AC Enterprises, Inc. vs. Frabelle Properties Corporation

An action for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance, though accompanied by claims for damages, is incapable of pecuniary estimation and falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC; local government units, while empowered to abate nuisances under the Local Government Code and DENR Administrative Order No. 30, cannot declare a particular thing a nuisance unless it is a nuisance per se, and whether noise from a lawful business constitutes an actionable nuisance is a judicial question of reasonableness that must be resolved by the courts in due course of proceedings.

Petitioner AC Enterprises, Inc. (ACEI), a domestic corporation, owns the 10-storey Feliza Building along Herrera Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, subdivided into commercial and office units leased to private persons and entities. The building houses 36 blowers from 18 air-cooled air-conditioning units, four blowers on each floor from the 2nd to the 10th floors, aesthetically covered by vertical concrete baffles, with exhaust directed toward the rear of respondent's property. Respondent Frabelle Properties Corporation (FPC), formerly FTL & Sons Development Corporation, is the developer of Frabella I Condominium, a 29-storey commercial/residential building at 109 Rada Street, Legaspi Village, Makati City, and owns units therein which it leases to tenants; the building is managed by the Frabella I Condominium Corporation (FCC), a separate corporate entity. Rada and Herrera Streets lie parallel to each other, such that the Feliza Building is situated at the back of Frabella I, separated by Rodriguez Street, a two-lane road approximately 12 meters wide bounded by the Thailand Embassy on the side of Frabella I. Both properties are located in Makati City, classified as a commercial district under the noise quality standards of the NPCC Rules implementing P.D. No. 984.

On April 11, 1995, respondent FPC wrote petitioner ACEI demanding that it abate the daily continuous, intense, and "unbearable noise" and hot air blast coming from the 36 blowers of the Feliza Building's air-conditioning system, whose exhaust was directed toward the rear of Frabella I Condominium. Petitioner rejected the demand in a letter dated May 15, 1995. Respondent reiterated its demand on June 6, 1995, and on June 29, 1995 requested that the 36 blowers be tested by the NCR Environmental Management Bureau (EMB) of the DENR. On August 11, 1995, respondent received an EMB report stating that the noise generated by the blowers exceeded the legally allowable level under Section 78(b) of P.D. No. 984, as amended. Respondent had the blowers retested on December 8, 1995 and July 1, 1996, with the same results. Despite repeated demands, petitioner refused to act.

On August 14, 2000, respondent again wrote petitioner demanding abatement of the nuisance; petitioner ignored the letter. Respondent had the blowers tested again by the EMB, with the same results, as evidenced by reports dated August 29, 2000 and November 4, 2000. On March 11, 2001, the Frabella I Condominium Corporation (FCC), through counsel, filed a complaint against petitioner with the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB) for abatement of noise and/or air pollution and damages with a plea for injunctive relief, alleging that the operation of the 36 blowers generated unbearable hot air and continuous, deafening, intolerable, vibrating noise that made normal conversation across the street difficult, forcing occupants of Frabella I to vacate their units. The complaint averred that respondent had, over several years, written and made numerous contacts with petitioner, and solicited the intercession of the Makati Commercial Estate Association, Inc. (MACEA) and the Metro Manila Development Authority (MMDA) to settle the matter amicably, to no avail.

While the PAB case was pending, respondent, through its Vice-President, wrote Dr. Maria Leonor B. Soledad, City Health Officer of Makati City, requesting her intervention. On March 5, 2002, Dr. Soledad replied that a panel must be formed to settle the matter. On March 7, 2002, respondent requested Makati City Mayor Jejomar C. Binay not to renew or to cancel the Mayor's License and Business Permits of Feliza Building and to compel petitioner to comply with the law. Copies were forwarded to Engr. Nelson B. Morales, the City Building Official, and Atty. Enrico Lainez, City Attorney. Engr. Morales acted on the letter and requested the EMB on April 30, 2002 to investigate the complaint. A panel from the EMB conducted tests on the 36 blowers on May 24, 2002, and on June 28, 2002 submitted an Investigation Report stating that passing vehicles and blowers of nearby buildings contributed to the ambient noise quality in the area, and that since DENR Administrative Order No. 30 had devolved noise nuisance abatement functions to the Local Government Unit, the case should be endorsed to the City Government of Makati. Regional Director Sixto E. Tolentino, Jr. of the EMB forwarded the report to Engr. Morales on July 2, 2002.

