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Adtel, Inc. and/or Reynaldo T. Casas vs. Marijoy A. Valdez

The petition was denied and the Court of Appeals Resolutions dated 28 May 2009 and 8 October 2009 were affirmed. Adtel, Inc. terminated Marijoy A. Valdez after her husband filed civil and criminal cases against Adtel; the Labor Arbiter dismissed her illegal dismissal complaint, but the NLRC reversed and awarded separation pay, backwages, and attorney's fees. Adtel received the NLRC's denial of its motion for reconsideration on 5 February 2009; on 7 April 2009, the last day of the 60-day period, it filed a motion for extension instead of the petition, and it filed the petition on 22 April 2009. The CA dismissed the petition as late, and the Supreme Court upheld the dismissal. The Court ruled that the 60-day period under Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, is generally non-extendible and that heavy workload of counsel, standing alone, is not a compelling or special reason for extension.

Primary Holding

A motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is a prohibited pleading, and an extension may be granted only in exceptional or meritorious cases upon a showing of special or compelling reasons; heavy workload of counsel, standing alone, is not such a reason.

Background

Adtel, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the distribution of telephone units, gadgets, equipment, and allied products. It employed Marijoy A. Valdez as an accountant and later promoted her to purchasing and logistics supervisor. Adtel also entered into a dealership agreement with Valdez's husband, Angel Valdez, for the distribution of Adtel's wideband VHF-UHF television antennas. The present petition concerns the procedural rule governing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, particularly the 60-day period as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.

History

  1. Labor Arbiter, 24 May 2007 — dismissed respondent's complaint for illegal dismissal, finding a conflict of interest and just cause because respondent was a managerial employee and her husband's civil and criminal cases created a conflict of interest.

  2. NLRC, 21 May 2008 — reversed the Labor Arbiter, held that Adtel illegally dismissed respondent for failure to prove an act or omission personally attributable to her, and ordered separation pay of ₱283,000.00, backwages of ₱684,600.58, and 10% attorney's fees.

  3. NLRC, 24 December 2008 — denied Adtel's motion for reconsideration; Adtel received the denial on 5 February 2009.

  4. CA, 7 April 2009 — Adtel filed a motion for extension of time to file a petition for certiorari, citing the heavy volume of work of its counsel.

  5. CA, 22 April 2009 — Adtel filed its petition for certiorari, the last day of the extended period prayed for.

  6. CA, 28 May 2009 — denied the motion for extension and dismissed the petition for certiorari for being filed beyond the reglementary period under A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.

  7. CA, 8 October 2009 — denied Adtel's motion for reconsideration.

  8. Supreme Court, 9 August 2017 — denied the petition and affirmed the CA Resolutions dated 28 May 2009 and 8 October 2009.

Facts

Adtel, Inc., a domestic corporation engaged in the distribution of telephone units, gadgets, equipment, and allied products, hired Marijoy A. Valdez on 9 September 1996 as an accountant. Adtel later promoted her as the company's purchasing and logistics supervisor. Adtel also entered into a dealership agreement with Valdez's husband, Angel Valdez, for the distribution of Adtel's wideband VHF-UHF television antennas; the agreement was for twelve months and was extended for another three months.

On 3 February 2006, Angel Valdez filed a civil case against Adtel for specific performance and damages for the execution of the terms of the dealership agreement. On 10 May 2006, he also instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Adtel's chairman, president, and officers.

On 22 May 2006, Adtel issued a memorandum directing respondent to show cause in writing why she should not be terminated for conflict of interest and/or serious breach of trust and confidence. The memorandum stated that the filing of the cases by respondent's husband created a conflict of interest since respondent had access to vital information that could be used against Adtel. Respondent was placed under preventive suspension. On 23 May 2006, respondent denied the charges, contending that the cases had nothing to do with her employment and had not affected her performance in the company.

On 29 May 2006, Adtel terminated respondent. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. In her Position Paper, she alleged that she did not violate any company rule or policy; neither was she guilty of fraud, nor willful breach of trust. She contended that she was illegally dismissed without just cause and was entitled to separation pay, backwages, and damages.

The Labor Arbiter found that a conflict of interest existed between respondent and Adtel. The Labor Arbiter ruled that respondent was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee but a managerial employee with a fiduciary duty to protect Adtel's interest, and that the civil and criminal cases initiated by her husband indubitably created a conflict of interest that was a just cause for dismissal. The NLRC, on the other hand, found that Adtel failed to substantially prove the existence of an act or omission personally attributable to respondent to serve as a just cause to terminate her employment.

