Abubakar vs. Arca

A provincial fiscal may independently investigate and file an information on a charge previously dismissed by a justice of the peace after preliminary investigation, because that dismissal does not place the accused in jeopardy. Under Republic Act No. 1799, amending Republic Act No. 732, the fiscal must conduct the investigation in the accused’s presence if the accused requests it.

Benjamin R. Abubakar and Habib Sabre were among the accused named in an amended criminal complaint for double murder and multiple frustrated murder filed by PC Lt. Atilano C. Mercado on April 24, 1958, before the Justice of the Peace of Indanan, Sulu. At the bottom of the complaint, Acting Justice of the Peace Peregrino S. Garcia signed a verification stating that he had conducted a preliminary investigation and examined witnesses under oath. On the same day, Atty. A. V. Valbuena, counsel for Abubakar, submitted a letter requesting an opportunity to attend the first stage of the preliminary investigation. Three prosecution witnesses had already been examined when the letter was presented. The justice of the peace set a hearing for April 30, 1958, but on April 26, 1958, found no prima facie case against Abubakar and Sabre. Other accused waived further preliminary investigation, while some remained at large, and the records were forwarded to the CFI.

Thereafter, on May 5, 1958, Secretary of Justice Jesus G. Barrera appointed Bukidnon Provincial Fiscal Himerio B. Garcia as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Sulu under Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The appointment authorized him to investigate and, if warranted, prosecute the deaths of Board Member Akuk Sangkula and others. On May 24, 1958, Attys. Rasul and Amin, two lawyers for the accused, requested an opportunity to attend the fiscal’s investigation and submit evidence. They appeared at the preliminary investigation on June 2, 1958, and expressed their conformity to it. Their request and appearance were uncontradicted in the record.

Following his investigation, the acting provincial fiscal filed an information dated August 14, 1958, against Salip Anual and Marajuki Kissai for double murder with multiple frustrated murder. On August 15, 1958, he filed a second information charging Abubakar and Sabre as principals by induction of the crime charged in the first information. His verified certification stated that he had conducted the proper preliminary investigation under Republic Act No. 732, examined witnesses under oath, and found reasonable ground to believe that the accused had committed the offense. Judge Marave ordered the petitioners’ arrest and subsequently ordered Abubakar’s release upon the filing of a bond.

• Fiscal’s Authority: The petitioners argued that Republic Act No. 732 did not authorize the provincial fiscal to investigate independently and file informations after the justice of the peace had dismissed the same case following preliminary investigation.

• CFI Jurisdiction: The petitioners maintained that the fiscal’s alleged lack of authority to file the information consequently deprived the CFI of jurisdiction.

• Reliance on Magbanua: The petitioners relied solely on People vs. Magbanua, et al., a CA decision interpreting the fiscal’s authority as unavailable where the criminal case had originally been instituted before a justice of the peace.

• Independent Fiscal Investigation: Whether the provincial fiscal could independently investigate and file an information against the petitioners after the justice of the peace had dismissed the charge following preliminary investigation.

• Applicability of Magbanua: Whether the CA ruling in People vs. Magbanua required the quashing of the information against the petitioners.

• Independent Fiscal Investigation: Yes. Under Republic Act No. 1799, amending Republic Act No. 732, the fiscal may independently investigate a charge previously dismissed by a justice of the peace and file the corresponding information; the earlier dismissal does not place the accused in jeopardy. The SC therefore found no error in the orders denying the motion to quash and reconsideration.

• Applicability of Magbanua: No. The accused in Magbanua had been denied preliminary investigation, whereas the petitioners received one and their counsel appeared. Magbanua also incorrectly interpreted Villanueva as restricting the fiscal’s authority merely because the case had originated before a justice of the peace.

• Independent Fiscal Investigation: The SC distinguished between a charge forwarded to the CFI after a finding of a prima facie case or a waiver of preliminary investigation, and a charge dismissed by the justice of the peace after investigation. In the former situation, the fiscal may rely on the evidence already presented and need not conduct another preliminary investigation; Republic Act No. 732 does not apply to that situation. In the latter, the dismissal leaves the case as though no charge had been made, and no jeopardy attaches. The fiscal may therefore conduct an independent investigation under Republic Act No. 1799, amending Republic Act No. 732, with the accused present if they request it. Villanueva, et al. vs. Gonzales, et al. established that a second investigation was unnecessary in the former situation, rather than prohibited in the latter. People vs. Reginaldo, reiterating People vs. Pervez, expressly confirmed the fiscal’s authority following dismissal. Because the justice of the peace had dismissed the charge against Abubakar and Sabre, the fiscal could investigate it anew and file an information.

• Applicability of Magbanua: The SC rejected the proposed analogy because Magbanua involved an accused who had been denied preliminary investigation. Here, the fiscal actually conducted one; counsel requested participation on May 24, 1958, and appeared on June 2, 1958. Independently of that factual distinction, Magbanua misread Villanueva’s statement that a fiscal was under no obligation to repeat an investigation already conducted before a justice of the peace. An absence of obligation did not mean an absence of authority. Magbanua therefore supplied neither a factual nor a doctrinal basis for annulling the challenged orders.

• Independent preliminary investigation after dismissal — When a justice of the peace dismisses a charge after due investigation, the provincial fiscal may independently investigate the same charge under Republic Act No. 1799, amending Republic Act No. 732. The SC applied this rule to sustain the investigation and information against Abubakar and Sabre.

• When another preliminary investigation is unnecessary — If a competent party or officer files a charge cognizable by the CFI before a justice of the peace, and the accused waives preliminary investigation or the justice of the peace finds a prima facie case after regular investigation and forwards the records, the fiscal may immediately file the information in the CFI. The fiscal may rely on the earlier evidence and need not repeat the investigation.

• Participation in the fiscal’s independent investigation — The fiscal must conduct the independent investigation in the accused’s presence if the accused requests it. The petitioners’ lawyers requested participation and appeared, defeating their reliance on a precedent involving denial of preliminary investigation.

• No jeopardy from dismissal at preliminary investigation — A justice of the peace’s dismissal of a charge following preliminary investigation does not place the accused in jeopardy. That dismissal therefore does not prevent the fiscal from investigating the same charge again.

• “It does not mean that just because the case was originally instituted in the justice of the peace court the fiscal is precluded from conducting another preliminary investigation by himself after the justice of the peace court has dismissed the case. For certainly no jeopardy has attached by such dismissal.” — The SC rejected the proposition that the original filing before a justice of the peace permanently barred an independent fiscal investigation.

• “But if the Justice of the Peace, after due investigation, dismissed the charge, then, the case stands as if no charge had been made, and the Provincial Fiscal may thereafter conduct his own investigation of the same charge under the aforesaid Republic Act 1799 (amending R.A. 732), making it in the presence of the accused if and when the latter so requests.” — Quoting People vs. Pervez, the SC stated the operative rule governing renewed investigation after dismissal and the accused’s right to participate upon request.

• People vs. Magbanua, et al., CA No. 19844-R, February 14, 1958 — Distinguished because the accused there was denied preliminary investigation. Its interpretation that the fiscal could not independently investigate a charge originally filed before a justice of the peace was rejected.

• Villanueva, et al. vs. Gonzales, et al., L-9037, July 31, 1956, 52 O.G. 5497 — Explained as dispensing with the need for another fiscal investigation when the earlier proceedings sufficiently supported forwarding the case to the CFI, without prohibiting an independent investigation after dismissal.

• People vs. Reginaldo, L-15960, April 29, 1961 — Followed for its clarification that Villanueva did not bar an independent fiscal investigation after a justice of the peace dismissed the charge.

• People vs. Pervez, L-15231, November 29, 1960 — Followed for the operative distinction between cases forwarded after a prima facie finding or waiver and cases dismissed after investigation, and for the accused’s right to attend a renewed investigation upon request.

• Section 1687, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 732 — Concerned the provincial fiscal’s authority to conduct preliminary investigations. The SC rejected the interpretation that this authority became unavailable merely because the charge had first been filed before a justice of the peace.

• Republic Act No. 1799, amending Republic Act No. 732 — Supplied the statutory basis identified in the operative rule allowing the fiscal to investigate independently after dismissal, with the accused present if they request it.

• Section 1679, Revised Administrative Code — Was the authority invoked by the Secretary of Justice in appointing Himerio B. Garcia as Acting Provincial Fiscal of Sulu to investigate and, if warranted, prosecute the deaths of Board Member Akuk Sangkula and others.