Ablaza vs. Republic of the Philippines

A collateral relative who stands to inherit from a deceased spouse has the requisite material interest to file an action for the declaration of absolute nullity of the deceased's marriage solemnized under the old Civil Code, notwithstanding the absence of an express provision in that Code designating who may bring such an action. The action is imprescriptible, but the plaintiff must be a real party in interest—one who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment—and indispensable parties must be impleaded.

The petitioner, Isidro Ablaza, is the surviving brother of the late Cresenciano Ablaza, who died without issue. The marriage subject of the action was contracted on December 26, 1949, during the effectivity of the old Civil Code, which governed the requisites for a valid marriage at the time of celebration. The petitioner sought to nullify the marriage to claim his share of the real properties acquired by his deceased brother, invoking the rules on intestate succession for collateral relatives. The case implicates the interplay between the old Civil Code, the Family Code, and the procedural rule on declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages.

On October 17, 2000, Isidro Ablaza filed a petition in the Regional Trial Court in Cataingan, Masbate, for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949, between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117, entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner. The petitioner alleged that the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license, the license having been issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio. He insisted that, as the surviving brother of Cresenciano, who had died without any issue, he was entitled to one-half of the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, making him a real party in interest. He further maintained that any person could impugn the validity of the marriage at any time, even after Cresenciano's death, because the marriage was void ab initio.

On October 18, 2000, the RTC dismissed the petition on two grounds: (1) the petition was filed out of time, the action having long prescribed, and (2) the petitioner was not a party to the marriage. The petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied on November 14, 2000. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal, holding that while an action to declare the nullity of a void marriage does not prescribe, the law requires that the action be filed by the proper party—specifically, any of the parties to the marriage. The CA found the petitioner's claim of being a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure misplaced, ruling that actions for annulment of marriage will not prosper if filed by persons other than those specified in the law. The CA further noted that the surviving wife, who stood to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party.

The Supreme Court noted that the petitioner and Leonila were also parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025, entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul vs. Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine ownership of property involved therein, which was decided on November 26, 2009, with the petitioner's motion for reconsideration denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner was reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano.

• Real Party in Interest: Petitioner argued that as the surviving brother of Cresenciano, who died without issue, he was entitled to one-half of the real properties acquired by the deceased, making him a real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
• Imprescriptibility of Action: Petitioner maintained that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after Cresenciano's death, because the marriage was void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.
• Error of Lower Courts: Petitioner assigned as lone error that the trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and for the petitioner not being a party to the marriage.

N/A — The decision does not recount the arguments of the respondent, the Republic of the Philippines, beyond the lower courts' rulings which the respondent presumably defended on appeal.

• Real Party in Interest: Whether the petitioner, as the surviving brother of the deceased spouse, is a real party in interest entitled to bring an action for the declaration of absolute nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
• Applicable Law: Whether the decision of the Court of Appeals is in accordance with applicable laws and jurisprudence, particularly Executive Order No. 209 (the Family Code) and existing jurisprudence.

• Real Party in Interest: Yes. The petitioner, having alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano's brother and surviving heir, has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that would be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. The absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes on who may file the action does not give license to just any person to bring it; the plaintiff must still be the real party in interest.
• Applicable Law: Yes, with modification. The marriage was contracted on December 26, 1949, under the regime of the old Civil Code, and the rule on exclusivity of parties under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC has no application to the petitioner. However, the action cannot proceed without impleading the indispensable parties—Leonila Honato and Leila Ablaza Jasul.

• Real Party in Interest: The Court reasoned that the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted, and the nature of a marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law. Since the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code. The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a marriage, and when. Citing Niñal vs. Bayadog, the Court noted that children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father's marriage due to lack of a marriage license. The Court distinguished between a void marriage and a voidable one: a void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights, and its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both spouses. However, the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action. According to Carlos vs. Sandoval, the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano's brother and surviving heir. Assuming that he was as he claimed, he has a material interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. A brother, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under Articles 1001 and 1003 of the Civil Code. The right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano's surviving heir—questions of fact that must be made by the trial court.
• Applicable Law and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: The Court clarified the impact of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003. Section 2, paragraph (a) of that rule explicitly provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. However, the Court held that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, and, being a procedural rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. Based on Carlos vs. Sandoval, actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are excepted from the limitation when (1) commenced before March 15, 2003, and (2) filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003. Since the marriage here was contracted on December 26, 1949, the rule on exclusivity of parties under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
• Indispensable Parties: The Court noted that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano's surviving wife, stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. Her participation was made all the more necessary to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been one excepted from the requirement of a marriage license under Articles 72 to 79 of the old Civil Code. She was truly an indispensable party whose presence is a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power. The Court also noted that Leila Ablaza Jasul, the daughter of the late Cresenciano, was another indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. However, the omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the action, considering that Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading to implead them, as the same rule allows such amendment at any stage of the action.

• Real Party in Interest — Every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest—the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in the issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the petitioner, as the alleged surviving brother and heir of the deceased, possessed the material interest required to file the action for declaration of nullity of his brother's marriage.
• Void Marriage vs. Voidable Marriage — A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights, and its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both spouses. A voidable marriage, by contrast, cannot be collaterally attacked except in a direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties, so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached and is made good ab initio. The Court relied on this distinction to hold that the action for declaration of nullity of a void marriage is imprescriptible.
• Prospective Application of Procedural Rules — A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, being a procedural rule, is prospective in application and is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003. It extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that the rule on exclusivity of parties to the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had no application to the petitioner, whose action was commenced before the rule's effectivity and concerned a marriage solemnized under the old Civil Code.
• Indispensable Party — An indispensable party is one whose presence is a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial power; when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed, and the absence of such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present. The Court applied this doctrine to hold that Leonila, the surviving wife, and Leila, the daughter, were indispensable parties who must be impleaded, though their non-joinder was not immediately fatal given Section 11, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.

• "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction." — This passage, quoted from Niñal v. Bayadog, articulates the principle that while a judicial decree is not strictly necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage, such a declaration is expedient for the good order of society; it underpins the Court's holding that the action is imprescriptible.
• "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the courts." — This passage defines the legal effect of a void marriage and supports the Court's conclusion that the petitioner could bring the action even after the death of his brother.
• "It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a marriage." — This statement establishes the controlling rule that the plaintiff in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage must still be a real party in interest, notwithstanding the absence of an express statutory provision on who may file such an action.
• "Interest within the meaning of the rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest. One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an action." — This passage defines the concept of material interest for purposes of the real party in interest rule and was applied to hold that the petitioner, as the alleged surviving heir, possessed the requisite interest to bring the action.

• Niñal vs. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000, 328 SCRA 122 — Controlling precedent on the right of persons other than the spouses to file a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; the Court relied on it for the proposition that children were allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father's marriage due to lack of a marriage license, and for the distinction between void and voidable marriages.
• Carlos vs. Sandoval, G.R. No. 179922, December 16, 2008, 574 SCRA 116 — Followed on the requirement that the plaintiff in an action for declaration of nullity of marriage must be a real party in interest, and on the exceptions to the limitation under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
• Enrico vs. Heirs of Sps. Eulogio B. Medinaceli and Trinidad Catli-Medinaceli, G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007, 534 SCRA 418 — Cited for the proposition that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, being a procedural rule, is prospective in application and confined to proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
• Oco vs. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348 — Cited for the basic procedural law principle that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.
• Amor-Catalan vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167109, February 6, 2007, 514 SCRA 607 — Cited for the proposition that only the party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
• Regner vs. Logarta, G.R. No. 168747, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 277 — Cited for the doctrine on indispensable parties: when an indispensable party is not before the court, the action should be dismissed, and the absence renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void.
• Heirs of Ignacio Conti vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 118464, December 21, 1998, 300 SCRA 345 — Cited for the proposition that the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives from succeeding to the deceased's estate.

• Article 1001, Civil Code — Provides that should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. The Court cited this provision to establish the petitioner's potential material interest in the estate of his deceased brother.
• Article 1003, Civil Code — Provides that if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. The Court cited this provision to establish the conditions under which the petitioner could succeed to his brother's estate.
• Section 2, Rule 3, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure — Defines a real party in interest as the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The Court applied this rule to determine the petitioner's standing to bring the action.
• Section 11, Rule 3, Rules of Court — Provides that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for dismissal of an action, and that parties may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. The Court applied this rule to hold that the petitioner's failure to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the action.
• Section 2, paragraph (a), A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC — Provides that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. The Court held that this rule had no application to the petitioner because it extends only to marriages covered by the Family Code and is prospective in application.
• Article 40, Family Code — Provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage, and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. The Court cited this provision to explain the imprescriptibility of the action for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
• Articles 72 to 79, old Civil Code — Provide for marriages of exceptional character exempt from the requirement of a marriage license, including marriages in articulo mortis, marriages at a place more than fifteen kilometers distant from the municipal building, marriages between Filipino citizens abroad, and marriages between Mohammedans or pagans. The Court cited these provisions to emphasize the necessity of Leonila's participation to determine whether the marriage might have been excepted from the marriage license requirement.

Carpio Morales, J. (Chairperson), Brion, J., Abad, J., and Villarama, Jr., J., concurred in the decision.

N/A — No dissenting opinions are noted in the provided case text.