Arguments of the Petitioners

  • Technicality Over Merits: Petitioners argued that the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in denying their motion for reconsideration and in dismissing the petition for certiorari on the sole basis of technicality.
  • Judgment on the Merits: Petitioners maintained that technicalities should give way to a judgment on the merits because the Labor Arbiter had justly and correctly ruled that the illegal dismissal complaint was baseless and unmeritorious, only to be later reversed by the NLRC upon respondent's appeal.
  • Heavy Workload as Justification: In their motion for extension, petitioners asserted that while a draft of the petition had already been prepared, final revisions had yet to be completed, and that the undersigned counsel's heavy volume of work constrained them to request an additional fifteen days; the motion was not intended to delay the proceedings but was prompted solely by that reason.

Arguments of the Respondents

  • No Violation of Company Rules: In her Position Paper before the Labor Arbiter, respondent alleged that she did not violate any company rule or policy and was not guilty of fraud or willful breach of trust.
  • Illegal Dismissal and Entitlement: Respondent contended that she was illegally dismissed without just cause and was entitled to separation pay, backwages, and damages.

Issues

  • Extension of the 60-Day Period: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in denying petitioners' motion for extension and dismissing the petition for certiorari for being filed beyond the reglementary period under Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
  • Technicality vs. Merits: Whether technicalities should give way to a judgment on the merits considering that the Labor Arbiter ruled the illegal dismissal complaint baseless and unmeritorious but was reversed by the NLRC upon respondent's appeal.
  • Sufficiency of Justification: Whether the heavy workload of counsel, standing alone, is a special or compelling reason to grant an extension of the 60-day period to file a petition for certiorari.

Ruling

  • Extension of the 60-Day Period: No. The CA correctly dismissed the petition for certiorari because it was filed beyond the 60-day period under Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC.
  • Technicality vs. Merits: No. Technicalities may be relaxed only in exceptional or meritorious cases; no such circumstance was shown to excuse the late filing.
  • Sufficiency of Justification: No. Heavy workload of counsel, standing alone, is not a special or compelling reason to extend the 60-day period; it must be coupled with more compelling reasons substantiated by affidavits of merit.

Ruling Rationale

  • Extension of the 60-Day Period: Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, requires a petition for certiorari to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution; if a motion for reconsideration is timely filed, the petition must be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the denial of the motion. The Court cited Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, which held that following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or denial of the motion for reconsideration; the 60-day period is non-extendible and the CA has no authority to grant an extension. However, the Court recognized the exception established in Domdom vs. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, Labao vs. Flores, Mid-Islands Power Generation vs. Court of Appeals, and Republic of the Philippines vs. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.: absent an express prohibition under Rule 65, a motion for extension is still permitted subject to the Court's sound discretion, but only in exceptional or meritorious cases anchored on special or compelling reasons. Here, Adtel received the NLRC's denial of its motion for reconsideration on 5 February 2009; its 60-day period expired on 6 April 2009, but because that was a holiday, the petition was due on 7 April 2009. On that last day, Adtel filed a motion for extension, not the petition, and filed the petition only on 22 April 2009. The motion cited only the undersigned counsel's heavy volume of work and the need for final revisions. Under Yutingco vs. Court of Appeals, heavy workload alone, absent a compelling or special reason, is not sufficient; it must be coupled with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies substantiated by affidavits of merit. Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals and Mid-Islands Power likewise held that heavy workload is not a compelling or meritorious reason. Because no more compelling reason was cited, the CA did not commit reversible error in dismissing the petition.
  • Technicality vs. Merits: The plea to relax procedural rules was denied. While extensions have been allowed in exceptional or meritorious cases, the party invoking liberality must advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for failure to comply with Rule 65, as stated in Labao. Adtel's explanation—heavy workload—did not meet this standard. Thus, the merits of the labor dispute could not override the mandatory 60-day period, and the CA's dismissal on technical grounds was upheld.
  • Sufficiency of Justification: Heavy workload is relative and often self-serving. It is not sufficient to deviate from the 60-day rule. The motion for extension did not allege illness of counsel, emergency, or other compelling reason substantiated by affidavits of merit. No special or compelling reason existed to grant the extension.

