Abunado vs. People of the Philippines

A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage does not extinguish criminal liability for bigamy, which is consummated at the time the second marriage is contracted while the first marriage is still subsisting.

Salvador S. Abunado married Narcisa Arceño on September 18, 1967, at the Manila City Hall. He had previously married Zenaida Biñas on December 24, 1955, before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo, and they had four children before separating in 1966; however, no evidence of that 1955 marriage existed. The Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, requires under Article 40 a final judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before a subsequent marriage may be contracted on the ground of the prior marriage's nullity. Abunado's second marriage to Zenaida on January 10, 1989, postdated the effectivity of the Family Code.

Salvador S. Abunado married Narcisa Arceño on September 18, 1967, at the Manila City Hall before Rev. Pedro Tiangco. Prior to this marriage, Salvador had married Zenaida Biñas on December 24, 1955, before a municipal trial court judge in Concepcion, Iloilo, and they had four children together before separating in 1966. There was, however, no evidence of the 1955 marriage. In 1988, Narcisa left for Japan to work but returned to the Philippines in 1992 upon learning that Salvador was having an extra-marital affair and had left their conjugal home.

After earnest efforts, Narcisa found Salvador in Quezon City cohabiting with Fe Corazon Plato. She also discovered that on January 10, 1989, Salvador had contracted a second marriage with Zenaida Biñas before Judge Lilian Dinulos Panontongan in San Mateo, Rizal. According to Salvador, he and Zenaida remarried in 1989 upon the request of their son, for the purpose of complying with the requirements for his commission in the military.

On January 19, 1995, Salvador filed an annulment case against Narcisa. On May 18, 1995, Narcisa filed a complaint for bigamy against Salvador and Zenaida. Salvador eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999. The trial court convicted Salvador of bigamy on May 18, 2001, sentencing him to imprisonment of six years and one day, as minimum, to eight years and one day, as maximum, while acquitting Zenaida for insufficiency of evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with modification, appreciating the mitigating circumstance that the accused was 76 years of age and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, thereby imposing an indeterminate prison term of two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as minimum to six years and one day of prision mayor as maximum.

• Defective Information: Petitioner argued that the Information was defective because it stated that the bigamous marriage was contracted in 1995, when in fact the second marriage was celebrated on January 10, 1989, thus violating his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.
• Condonation: Petitioner maintained that Narcisa consented to his marriage to Zenaida, which had the effect of absolving him of criminal liability for bigamy.
• Prejudicial Question: Petitioner claimed that his pending petition for annulment/declaration of nullity of marriage was a prejudicial question that should have suspended the proceedings in the bigamy case, noting that he eventually obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Narcisa on October 29, 1999.
• Improper Penalty: Petitioner contended that the penalty imposed on him was improper.

• Sufficiency of the Information: Whether the Information was defective for stating that the bigamous marriage was contracted in January 1995 instead of January 1989.
• Condonation as a Defense: Whether the offended spouse's consent or condonation absolves the accused of criminal liability for bigamy.
• Prejudicial Question: Whether the pending annulment case constitutes a prejudicial question requiring suspension of the bigamy proceedings, particularly given the subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage.
• Propriety of Penalty: Whether the indeterminate penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was proper.

• Sufficiency of the Information: No. The discrepancy was an obvious typographical error, as the same Information clearly states that the subsequent marriage was contracted on January 10, 1989; the defect was also cured by evidence during trial, and no objection was raised before the trial court.
• Condonation as a Defense: No. Pardon by the offended party does not extinguish the criminal action, bigamy being a public offense committed against the State.
• Prejudicial Question: No. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because the crime of bigamy had already been consummated prior to the declaration; all that is required is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.
• Propriety of Penalty: Yes. The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals was proper, correctly applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law with the mitigating circumstance of age exceeding 70 years under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

• Sufficiency of the Information: An accused has the constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information. The real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged, not by the title or designation in the caption. Here, the Information alleged that petitioner, having been legally married to Narcisa on September 16, 1967, which had not been legally dissolved, contracted a subsequent marriage to Zenaida on January 10, 1989. The statement "in or about and sometime in the month of January, 1995" was an obvious typographical error, as the same Information clearly states the correct date of the subsequent marriage. The general rule is that a defective Information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect was cured by evidence during trial and no objection was raised. Petitioner failed to object during trial and raised the defect only for the first time on appeal. All elements of bigamy — a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage possessing all requisites for validity — were sufficiently established by the prosecution.

• Condonation as a Defense: The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that condonation by the offended party does not extinguish the criminal action. Bigamy is a public offense committed against the State, and may be denounced not only by the person affected but even by a civic-spirited citizen who comes to know of it. Moreover, petitioner failed to establish condonation by clear and convincing evidence.

• Prejudicial Question: A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused; for it to suspend a criminal action, the resolution of the issues in the civil case must necessarily determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. The rationale is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because the crime had already been consummated prior to the declaration. All that is required for bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. A marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. Permitting an accused to file a nullity petition and invoke it as a prejudicial question would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases. Even if the first marriage was eventually declared void ab initio, both the first and second marriages were subsisting before the first was annulled.