On July 19, 2002, Engr. Morales informed respondent that based on the EMB investigation, the excess in the noise quality standard within the vicinity did not come from the air-conditioning system of Feliza Building alone, as there were other prevailing factors beyond the building's control, and advised that further inquiry be addressed directly to the EMB. Respondent sought clarification, but Engr. Morales insisted on his letter and dared respondent to go to court if dissatisfied. Respondent then wrote the EMB relative to the May 24, 2002 Report; the EMB conducted new Sound Pressure Level (SPL) measurements on February 4, 2003. In its Report dated November 24, 2003, the EMB declared that the SPL measurements were higher when doors were opened, but emphasized that the standards in Section 78(b) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 984 could not be applied since those provisions were for ambient noise and the measurements were taken inside the building. The EMB opined that the noise need not be high or low to annoy or cause nuisance to the receptor; as long as the complainant was disturbed by the level of sound, it was considered a nuisance.

On July 1, 2003, respondent filed a complaint for abatement of nuisance with damages and prayer for a writ of preliminary and permanent injunction before the RTC of Malabon City against petitioner. The complaint alleged that the 36 blowers, installed four to each floor from the 2nd to the 10th floor of Feliza Building, faced directly toward Frabella I, and that their simultaneous operation generated continuous, deafening, unbearable, vibrating, and stressful noise and hot air affecting respondent's tenants, particularly those on the 5th to 16th floors of Frabella I. Some tenants had vacated their units, leaving many of respondent's units vacant and uninhabitable, thereby depriving respondent of rental income. The complaint recounted that respondent had sought the intercession of Barangay San Lorenzo, MACEA, MMDA, the Makati City Government, the Makati Pollution Office, and the DENR over several years, and that the DENR had conducted multiple noise sampling tests since 1995 showing the noise exceeded allowable levels under Section 78(b) of P.D. No. 984. Petitioner moved to dismiss on grounds of lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, failure to state a cause of action, and that the action was barred by res judicata, litis pendentia, and forum shopping. Before the RTC could resolve the motion, the PAB dismissed FCC's complaint on July 29, 2003, declaring the case was more of a nuisance matter and endorsing it to the LGU concerned without prejudice. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss on September 15, 2003, and the CA affirmed on September 21, 2004, leading to the instant petition.

• Jurisdiction: Petitioner maintained that under Section 17(b)(4) in relation to Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of R.A. No. 7160, the City of Makati was obliged to enforce pollution control laws, and under Section 458(4)(i) the Sangguniang Panglungsod was empowered to declare, prevent, or abate nuisances; thus, the City of Makati had exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's complaint.
• Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Petitioner argued that the issues before the trial court were factual in nature, requiring the application of the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies. It contended that respondent's filing of multiple complaints before quasi-judicial bodies was an implied admission of the availability of administrative remedies, and that respondent failed to establish any exception to the exhaustion requirement.
• Res Judicata: Petitioner asserted that the July 19, 2002 letter of Engr. Morales, which ruled there was no factual basis for respondent's complaint, became final and executory because respondent did not appeal it in accordance with DENR Administrative Order No. 37-45; hence, the complaint was barred by res judicata.
• Litis Pendentia and Forum Shopping: Petitioner contended that the PAB case (No. 01-0009-NCR) involved the same set of issues and circumstances, and that the complainant therein and respondent represented the same interests, alleged the same rights, and prayed for the same reliefs; consequently, the RTC action was barred by litis pendentia and respondent was guilty of forum shopping for failing to disclose the pendency of the PAB case in its certification against forum shopping.
• No Cause of Action: Petitioner claimed the complaint stated no cause of action because, as shown by the EMB tests on May 24, 2002, the noise and air pollution did not emanate from Feliza Building alone but also from passing cars and nearby buildings. It further argued that the allegations in the complaint were mere conclusions of law, not statements of fact, and therefore were not hypothetically admitted.

