Acosta vs. Plan

A procedural law eliminating the record-on-appeal requirement (B.P. Blg. 129) may be applied retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of its passage, thereby curing a pauper litigant's failure to file a record on appeal under the prior rules.

Petitioners Magdalena, Juliana, and Rosita Acosta filed an accion publiciana against Bernardino Magday in the Court of First Instance of Isabela. The action was later amended to implead the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Bureau of Lands. After the parties submitted a stipulation of facts, the case was resolved on the pleadings. The dispute before the Supreme Court concerns only the procedural question of whether the petitioners' appeal was properly dismissed for failure to file a record on appeal, not the merits of the underlying land case.

On January 8, 1962, petitioners Magdalena, Juliana, and Rosita Acosta filed an accion publiciana (Civil Case No. 1201) in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against Bernardino Magday. After Magday filed his answer, the complaint was amended on August 25, 1971, to implead the Department of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Bureau of Lands as additional defendants. Magday filed an amended answer, while the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Lands filed separate answers to the amended complaint.

The parties thereafter submitted a stipulation of facts. Upon the plaintiffs' motion for judgment on the pleadings and/or summary judgment, which the defendant did not oppose, the trial court rendered judgment on October 3, 1975, dismissing the complaint with costs against the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs moved for reconsideration, but the respondent Judge denied the motion on December 12, 1975.

On December 22, 1975, the plaintiffs filed a motion for leave to appeal as paupers, followed by a notice of appeal on December 23, 1975. The trial court granted the motion to appeal as paupers on January 19, 1976. Believing that, as pauper litigants, they were not required to submit a record on appeal, the petitioners waited for the trial court to elevate the entire records of the case to the Court of Appeals, as they understood Section 16, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court to provide. On June 16, 1976, however, respondent Judge dismissed the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal. The appellants filed a motion for reconsideration on July 26, 1976, and on August 10, 1976, they mailed their record on appeal to the Court. On August 23, 1976, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration, prompting the petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court.

• Exemption from Record on Appeal: Petitioners contended that, having been allowed by the lower court to appeal as paupers, they were not required to file a record on appeal, since the entire record of the case would be transmitted to the appellate court and the case would be heard upon the original record so transmitted without printing the same.

• Record on Appeal Required Even for Paupers: The Solicitor General argued that under the Rules of Court then in force, a record on appeal was required to be filed by a pauper appellant, although it did not have to be printed. Section 16, Rule 41 expressly required the clerk to transmit "the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal," distinguishing it from Section 17 of the same Rule, which governs special civil actions and provides that the original record shall be transmitted "in lieu of the record on appeal." The Solicitor General further noted that records on appeal had been filed by pauper litigants as a matter of course.

• Perfection of Appeal by Pauper Litigant: Whether the timely submission of a record on appeal is required for the perfection of an appeal by a pauper litigant.

• Perfection of Appeal by Pauper Litigant: No, under B.P. Blg. 129 as applied retroactively. While the old Rules of Court required even pauper appellants to file a record on appeal (though not printed), B.P. Blg. 129 eliminated that requirement, and being procedural in nature, it was applied retroactively to pending cases.

• Perfection of Appeal by Pauper Litigant: Under the Rules of Court then in force, Section 16, Rule 41 expressly required the clerk to transmit "the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal" to the appellate court. The provision dispensed only with the printing of the record on appeal and the appeal bond — not with the filing of the record on appeal itself. This was contrasted with Section 17 of the same Rule, governing appeals in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and employee's liability cases, which categorically provided that the original record shall be transmitted "in lieu of the record on appeal," meaning no record on appeal was required in those cases. The petitioners' interpretation was therefore incorrect under the old rules. However, B.P. Blg. 129, which overtook the case before it could be decided, eliminated the record-on-appeal requirement for the perfection of an appeal. The same proviso appeared in Section 18 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines issued by the Court on January 11, 1983. Because these provisions were procedural in nature, they were applied retroactively to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, pursuant to the principle that procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. The dismissal of the appeal for failure to file a record on appeal could not stand under the new procedural regime.

• Retroactive Application of Procedural Laws — Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage; procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent. The Court applied this principle to B.P. Blg. 129, which eliminated the record-on-appeal requirement, giving it retroactive effect to benefit the petitioners whose appeal was still pending when the new law took effect.

• "Being procedural in nature, those provisions may be applied retroactively for the benefit of petitioners, as appellants. 'Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions pending undetermined at the time of their passage. Procedural laws are retrospective in that sense and to that extent.'" — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi: the retroactive application of B.P. Blg. 129's elimination of the record-on-appeal requirement to the petitioners' still-pending appeal.

• "It is clear that even a pauper litigant is required to file a record on appeal. What is not required of him is the filing of a printed record on appeal, and, of course, an appeal bond, since the cited Rule is designed to help the pauper litigant who may not be able to pay the expenses of prosecuting the appeal." — This passage, drawn from the Solicitor General's brief and adopted by the Court, clarifies the distinction between the old rule's exemption (printing and bond) and the requirement that remained (filing the record on appeal itself), underscoring why B.P. Blg. 129 was necessary to cure the petitioners' omission.

• Alday vs. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 — Controlling authority cited for the proposition that B.P. Blg. 129 eliminated the record-on-appeal requirement and that this new rule was given retroactive effect.
• Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board vs. Cloribel, 20 SCRA 517 (1967) — Cited to illustrate the distinction between ordinary appeals requiring a record on appeal and special civil actions perfected by mere filing of a notice of appeal.
• Tiozon vs. Court of Appeals, 70 SCRA 284 (1976) — Cited to show that records on appeal had been filed by pauper litigants as a matter of course under the old rules.
• People vs. Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 — Cited for the doctrine that procedural laws are retrospective in application to pending and undetermined actions.
• Palomo Building Tenants Association, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 133 SCRA 168; De Guzman vs. Court of Appeals, 137 SCRA 731; Lagunzad vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 199 — Cited as further applications of the retroactivity principle to B.P. Blg. 129's record-on-appeal elimination.

• Section 16, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Governed appeals by pauper litigants under the old rules. The Court construed it as requiring the filing of a record on appeal (though not printed), since the provision directed the clerk to transmit "the entire record of the case, including the evidence taken on trial and the record on appeal."
• Section 17, Rule 41, Rules of Court — Governed appeals in certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and employee's liability cases, providing that the original record shall be transmitted "in lieu of the record on appeal." Cited by contrast to show that only special civil actions dispensed with the record on appeal entirely under the old rules.
• B.P. Blg. 129 — Eliminated the record-on-appeal requirement for the perfection of an appeal. Applied retroactively as a procedural law to the petitioners' pending case, curing their failure to file a record on appeal.
• Section 18, Interim Rules and Guidelines (January 11, 1983) — Contained the same proviso eliminating the record-on-appeal requirement, reinforcing the retroactive application of the new procedural regime.

Narvasa, Cruz, Gancayco, and Medialdea, JJ., concurred.