• Propriety of Penalty: Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor for bigamy. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term is determined in view of attending circumstances, while the minimum term is taken from the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code, without reference to modifying circumstances. The modifying circumstances are considered only in fixing the maximum term. Petitioner being more than 70 years of age constitutes a mitigating circumstance under Article 13, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the maximum term was properly taken from prision mayor in its minimum period (six years and one day to eight years), and the minimum term from prision correccional in any of its periods (six months and one day to six years). The penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals — two years, four months, and one day of prision correccional as minimum to six years and one day of prision mayor as maximum — was therefore proper.

• Subsequent Declaration of Nullity Does Not Absolve Bigamy — The crime of bigamy is consummated at the time the second marriage is contracted while the first marriage is still subsisting. A subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage is immaterial to criminal liability, because all that the law requires is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time of the second marriage. The Court applied this doctrine to reject petitioner's claim that his October 29, 1999 declaration of nullity extinguished his liability for the bigamous marriage contracted on January 10, 1989.

• Marriage Deemed Valid Until Judicially Declared Void — Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding. The Court relied on this principle to hold that both the first and second marriages were subsisting before the first was annulled, thus satisfying the elements of bigamy.

• Prejudicial Question in Bigamy Cases — A prejudicial question must be based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that its resolution determines the guilt or innocence of the accused; its purpose is to avoid two conflicting decisions. The Court held that the outcome of the civil case for annulment had no bearing on the determination of guilt in the bigamy case, because the only requirement is that the first marriage subsist at the time the second is contracted.

• Pardon by Offended Party Does Not Extinguish Public Offense — A pardon or condonation by the offended party does not extinguish a criminal action where the offense is a public crime. Bigamy, being an offense against the State, may be denounced not only by the person affected but even by any citizen who comes to know of it.

• "The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated." — This passage states the ratio decidendi on the prejudicial question issue, establishing that bigamy is consummated upon contraction of the second marriage regardless of subsequent nullity declarations.

• "all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted." — This formulation defines the essential temporal element of bigamy and is frequently cited in subsequent jurisprudence on the effect of nullity declarations on bigamy liability.

• "a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding." — This statement articulates the principle that the marital vinculum subsists until judicially severed, which underpins the Court's rejection of the prejudicial question argument.

• Garcia vs. People, G.R. No. 144785, September 11, 2003 — Cited for the proposition that the real nature of the crime charged is determined by the facts alleged in the Information and not by the title or designation, and that every element of the offense must be alleged. Also cited on the proper application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

• People vs. Villamor, G.R. No. 124441, October 7, 1998, 297 SCRA 262 — Cited for the general rule that a defective Information cannot support a judgment of conviction unless the defect is cured by evidence during trial and no objection was raised.

• Marbella-Bobis vs. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747 — Cited for the elements of bigamy, specifically that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all its elements concur, including a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage possessing all requisites for validity.

• Te vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126746, November 29, 2000, 346 SCRA 327 — Cited for the definition and requisites of a prejudicial question, and for the principle that the first marriage must be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted.

• Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122 — Cited for the proposition that allowing an accused to file a nullity petition and invoke it as a prejudicial question would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases.

• Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572 — Cited in the concurring opinion of Justice Carpio for the explanation of Article 40 of the Family Code, holding that with a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, a person who remarries cannot be charged with bigamy; conversely, remarriage without such declaration renders the person liable for bigamy.

• Cariño vs. Cariño, G.R. No. 132529, February 2, 2001, 351 SCRA 127 — Cited in the concurring opinion for the distinction that Article 40 of the Family Code requires a judicial declaration of nullity only for purposes of remarriage, while for purposes other than remarriage, void marriages are void even without judicial declaration.

• Article 349, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes bigamy with prision mayor. Applied as the substantive offense for which petitioner was convicted, the provision requiring that the second or subsequent marriage be contracted before the former marriage has been legally dissolved.

• Article 13, paragraph 2, Revised Penal Code — Provides the mitigating circumstance of age exceeding 70 years. Applied to reduce the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence, as petitioner was more than 70 years old at the time of sentencing.

• Indeterminate Sentence Law — Governs the imposition of an indeterminate penalty, with the maximum term determined by attending circumstances and the minimum term taken from the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code. Applied to sustain the penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals.

• Article 40, Family Code — Provides that the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage only on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Discussed in the concurring opinion as the basis for requiring a judicial declaration of nullity before contracting a subsequent marriage, the Family Code having taken effect on August 3, 1988, before petitioner's second marriage on January 10, 1989.

• Article III, Section 14(2), Constitution — Guarantees the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Cited in connection with the argument on the defective Information.

• Rule 110, Section 6, Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure — Requires that the acts and omissions complained of as constituting the offense be alleged in the Information. Cited in connection with the sufficiency of the Information.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Panganiban, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concurred.

Justice Carpio wrote a separate concurring opinion emphasizing that the sole issue was whether Abunado's first marriage to Arceño was still subsisting at the time he married Biñas on January 10, 1989. He anchored his concurrence on Article 40 of the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988 — before the second marriage — and requires a final judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage before remarriage. He noted that under Article 40, the marital vinculum of a previous void marriage subsists for purposes of remarriage unless judicially declared void, rendering the second marriage bigamous. He further observed that the ponencia's statement that "a marriage, even one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding" appears to contradict the ruling in Cariño vs. Cariño, which held that for purposes other than remarriage, void marriages are void even without judicial declaration. He expressed belief that the ruling in Cariño is correct and should not be disturbed, clarifying that the general rule is that void marriages are ipso facto void, with Article 40 being the sole recognized exception requiring judicial declaration for purposes of remarriage.