion under Sections 7 and 10 (and the quoted Section 12) may excuse technical lapses.
• Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation as a precondition — Under Sections 408 and 409(d) of Republic Act No. 7160, disputes between parties residing in the same city or municipality, including those arising at the workplace, must undergo barangay conciliation before filing in court or any government office, except in enumerated cases. Failure to allege that the case is excepted, prior availment, or a certification that no conciliation was reached warrants dismissal. The Court applied this to Agbayani’s complaint because she and Genabe were residents of Las Piñas City and the incident occurred at their workplace.
• Grave and slight oral defamation — Oral defamation is the speaking of base and defamatory words tending to prejudice another in reputation, office, trade, business, or means of livelihood. It is grave when serious and insulting; otherwise it is slight. Gravity depends on the expressions used, the personal relations of the accused and the offended party, and the special circumstances, antecedents, or relationship that may prove the offender’s intention. Uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger with some provocation constitutes only a light felony. The DOJ’s finding of slight oral defamation was upheld as beyond review.
• DOJ Secretary’s review of probable cause — Prosecutors have latitude in determining probable cause, but their findings are subject to review by the Secretary of Justice, who may reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution and may accept additional evidence. Courts generally do not interfere with preliminary investigations and review probable-cause determinations only for grave abuse of discretion. The Secretary’s authority to review and order withdrawal of an Information is not time-barred, subject to court approval if jurisdiction over the accused has attached.

• “The rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence.” — The passage states the Court’s rationale for relaxing the requirements of DOJ Circular No. 70 and for allowing substantial compliance.
• “The compulsory process of arbitration is a pre-condition for the filing of the complaint in court. Where the complaint (a) did not state that it is one of excepted cases, or (b) it did not allege prior availment of said conciliation process, or (c) did not have a certification that no conciliation had been reached by the parties, the case should be dismissed.” — The passage states the Katarungang Pambarangay precondition and the consequence of non-compliance, which the Court applied to Agbayani’s complaint.
• “In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be relaxed.” — The passage, quoted from Yao vs. Court of Appeals, supports the Court’s liberal construction of DOJ Circular No. 70.
• “In particular, it is a rule that uttering defamatory words in the heat of anger, with some provocation on the part of the offended party constitutes only a light felony.” — The passage states the rule applied to uphold the DOJ’s finding that Genabe’s utterances constituted only slight oral defamation.

• Punzalan vs. Dela Peña, 478 Phil. 771 (2004) — Cited by the Court of Appeals for the standard of grave abuse of discretion; the Supreme Court did not disturb that standard in affirming the Court of Appeals.
• Guy vs. Asia United Bank, G.R. No. 174874, October 4, 2007, 534 SCRA 703 — Relied upon to uphold the DOJ Secretary’s authority to entertain a belated motion for reconsideration and to review and order withdrawal of an Information; the authority is not time-barred, subject to court approval if jurisdiction has attached.
• First Women’s Credit Corporation vs. Perez, G.R. No. 169026, June 15, 2006, 490 SCRA 774 — Cited for the general rules that criminal prosecution may not be restrained by injunction, courts follow a policy of non-interference in preliminary investigations, and probable-cause determinations are reviewed only for grave abuse of discretion.
• Villanueva vs. People, 521 Phil. 191 (2006) — Cited for the definition of oral defamation, the factors determining gravity, and the rule that defamatory words uttered in the heat of anger with some provocation constitute only a light felony.
• Morato vs. Go, et al., 210 Phil. 367 (1983) — Cited for the rule that compliance with the Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation process is a precondition to filing in court; failure to allege exception, prior availment, or lack of settlement warrants dismissal.
• Yao vs. Court of Appeals, 398 Phil. 86 (2000) — Cited for the principle that procedural rules of the most mandatory character may be relaxed in the interest of substantial justice.
• Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-56224-26, November 25, 1982 — Cited by the DOJ in its resolution for the rule that abusive remarks made in the heat of unrestrained anger and obfuscation, with provocation, may constitute only slight oral defamation.
• Crespo vs. Judge Mogul, 235 Phil. 465 (1987) — Cited in Guy vs. Asia United Bank for the authority of the Secretary of Justice to order the withdrawal of an Information, subject to the approval of the court if jurisdiction over the accused has attached.
• Buan vs. Matugas, G.R. No. 161179, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 263 — Cited as support for the ruling that the DOJ’s determination that the defamation was uttered in extreme excitement or passion and obfuscation is beyond the ambit of review.
• Ginete vs. CA, 357 Phil. 36, 51 (1998) — Cited for the principle that rules of procedure are instruments designed to facilitate justice and should not be applied with severity and rigidity.

• Article 358, Revised Penal Code — Defines slander/oral defamation and its penalties: arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if serious and insulting; otherwise arresto menor or a fine not exceeding ₱200. The provision was used to determine whether the offense fell within the barangay conciliation exception for offenses with a maximum penalty exceeding one year or a fine over ₱5,000; the DOJ found only slight oral defamation.
• Sections 408 and 409(d), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Section 408 gives the lupon authority to bring together parties residing in the same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except those enumerated; Section 409(d) provides that disputes arising at the workplace shall be brought in the barangay where the workplace is located. These provisions made barangay conciliation a precondition to Agbayani’s complaint.
• Sections 5 and 6, DOJ Circular No. 70 (2000 NPS Rules on Appeal) — Section 5 lists the contents and attachments of a petition for review; Section 6 states that failure to comply with any requirement shall constitute sufficient ground for dismissal. The Court held these requirements not absolutely mandatory and found substantial compliance.
• Sections 7 and 10 (with Section 12 as quoted), DOJ Circular No. 70 — The Secretary of Justice may dismiss a petition outright if patently without merit or manifestly intended for delay, and may reverse, affirm, or modify the appealed resolution; the Secretary may also motu proprio or upon motion dismiss for non-compliance. These provisions were cited to show the Secretary’s wide latitude of discretion.
• Administrative Circular No. 14-93, Supreme Court, July 15, 1993 — Lists the disputes exempt from barangay conciliation and states that prior recourse to barangay conciliation is a precondition before filing a complaint in court or any government office. The Court applied it to find no exception for Agbayani’s complaint.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Court — The procedural vehicle for Agbayani’s petition for review before the Supreme Court.
• Section 3, DOJ Circular No. 70 — Provides that an appeal to the DOJ must be taken within 15 days from receipt of the resolution or denial of the motion for reconsideration; mentioned in relation to the motion to defer arraignment.
• Section 13, DOJ Circular No. 70 — Referred to in Guy vs. Asia United Bank as the non-extendible period of ten days for a motion for reconsideration, which the DOJ Secretary may relax.

Antonio T. Carpio, Arturo D. Brion, Jose Portugal Perez, and Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno.