Acaac vs. Azcuna

A municipal ordinance is deemed approved and valid by operation of law when the Sangguniang Panlalawigan fails to take action declaring it invalid within 30 days from its submission for review, pursuant to Section 56(d) of the Local Government Code; the "action" contemplated by the provision refers to a declaration that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part, not mere pendency before a committee.

Petitioner People's Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PETAL) is a non-governmental organization founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, engaged in ecological protection, tourism, and livelihood projects within Misamis Occidental. PETAL built cottages on Capayas Island — a 1,605-square-meter islet — in 1995 and a seminar cottage in 2001, which it rented to the public as a source of livelihood for its beneficiaries, including petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin. Capayas Island is classified as timberland and forms part of the public domain. Respondents are the Mayor and the Municipal Engineer/Building Official-Designate of Lopez Jaena Municipality, Misamis Occidental, who issued notices of illegal construction against PETAL for its failure to secure building permits under Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines).

PETAL, a non-governmental organization founded by Ramonito O. Acaac, was engaged in ecological protection, tourism, and livelihood projects in Misamis Occidental. In line with its objectives, PETAL constructed cottages made of indigenous materials on Capayas Island — a 1,605-square-meter islet — in 1995, and later built a seminar cottage in 2001. These structures were rented to the public and served as the source of livelihood for PETAL's beneficiaries, among them petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo Bulawin. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the island since 1961, with whom it had entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the operation of the island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort.

On April 11 and May 20, 2002, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna, Jr. and Building Official Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to construction, in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines), ordering it to cease all illegal building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements for issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was issued on July 8, 2002, but remained unheeded.

On the same date, July 8, 2002, the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002, entitled "An Ordinance Establishing Capayas Island and Its Surroundings, Mansabay Bajo and Sibula as Birds, Fish and Shells Sanctuary." The ordinance prohibited, among other things, the entry of any entity, association, corporation, or organization inside the sanctuaries, and the construction of any structures, permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government. On July 12, 2002, Mayor Azcuna approved the ordinance, which was then submitted to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental for review. The SP conducted a joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at designated areas, including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting ingress and egress.

On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island, citing among the reasons its violation of the ordinance. A similar notice was served on the individual petitioners on October 25, 2002. On October 29, 2002, petitioners filed an action before the RTC of Oroquieta City, Branch 2, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, praying for a temporary restraining order, injunction, and damages, alleging prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL assailed the ordinance's validity on grounds that it was adopted without public consultation, was not published in a newspaper of general circulation as required by the Local Government Code, and was not approved by the SP. Respondents countered that petitioners had no cause of action since they were neither lawful owners nor lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland and property of the public domain, and that the ordinance was deemed approved by operation of law for the SP's failure to act within the period prescribed by the LGC.

The RTC declared the ordinance void, finding that PETAL's protest had not been resolved, the ordinance was not duly approved by the SP, it was not published or posted, Capayas Island was timberland unsuited for a sanctuary, and authority over timberlands belonged to the DENR. The RTC ordered respondents to desist from closing the island but directed petitioners to remove their structures for lack of building permits and title. On appeal, the CA reversed, holding the ordinance deemed approved under Section 56(d) of the LGC, crediting Azcuna's testimony on posting and publication, noting that public consultations were conducted, and affirming that petitioners had no proprietary rights over the island.

• Deemed Approval Not Triggered: Petitioners maintained that the subject ordinance could not be deemed approved through the mere passage of time, since the same was still pending with the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
• Non-Compliance with Publication and Posting Requirements: Petitioners contended that the ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor posted in public places as required by the Local Government Code.
• Lack of Public Consultation: Petitioners assailed the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted without public consultation.
• Lack of SP Approval: Petitioners argued that the ordinance was not duly approved by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
• Prior Vested Rights: Petitioners alleged prior vested rights to occupy and utilize Capayas Island, claiming their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession since 1961, and that the ordinance deprived them of their livelihood.

