Achacoso vs. Macaraig

Security of tenure attaches to the nature of the appointment — permanent or temporary — not to the position itself; a person who lacks the requisite civil service eligibility for a career service position holds at best a temporary appointment, which may be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority without violating the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure.

Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), a position classified under the Career Executive Service (CES). The Civil Service Decree (P.D. 807) defines the Career Service and includes therein positions in the Career Executive Service such as undersecretary, assistant secretary, bureau director, and other officers of equivalent rank. The Integrated Reorganization Plan, as approved by P.D. 1 and amended by P.D. 336 and P.D. 337, governs appointments to the Career Executive Service: the President normally appoints from a list of CES eligibles recommended by the Board, but may in exceptional cases appoint a person who is not CES eligible, provided that such appointee subsequently takes the required CES examination and is not promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies. Achacoso had not participated in a Career Executive Service Development Program and was not a CES eligible, as certified by the Civil Service Commission.

Tomas D. Achacoso was appointed Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on October 16, 1987, and assumed office on October 27, 1987. On January 2, 1990, in compliance with a request addressed by the President of the Philippines to all Department Heads, Undersecretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Bureau Heads, and other government officials, he filed a courtesy resignation. The President accepted the courtesy resignation on April 3, 1990, "with deep regrets." On April 10, 1990, the Secretary of Labor requested him to turn over his office to the Deputy Administrator as officer-in-charge.

In a letter dated April 19, 1990, Achacoso protested his replacement and declared he was not surrendering his office because his resignation was not voluntary but filed only in obedience to the President's directive. On the same date, respondent Jose N. Sarmiento was appointed Administrator of the POEA, vice the petitioner. Achacoso was informed of the appointment the following day and was again asked to vacate his office. He filed a motion for reconsideration on April 23, 1990, but this was denied on April 30, 1990. He then filed the present petition for prohibition and mandamus with the Supreme Court, seeking to annul the appointment of Sarmiento and to prohibit the respondents from preventing him from discharging his duties as POEA Administrator.

The Civil Service Commission certified that Achacoso had not participated in a Career Executive Service Development Program and was not a CES eligible, and that he was not appointed to a rank in the CES and was therefore not a member of the Career Executive Service. The respondents contended that because he was not CES eligible at the time of his appointment, he fell under the exception in the Integrated Reorganization Plan allowing the President to appoint a non-eligible who must subsequently take the CES examination, and that not having taken that examination, he could not claim a permanent appointment with security of tenure.

• Membership in the Career Service: Petitioner contended that he is a member of the Career Service and so enjoys security of tenure, which is one of the characteristics of the Career Service as distinguished from the Non-Career Service. Claiming the rank of undersecretary, he argued that he comes under Article IV, Section 5 of P.D. 807, which includes positions in the Career Executive Service.
• Involuntariness of Courtesy Resignation: Petitioner argued that it was beyond the prerogatives of the President to require career officials to submit courtesy resignations, and that such resignations, even if filed, should be disregarded for having been submitted under duress, as otherwise the President would have the power to remove career officials at pleasure. He invoked Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, where the Court observed that a courtesy resignation cannot properly be interpreted as a resignation in the legal sense.
• Permanence of Appointment: Petitioner contended that his appointment was really intended to be permanent because temporary appointments are not supposed to exceed twelve months and he was allowed to serve in his position for more than three years.

• Lack of CES Eligibility: Respondents conceded that the office of POEA Administrator is a career executive service position but submitted that the petitioner himself was not a career executive service official entitled to security of tenure, citing a Civil Service Commission certification that he was not a CES eligible and not a member of the Career Executive Service.
• Temporary Nature of Appointment: Respondents contended that as the petitioner was not a CES eligible at the time of his appointment, he came under the exception in the Integrated Reorganization Plan, which provides that a non-eligible appointee shall subsequently take the required CES examination and shall not be promoted to a higher rank until he qualifies. Not having taken that examination, he could not claim that his appointment was permanent and guaranteed him security of tenure.

• Security of Tenure: Whether the petitioner, as Administrator of the POEA, enjoys security of tenure that protects him from replacement.
• Validity of Courtesy Resignation: Whether the courtesy resignation filed by the petitioner was voluntary and effective as a legal resignation.
• Nature of Appointment: Whether the petitioner's appointment was permanent despite his lack of CES eligibility and his service of more than three years.

• Security of Tenure: No. The petitioner did not enjoy security of tenure because, lacking CES eligibility, he held at best a temporary appointment, which may be withdrawn at will by the appointing authority without need to show cause.
• Validity of Courtesy Resignation: Not ruled upon. The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the legality of the courtesy resignation because the petitioner could have been validly replaced even if he had not filed it.
• Nature of Appointment: No. The appointment was at best temporary. The length of service — more than three years — did not by itself convert a temporary appointment into a permanent one, nor did it confer the civil service eligibility the petitioner did not possess.