• Jurisdiction: Respondent countered that the provisions of R.A. No. 7160 cited by petitioner applied to pollution control cases, not to the abatement of nuisances. It maintained that LGUs were granted only administrative and executive powers, not judicial or quasi-judicial functions to abate a nuisance, and that while DENR A.O. No. 30 devolved noise nuisance abatement to LGUs, said administrative order was not a law and could not deprive the courts of jurisdiction over nuisance abatement.
• Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion: Respondent argued that by filing a motion to dismiss, petitioner hypothetically admitted the factual allegations in the complaint, leaving only questions of law; hence, the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies did not apply. It pointed out that it had already sought administrative relief before the Makati City Government, but the City Building Official denied the complaint without due process, and that no rules governed appeals from the letters of the City Mayor and Building Official.
• Res Judicata: Respondent maintained that Engr. Morales' letter could not constitute res judicata because it was merely a reply-letter, not the product of quasi-judicial proceedings; no adversarial proceedings or submission of evidence took place, and the City Engineer/Building Official could not exercise quasi-judicial functions.
• Litis Pendentia and Forum Shopping: Respondent asserted that it did not engage in forum shopping because the complainant in the PAB case was FCC, a corporation of unit owners of Frabella I — a totally different corporate entity with stockholders and officers not similar to FPC.
• Cause of Action: Respondent declared that the material allegations of its complaint and the appended documents — including demand letters and DENR test results showing noise levels beyond legal allowable standards — demonstrated a cause of action for abatement of a private nuisance and damages.

• Jurisdiction: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction over respondent's action for abatement of nuisance, or whether such jurisdiction exclusively lies with the City of Makati as the local government unit concerned.
• Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: Whether the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies apply to bar respondent's complaint before the RTC.
• Res Judicata, Litis Pendentia, and Forum Shopping: Whether respondent's complaint is barred by res judicata (based on the City Building Official's letter), litis pendentia (based on the pending PAB case), and whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
• Cause of Action: Whether respondent's complaint states a cause of action for the abatement of a private nuisance and damages.

• Jurisdiction: Yes. The RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the action, which is one for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance incapable of pecuniary estimation, the damages claimed being merely incidental to the principal relief sought, pursuant to B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691.
• Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: No. These doctrines need not be applied when the question between the parties is purely legal; by filing a motion to dismiss on the ground of no cause of action, petitioner hypothetically admitted the complaint's factual averments, leaving only the application of laws on nuisance for the court to adjudicate.
• Res Judicata, Litis Pendentia, and Forum Shopping: No. The City Building Official's letter was an exercise of administrative, not quasi-judicial, power and thus cannot constitute res judicata; the PAB case was filed by FCC, a distinct corporate entity, and was dismissed without prejudice, precluding litis pendentia; and there is no identity of parties to support a charge of forum shopping.
• Cause of Action: Yes. The complaint's material allegations — if hypothetically admitted — show a right in favor of respondent (peaceful enjoyment of its property), an obligation on the part of petitioner to respect that right, and an act or omission (refusal to abate the nuisance despite repeated demands) violative of that right, satisfying all three elements of a cause of action.

• Jurisdiction: The nature of an action and the tribunal's jurisdiction are determined from the material allegations of the complaint, the law in force at the time of filing, and the character of the relief sought — not by the defenses raised in a motion to dismiss. As gleaned from the complaint's averments and the relief prayed for, the action was one for the judicial abatement of a private nuisance — specifically noise from the blowers of the Feliza Building's air-conditioning system — with a plea for injunction and damages. Such an action is incapable of pecuniary estimation because the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money; the claims for temperate, exemplary, and attorney's fees are merely incidental to the principal relief. Under B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691, actions incapable of pecuniary estimation fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. This was affirmed in Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, which ruled that a simple suit for abatement of a nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. While Section 447(a)(3)(i) of R.A. No. 7160 empowers the Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact ordinances declaring, preventing, or abating nuisances, the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing a nuisance per se and order its condemnation, nor can it find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when it is not a nuisance per se. Whether noise from a blower constitutes an actionable nuisance is a judicial question to be resolved by the courts in due course of proceedings. The PAB itself dismissed the FCC complaint, declaring the case was more of a nuisance matter under the Civil Code and not a pollution case over which it had jurisdiction. The resolution of whether noise is an actionable nuisance does not require special technical knowledge of the PAB or the LGU requiring determination of intricate matters of fact.

