Abuyo vs. People

The reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel unlawful aggression requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability, between the danger perceived and the means used to repel it, and must be judged from the standpoint of the accused at the time they acted — not in light of after-the-fact calm deliberation — such that a person under imminent threat of fatal harm cannot be expected to reflect coolly or choose the least injurious means of defense.

Leo Abuyo and his wife were traveling home on a motorcycle when they encountered Cesar Tapel and his son Charles Tapel, who were armed with a fan knife and a gun, respectively. The Tapels blocked Leo's path and pursued him to his father's house. Leo was charged with homicide after Cesar died from stab wounds inflicted during a confrontation in which Leo grabbed a bolo to defend himself and his already-wounded father.

On August 16, 2011, at around 7:30 p.m., Leo Abuyo and his wife were heading home on board their motorcycle when Leo saw Cesar Tapel and his son Charles Tapel, who were armed with a fan knife (balisong) and a gun, respectively. Cesar and Charles blocked Leo's way, but Leo swerved the motorcycle to the left and sped toward the house of his father, Leonardo Abuyo, which was situated beside Leo's own house.

Charles followed and went outside Leonardo's house. Furious, Charles kicked the bamboo fence of Leonardo's house, pointed his gun at people, and yelled for Leo to come out. Leonardo tried to pacify Charles, but Cesar arrived and stabbed Leonardo in the lower left part of his chest. Leonardo ran toward Leo's house, but Cesar pursued him with the fan knife. At that point, Leo went outside and chased Cesar to Leo's house.

In their confrontation, Cesar tried to stab Leo. As a defense, Leo grabbed a bolo on top of the table and hacked Cesar's right hand, causing Cesar to drop the fan knife. Cesar managed to pick up the fan knife again, and Leo stabbed him in the lower part of his stomach. Cesar later died due to the stab injury on his left abdomen and multiple lacerated wounds on his right hand. Leo voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after the incident.

Leo was charged with homicide before the RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 38. He pleaded not guilty and contended that he acted in self-defense and defense of a relative. The RTC convicted him, finding that he failed to prove all elements of self-defense, specifically that the means employed was not reasonably necessary to repel the unlawful aggression, though it appreciated incomplete self-defense and voluntary surrender as mitigating circumstances. The CA affirmed the conviction with modification as to damages, reasoning that Leo could have disarmed Cesar again or fled rather than inflicting a fatal wound, and that Leo had the upper hand with a bolo that could cause more damage than a fan knife.

• Reasonable Necessity of Means Employed: Petitioner maintained that the means he employed was reasonably necessary to repel the unlawful aggression from Cesar and Charles, who were both armed and had clear intent to kill him.

• Excessive Force: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, argued that after Cesar regained possession of the knife, Leo could have just disarmed him again rather than stabbing him in the stomach, and that stabbing Cesar would not have prevented a gun attack from Charles. Respondent contended that stabbing Cesar on the stomach was an extreme measure if the intention was truly to repel or parry the latter's thrusts, as Leo had the upper hand with a bolo that could readily cause more damage than a fan knife.

• Reasonable Necessity of Means Employed: Whether the means employed by Leo — stabbing Cesar in the stomach with a bolo after Cesar repossessed his fan knife — was reasonably necessary to repel the unlawful aggression, such that Leo is entitled to complete self-defense and defense of a relative.

• Reasonable Necessity of Means Employed: Yes. The means Leo employed was reasonably necessary to repel the unlawful aggression, as the reasonableness of the means must be judged from the accused's standpoint at the time they acted, not with the benefit of hindsight. Rational equivalence between the perceived danger and the means employed was satisfied given the totality of circumstances, including Cesar's continued aggression after being disarmed and Charles's threatening presence with a gun.

• Reasonable Necessity of Means Employed: The second requisite of self-defense — reasonable necessity of the means employed — does not require material commensurability between the means of attack and defense, but rather rational equivalence, which considers the totality of circumstances surrounding the defense vis-à-vis the unlawful aggression. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. Courts should not demand that an accused conduct themselves with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm; one who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate, and make comparisons. The test is whether the accused's subjective belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the danger was reasonable, viewed from their standpoint at the time they acted. Here, after Leo hacked Cesar's right hand and Cesar dropped the fan knife, Cesar's unlawful aggression did not cease — he regained possession of the knife, making the danger more imminent and real. The lower courts' reasoning that Leo could have grabbed the knife, escaped, or struck a less fatal blow was characterized as "a product of tranquil minds basking in the comfort of judicial chambers." Three crucial facts showed Leo was impelled by instinct of self-preservation rather than homicidal intent: first, Leo never took advantage of the opportunity to attack the disarmed Cesar, acting only when Cesar repossessed the knife; second, Charles was present with a gun that could be fired at any moment, yet Leo did not pursue an attack against Charles; and third, Leo voluntarily surrendered after the incident, which is inconsistent with guilt. The stomach wound proving fatal did not make the means less reasonable under the circumstances, as Leo was fighting desperately for his life and that of his father, animated only by mortal fear of the unyielding aggressor.

• Rational Equivalence vs. Material Commensurability — The reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel unlawful aggression requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability, between the perceived danger and the means used. Rational equivalence presupposes consideration not only of the nature and quality of weapons used by the defender and assailant, but of the totality of circumstances surrounding the defense vis-à-vis the unlawful aggression. The law requires rational necessity, not indispensable need. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Leo's use of a bolo against Cesar's fan knife was rationally equivalent given the continued aggression and the threatening presence of Charles with a gun.

