Acebedo vs. Sarmiento

A dismissal of a criminal case, even when sought by the accused himself, is tantamount to an acquittal and bars further prosecution where it is predicated on the denial of the accused's constitutional right to a speedy trial; such an order may no longer be reconsidered or set aside, and doing so offends the prohibition against being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.

David Acebedo y Dalman stood charged, together with Chi Chan Tan, in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga under a criminal information for damage to property through reckless imprudence filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga. The respondents are the presiding judge of that court and the provincial fiscal, impleaded in their official capacities in a special civil action directed at a judicial order. The controversy turns on two constitutional guarantees — the right of an accused to a speedy trial and the prohibition against being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense — which the petitioner invoked against the further prosecution of the criminal charge.

On August 3, 1959, the Provincial Fiscal of Pampanga filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga a criminal information for damage to property through reckless imprudence against David Acebedo y Dalman and a certain Chi Chan Tan. No further proceedings were taken for some time, and on May 19, 1965, petitioner moved to dismiss the criminal charge. Respondent Judge declined to do so, denying the motion in his order of July 10, 1965.

Two more years passed before the case reached the trial stage. At that trial, the complainant testified on direct examination but had not as yet been fully cross-examined. At the continuation of the trial set for June 7, 1967, the complainant did not appear. The provincial fiscal moved for postponement, but counsel for petitioner not only objected; he sought the dismissal of the case based on the right of the accused to a speedy trial. Respondent Judge this time acceded, and gave an oral order of dismissal in open court, likewise basing it on the ground that the cross-examination of the complainant had not yet started.

Later that same day, however, respondent Judge reconsidered the order and reinstated the case, his action being due to its being shown that the cross-examination of the complainant had already started.

The record showed that for more than six years the threat of petitioner's being subjected to a penal liability hung over his head, with the prosecution failing to take any step to have the matter heard, and that the trial took place only after two additional years had elapsed. When postponement was again sought because the complainant was unavailable for cross-examination, petitioner once more moved to put an end to the prosecution on the ground that he had not been accorded the speedy trial that was his due.

• Denial of Speedy Trial: Petitioner maintained that he had been denied the constitutional right to a speedy trial, the criminal charge having hung over his head for more than six years without the prosecution taking any step to have the matter heard, and the trial having commenced only after two more years had elapsed.
• Dismissal as Acquittal: Petitioner argued that the order of dismissal given in open court, predicated on the denial of his right to a speedy trial, had the effect of an acquittal and could not thereafter be reconsidered.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion: Petitioner assailed the respondent Judge's reconsideration of the order of dismissal and reinstatement of the case as a grave abuse of discretion, since it would subject him to the risk of being put in jeopardy once more.

• Misapprehension of Fact: Respondent Judge maintained that he could reconsider his order of dismissal because he had acted under a misapprehension, namely, that the cross-examination of the complainant had not yet started.
• Cabarroguis vs. San Diego: Respondent Judge relied on Cabarroguis vs. San Diego to lend support to the reconsideration of his order of dismissal.

• Speedy Trial: Whether petitioner was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
• Dismissal Amounting to Acquittal: Whether the order of dismissal given in open court, predicated on the denial of the right to a speedy trial, amounted to an acquittal that barred its reconsideration and the reinstatement of the criminal case.
• Reconsideration and Applicability of Cabarroguis: Whether respondent Judge could validly reconsider the order of dismissal on the ground that he acted under a misapprehension of fact, as in Cabarroguis vs. San Diego.

• Speedy Trial: Yes. The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, and its violation occurs not only when unjustified postponements are sought and secured but also when, without good cause, a long period is allowed to elapse without the case being tried.
• Dismissal Amounting to Acquittal: Yes. A dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal, and any further attempt at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one falls within the prohibition against being twice put in jeopardy.
• Reconsideration and Applicability of Cabarroguis: No. Cabarroguis vs. San Diego is inapplicable, its factual setting being different; the order of dismissal set aside there did not rest on any plea of denial of the right to a speedy trial.

• Speedy Trial: The constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy for its non-observance is habeas corpus if the accused is restrained of his liberty, or certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. Here, more than six years elapsed from the filing of the information on August 3, 1959 without the prosecution taking any step to have the matter heard; petitioner sought dismissal and was rebuffed on July 10, 1965; and the trial commenced only two years later, in 1967, when the complainant again became unavailable for cross-examination. A clear case of denial of the right to a speedy trial was thus made out. Following Kalaw vs. Apostol, the right is violated not only when unjustified postponements are asked for and secured, but also when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried; and no waiver or abandonment may be presumed from the accused's failure to urge that the case be heard, such waiver being presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained by him. Mercado vs. Santos further settled that the right is available irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which the prosecution is commenced, and that an accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity, without being oppressed by delay in the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time.
• Dismissal Amounting to Acquittal: The Court has consistently adhered to the view that a dismissal based on the denial of the right to a speedy trial amounts to an acquittal; necessarily, any further attempt at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one falls within the prohibition against an accused being twice put in jeopardy. In People vs. Diaz, the prosecution failed to appear at two scheduled hearings without asking for postponement or giving any explanation. In People vs. Abano, there were three postponements and, at the scheduled resumption, the complaining witness was absent; the annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal would have placed the accused twice in jeopardy. In People vs. Robles, prosecution witnesses were unavailable, the lower court denied the last plea for postponement, and the resulting dismissal was held not provisional in character but tantamount to an acquittal barring further prosecution for the same offense. In People vs. Cloribel, where the case dragged for three years and eleven months, the dismissal entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to a speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear was held not truly a dismissal but an acquittal. The order of dismissal given in open court in this case therefore had the effect of an acquittal, and the respondent Judge's reconsideration subjected petitioner to the risk of being put in jeopardy once more.
• Reconsideration and Applicability of Cabarroguis: The respondent Judge's claim that he could reconsider because he acted under a misapprehension was unpersuasive, the decisive fact being the absence of the speedy trial guaranteed by the Constitution. Cabarroguis vs. San Diego is not applicable because its factual setting is different: the order of dismissal set aside in that case arose from the belief of the court that the crime of estafa was not committed as the liability was civil in character, and at no stage was there a plea that the accused was denied his right to a speedy trial; the reconsideration was granted there because documentary evidence showed the intention to defraud. No grave abuse of discretion was found in that actuation. The proceeding before the Court is anything but that: petitioner not once but twice sought to have the prosecution terminated, and a clear case of denial of the right to a speedy trial was made out, producing an order of dismissal amounting to an acquittal that no reconsideration could undo without offending the provision on double jeopardy.

• Right to a speedy trial — The right means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays; its salutary objective is to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose. The remedy for its non-observance is habeas corpus if the accused is restrained of his liberty, or certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. Applied here, the more than six-year dormancy of the case before trial, followed by the complainant's non-appearance at the scheduled continuation of her cross-examination, established a clear denial of the right.
• Violation of the right to a speedy trial — The right is violated not only when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the accused's case being tried. The Court applied this formulation to the six-year delay attributable to the prosecution's inaction.
• Non-waiver of the right to a speedy trial — A waiver or abandonment of the right may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained by the accused. Petitioner's failure to urge that the case be heard did not constitute waiver, since the delays were not of his making.
• Dismissal on speedy-trial grounds as acquittal — A dismissal of a criminal case, though at the instance of the defendant and grounded on the disregard of his right to a speedy trial, is tantamount to an acquittal. Necessarily, any further attempt at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one falls within the prohibition against an accused being twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
• Finality of an order of dismissal amounting to acquittal — An order of dismissal that operates as an acquittal may not be reconsidered or set aside by the trial court, even on the claim that the judge acted under a misapprehension of fact; to do so would subject the accused to the risk of being placed in jeopardy a second time.
• Requisites for the Cabarroguis exception — The ruling in Cabarroguis vs. San Diego, allowing reconsideration of an order of dismissal, applies only where the dismissal did not rest on any plea of denial of the right to a speedy trial and where supervening documentary evidence justified the reinstatement; it does not authorize reconsideration of a dismissal predicated on the denial of that constitutional right.

• "The right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays, its salutary objective being to assure that an innocent person may be free from the anxiety and expense of a court litigation or, if otherwise, of having his guilt determined within the shortest possible time compatible with the presentation and consideration of whatever legitimate defense he may interpose." — This is the Court's canonical definition of the constitutional right to a speedy trial, setting the standard against which the six-year delay in the case was measured.
• "The right of the accused to have a speedy trial is violated not only when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, but also when, without good cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without having his case tried." — Quoted from Kalaw vs. Apostol, this passage supplies the operative test for violation of the right and is the formulation applied to the prosecution's prolonged inaction.
• "Such a waiver or abandonment may be presumed only when the postponement of the trial has been sought and obtained [by him]". — This passage disposes of any claim that the accused waived the right by failing to press for trial, confining the presumption of waiver to delays procured by the accused himself.
• "There is no escaping the conclusion then that petitioner here has clearly made out a case of an acquittal arising from the order of dismissal given in open court." — This is the ratio decidendi of the decision, characterizing the oral dismissal as an acquittal and thus foreclosing the respondent Judge's reconsideration of it.

