Adzuara vs. Court of Appeals

A motorist on a thru-street who runs a red light and strikes a vehicle lawfully making a U-turn is guilty of reckless imprudence, and the factual findings of the trial court on negligence, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals and free from oversight or misapplication, are binding on the Supreme Court.

Petitioner Xerxes Adzuara y Dotimas was, at the time of the incident, a law student driving a 4-door Colt Galant sedan along Quezon Avenue in Quezon City. Private complainant Gregorio Martinez, together with his daughter Sahlee, had just attended a Loved Flock meeting and was driving a 1975 4-door Toyota Corona along the same avenue. The collision occurred at the intersection of Quezon Avenue and 4th West Street, a signalized intersection governed by traffic lights including a left-turn arrow. The charge arose under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical injuries.

On December 17, 1990, at half past 1:00 in the morning, petitioner Xerxes Adzuara y Dotimas, then a law student, was cruising in a 4-door Colt Galant sedan with plate number NMT 718 along Quezon Avenue, coming from the direction of EDSA towards Delta Circle at approximately 40 kilometers per hour. His friends Rene Gonzalo and Richard Jose were with him in the vehicle. Upon reaching the intersection of 4th West Street, the Galant collided with a 1975 4-door Toyota Corona sedan with plate number PMD 711 owned and driven by Gregorio Martinez. Martinez had just attended a Loved Flock meeting with his daughter Sahlee and was coming from the eastern portion of Quezon Avenue near Delta Circle. He was executing a U-turn at the speed of 5 kph at the north-west portion of Quezon Avenue going to Manila when the accident occurred.

The collision flung the Corona twenty meters southward from the point of impact, causing it to land atop the center island of Quezon Avenue. The Galant skittered southward on the western half of Quezon Avenue, leaving its left rear about four meters past the Corona's right front side. The principal points of contact between the two cars were the Galant's left front side and the Corona's right front door including its right front fender. Both petitioner and Martinez claimed that their lanes had green traffic lights, although the investigating policeman, Marcelo Sabido, declared that the traffic light was blinking red and orange when he arrived at the scene an hour later.

Sahlee Martinez, who was seated on the Corona's right front seat, sustained physical injuries requiring confinement and medical attendance at the National Orthopaedic Hospital for five days, causing her to miss classes at St. Paul's College for two weeks. Petitioner and his friends were treated at the Capitol Medical Center for their injuries.

On July 12, 1991, petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical injuries under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code. He pleaded not guilty. On December 11, 1991, before the presentation of evidence, private complainant Martinez manifested his intention to institute a separate civil action for damages against petitioner. The trial court found that the traffic light facing petitioner was red while the left-turn arrow for Martinez was green, and that petitioner's speed was excessive given the circumstances, as evidenced by the distance the vehicles were thrown after impact. The Court of Appeals affirmed these factual findings, noting that the strong impact and the positions of the vehicles after collision confirmed that petitioner had been driving at high speed.

• Insufficiency of Evidence for Negligence: Petitioner argued that his conviction was based merely on his post-collision conduct and that there were no factual circumstances warranting a finding of negligence on his part.
• Uncorroborated Medical Certificate: Petitioner contended that the medical certificate presented by the prosecution was unsubstantiated by the testimony of the physician who accomplished it, and thus had no probative value as to the physical injuries suffered by Sahlee.
• Right of Way: Petitioner insisted that the traffic light facing him at the intersection was green, indicating that he had the right of way.
• Contributory Negligence: Petitioner claimed that Martinez was guilty of contributory negligence because his car had no lights on.
• Inconsistencies in Prosecution Testimony: Petitioner assailed the testimony of Martinez as being replete with inconsistencies to weaken the prosecution's evidence.

• Factual Findings on Negligence: Whether the findings of fact of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on petitioner's negligence are binding on the Supreme Court and sufficient to sustain a conviction for reckless imprudence.
• Probative Value of Medical Certificate: Whether a medical certificate uncorroborated by the testimony of the attending physician has probative value in proving the physical injuries suffered by the victim.
• Contributory Negligence: Whether private complainant Martinez was guilty of contributory negligence such as to exculpate or mitigate petitioner's liability.

• Factual Findings on Negligence: Yes. The findings of fact of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court, there being no showing that the lower courts overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied any fact of weight or substance.
• Probative Value of Medical Certificate: Yes. The fact of injury resulting from the collision may be proved by means other than the physician's testimony, such as the testimony of the injured person herself, which was corroborated by her father.
• Contributory Negligence: No. The negligence of Martinez was not satisfactorily shown; petitioner had the last clear chance to avoid the accident but ignored it.

