Adlawan vs. Adlawan

A co-owner’s action for ejectment under Article 487 of the Civil Code is permitted only when the suit is brought for the benefit of the co-ownership; where the co-owner plaintiff asserts absolute and exclusive ownership and seeks possession and damages solely for himself, the action operates as a repudiation of co-ownership, does not fall within the protective ambit of Article 487, and must be dismissed for want of authority to sue and for failure to implead the other co-owners as indispensable parties.

Dominador Adlawan died intestate on May 28, 1987. He was the registered owner of Lot 7226 and the house built on it in Barrio Lipata, Minglanilla, Cebu, covered by TCT No. 8842. Dominador had acquired the property from his parents, Ramon and Oligia Adlawan, through a deed of sale executed on January 31, 1962. He was survived by his childless legal wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan, who later died on May 6, 1997, and by petitioner Arnelito Adlawan, an alleged acknowledged illegitimate child. Respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan, Dominador’s siblings, had continuously occupied the ancestral home on the lot since birth, along with their parents and other deceased siblings. After Dominador’s death, Graciana and respondents lived on the property undisturbed. Petitioner later executed an affidavit of self-adjudication claiming sole heirship and absolute ownership, demanded respondents vacate, and, upon their refusal, initiated the present unlawful detainer suit.

• Property Ownership and Family Background: Lot 7226 and the house built on it, covered by TCT No. 8842, were originally part of the estate of Ramon Adlawan and Oligia Mañacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine children, including Dominador, Emeterio, and Narcisa. Respondents Emeterio and Narcisa Adlawan had lived on the property since birth along with their parents and siblings. In 1961, to finance the renovation of the ancestral house, Ramon and Oligia transferred ownership of the lot to their son Dominador — then single — via a January 31, 1962 deed of sale (which respondents alleged was simulated). TCT No. 8842 was issued in Dominador’s name, enabling him to use the lot as collateral for a loan. Dominador never disputed his parents’ ownership and later lived on the property with his wife, Graciana Ramas Adlawan; neither Dominador nor Graciana disturbed respondents’ possession.

• Succession and Claim of Sole Heirship: Dominador died intestate on May 28, 1987, survived by his wife Graciana and, according to petitioner, by his acknowledged illegitimate son, Arnelito Adlawan (born April 10, 1967). Graciana, who died childless on May 6, 1997, continued to live on the property with respondents. Petitioner executed an affidavit of self-adjudication, asserting that he was the sole heir and absolute owner of Lot 7226 and the house. Respondents disputed petitioner’s filiation, asserting that Dominador’s signature on the birth certificate was forged, and contended that even if legitimate, Dominador’s widow survived him, entitling her legal heirs to a share.

• Demand and Filing of Unlawful Detainer: Petitioner claimed he allowed respondents to remain on the property out of respect and generosity, on condition they would vacate when his need arose. In January 1999, he verbally demanded they vacate. Respondents refused and instead filed an action for quieting of title (Civil Case No. CEB-23205) before the RTC. Petitioner sent a final demand letter dated August 2, 2000. When respondents failed to vacate, petitioner filed the complaint for unlawful detainer on August 9, 2000, unequivocally asserting sole ownership and seeking recovery of possession and damages solely for himself.

• Respondents’ Defense and Intervention: Respondents denied that they begged to stay. They asserted a lifelong possession of the ancestral home, maintained the transfer to Dominador was simulated and that Dominador held the property in trust for the family, and challenged petitioner’s heirship. After the RTC decision, alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana moved for leave to intervene, claiming co-ownership rights as her intestate heirs. They opposed execution and stated they allowed respondents to stay pending partition. The RTC denied intervention.

• Sole Heirship and Absolute Ownership: Petitioner maintained that he was the acknowledged illegitimate son and sole heir of Dominador, having executed an affidavit of self-adjudication, and consequently the absolute owner of the disputed property with the right to eject any occupant by tolerance.

• Right to Sue Under Article 487 of the Civil Code: Even assuming co-ownership existed, petitioner argued that Article 487 permits any co-owner to bring an action in ejectment without joining all co-owners, because the suit is deemed instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. He claimed that the ejectment of respondents would inure to the benefit of his alleged co-owners.

• Indefeasibility of Torrens Title: Petitioner contended that Dominador’s Torrens title could not be collaterally attacked in an ejectment suit, rendering respondents’ allegations of simulation and implied trust irrelevant.

• Petitioner Is Not the Sole Owner: Respondents countered that even under petitioner’s own claim of filiation, Dominador was survived by his legal wife Graciana who, under the rules of intestate succession, inherited a one-half share. Petitioner was therefore a co-owner with Graciana’s intestate heirs and could not claim exclusive ownership.

• Action Filed for Petitioner’s Exclusive Benefit: Respondents argued that the complaint expressly alleged sole ownership and sought possession and damages exclusively for petitioner, thereby repudiating co-ownership. Such an action does not comply with Article 487, which requires the suit to be for the benefit of all co-owners.

• Lack of Legal Personality and Non-Joinder of Indispensable Parties: Because petitioner sued as the sole owner, he lacked the requisite legal personality to maintain the unlawful detainer suit. The other co-owners were indispensable parties, and their absence rendered all proceedings ineffective.

• Right to Sue as Sole Owner: Whether petitioner, who alleged absolute and sole ownership of the property based on his claimed status as the sole heir, could validly maintain an unlawful detainer suit in his name alone.

• Application of Article 487 of the Civil Code: Whether a co-owner who repudiates the co-ownership and seeks possession and damages exclusively for himself may bring an action in ejectment under Article 487 of the Civil Code.