• People vs. Obsania, L-24447, June 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 1249 — The principal controlling precedent, cited at the outset as having recently reaffirmed the doctrine that a dismissal amounting to an acquittal, even if arising from a motion by the accused, permits invocation of the ban on double jeopardy, especially where the dismissal was predicated on the right to a speedy trial; its exhaustive opinion by Justice Castro collected the supporting Philippine cases.
• People vs. Diaz, 94 Phil. 714 (1954) — Cited among the four decisions establishing that a dismissal at the instance of the defendant grounded on disregard of the right to a speedy trial is tantamount to an acquittal; there the prosecution failed to appear at two scheduled hearings without explanation.
• People vs. Abano, 97 Phil. 28 (1955) — Followed for the holding that where three postponements occurred and the complaining witness was absent at the scheduled resumption, the respondent judge was justified in dismissing upon motion of the defense, and annulment of the dismissal would place the accused twice in jeopardy.
• People vs. Robles, 105 Phil. 1016 (1959) — Followed for the ruling that a dismissal entered after prosecution witnesses proved unavailable and the last plea for postponement was denied is not provisional in character but tantamount to an acquittal barring further prosecution for the same offense.
• People vs. Cloribel, L-20314, Aug. 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 805 — Followed for the holding that a dismissal entered upon the defendants' insistence on their constitutional right to a speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear was not truly a dismissal but an acquittal.
• Conde vs. Rivera, 45 Phil. 650 (1924) — Cited, through Justice Malcolm's opinion, for the pre-Commonwealth articulation of the right and for the proposition that the prosecution's failure of reasonable diligence deprived the accused of a trial free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays.
• Kalaw vs. Apostol, 64 Phil. 852 (1937) — The source of the controlling test quoted by the Court: the right is violated not only by unjustified postponements secured by the prosecution but also by allowing a long period to elapse without trial, and waiver is presumed only where the postponement was sought and obtained by the accused.
• People vs. Castañeda, 63 Phil. 480 (1936) — Cited as the first Supreme Court decision after the Constitution took effect in which a conviction was set aside and the accused acquitted because the case had dragged on for almost five years, the Court stressing the Government's moral and legal obligation to see that criminal proceedings come to an end.
• Esguerra vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 134 (1938) — Cited for the ruling that mandamus to compel the trial judge to dismiss the case was the appropriate remedy where the accused, prosecuted for alleged abuse of chastity, was arrested three times and had each time to post bond for provisional liberty.
• Mercado vs. Santos, 66 Phil. 215 (1938) — Followed for the rulings that an accused is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity and cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time, and that the right to a speedy trial is not confined to prosecutions commenced by the fiscal but extends to those commenced by private individuals.
• Cabarroguis vs. San Diego, L-19517, Nov. 30, 1962, 6 SCRA 866 — Distinguished. The order of dismissal set aside in that case arose from the court's belief that the crime of estafa was not committed because the liability was civil in character, and no plea of denial of the right to a speedy trial was ever made; the reconsideration was allowed on documentary evidence of intent to defraud, and no grave abuse of discretion was found.

• Constitutional right to a speedy trial — Invoked by petitioner and applied by the Court as the ground for the dismissal. The Court held that the guarantee was denied where the criminal charge remained pending for more than six years without the prosecution taking any step to have the matter heard, and where the trial commenced only two years later with the complainant again unavailable for cross-examination.
• Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy — Applied to bar the reconsideration of the order of dismissal and the reinstatement of the criminal case. Because the dismissal was predicated on the denial of the right to a speedy trial and therefore amounted to an acquittal, any further attempt at continuing the prosecution or starting a new one would place petitioner twice in jeopardy for the same offense.

Reyes, J.B.L.; Makalintal; Zaldivar; Castro; Teehankee; Barredo; and Villamor, JJ., concurred. Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon and Makasiar, JJ., were on leave.