• Factual Findings on Negligence: The Supreme Court is bound by the doctrine that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed on appeal, since the trial court is in the best position to assess the demeanor and manner of testifying of witnesses firsthand. Nothing in the record showed that the court a quo failed to properly evaluate the facts. The trial court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that petitioner ran a red light and proceeded at a fast clip into the intersection, while Martinez had a green left-turn arrow. Martinez's version was consistent from his written statement to the police on December 13, 1990 through his testimony, and was corroborated by Sahlee. The physical evidence — the dent on the main frame of Martinez's car and the positions of the vehicles twenty meters from the point of impact — confirmed the strong impact and petitioner's excessive speed. Petitioner's claim of driving at 40 kph was belied by Martinez's testimony that when he checked the opposite lane for oncoming cars he saw none, then seconds later he was hit. The appreciation of petitioner's post-collision behavior served only to emphasize the finding of negligence already established by his admission that he saw Martinez's car making a U-turn but could not avoid the collision by braking alone.

• Probative Value of Medical Certificate: The fact of injury resulting from a collision may be proved in ways other than the physician's testimony. Sahlee Martinez herself testified that her injuries as described in the medical certificate were caused by the vehicular accident of December 17, 1990. This declaration was corroborated by Gregorio Martinez. The Court found this sufficient and convincing proof of the injuries, notwithstanding the absence of the physician's testimony.

• Contributory Negligence: While a motorist crossing a thru-stop street generally has the right of way over one making a U-turn, the rule shifts when the person making the U-turn has already negotiated half the turn and is almost on the other side, becoming visible to the person on the thru-street — in which case the latter must give way. Petitioner was on the thru-street and had already seen Martinez's car. He should have stopped to allow Martinez to complete the U-turn, having the last clear chance to avoid the accident, which he ignored. Petitioner's claim that Martinez's car had no lights on was unsubstantiated, and the negligence of Martinez was not satisfactorily shown. The alleged inconsistencies in Martinez's testimony referred only to minor points, which tended to bolster rather than diminish the probative value of his testimony by indicating it was not rehearsed.

• Binding Effect of Trial Court Findings on Credibility — The findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are generally not disturbed on appeal, because the trial court is in the best position to observe the demeanor and manner of testifying of witnesses firsthand. An appellate court may depart from this rule only when strong justifications exist — specifically, when the trial court has clearly overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance that could affect the result of the case. The Court applied this doctrine by refusing to re-evaluate the evidence, finding nothing in the record showing that the court a quo failed to properly evaluate the facts.

• Negligence as a Relative Concept — Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term, and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require. The Court applied this principle by evaluating the degree of care required at 1:30 a.m. on an almost deserted avenue — ordinary care and vigilance, consisting of keeping a watchful eye on the road and observing traffic rules on speed, right of way, and traffic lights.

• Last Clear Chance — Where a motorist on a thru-street has already seen a vehicle making a U-turn and the U-turning vehicle has already negotiated half the turn and is visible, the motorist on the thru-street must give way and stop to allow the U-turn to be completed. Petitioner had the last clear chance to avoid the accident but ignored it, never stopping his vehicle.

• Minor Inconsistencies Bolster Credibility — Inconsistencies in a witness's testimony that refer only to minor points indicate veracity rather than prevarication, and tend to bolster the probative value of the testimony by erasing any suspicion of being rehearsed.

• "Negligence is the want of care required by the circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an absolute, term and its application depends upon the situation of the parties and the degree of care and vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require." — This passage provides the canonical definition of negligence under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code as applied in Philippine jurisprudence, establishing the standard against which petitioner's conduct was measured.

• "It is a rule that a motorist crossing a thru-stop street has the right of way over the one making a U-turn. But if the person making a U-turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru-street, the latter must give way to the former." — This passage articulates the right-of-way rule as between a thru-street motorist and a U-turning vehicle, and was the controlling principle for finding that petitioner should have yielded.

• "The fact of the injury resulting from the collision may be proved in other ways such as the testimony of the injured person." — This passage establishes that a medical certificate need not be corroborated by the attending physician's testimony where the injured party herself testifies to the injuries and their cause, corroborated by another witness.

• People vs. Bernal, G.R. No. 101332, March 13, 1996, 254 SCRA 659 — Cited as controlling authority for the doctrine that findings of the trial court on witness credibility are binding on appeal and may be disturbed only when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts of weight or substance. The Court relied on this case to refuse re-evaluation of the evidence.

• United States vs. Barias, No. 7567, 23 Phil. 434 (1912) — Cited as the source of the definition of negligence as the want of care required by the circumstances, a relative or comparative term. The Court applied this definition to assess the degree of care required under the circumstances of the case.

• People vs. Fabrigas Jr., G.R. No. 115005, September 5, 1996, 261 SCRA 436 — Cited for the proposition that minor inconsistencies in a witness's testimony indicate veracity rather than prevarication and tend to bolster the probative value of the testimony.

• Valenzuela vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115024, February 7, 1996, 253 SCRA 303 — Cited in support of the definition of negligence as a relative concept dependent on the circumstances of the parties.

• Article 365, Revised Penal Code — Defines and punishes reckless imprudence, under which petitioner was charged with reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property with less serious physical injuries. The provision was the statutory basis for the conviction and the penalty of two months and fifteen days of arresto mayor medium.

Puno, Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concurred.