Doctrines

  • Non-extendibility of the 60-day period under Rule 65; exception for exceptional or meritorious cases — Under Section 4, Rule 65, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, a petition for certiorari must be filed within 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution, or if a motion for reconsideration is timely filed, from notice of denial of the motion. The 60-day period is generally non-extendible, and a motion for extension is a prohibited pleading. However, in exceptional or meritorious cases, the Court may grant an extension anchored on special or compelling reasons, subject to sound discretion, pursuant to Domdom vs. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, Labao vs. Flores, Mid-Islands Power Generation vs. Court of Appeals, and Republic of the Philippines vs. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc.
  • Heavy workload as insufficient justification — Heavy workload of counsel, standing alone, is relative and often self-serving; it is not a compelling or special reason to extend the 60-day period. It must be coupled with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies substantiated by affidavits of merit. The Court applied this in Yutingco vs. Court of Appeals, Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, and Mid-Islands Power Generation vs. Court of Appeals.
  • Requisites for liberality in procedural rules — A party invoking liberality must advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for failure to comply with Rule 65. Absent such explanation, the dismissal of a late petition for certiorari stands. Labao vs. Flores was cited for this requirement.
  • Technicalities may yield only in exceptional or meritorious cases — Procedural rules may be relaxed only upon a showing of exceptional or meritorious circumstances; the bare invocation of substantial merits does not excuse non-compliance with the mandatory 60-day period.

Key Excerpts

  • "The 60-day period is deemed reasonable and sufficient time for a party to mull over and to prepare a petition asserting grave abuse of discretion by a lower court. The period was specifically set to avoid any unreasonable delay that would violate the constitutional rights of the parties to a speedy disposition of their case." — This passage, quoted from Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, states the rationale for the strict observance of the 60-day period for petitions for certiorari.
  • "Heavy workload, which is relative and often self serving, ought to be coupled with more compelling reasons such as illness of counsel or other emergencies that could be substantiated by affidavits of merit. Standing alone, heavy workload is not sufficient reason to deviate from the 60-day rule. Thus, we are constrained to state that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for having been filed late." — This passage from Yutingco vs. Court of Appeals establishes that heavy workload alone is not a sufficient justification for extending the 60-day period.
  • "Therefore, the rule is that in filing petitions for certiorari under Rule 65, a motion for extension is a prohibited pleading. However in exceptional or meritorious cases, the Court may grant an extension anchored on special or compelling reasons." — This is the Court's own formulation of the general rule and the exception governing motions for extension in Rule 65 petitions.

Precedents Cited

  • Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 611 Phil. 530 (2009) — Cited as holding that following A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or denial of a motion for reconsideration; the 60-day period is non-extendible and the CA has no authority to grant an extension.
  • Domdom vs. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, 627 Phil. 341 (2010) — Cited for the exception that strict observance of the 60-day period is not absolute; absent an express prohibition under Rule 65, a motion for extension is still permitted subject to the Court's sound discretion.
  • Labao vs. Flores, 649 Phil. 213 (2010) — Cited for the requirement that a party invoking liberality must advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for failure to comply, and that an extension may be granted in special or compelling circumstances.
  • Mid-Islands Power Generation vs. Court of Appeals, 683 Phil. 325 (2012) — Cited for the rule that a motion for extension is allowed only under exceptional or meritorious cases, and that heavy workload and the resignation of the lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons.
  • Republic of the Philippines vs. St. Vincent de Paul Colleges, Inc., 693 Phil. 145 (2012) — Cited as a more recent application of the exception, stating that under exceptional circumstances the period may be extended pursuant to Domdom, Labao, and Mid-Islands Power.
  • Yutingco vs. Court of Appeals, 435 Phil. 83 (2002) — Cited as holding that heavy workload alone, absent a compelling or special reason, is not sufficient justification to extend the 60-day period; it must be coupled with more compelling reasons substantiated by affidavits of merit.
  • Thenamaris Philippines, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 725 Phil. 590 (2014) — Cited as holding that heavy workload of counsel is hardly a compelling or meritorious reason for an extension of time to file a petition for certiorari.
  • De Los Santos vs. Court of Appeals, 522 Phil. 313 (2006) — Cited in Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals for the rationale behind the 60-day period.

Provisions

  • Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC — Requires a petition for certiorari to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order, or resolution; if a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the petition shall be filed not later than 60 days counted from notice of the denial of the motion. The Court applied this provision to Adtel's filing: because Adtel received the NLRC denial on 5 February 2009, the 60-day period expired on 6 April 2009; with 7 April 2009 as the last day due to a holiday, its filing of a motion for extension on that date and its petition on 22 April 2009 were beyond the period.

Notable Concurring Opinions

Diosdado M. Peralta, Jose Catral Mendoza, Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, and Samuel R. Martires concurred.