Adormeo vs. COMELEC

The three-term disqualification for local elective officials under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code requires the concurrence of two conditions: (a) that the official was elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that the official fully served three consecutive terms. An electoral defeat that severs the official from office for any length of time constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service, rendering the terms non-consecutive.

Petitioner Raymundo M. Adormeo and private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. were the only candidates who filed certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections. Talaga was the incumbent mayor at the time, having won a recall election on May 12, 2000 to serve the unexpired term of Bernard G. Tagarao, who had defeated Talaga in the 1998 regular election. The dispute centers on the interpretation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code), both of which bar local elective officials from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position.

Private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. was first elected mayor of Lucena City in May 1992 and served a full three-year term. He was re-elected in May 1995 and again served a full term. In the May 1998 regular election, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao, who then served as mayor from June 30, 1998. On May 12, 2000, a recall election was held, and Talaga won, returning to office to serve the unexpired portion of Tagarao's term, which ran until June 30, 2001.

On March 2, 2001, petitioner Raymundo M. Adormeo, who along with Talaga was the only other candidate to file a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections, filed a petition before the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor seeking to deny due course to or cancel Talaga's certificate of candidacy and/or disqualify him. Petitioner contended that Talaga had already been elected and had served as city mayor for three consecutive terms: the full term beginning May 1992, the full term beginning May 1995, and the unexpired term he served after winning the May 12, 2000 recall election. Petitioner argued that this constituted a violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which prohibits local elective officials from serving more than three consecutive terms.

Talaga responded on March 9, 2001, asserting that he had been elected mayor for only two consecutive terms, not three, because his defeat in the 1998 election interrupted the consecutiveness of his service. He maintained that for nearly two years — from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000 — he was a private citizen, and that his service following the recall election, lasting approximately thirteen months and eighteen days, was not a full term within the contemplation of the Constitution. He cited Lonzanida vs. COMELEC as authority for the proposition that disqualification under Section 8 requires both election to and full service of three consecutive terms.

On April 20, 2001, the COMELEC First Division found Talaga disqualified, ordering his certificate of candidacy withdrawn and/or cancelled. Talaga filed a motion for reconsideration on April 27, 2001, reiterating that "three consecutive terms" means continuous service for nine years and that Tagarao's two-year tenure from 1998 to 2000 prevented him from having served three consecutive terms. Petitioner filed his opposition on May 3, 2001, arguing that serving an unexpired term is considered one term and that the Constitution speaks of "term," not "tenure." On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc reversed the First Division and declared Talaga qualified, holding that he was not elected for three consecutive terms because he lost in the May 1998 election, that his victory in the recall election was not considered a regular term of office for purposes of the three-term disqualification rule, and that his loss in 1998 constituted an interruption in the continuity of his service. Talaga was proclaimed the duly elected mayor on May 19, 2001, prompting petitioner to elevate the matter to the Supreme Court via petition for certiorari.

• Three-Term Limit Violation: Petitioner contended that Talaga was disqualified to run for city mayor under the three-term rule because the unexpired portion of the term Talaga served after winning the recall election — covering May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 — should be considered a full term. Petitioner posited that interpreting otherwise would allow Talaga to serve four consecutive terms totaling ten years, in violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and Section 43(b) of Republic Act No. 7160.
• "Term" vs. "Tenure": Petitioner argued that Article X, Section 8 of the Constitution speaks of "term" and does not mention "tenure," so the fact that Talaga was not elected in the May 1998 election to start a term beginning June 30, 1998 was of no moment. What mattered was that Talaga was elected to an unexpired term in the recall election, which should be considered one full term from June 30, 1998 to June 30, 2001.
• Unexpired Term as One Term: Petitioner maintained that serving the unexpired term of office is considered as one term for purposes of computing the number of successive terms allowed.

• Interruption by Electoral Defeat: Private respondent maintained that his service as city mayor was not consecutive, because he lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and, between June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, during Tagarao's incumbency, he was a private citizen. He thus had not been mayor for three consecutive terms.
• Recall Election Not a Regular Term: Respondent argued that the recall election was not a regular election but a separate special election specifically to remove incompetent local officials, and that his victory therein should not be counted as a term for purposes of the three-term disqualification rule.
• Two-Condition Test: Respondent cited Lonzanida vs. COMELEC as authority that two conditions must concur for disqualification: (a) that the official was elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that he fully served three consecutive terms. He contended that neither condition was satisfied in his case.
• COMELEC's Position: The COMELEC, in its comment, restated its position that Talaga was not elected for three consecutive terms, his defeat in the May 1998 elections being an interruption in the continuity of his service as city mayor of Lucena.