• Primary Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies: The doctrine of primary jurisdiction calls for the determination of administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact and not of law. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that available administrative remedies be pursued before resorting to the courts. However, these doctrines need not be adhered to when the question between the parties is purely legal. By filing a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action, petitioner is deemed to have hypothetically admitted all the factual averments of the complaint. What remains for the court to adjudicate is only the application of laws dealing with nuisance — a question of law. Moreover, respondent had already sought the intercession of Barangay San Lorenzo, MACEA, the DENR, and the Makati City Government to no avail. The EMB's November 24, 2003 Report itself opined that the issue was beyond the competence of the LGUs, implying it should be presented to and resolved by the ordinary courts. Engr. Morales' July 19, 2002 letter was not appealable because he had not submitted a report on his findings to the City Mayor for final disposition; until the City Mayor acted, an appeal would be premature. Respondent took its cue from the EMB Report and filed its complaint in the RTC. There was thus no basis for the contention that respondent failed to exhaust administrative remedies.

• Res Judicata, Litis Pendentia, and Forum Shopping: Res judicata applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. The letter of Engr. Morales to respondent was only a reply-letter; no adversarial proceedings or submission of evidence and position papers took place before his office. At best, it was an exercise of the City Government's administrative powers, not judicial or quasi-judicial functions, which the City Building Official does not possess. The PAB dismissed FCC's complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and without prejudice, ruling that the action was for abatement of a nuisance already devolved to the local government. Since the PAB had no jurisdiction and the dismissal was without prejudice, respondent's action before the RTC was not barred by res judicata or litis pendentia. The PAB decision was not a decision on the merits. As for forum shopping, FCC — the complainant in the PAB case — is a corporation separate and distinct from respondent FPC, with different stockholders and officers; there is no identity of parties. Consequently, the contention that respondent is guilty of forum shopping has no factual basis.

• Cause of Action: A cause of action exists when three elements are present: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff; (2) an obligation on the part of the defendant to respect that right; and (3) an act or omission by the defendant violative of that right. The fundamental test for failure to state a cause of action is whether, admitting the veracity of the allegations on the face of the complaint, the plaintiff is entitled to the relief prayed for. A defendant moving to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action is regarded as having hypothetically admitted all averments of the complaint. The complaint alleged that the operation of petitioner's 36 blowers generated continuous, deafening, unbearable, vibrating, and stressful noise and hot air affecting respondent's tenants, forcing them to vacate, leaving respondent's units vacant and depriving it of rental income; that respondent repeatedly demanded abatement but petitioner ignored all demands; and appended thereto were demand letters and DENR test results showing noise levels beyond allowable standards. These allegations, if admitted, show respondent's right to peaceful enjoyment of its property, petitioner's obligation to respect that right, and petitioner's refusal to abate the nuisance as a violation thereof. Respondent is a real party-in-interest because it owned units in Frabella I and, as a result of the nuisance, lost tenants and rental income. Under Article 697 of the Civil Code, the aggrieved party is entitled to damages for the past existence of a nuisance. The EMB's July 2, 2002 Report — which noted that passing vehicles and nearby building blowers were merely contributory to ambient noise — should not be considered in isolation of other EMB reports since 1995 showing the noise from Feliza Building's blowers exceeded allowable levels. Even assuming arguendo that petitioner had abated the nuisance in 2002, the complaint still states a cause of action for damages based on the past existence of the nuisance from 1995, as damages from a continuing or recurring nuisance are regarded as continuing.

• Jurisdiction over actions incapable of pecuniary estimation — An action is incapable of pecuniary estimation when the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, even if damages are claimed as incidental relief. Such actions fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC under B.P. Blg. 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691. The Court applied this by classifying respondent's nuisance abatement action — though it included claims for temperate, exemplary damages and attorney's fees — as incapable of pecuniary estimation, because the damages were merely incidental to the principal relief of abatement and injunction.

