Advincula vs. Commission on Appointments

The Supreme Court cannot pass upon and determine the correctness of the interpretation placed by a co-equal, coordinate department of the government on its own rules without violating the fundamental principle of separation of powers. Where the case does not involve an alleged infringement of the Constitution or any lawfully enacted law or measure, but only a supposed misconstruction by the legislature of its own regulation, the matter concerns the internal business of such branch of the Government and cannot be made the subject of judicial inquiry.

Petitioners Ruperto Advincula and Braulio Avelino were extended ad interim appointments by former President Garcia on October 27, 1961, as Justices of the Peace of Dao and Ivisan, Capiz, respectively. The Commission on Appointments is a constitutional body created under the Constitution, and its Revised Rules govern the confirmation process for presidential appointments. Section 21 of the Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments provides that a resolution on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one day after approval.

Petitioners Ruperto Advincula and Braulio Avelino were extended ad interim appointments by former President Garcia on October 27, 1961, as Justices of the Peace of Dao and Ivisan, Capiz, respectively. They duly qualified — Advincula on November 2, 1961, and Avelino on October 31, 1961 — and immediately thereafter entered and discharged the functions of said offices. On April 27, 1962, their ad interim appointments were favorably considered and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments.

On April 30, 1962, a member of the Commission on Appointments, invoking Section 21 of the Revised Rules of said body, asked for a reconsideration of the aforementioned confirmation. As a result, the approval or confirmation of petitioners' appointments was withdrawn, and the appointments remained unacted upon until the adjournment of the session of Congress on May 17, 1962. The Department of Justice thereafter advised petitioners to vacate their positions in view of the by-passing or non-confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of their ad interim appointments.

The discussion by the Commission on Appointments of the motion to reconsider the April 27-confirmation appeared in the minutes of its meeting of April 30, 1962. Congressman Ganzon, who filed the motion, stated that he found out after the confirmation that there were pending sworn complaints against the two appointees, and he filed the motion for reconsideration to give the proper committee the chance to reconsider. Senator Puyat noted that under the Rules, any member could present a motion for reconsideration within 24 hours, and if favorably reconsidered, the committee which originally reported out the confirmation would investigate the case. Senator Primicias, as Chairman of the Committee on Justice who proposed the confirmation, argued that the motion was filed beyond the period under the Rules, noting that no motion for reconsideration was filed because the action in confirming the appointments was considered illegal by some. Congressman Lagumbay raised whether the doctrine of fraud, accident, mistake, and excusable neglect under the Rules of Court could allow reopening, but Senator Primicias responded that the Rules of Court are not applicable.

Congressman Ganzon then argued that the confirmation was made on Friday, April 27, and the motion was filed on Monday, April 30, contending that since April 28 was Saturday and April 29 was Sunday — both non-working days — filing on Monday as the next working day should come within the 24-hour reglementary period. Senator Primicias agreed that the point was well taken, stating that when the Rules require 24 hours, it contemplates that the next day is a working day, and if it is not a working day, it should not be taken into account. The Commission then voted and approved the motion to reconsider.

Petitioners filed the instant petition claiming that the reconsideration by the Commission on Appointments of the April 27-confirmation of their appointments, made on April 30, 1962, or three days thereafter, was in violation of Section 21 of the Revised Rules of said body and therefore null and void. They argued that Republic Act 1880, providing for Monday-to-Friday working days, could not have the effect of amending the constitutional provision, and that the confirmation of their appointments, having been made on Friday, April 27, 1962, became final and irrevocable after April 28, 1962.

• Violation of Section 21 of the Revised Rules: Petitioners claimed that the reconsideration by the Commission on Appointments of the April 27-confirmation of their appointments, made on April 30, 1962, or three days thereafter, was in violation of Section 21 of the Revised Rules of said body and therefore null and void.
• Republic Act 1880 Cannot Amend the Constitution: Petitioners assailed the Commission's conclusion on the ground that Republic Act 1880, providing for Monday-to-Friday working days — which apparently influenced the conclusion reached by the Commission — could not have the effect of amending the constitutional provision regarding computation of periods.
• Finality of Confirmation: Petitioners argued that the confirmation of their appointments, having been made on Friday, April 27, 1962, became final and irrevocable after April 28, 1962.

N/A — The decision does not recount the respondents' arguments in detail beyond the procedural context of the Commission's deliberations.