• Three-Term Limit: Whether the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared Talaga qualified to run for mayor, i.e., whether Talaga was disqualified under the three-term limit rule having served as mayor from 1992 to 1998 and again from 2000 to 2001 after winning a recall election.

• Three-Term Limit: No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Talaga was not elected for three consecutive terms because his defeat in the 1998 election interrupted the continuity of his service for nearly two years, during which he was a private citizen. The disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution requires both election to and full service of three consecutive terms, neither of which was satisfied.

• Three-Term Limit: The Court applied the two-condition test articulated in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC and Lonzanida vs. COMELEC: disqualification attaches only when (a) the official was elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) the official fully served three consecutive terms. Both conditions must concur. Talaga was elected mayor in May 1992 and served a full term; he was re-elected in May 1995 and served a full term; but he lost the May 1998 election to Tagarao, who served as mayor for nearly two years. That electoral defeat severed Talaga from office and rendered him a private citizen from June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, thereby interrupting the continuity of his service. His subsequent victory in the May 12, 2000 recall election and service of the unexpired term until June 30, 2001 did not constitute a third consecutive term because the consecutiveness had been broken. The Court rejected petitioner's reliance on Fr. Joaquin Bernas's commentary that service of an unexpired term counts as one term, noting that the comment pertained only to members of the House of Representatives, for whom no recall election is provided, unlike local government officials. The Court also noted that Talaga's departure from office in 1998 was not a voluntary renunciation but an involuntary severance by electoral defeat, which, consistent with Lonzanida, amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Accordingly, the COMELEC's ruling that Talaga was not elected for three consecutive terms was upheld.

• Three-Term Limit Two-Condition Test (Borja Doctrine) — The term limit for elective local officials refers to both the right to be elected and the right to serve in the same elective position. Disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution requires the concurrence of two conditions: (a) that the official was elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that the official fully served three consecutive terms. It is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms; he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times. In this case, Talaga was elected only twice consecutively (1992 and 1995), his 1998 defeat breaking the chain, so the disqualification did not apply.
• Involuntary Severance as Interruption (Lonzanida Doctrine) — Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time is not considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official was elected. Conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Talaga's loss in the 1998 election was an involuntary severance — not a voluntary renunciation — and thus interrupted the continuity of his service, preventing the three terms from being consecutive.

• "Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply." — This passage, quoted from Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, articulates the two-condition test that is the controlling doctrine for the three-term limit, requiring both election and full service for three consecutive terms before disqualification attaches.
• "Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service." — This passage, quoted from Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, defines the distinction between voluntary renunciation and involuntary severance for purposes of computing consecutive terms, establishing that electoral defeat constitutes an interruption.
• "The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections." — This is the Court's application of the two-condition test to Talaga's factual situation, concluding that the electoral defeat broke the consecutiveness of his terms and thus the disqualification did not apply.

• Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157 (1998) — Controlling precedent. The Court relied on this case for the two-condition test: the term limit refers to both the right to be elected and the right to serve, so disqualification requires both election to and full service of three consecutive terms. The Court quoted its hypothetical illustrations showing that an official who has served only two full terms successively remains eligible for one more term.
• Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 135150, 311 SCRA 602 (1999) — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the two-condition test and for the principle that involuntary severance from office — as opposed to voluntary renunciation — constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service, thereby preventing terms from being counted as consecutive.

• Section 8, Article X, 1987 Constitution — Provides that the term of office of elective local officials shall be three years and that no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the official was elected. The Court interpreted this provision as requiring both election to and full service of three consecutive terms before disqualification attaches, and as distinguishing voluntary renunciation (which does not interrupt continuity) from involuntary severance (which does).
• Section 43(b), Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides that no local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the same position, and that voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official was elected. The Court applied this provision in pari materia with the constitutional provision, treating both as imposing the same two-condition test.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Pardo, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concurred.