• No Cause of Action: Respondents averred that petitioners had no cause of action because they were neither the lawful owners nor lessees of Capayas Island, which was classified as timberland belonging to the public domain.
• Compliance with Procedural Requirements: Respondents maintained that they had complied with all publication and hearing requirements for the passage of the ordinance.
• Deemed Approval by Operation of Law: Respondents argued that the ordinance was deemed approved by operation of law for the SP's failure to take any positive action thereon within the period provided under the LGC.
• Municipal Authority to Enact the Ordinance: Respondents asserted that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section 16 of the LGC, and that it was not only the DENR that could create and administer sanctuaries.

• Validity of the Ordinance — Deemed Approval: Whether the subject ordinance was deemed approved and valid under Section 56(d) of the Local Government Code notwithstanding its pendency before a committee of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.
• Validity of the Ordinance — Publication and Posting: Whether the subject ordinance complied with the publication and posting requirements under the Local Government Code.
• Validity of the Ordinance — Public Consultation: Whether the subject ordinance was enacted in compliance with public consultation requirements.
• Petitioners' Right to Injunctive Relief: Whether petitioners possess proprietary rights over Capayas Island entitling them to injunctive relief against the ordinance's enforcement.

• Validity of the Ordinance — Deemed Approval: Yes. The ordinance was deemed approved and valid under Section 56(d) of the LGC, more than 30 days having elapsed from its submission to the SP without any action declaring it invalid.
• Validity of the Ordinance — Publication and Posting: Yes. The presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance was upheld, petitioners having failed to present evidence of non-compliance, while respondent Azcuna testified that posting and publication requirements were met.
• Validity of the Ordinance — Public Consultation: Yes. Petitioners' own evidence showed that a public hearing — a "dialogue-consultation" — was conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan on June 13, 2002, prior to the ordinance's promulgation.
• Petitioners' Right to Injunctive Relief: No. Petitioners had not shown any valid title to the property in dispute and thus were not entitled to its possession; the RTC's order directing removal of their structures was not appealed and had become final.

• Validity of the Ordinance — Deemed Approval: Section 56 of the LGC governs the review of municipal ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Paragraph (c) provides that the SP may declare an ordinance invalid in whole or in part if it finds the same beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan. Paragraph (d) provides that if no action is taken within 30 days after submission, the ordinance is presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. The Court read paragraph (d) in conjunction with paragraph (c), holding that the "action" contemplated — which must be entered in the minutes — refers specifically to a declaration that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. Mere pendency before a committee does not constitute such action. Since more than 30 days had elapsed from submission of the ordinance to the SP without any declaration of invalidity, the ordinance was deemed approved pursuant to Section 56(d). This construction harmonizes the provisions of the statute in accordance with the rule that the parts of a statute must be read together to give effect to all of them.

• Validity of the Ordinance — Publication and Posting: Petitioners bore the burden of proving non-compliance with publication and posting requirements, which was a negative allegation essential to their cause of action. Other than bare allegations, they presented no evidence that no publication or posting was made. In contrast, Azcuna testified that the municipality had complied with these requirements. While Azcuna likewise failed to submit documentary evidence, the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance prevails in the absence of controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. The Court relied on Figuerres vs. CA, which in turn cited United States vs. Cristobal, for the principle that in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, it is presumed that officials have done what the law requires them to do.

• Validity of the Ordinance — Public Consultation: Petitioners' own evidence revealed that a public hearing was conducted prior to the promulgation of the ordinance — specifically, a "dialogue-consultation" conducted by the Sangguniang Bayan on June 13, 2002. This fact, appearing in petitioners' own records, undermined their contention that no public consultation was held.

• Petitioners' Right to Injunctive Relief: Petitioners had not shown any valid title to Capayas Island entitling them to possession. The island was classified as timberland and property of the public domain. The RTC's order directing the removal of petitioners' structures built without building permits was not appealed and had therefore become final and conclusive upon them. The CA correctly upheld the finding that petitioners had no proprietary rights over the island, rendering their action for injunction improper.

• Presumption of Validity of Ordinances — An ordinance is presumed valid and constitutional or legal in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in its enactment. The burden of proving non-compliance with procedural requirements — such as the holding of public hearings, publication, or posting — rests on the party assailing the ordinance, as these are negative allegations essential to that party's cause of action. In the absence of positive proof to the contrary, it is presumed that public officials have done what the law requires them to do. The Court applied this doctrine to uphold the ordinance's validity despite the absence of documentary evidence on publication and posting, because petitioners likewise failed to present evidence of non-compliance.

• Deemed Approval of Municipal Ordinances Under Section 56(d) of the LGC — When the Sangguniang Panlalawigan fails to act on a municipal ordinance submitted for review within 30 days from receipt, the ordinance is presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. The "action" that must be taken within the 30-day period, as read in conjunction with paragraph (c) of Section 56, refers to a declaration by the SP that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part — an action that must be entered in the minutes. Mere pendency of review before a committee does not constitute "action" within the meaning of the provision. The Court applied this doctrine by holding that since more than 30 days had elapsed from the submission of the ordinance to the SP without any declaration of invalidity, the ordinance was deemed approved by operation of law.

• "Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the meaning of the disputed word, 'action.' It is clear, based on the foregoing provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the ordinance is invalid in whole or in part." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on the interpretation of Section 56(d) of the LGC, defining what constitutes "action" by the SP for purposes of the deemed-approval rule.

• "However, in accordance with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their enactment." — This passage, quoted from Figuerres vs. CA, states the canonical formulation of the presumption of validity doctrine as applied to municipal ordinances, and is the controlling principle for the publication and posting issue in this case.

• "We have a right to assume that officials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the absence of positive proof to the contrary." — This passage, quoted from United States vs. Cristobal, establishes the foundational presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, which underpins the presumption of validity accorded to ordinances.

• Figuerres vs. CA, 364 Phil. 683 (1999) — Followed. The Court relied on this case for the presumption of validity in favor of ordinances and the allocation of the burden of proof on the party challenging the ordinance to demonstrate non-compliance with procedural requirements such as public hearings.

• United States vs. Cristobal, 34 Phil. 825 (1916) — Followed through Figuerres. Cited for the principle that in the absence of positive proof to the contrary, it is presumed that public officials have done what the law requires them to do, applied to uphold the presumptive validity of an ordinance challenged for alleged non-compliance with procedural requirements.

• Section 56, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Governs the review of component city and municipal ordinances by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Paragraph (c) authorizes the SP to declare an ordinance invalid in whole or in part if it finds the same beyond the powers of the Sangguniang Bayan. Paragraph (d) provides that if no action is taken by the SP within 30 days after submission, the ordinance is presumed consistent with law and therefore valid. The Court applied Section 56(d) to hold the ordinance deemed approved, reading paragraph (d) in conjunction with paragraph (c) to define "action" as a declaration of invalidity.

• Section 447, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Defines the powers, duties, and functions of the Sangguniang Bayan, including the authority to enact ordinances. The CA relied on this provision in holding that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with sufficient power and authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance.

• Section 16, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Sets forth the general welfare powers of local government units. Read in relation to Section 447, this provision was cited by the CA as the source of the municipality's authority to establish and administer sanctuaries within its municipal waters.

• Section 511, Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991) — Requires that ordinances with penal sanctions be posted at prominent places for a minimum of three consecutive weeks and published in a newspaper of general circulation where available. The Court referenced this provision in addressing petitioners' contention that the ordinance was not published or posted in accordance with the LGC.

• Presidential Decree No. 1096 (National Building Code of the Philippines) — Requires the securing of building permits prior to construction. Petitioners' failure to obtain building permits for their structures on Capayas Island was the basis for the notices of illegal construction and the RTC's unappealed order directing removal of the structures.

Antonio T. Carpio (Chairperson), Arturo D. Brion, Mariano C. Del Castillo, and Jose Portugal Perez concurred.