• Justiciability / Separation of Powers: Whether the Supreme Court may pass upon and determine the correctness of the interpretation placed by the Commission on Appointments, a co-equal and coordinate department of the government, on its own rules.
• Computation of the One-Day Period: Whether the Commission on Appointments correctly construed Section 21 of its Revised Rules to mean that the one-day period for filing a motion for reconsideration should be computed as the "next working day," excluding Saturdays and Sundays.

• Justiciability / Separation of Powers: No. The Court cannot pass upon the correctness of the interpretation placed by a co-equal, coordinate department on its own rules without violating the fundamental principle of separation of powers. The case does not involve an alleged infringement of the Constitution or any lawfully enacted law or measure, but only a supposed misconstruction by the legislature of its own regulation.
• Computation of the One-Day Period: Not reached on the merits. The Court declined to review the Commission's interpretation of its own rules, as the matter concerns the internal business of a branch of the Government which cannot be made the subject of judicial inquiry.

• Justiciability / Separation of Powers: The Court reasoned that the petition would require it to pass upon and determine the correctness of the interpretation placed by a co-equal, coordinate department, through one of its duly constituted committees or commissions — a constitutional body no less — on its own rules. This the Court cannot do without violating the fundamental principle of separation of powers. The Court noted that the case does not involve an alleged infringement of the Constitution or any lawfully enacted law or measure, but of a supposed misconstruction, by the legislature, of its own regulation. The matter concerns the internal business of such branch of the Government which cannot be made the subject of judicial inquiry.
• Computation of the One-Day Period: The Court observed that the Commission on Appointments, confronted with the question of how the one-day period prescribed in its Rules would be computed in connection with its proceedings, construed the same to mean the "next working day," excluding Saturdays and Sundays. This was based on the theory that unlike in the computation of the 100-session days of Congress from which only Sunday was specifically excluded (Section 9, Article VI, Constitution), the Commission on Appointments is authorized to hold sessions only on specified days. However, the Court did not rule on the correctness of this interpretation, as doing so would violate the separation of powers principle.

• Separation of Powers — The fundamental principle that the three branches of government — executive, legislative, and judicial — are co-equal and coordinate, and that no branch may interfere with the internal operations of another. The Court applied this doctrine by refusing to review the Commission on Appointments' interpretation of its own rules, holding that the matter concerns the internal business of a branch of the Government which cannot be made the subject of judicial inquiry.
• Political Question Doctrine — Matters concerning the internal business of a branch of the Government, involving a supposed misconstruction by the legislature of its own regulation, are not justiciable. The Court held that where the case does not involve an alleged infringement of the Constitution or any lawfully enacted law or measure, the matter is not subject to judicial inquiry.

• "Clearly, the petition would want this Court to pass upon and determine the correctness of the interpretation placed by a co-equal, coordinate department, through on a of its duly constituted committees, or commissions, a constitutional body, no less, on its own rules. This, we can not do without violating the fundamental principle of separation of powers." — This passage articulates the core ratio decidendi: the Court's refusal to review the Commission on Appointments' interpretation of its own rules based on the separation of powers principle.
• "Note that the case does not involve an alleged infringement of the Constitution or any lawfully enacted law or measure, but of a supposed misconstruction, by the legislature, of its own regulation. Certainly, the matter concerns the internal business of such branch of the Government which can not be made the subject of judicial inquiry." — This passage defines the scope of judicial inquiry and establishes the political question doctrine as applied to internal legislative rules.

N/A — The decision does not cite any prior jurisprudence.

• Section 21, Revised Rules of the Commission on Appointments — Provides that a resolution of the Commission on any appointment may be reconsidered on motion by a member presented not more than one day after approval, and that if a majority of the members present concur to grant a reconsideration, the appointment shall be reopened and submitted anew to the Commission. The Commission interpreted this provision to mean the "next working day," excluding Saturdays and Sundays.
• Section 9, Article VI, Constitution — Referenced in the Commission's deliberations regarding the computation of the 100-session days of Congress, from which only Sunday was specifically excluded, in contrast to the Commission on Appointments which is authorized to hold sessions only on specified days.
• Republic Act 1880 — Provides for Monday-to-Friday working days; petitioners argued that this statute could not have the effect of amending the constitutional provision regarding computation of periods.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concurred. Reyes, J.B.L., J., took no part.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the decision.