Acuzar vs. Jorolan

Certiorari is not the proper remedy when appeal is available within the administrative machinery, and the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that a party first avail of administrative processes before seeking judicial intervention. Due process in administrative proceedings does not require trial-type proceedings; it is satisfied where the party is afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side through oral arguments or pleadings.

The case involves an administrative disciplinary proceeding against a member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) before the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB), the administrative body created under Republic Act No. 6975 and tasked to hear complaints against erring PNP members. The petitioner, a police officer, was charged with grave misconduct for an alleged illicit relationship with the minor daughter of the respondent complainant. A parallel criminal case for violation of Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610 (Child Abuse Act) was separately filed before the Municipal Trial Court, raising the question of whether the administrative case could proceed independently of the criminal case.

On May 2, 2000, respondent Aproniano Jorolan filed Administrative Case No. 2000-01 before the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) of the Municipality of New Corella, Davao del Norte, charging petitioner SPO1 Leonito Acuzar with Grave Misconduct for allegedly having an illicit relationship with respondent's minor daughter. On May 11, 2000, respondent also instituted Criminal Case No. 1712 before the Municipal Trial Court of New Corella for Violation of Section 5(b), Article III of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act.

On May 15, 2000, petitioner filed his Counter-Affidavit before the PLEB vehemently denying all the accusations, attaching the affidavit of complainant's daughter, Rigma A. Jorolan, who denied having any relationship with the petitioner or having kissed him despite knowing him to be a married person. On July 24, 2000, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the PLEB proceedings pending resolution of the criminal case before the regular court. The PLEB denied his motion for lack of merit, and a hearing of the case was conducted. The PLEB also denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration on August 9, 2000 for allegedly being dilatory.

On August 17, 2000, after due proceedings, the PLEB issued a decision finding petitioner GUILTY of GRAVE MISCONDUCT (Child Abuse), punishable by dismissal effective immediately. Immediately upon receipt of the decision, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order with the RTC of Tagum City, Branch 31, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 384, alleging that the decision was issued without giving him an opportunity to be heard and that the Board acted without jurisdiction because prior conviction in the criminal case was required under the PLEB Rules of Procedure. On September 16, 2000, petitioner was ordered dismissed from the Philippine National Police by the Chief Regional Directorial Staff, Police Regional Office 11, effective September 7, 2000.

On October 15, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision annulling the PLEB decision, noting that nothing in the record showed that the Board scheduled a hearing for the reception of petitioner's evidence, and that petitioner was not given his day in court. The trial court reasoned that because the administrative hearing had the penal sanction of dismissal and forfeiture of benefits, petitioner should be afforded all opportunities of hearing, including the reception of his evidence, consistent with procedural due process.

Respondent thereafter elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which on March 23, 2007 reversed and set aside the trial court's decision. The CA found merit in respondent's argument that the petition for certiorari was not the proper remedy because appeal was available and the issues raised were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact. The CA ruled that petitioner should have appealed the PLEB decision to the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari, and that petitioner failed to demonstrate any ground to warrant immediate resort to the extraordinary writ.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Petitioner contended that the petition for certiorari he filed before the trial court was appropriate because the case fell under the exceptions to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies, the PLEB decision being patently illegal.
• Prior Conviction Requirement: Petitioner maintained that a conviction should have been first obtained in the criminal case for child abuse before the PLEB could acquire jurisdiction over his administrative case, since the charge, although denominated as grave misconduct, was actually for violation of law.
• Denial of Due Process: Petitioner maintained that the Board's decision was reached without giving him an opportunity to be heard and that his right to due process was violated; the decision having been rendered without jurisdiction, appeal was not an appropriate remedy.

• Improper Remedy: Respondent argued that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner before the RTC was not the proper remedy because appeal was available and the issues raised were not pure questions of law but both questions of law and fact.
• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Respondent argued that petitioner should have appealed the PLEB decision to the regional appellate board of the PNP before resorting to certiorari, and that petitioner failed to demonstrate any ground to warrant immediate resort to the extraordinary writ.

• Propriety of Certiorari: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that certiorari was not the proper remedy to assail the PLEB decision because appeal was available and the issues raised were not pure questions of law.
• Due Process: Whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was accorded due process before the PLEB and was given his day in court for his defense.

• Propriety of Certiorari: No. Certiorari was not the proper remedy because appeal to the Regional Appellate Board was available under Section 43(e) of Republic Act No. 6975, and the existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies required petitioner to first avail of the administrative remedy before seeking judicial intervention.
• Due Process: Yes. Petitioner was accorded due process before the PLEB. He was notified of the complaint, submitted his counter-affidavit and witness affidavits, attended hearings with counsel, and asked for several postponements; due process in administrative proceedings does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice.

• Propriety of Certiorari: The Court found petitioner's contention that the PLEB lacked jurisdiction until conviction in the criminal case untenable. A careful perusal of respondent's affidavit-complaint showed that petitioner was charged with grave misconduct for engaging in an illicit affair with respondent's minor daughter, he being a married man, and not for violation of law. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose, and does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention. "Violation of law," on the other hand, presupposes final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other: criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence, and administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The PLEB, being the administrative disciplinary body tasked to hear complaints against erring PNP members, had jurisdiction over the case. Section 43(e) of Republic Act No. 6975 explicitly provides that a PLEB decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate board within ten days from receipt of the copy of the decision. Since appeal was available, filing a petition for certiorari was inapt. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, he should have availed of the means of administrative processes afforded to him, to enable the administrative body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court. For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, three requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Petitioner's bare allegation that appeal may not be adequate did not justify immediate resort to certiorari, and he failed to sufficiently show any grave abuse of discretion of the Board.