• Security of Tenure: The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant if he does not possess the required qualifications. Security of tenure depends on the nature of the appointment, which in turn depends on the appointee's eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications cannot be permanently appointed to the position; at best, he may be appointed in an acting or temporary capacity. A permanent appointment can be issued only to a person who meets all the requirements for the position, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed. Achacoso did not possess CES eligibility, as certified by the Civil Service Commission. His appointment could therefore be regarded only as temporary, and a temporary appointee has no fixed tenure and may be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power. The cases he cited — Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, Pamantusan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, and Dario vs. Mison — were distinguished as involving permanent appointees who could not be removed because of security of tenure, unlike the petitioner who was not eligible and thus could be appointed only temporarily.
• Validity of Courtesy Resignation: The Court found it unnecessary to rule on the legality of the courtesy resignation because the petitioner could have been validly replaced even without it. The courtesy resignation could have been a graceful way of withdrawing him from office, but his challenge to it did not succeed because his lack of eligibility independently justified his replacement.
• Nature of Appointment: The petitioner's argument that his appointment was intended to be permanent because he served more than three years was rejected. Even if such an intention were assumed, it would not by itself make the appointment permanent. The appointment did not confer the appropriate civil service eligibility the petitioner did not possess, nor did it vest him with the right to security of tenure available only to permanent appointees. The purpose of an acting or temporary appointment is to prevent a hiatus in official functions pending selection of a permanent appointee, and the person named in an acting capacity accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office when called upon to do so. Separation in such a case is by expiration of the term, not removal, and expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure.

• Security of Tenure Depends on Nature of Appointment, Not Position — Security of tenure is not determined by the classification of the position occupied but by the nature of the appointment extended, which in turn depends on whether the appointee possesses the requisite eligibility and qualifications. A career service position does not automatically confer security of tenure on an occupant who lacks the required qualifications. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that although the POEA Administrator position belongs to the Career Executive Service, Achacoso's lack of CES eligibility meant his appointment was at best temporary, and temporary appointees have no security of tenure.
• Temporary Appointment and Expiration of Term — A temporary or acting appointment serves to prevent a hiatus in the discharge of official functions pending the selection of a permanent appointee. The temporary appointee accepts the position on the condition that he shall surrender the office when called upon to do so. Separation of a temporary appointee is by expiration of the term, not removal; expiration of the term is not covered by the constitutional provision on security of tenure, which prohibits removal except for cause as provided by law. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that Achacoso's separation was effectively an expiration of his temporary term, not an illegal removal.
• Courtesy Resignation — A courtesy resignation is not necessarily a reflection of a public official's intention to surrender his position; to constitute a complete and operative act of resignation, the officer must show a clear intention to relinquish. The Court cited this principle from Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections but found it unnecessary to rule on the legality of the courtesy resignation because the petitioner could have been validly replaced even without it.

• "The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it." — This passage states the ratio decidendi: security of tenure is a function of the appointment's nature, not the position's classification, and eligibility is the determining factor.
• "One who holds a temporary appointment has no fixed tenure of office; his employment can be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power, there being no need the show that the termination is for cause." — This is the canonical formulation of the temporary-appointment doctrine as affirmed in a long line of cases, frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on security of tenure.
• "The appointment extended to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated." — This passage clarifies that the label given to an appointment does not control its legal character; eligibility and qualifications do.

• Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, 162 SCRA 812 — Cited by the petitioner for the proposition that a courtesy resignation is not necessarily a legal resignation. The Court acknowledged the principle but found it unnecessary to rule on the courtesy resignation's validity.
• Luego vs. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327 — Distinguished. In Luego, the petitioner was qualified and held a permanent appointment that could not be withdrawn as merely temporary. In the present case, the petitioner was not eligible and could be appointed only temporarily.
• Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22 — Distinguished as involving a permanent appointee who could not be removed due to security of tenure.
• Palma-Fernandez vs. De la Paz, 160 SCRA 751 — Distinguished for the same reason: it involved a permanent appointee protected by security of tenure.
• Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 — Distinguished as also involving a permanent appointee.
• Cuadra vs. Cordova, 103 Phil. 391 — Cited for the rule that a person who does not have the requisite qualifications may be appointed only in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles, and for the rule that a temporary appointee has no fixed tenure.
• Mendez vs. Ganzon, 101 Phil. 48 — Cited as part of the long line of cases affirming that a temporary appointment may be terminated at the pleasure of the appointing power without need to show cause.

• Article IV, Section 5, P.D. 807 (Civil Service Decree) — Defines the Career Service and includes therein positions in the Career Executive Service such as undersecretary, assistant secretary, bureau director, and other officers of equivalent rank. The petitioner invoked this provision to claim membership in the Career Service, but the Court held that membership in the Career Service does not automatically confer security of tenure without the requisite eligibility.
• Part III, Article IV, Integrated Reorganization Plan (approved by P.D. 1, amended by P.D. 336 and P.D. 337) — Governs appointments to the Career Executive Service. The President normally appoints from a list of CES eligibles but may in exceptional cases appoint a non-eligible who must subsequently take the CES examination. The Court applied this provision to show that the petitioner fell under the exception and was therefore subject to the condition of subsequently qualifying, which he never did.
• Constitution, provision on security of tenure — The constitutional guaranty of security of tenure allows removal only for cause as provided by law. The Court held that this provision does not apply to temporary appointees, whose separation is by expiration of term rather than removal.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concurred.