• Standpoint of the Accused — The reasonableness of the accused's belief as to the imminence and seriousness of the danger must be viewed from their standpoint at the time they acted, not in light of circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that others might entertain. Courts should not demand that the accused conduct themselves with the poise of a person not under imminent threat of fatal harm. One who is assaulted cannot have sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate, and make comparisons. The Court applied this principle to reject the lower courts' analysis that Leo could have chosen less injurious means, holding that Leo had no equanimity to think and calculate at the crossroads of survival and death.

• Elements of Self-Defense — (1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person resorting to self-defense. Unlawful aggression is the indispensable element; without it, the defenses are unavailing. The Court found all three elements present: Cesar's attack and pursuit of Leonardo and attempted stabbing of Leo constituted unlawful aggression; Leo's use of a bolo was reasonably necessary; and there was no provocation from Leo, as the attack originated from Cesar and Charles.

• Elements of Defense of a Relative — The accused must establish the first two requisites of self-defense (unlawful aggression and reasonable necessity of means employed). In lieu of the third requirement (lack of sufficient provocation), the accused must prove that "in case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had no part therein." The Court found all elements present, as Leo acted to defend his father Leonardo, who had been stabbed and pursued by Cesar.

• Burden of Evidence in Self-Defense — The admission of self-defense or defense of a relative shifts the burden of evidence to the accused to prove that their act was justified. The justifying circumstances must be clearly established through convincing evidence and cannot be appreciated if uncorroborated or patently doubtful. The Court found that Leo successfully discharged this burden.

• Instinct of Self-Preservation — When it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon the instinct of self-preservation, it is the duty of the courts to sanction the act and hold the actor not responsible in law for the consequences. Human nature in emergencies does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation. The Court applied this doctrine to conclude that Leo's actions were animated by mortal fear, not criminal intent, as evidenced by his reactive rather than proactive conduct and his voluntary surrender.

• "The courts ought to remember that a person who is assaulted has neither the time nor the sufficient tranquility of mind to think, calculate and choose the weapon to be used. For, in emergencies of this kind, human nature does not act upon processes of formal reason but in obedience to the instinct of self-preservation; and when it is apparent that a person has reasonably acted upon this instinct, it is the duty of the courts to hold the actor not responsible in law for the consequences. Verily, the law requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability[.]" — This passage, quoted from People vs. Olarbe, articulates the core principle governing the reasonable necessity analysis and is the doctrinal foundation for the Court's reversal of the lower courts' rulings.

• "However, the CA and the RTC's identical reasoning is a product of tranquil minds basking in the comfort of judicial chambers. Unlike magistrates, Leo, at the narrow crossroads of survival and death, had no equanimity to think, calculate, and make comparisons that can easily be made in the calmness of reason." — This passage captures the Court's critique of the lower courts' analysis and its central rationale for reversal, emphasizing that the reasonableness inquiry must account for the pressures of imminent danger.

• "The right of a person to take life in self-defense and defense of a relative or a stranger arises from their belief in the necessity for doing so; and such belief and reasonableness thereof are to be judged in light of the circumstances as they then appeared to the accused, not in light of circumstances as they would appear to others or based on the belief that others may or might entertain as to the nature and imminence of the danger and the necessity to kill." — This states the controlling standard for evaluating the reasonableness of the accused's belief, anchoring the subjective-objective test that governs self-defense analysis.

• "The law does not require that Leo should mete out his blows in such manner that, upon a calm and deliberate review of the incident, it will not appear that he exceeded the precise limits of what was absolutely necessary to put his antagonist hors de combat, or that he struck one blow more than what was absolutely necessary to save his own life, or that he failed to hold his hand so as to avoid inflicting a fatal wound where a less severe stroke might have served the purpose." — This defines the outer limits of what the law demands of a person acting in self-defense, rejecting any requirement of surgical precision in the application of defensive force.

• People vs. Olarbe, 836 Phil. 1015 (2018) — Controlling precedent on the instinct of self-preservation and rational equivalence. The Court applied its reasoning directly to Leo's case, as both involved an accused who used force against an aggressor who continued to attack after being initially disarmed. The Court quoted Olarbe's formulation that a person assaulted has neither the time nor tranquility of mind to calculate, and that the law requires rational equivalence, not material commensurability.

• Ganal, Jr. vs. People, G.R. No. 248130, December 2, 2020 — Followed. The Court cited this case, where the accused's killing of an armed aggressor who continued advancing despite warning shots was justified, as analogous to Leo's situation. The Court stressed that the instinct of self-preservation prevailed upon the accused during the fateful incident.

• People vs. Agripa, 284-A Phil. 93 (1992) — Cited for the principle that an accused fighting desperately for life is animated by mortal fear, not criminal intent, and may strike without discerning the location of blows. The Court applied this reasoning to explain why Leo's fatal stomach wound did not indicate homicidal intent.

• Article 11(1), Revised Penal Code — Justifying circumstance of self-defense, requiring unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. The Court found all three elements present and applied this provision to acquit Leo.

• Article 11(2), Revised Penal Code — Justifying circumstance of defense of relatives, requiring the first two elements of self-defense plus proof that the defender took no part in any provocation given by the person attacked. The Court found all elements present as Leo acted to defend his father Leonardo, who had been stabbed by Cesar.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), Lazaro-Javier, J., and Kho, Jr., J., concurred.