• Due Process: The Court reviewed the records of the PLEB proceedings, which showed that the Board issued a summon to petitioner on May 3, 2000; petitioner's wife made an informal letter on May 4, 2000 stating he was in critical condition in the hospital; petitioner's counsel filed a motion for extension of time to submit counter-affidavit on May 9, 2000; the Board received petitioner's sworn statement on May 16, 2000; subpoenas were sent for the first hearing on June 1, 2000; a second hearing on June 15, 2000 was postponed because counsel was slated to appear before the RTC; the third, fourth, fifth, and sixth hearings were postponed because counsel filed motions for postponement and to suspend proceedings; and the final hearing was set on August 3, 2000, but petitioner walked out during the hearing because of the non-appearance of his legal counsel, and the PLEB Members continued to hear the case based on sworn affidavits. In administrative proceedings, procedural due process includes: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. Petitioner was notified of the complaint, submitted his counter-affidavit and the affidavits of his witnesses, attended the hearings together with his counsel, and even asked for several postponements. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice; where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. It is not legally objectionable for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties, as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of direct testimony.

• Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies — Before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court, it is a precondition that he should have availed of the means of administrative processes afforded to him; if a remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this alternative should first be utilized before resort can be made to the courts, to enable the administrative body to review and correct any mistakes without the intervention of the court. The Court applied this doctrine in holding that petitioner should have appealed the PLEB decision to the Regional Appellate Board under Section 43(e) of RA 6975 before filing certiorari.
• Requisites for Certiorari — For a special civil action for certiorari to prosper, three requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board or officer must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that the availability of appeal to the Regional Appellate Board defeated petitioner's resort to certiorari.
• Due Process in Administrative Proceedings — Procedural due process in administrative cases includes: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one's favor, and to defend one's rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding supported by substantial evidence. Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings; it is satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy, and affidavits of witnesses may take the place of direct testimony. The Court applied this doctrine in finding that petitioner was not denied due process despite the PLEB's continuation of the hearing after he walked out.
• Independence of Criminal and Administrative Cases — Criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other; criminal cases require proof beyond reasonable doubt while administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence, and administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings. The Court applied this doctrine in rejecting petitioner's claim that the PLEB could not proceed until he was first convicted in the criminal case for child abuse.

• "The existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari." — This states the controlling rule that certiorari cannot prosper where appeal is available, forming the core of the Court's ruling on the propriety of the remedy.
• "The settled rule is that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct from each other. In criminal cases, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed whereas in administrative proceedings, only substantial evidence is required. Verily, administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings." — This articulates the doctrine of independence of criminal and administrative proceedings, directly rejecting petitioner's prior-conviction argument.
• "Due process in an administrative context does not require trial-type proceedings similar to those in courts of justice. Where opportunity to be heard either through oral arguments or through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process." — This defines the standard of due process in administrative proceedings and supports the Court's finding that petitioner was afforded sufficient opportunity to present his defense.

• Villaseñor vs. Sandiganbayan (5th Division), G.R. No. 180700, March 4, 2008, 547 SCRA 658 — Cited as authority for the settled rule that criminal and administrative cases are separate and distinct, and that administrative cases may proceed independently of criminal proceedings.
• Metropolitan Bank & Trust Company vs. Hon. Salvador Abad Santos, G.R. No. 157867, December 15, 2009 — Cited for the proposition that the existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari.
• Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company, Inc. vs. National Wages and Productivity Commission, G.R. No. 144322, February 26, 2007, 514 SCRA 346 — Cited for the requisites that must concur for a special civil action for certiorari to prosper.
• Redeña vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146611, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 389 — Cited for the rule that the extraordinary writ of certiorari may be issued only where there is patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to evasion of positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law.
• Philippine Economic Zone Authority (PEZA) vs. Pearl City Manufacturing Corporation, G.R. No. 168668, December 16, 2009 — Cited for the elements of procedural due process in administrative proceedings.

• Section 43(e), Republic Act No. 6975 — Provides that the decision of the PLEB shall become final and executory, provided that a decision involving demotion or dismissal from the service may be appealed by either party with the regional appellate board within ten days from receipt of the copy of the decision. The Court applied this provision in holding that appeal was available to petitioner, making certiorari inapt.
• Section 5(b), Article III, Republic Act No. 7610 (Child Abuse Act) — The provision under which the criminal case against petitioner was filed before the Municipal Trial Court; the Court noted that the administrative charge was for grave misconduct, not violation of law, so no prior conviction was required.
• Rule VI, Section 2(c), PLEB Rules of Procedure — Defines misconduct as wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct, motivated by premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose, which does not necessarily imply corruption or criminal intention. The Court applied this definition in distinguishing grave misconduct from violation of law.
• Rule VI, Section 2(h), PLEB Rules of Procedure — Defines "violation of law" as presupposing final conviction in court of any crime or offense penalized under the Revised Penal Code or any special law or ordinance. The Court applied this definition in rejecting petitioner's claim that prior conviction was required.
• Rule 45, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — The procedural basis for the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioner before the Supreme Court.

Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno (Chairperson), Associate Justice Conchita Carpio Morales, Associate Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, and Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin concurred in the decision.