• Hypothetical admission in motions to dismiss — A defendant moving to dismiss a complaint on the ground of failure to state a cause of action is deemed to have hypothetically admitted all the material averments thereof. The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the allegations. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that petitioner, by moving to dismiss, admitted the complaint's factual allegations, leaving only questions of law for adjudication and rendering the doctrines of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of administrative remedies inapplicable.

• Nuisance — definition and classification — Under Article 694 of the Civil Code, a nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else that injures or endangers health or safety, annoys or offends the senses, shocks decency or morality, obstructs passage, or hinders or impairs the use of property. Under Article 695, nuisance is either public (affecting a community or considerable number of persons) or private (violating only private rights). The Court classified the noise from petitioner's blowers as a potential private nuisance, actionable by the injured party through a civil action under Article 705.

• Noise as actionable nuisance — test of reasonableness — Noise is not a nuisance per se. It may constitute a nuisance, even from a lawful business, only if it affects injuriously the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity to an unreasonable extent. The determining factor is not the intensity or volume of the noise but whether it is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable. Reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all the circumstances and conditions, including locality, the nature and utility of the use, the extent and nature of the harm, and the character of the surroundings. There can be no fixed standard as to what kind of noise constitutes a nuisance. The Court held that this determination is a judicial question that must be resolved by the courts, not by LGUs through mere resolution.

• Limitations on LGU power to abate nuisance — While the Sangguniang Panglungsod is empowered under R.A. No. 7160 to enact ordinances declaring, preventing, or abating nuisances, and DENR A.O. No. 30 devolved noise nuisance abatement functions to LGUs, the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing a nuisance per se and order its condemnation, nor find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance when it is not a nuisance per se. Those determinations must be made by the ordinary courts of law. A finding by the LGU that noise quality standards have not been complied with is not a prerequisite or indispensable evidence to prove nuisance liability; it is merely corroborative.

• Res judicata limited to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings — Res judicata applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of administrative powers. An administrative letter resolving a complaint without adversarial proceedings, submission of evidence, or due process does not constitute a judgment that can bar a subsequent court action.

• "Whether or not noise emanating from a blower of the airconditioning units of the Feliza Building is nuisance is to be resolved only by the court in due course of proceedings. The plaintiff must prove that the noise is a nuisance and the consequences thereof. Noise is not a nuisance per se." — This passage articulates the ratio decidendi on jurisdiction: the determination of whether noise constitutes an actionable nuisance is a judicial question beyond the power of LGUs to conclusively resolve by mere resolution.

• "The determining factor when noise alone is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume. It is that the noise is of such character as to produce actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, rendering adjacent property less comfortable and valuable." — This is the canonical formulation of the test for noise as actionable nuisance, adopted from Kentucky and West Virginia Power Co. vs. Anderson and frequently cited in Philippine nuisance jurisprudence.

• "A finding by the LGU that the noise quality standards under the law have not been complied with is not a prerequisite nor constitutes indispensable evidence to prove that the defendant is or is not liable for a nuisance and for damages. Such finding is merely corroborative to the testimonial and/or other evidence to be presented by the parties." — This passage defines the evidentiary weight of LGU noise standard findings in judicial nuisance proceedings, clarifying that compliance or non-compliance with administrative standards does not control the judicial determination of nuisance liability.

• "In determining whether allegations of a complaint are sufficient to support a cause of action, it must be borne in mind that the complaint does not have to establish or allege facts proving the existence of a cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case." — This passage states the controlling standard for evaluating motions to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, emphasizing sufficiency over veracity and the distinction between pleading and proving.