• Necessity of Impleading Other Co-owners: Whether the failure to implead the other co-owners as parties is fatal to an ejectment suit where the plaintiff claims sole ownership and the action is for his exclusive benefit.

• Right to Sue as Sole Owner: Petitioner could not validly maintain the unlawful detainer suit as the sole owner. His own theory of succession established that Dominador died survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife Graciana. Under Article 998 of the Civil Code, the widow is entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the illegitimate child to the other half; thus, upon Dominador’s death, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of the contested property. Graciana’s subsequent death did not make petitioner the absolute owner, because her one-half share passed to her own relatives by consanguinity, not to petitioner. Consequently, petitioner was merely a co-owner, not the sole owner, and his claim of absolute ownership was unfounded.

• Application of Article 487 of the Civil Code: Article 487 allows any co-owner to bring an action in ejectment, covering all actions for recovery of possession. The provision is grounded on the presumption that the suit is instituted for the benefit of the entire co-ownership. However, where the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone — such that he claims exclusive ownership and seeks possession solely for himself — it operates as a complete repudiation of co-ownership and cannot prosper under Article 487. Petitioner’s complaint explicitly averred that he was the “sole heir” and “absolute owner,” and he prayed for possession and damages exclusively for his own benefit. Accordingly, the case fell outside the protective ambit of Article 487 and the action was correctly dismissed.

• Necessity of Impleading Other Co-owners: Because the suit was for petitioner’s exclusive benefit and in derogation of the rights of his co-owners, the heirs of Graciana were indispensable parties. Petitioner failed to implead them. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the absence of indispensable parties rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint ineffective, including the judgment. The dismissal of the complaint was therefore proper.

• Action by a Co-owner for Recovery of Possession (Article 487, Civil Code) — Article 487 covers all actions for the recovery of possession, including forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership (accion de reivindicatoria). A co-owner may bring such an action without joining all other co-owners because the suit is deemed instituted for the benefit of all co-owners. Any judgment in favor of the suing co-owner benefits the others; an adverse judgment cannot prejudice the rights of unimpleaded co-owners. However, if the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone — such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership — the action will not prosper unless the other co-owners, who are indispensable parties, are impleaded. The action must not operate as a repudiation of the co-ownership.

• Effect of a Co-owner’s Claim of Sole Ownership — When a co-owner files an ejectment suit expressly asserting exclusive ownership and seeking recovery of possession and damages solely for his own benefit, the suit is a complete repudiation of the co-ownership. This removes the case from the scope of Article 487 and necessitates joinder of the other co-owners as indispensable parties. The suit must be dismissed for lack of authority to sue and for failure to state a cause of action that benefits the co-ownership.

• “A co-owner may bring such an action, without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs, because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone, such that he claims possession for himself and not for the co-ownership, the action will not prosper.” — Quoting Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II (1983 ed.), p. 157, and adopted as the controlling principle.

• “In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. … If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.” — From Baloloy v. Hular, 438 SCRA 80, applied to the present ejectment suit.

• “Clearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof.” — Distinguishing Resuena, Sering, Celino, and Vencilao where the suing co-owners did not assert exclusive ownership.

• Baloloy v. Hular, G.R. No. 157767, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 80 — Followed and extensively quoted. The Court held that a co-owner who files a complaint claiming sole ownership and praying to be declared sole owner cannot maintain the action under Article 487 because the suit is for his own exclusive benefit; the other co-owners are indispensable parties and must be impleaded. This doctrine was directly applied to the unlawful detainer suit.

• Resuena v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128338, March 28, 2005, 454 SCRA 42; Sering v. Plazo, G.R. No. L-49731, September 29, 1988, 166 SCRA 84; Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, G.R. No. 161817, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 690; Vencilao v. Camarenta, 140 Phil. 99 — Distinguished. In these cases, the co-owners who filed the suits did not represent themselves as exclusive owners; the actions were brought in behalf of the co-ownership, and a favorable decision would benefit all co-owners. The present case was held different because petitioner expressly claimed sole ownership.

• De Guia v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120864, October 8, 2003, 413 SCRA 114 — Cited for the settled principle that Article 487 covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including accion interdictal, accion publiciana, and accion reivindicatoria.

• Article 487, Civil Code — “Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.” Applied: The provision allows a co-owner to sue for recovery of possession, but the action must be for the benefit of the entire co-ownership. Because petitioner sued as sole owner and for his exclusive benefit, the suit did not fall within the purview of Article 487 and was dismissed.

• Article 998, Civil Code — “If a widow or widower survives with illegitimate children, such widow or widower shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance, and the illegitimate children or their descendants, whether legitimate or illegitimate, to the other half.” Applied: This article established that upon Dominador’s death, his wife Graciana inherited one-half of the estate, making her and petitioner co-owners; petitioner was therefore not the sole heir.

• Article 1078, Civil Code — “Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment of debts of the deceased.” Applied: Upon Dominador’s death, the property was owned in common by petitioner and Graciana as co-heirs, confirming the existence of co-ownership.

• Article 1011, Civil Code — “In default of persons entitled to succeed in accordance with the provisions of the preceding Sections, the State shall inherit the whole estate.” Noted: If Graciana’s heirs were indeed “fictitious,” the State would succeed to her share and become a co-owner entitled to possession, further underscoring that petitioner could not claim exclusive ownership.

• Section 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Mandates the compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Applied: The heirs of Graciana were indispensable parties; their absence rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint ineffective, warranting dismissal.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN (Chief Justice), MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR., MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO.