Agacid vs. People of the Philippines

Republic Act No. 9262 applies to lesbian relationships, the law's use of the gender-neutral term "any person" in Section 3(a) encompassing female perpetrators of violence against women who are or were their intimate partners. The denial of a motion to quash, being an interlocutory order, is not a proper subject of a petition for certiorari where the remedy of appeal is available after trial.

Petitioner Roselyn Agacid and private respondent Maria Alexandria Bisquerra were former intimate partners who had been in a four-year relationship that ended in March 2014. Republic Act No. 9262, the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004, penalizes violence committed against women and their children in the context of intimate or familial relationships. The statutory framework defines the offense in Section 3(a) by reference to acts committed "by any person" against a woman who is or was the offender's wife, sexual or dating partner, or with whom the offender shares a common child. The interpretive question central to this case is whether that gender-neutral phrasing extends the law's coverage to female perpetrators in same-sex relationships.

Roselyn Agacid and Maria Alexandria Bisquerra were in a four-year intimate relationship that ended in March 2014. On August 31, 2014, at approximately 4:00 p.m., the two met at Starbucks, Ali Mall, Cubao, Quezon City, so that Bisquerra could return items Agacid had given her during their relationship. According to Bisquerra's Complaint-Affidavit, Agacid had expected the meeting to be an opportunity to talk and reconcile, but Bisquerra insisted on finalizing the break-up because she no longer wished to continue the relationship.

Upon hearing this, Agacid became angry. She slapped Bisquerra and then stabbed her on the right forearm with a sharp object — described in the Information as a cutter — causing a laceration on the proximal third of the right forearm. Bisquerra fled and sought assistance from the security guards at Ali Mall, but Agacid had already left the scene. Bisquerra thereafter proceeded to Quezon Memorial Medical Center for treatment of her wound and then went to the Cubao Police Station to file a complaint.

Agacid was eventually charged with violation of Section 5(a) of Republic Act No. 9262 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 229, under Criminal Case No. R-QZN-16-10244-CR. The Information alleged that Agacid had willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously committed physical abuse upon Bisquerra, her former lover and live-in partner, by slapping her and stabbing her on the forearm with a cutter. Agacid moved to quash the Information, contending that the allegations did not constitute an offense because a woman could not be charged under Republic Act No. 9262, the law being intended to protect women from abusive men. The RTC denied the motion and its reconsideration, relying on the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Garcia vs. Drilon. Agacid then elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, which likewise denied relief, prompting the present petition.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Petitioner argued that a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals was the proper remedy to assail an interlocutory order issued by a lower court.
• Obiter Dictum in Garcia: Petitioner claimed the Court of Appeals erred in agreeing with the RTC's reliance on what she characterized as an obiter dictum in Garcia vs. Drilon, since that case did not involve a lesbian relationship. She maintained that Garcia explained why the law limited its protection to women against their male partners and that the main discussion concerned the substantial distinctions between men and women.
• Legislative Intent: Petitioner contended that the courts should not have relied solely on statutory construction but should have examined the intent behind the law, which she described as protecting women from the abusive acts of men, the latter being physically stronger. She cited legislative deliberations to support this claim.
• Textual Indicators of Gender-Specific Application: Petitioner argued that the phrase "husband and wife" in the law indicates that it was intended to cover only relationships between men and women. She further asserted that the law refers to violence against women with whom one has a common child, which she claimed is not possible in a relationship between two women.

• Improper Remedy: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that the Court of Appeals correctly ruled that certiorari was not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash because the remedy of appeal was available. The OSG pointed out that the Court of Appeals confined itself to the issue of the propriety of the remedy and did not rule on the correctness of the RTC's conclusions.
• Plain Text of the Law: The OSG insisted there was no error in the RTC's reliance on Garcia, arguing that the plain text of the law states that violence against women and their children may be committed by "any person" and not just men. It noted that the intentional use of the pronouns "his/he" appears only where the law describes marital relations or common children, but shifts to the gender-neutral term "person" when referring to those in sexual or dating relationships with women.
• No Need for Construction: Since the plain text of the law is clear, the OSG maintained that construction and determination of legislative intent are unnecessary, because bills pending before Congress are different from the final document passed and signed into law.
• Garcia's Equal Protection Analysis: The OSG argued that the equal protection issue in Garcia focused on ensuring victim protection rather than limiting abuser prosecution, and it was in that context that the Court declared that any abuser, male or female, may be prosecuted under Republic Act No. 9262.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash.
• Applicability of RA 9262 to Lesbian Relationships: Whether Republic Act No. 9262 covers lesbian relationships such that a woman may be charged under the law for violence against her female intimate partner.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. Certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash, the accused having the plain, speedy, and adequate remedy of entering a plea, going to trial, and appealing any adverse judgment.
• Applicability of RA 9262 to Lesbian Relationships: Yes. Republic Act No. 9262 applies to lesbian relationships because Section 3(a) uses the gender-neutral term "any person" to describe the perpetrator, encompassing female offenders against their female intimate partners.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The Court of Appeals correctly limited its discussion to the propriety of the certiorari remedy. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 seeks only to correct errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. Petitioner's true objective was to question the legal correctness of the RTC's orders — specifically, her insistence that a woman cannot be charged under Republic Act No. 9262 — which is beyond the ambit of a Rule 65 petition. The denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order that is not appealable and may not be the subject of certiorari where other remedies in the ordinary course of law are available. Petitioner failed to demonstrate that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion; the trial court merely discharged its duty to evaluate and resolve the motion to quash and the motion for reconsideration in accordance with procedural rules. The adequate remedy was to enter a plea of not guilty, participate in trial, and appeal any conviction.