• Tatel vs. Municipality of Virac, G.R. No. 40243, March 11, 1992, 207 SCRA 157 — Controlling precedent followed for the proposition that a simple suit for abatement of a nuisance is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC (then the Court of First Instance).
• Estate of Francisco vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91279, July 25, 1991, 199 SCRA 597 — Followed for the principle that the Sangguniang Bayan cannot declare a particular thing a nuisance per se and order its condemnation, nor find as a fact that a thing is a nuisance when it is not a nuisance per se; such determinations must be made by the ordinary courts.
• Velasco vs. Manila Electric Company, G.R. No. 18390, August 6, 1971, 40 SCRA 342 — Cited for the proposition that the determining factor when noise is the cause of complaint is not its intensity or volume but whether it produces actual physical discomfort and annoyance to a person of ordinary sensibilities, quoting Kentucky and West Virginia Power Co. vs. Anderson.
• Kentucky and West Virginia Power Co. vs. Anderson, 156 S.W.2d 857 (1941) — Foreign authority cited and quoted extensively for the test of noise as actionable nuisance, emphasizing that reasonableness is a question of fact dependent upon all circumstances and conditions, with no fixed standard for what constitutes a nuisance.
• Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education, G.R. No. 139371, April 4, 2001, 356 SCRA 367 — Cited for the principle that certiorari is a remedy narrow in scope, limited to correcting grave abuse of discretion, and that an order denying a motion to dismiss — being interlocutory — cannot be questioned via certiorari until a final judgment is rendered.
• Cayana vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125607, March 18, 2004, 426 SCRA 10 — Cited for the proposition that when an administrative body dismisses a case for lack of jurisdiction and without prejudice, the dismissal does not bar a subsequent court action under res judicata or litis pendentia.

• Article 694, Civil Code of the Philippines — Defines nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or anything else that injures or endangers health or safety, annoys or offends the senses, shocks decency or morality, obstructs passage, or hinders or impairs the use of property. Applied to classify the noise and hot air from petitioner's blowers as a potential nuisance.
• Article 695, Civil Code of the Philippines — Classifies nuisance as public or private. Applied to identify respondent's action as one for abatement of a private nuisance, since the noise and hot air primarily affected respondent's property and tenants.
• Article 705, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides that a party aggrieved by a private nuisance has two alternative remedies: a civil action or abatement without judicial proceedings. Applied to confirm that respondent properly availed of a civil action before the RTC.
• Article 697, Civil Code of the Philippines — Entitles the aggrieved party to damages for the present and past existence of a nuisance. Applied to support the finding that respondent's complaint stated a cause of action for damages based on the nuisance's existence since 1995.
• Section 17(b)(3)(iii) and (b)(4), R.A. No. 7160 (Local Government Code) — Provides that LGUs shall enforce pollution control and environmental protection laws. Applied to distinguish between pollution control (devolved to LGUs) and judicial abatement of nuisance (retained by courts).
• Section 447(a)(3)(i), R.A. No. 7160 — Empowers the Sangguniang Panglungsod to enact ordinances declaring, preventing, or abating noise and other forms of nuisance. Applied but distinguished: the Court held this grants legislative power to enact ordinances, not the power to judicially declare a particular thing a nuisance or order its condemnation.
• Section 78(b), Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 984 — Sets environmental quality standards for noise in general areas, classifying areas into categories (AA, A, B, C, D) with corresponding decibel limits for daytime, morning/evening, and nighttime. Applied to note that both properties are in a Class "B" commercial area, but the EMB itself opined these standards could not be applied to the SPL measurements taken inside the building, as they were for ambient noise.
• Section 6, P.D. No. 984 — Enumerates the powers of the National Pollution Control Commission (now vested in the PAB), including issuing orders to compel compliance, making orders for discontinuance of pollution, and serving as arbitrator for damages from pollution. Applied to delineate the PAB's jurisdiction over pollution cases, which the PAB itself found inapplicable to the present nuisance complaint.
• B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691 — vests exclusive jurisdiction in the RTC over actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. Applied as the statutory basis for the RTC's jurisdiction over respondent's nuisance abatement action.
• Section 1(g) [actually (j)], Rule 16, Rules of Court — Allows dismissal of a complaint upon motion if it states no cause of action. Applied in evaluating petitioner's motion to dismiss, with the Court finding the complaint sufficient.
• Section 2, Rule 2, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines a real party-in-interest as one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment. Applied to confirm respondent's standing as a real party-in-interest, it having lost tenants and rental income due to the nuisance.
• DENR Administrative Order No. 30, Series of 1992 — Devolved to LGUs the regulatory functions of the NPCC, including enforcement of pollution control laws, abatement of noise and other forms of nuisance, and implementation of cease and desist orders. Applied but distinguished: the Court held that devolution of administrative functions does not deprive the courts of jurisdiction over judicial abatement of nuisance.

Panganiban, C.J. (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concurred.