• Applicability of RA 9262 to Lesbian Relationships: The plain text of Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9262 defines violence against women and their children as any act committed "by any person" against a woman who is or was the offender's wife, sexual or dating partner, or with whom the offender shares a common child. The law uses a gender-neutral term when referring to offenders. Because there is no ambiguity in the law, further interpretation and determination of legislative intent are unnecessary. The pivotal case of Garcia vs. Drilon, where the Court ruled on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262, already observed that the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with a woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. While Garcia did not itself involve a lesbian relationship, the pronouncement was not obiter dictum; it was part of the Court's resolution of the equal protection issue raised in that case. Jacinto vs. Fouts subsequently and squarely applied this holding to a lesbian relationship, reiterating that the law applies to female perpetrators against their female partners. The Court further reasoned that violence against women in intimate relationships is not merely a gender issue but a power issue. Women can also internalize patriarchal culture and perpetuate violence against other women in intimate relationships. The law's protective purpose — to rescue women from the distinctive forms of violence that arise in private, hidden, and invisible domestic relationships — would be undermined by excluding lesbian relationships from its coverage, as the same dynamics of impunity, invisibility, and imbalanced power relationships that characterize male-perpetrated violence also afflict lesbian relationships.

• Gender-Neutral Application of Republic Act No. 9262 — Republic Act No. 9262 may be committed by "any person" against a woman who is or was the offender's sexual or dating partner, regardless of the perpetrator's gender. The law's use of the gender-neutral term "person" in Section 3(a) encompasses female offenders in lesbian relationships. This doctrine was first articulated in Garcia vs. Drilon as part of the Court's equal protection analysis — not as obiter dictum — and was squarely applied to a lesbian relationship in Jacinto vs. Fouts.

• Denial of a Motion to Quash as Interlocutory — The denial of a motion to quash is an interlocutory order that is not appealable and may not be the subject of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. The accused's proper remedy is to enter a plea, go to trial, and, if convicted, reiterate the denial of the motion to quash as error on appeal from the final judgment. Certiorari lies only when there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

• Violence Against Women as a Power Issue — Violence against women in intimate relationships should not be understood solely as a gender issue but as a power issue. Women can internalize patriarchal culture and perpetuate violence against other women. The law's protective mandate is triggered by the vulnerability of the woman victim within the intimate relationship, regardless of the perpetrator's identity.

• "Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 also applies even if the perpetrator is a woman, so long as the victim is a woman." — This is the opening declaration of the decision, stating the core proposition that the law's coverage extends to female perpetrators in same-sex relationships.

• "As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed 'against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship.' Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word 'person' who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships." — This passage, quoted from Garcia vs. Drilon, articulates the textual basis for the law's applicability to lesbian relationships and was relied upon as controlling precedent rather than obiter dictum.

• "To be sure, while intersectionality would better inform, the distinctiveness and uniqueness of lesbian relationships, the same impunity, invisibility, and imbalanced power relationships that characterize [Violence Against Women and. their Children committed by men] and [what Republic Act No.] 9262 aims to eradicate also infect and afflict lesbian relationships. As experts have put it, abusive tactics can be used in any relationship, regardless of gender." — This passage, quoted from the RTC's Order, frames the policy rationale for extending the law's coverage: the dynamics of intimate-partner violence transcend gender, and excluding lesbian relationships would create an arbitrary gap in the law's protective mandate.

• Garcia vs. Drilon, 712 Phil. 44 (2013) — Controlling precedent on the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9262 and its applicability to lesbian relationships. The Court held that the use of the gender-neutral term "person" in Section 3(a) encompasses lesbian relationships. The present decision confirmed that this pronouncement was part of the Court's resolution of the equal protection issue — not obiter dictum — and was therefore binding.

• Jacinto vs. Fouts, G.R. No. 250627, December 7, 2022 — Directly on point. Jacinto involved a woman accused of violating Republic Act No. 9262 against her female live-in partner. The Court squarely ruled that the law applies to lesbian relationships and that Garcia's pronouncement on this point was not obiter dictum. The present decision relied on Jacinto as the case that applied Garcia's holding to a lesbian relationship.

• Section 3(a), Republic Act No. 9262 — Defines "violence against women and their children" as any act or series of acts committed "by any person" against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child. The Court held that the gender-neutral term "any person" encompasses female perpetrators, extending the law's coverage to lesbian relationships.

• Section 5(a), Republic Act No. 9262 — Penalizes physical violence committed against a woman who is the offender's wife, former wife, or with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the offender shares a common child. Agacid was charged under this provision for slapping and stabbing Bisquerra, her former live-in partner.

Gesmundo, C.J., Caguioa, Hernando, Lazaro-Javier, Inting, Zalameda, M. Lopez, Gaerlan, Rosario, J. Lopez, Dimaampao, Marquez, and Kho, Jr., JJ., concurred. Singh, J., filed a separate concurring opinion, the text of which was not included in the provided source.