Aberca vs. Ver

Service of a notice to file answer by publication is not a recognized mode of service under the Rules of Court, and a default judgment rendered on the basis of such defective service violates the constitutional right to procedural due process and is null and void.

The petitioners were suspected subversives arrested and detained by Task Force Makabansa, a composite group of various intelligence units of the AFP, on the strength of allegedly defective search warrants. They filed a complaint for damages against high-ranking military officers, including then-AFP Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. Fabian Ver and subordinate officers, alleging that they were subjected to physical and psychological harm, torture, and other brutalities during detention. The respondents were initially represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), then under Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza. The 1986 EDSA Revolution removed the respondents from their government positions and replaced the Solicitor General, fundamentally altering the legal representation landscape for the case.

On January 25, 1983, several suspected subversives who had been arrested and detained by the military filed a complaint for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against Gen. Fabian Ver, then AFP Chief of Staff, and subordinate officers including Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Galileo Kintanar, Lt. Col. Panfilo Lacson, Maj. Rodolfo Aguinaldo, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, 1Lt. Pedro Tango, 1Lt. Romeo Ricardo, 1Lt. Raul Bacalso, and M/Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint alleged that the petitioners were arrested and detained by Task Force Makabansa on the strength of defective search warrants, and that while under detention they were subjected to physical and psychological harm, torture, and other brutalities to extort confessions and information. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 37487 and assigned to Branch 95.

The respondents, through the OSG under Solicitor General Estelito Mendoza, filed a motion to dismiss on three grounds: the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus precluded inquiry into the arrests; the respondents were immune as they were performing official duties; and the complaint stated no cause of action. The RTC granted the motion on November 8, 1983. After the RTC declared the dismissal order final on May 11, 1984 and denied reconsideration on September 21, 1984, the petitioners elevated the case to the Supreme Court via petition for review on certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 69866.

While the case was pending before the Supreme Court, the 1986 EDSA Revolution occurred, resulting in the removal of the respondents from their government positions and the replacement of Solicitor General Mendoza. On April 15, 1988, the Supreme Court annulled the RTC orders and remanded the case for further proceedings. The case was re-raffled to Branch 107. Trial could not proceed immediately because on June 11, 1988, fire razed the Quezon City Hall, destroying the records. The petitioners sought reconstitution on October 9, 1989, which was granted without opposition on March 12, 1990, there being no record that the respondents or their counsel were notified of the reconstitution hearing.

On August 17, 1990, the RTC directed the petitioners to report the addresses and whereabouts of the respondents so they could be properly notified, given that the OSG could no longer represent them and the respondents no longer held official positions. The petitioners did not comply; instead, they moved to declare the respondents in default. The RTC denied the motion on December 27, 1990, emphasizing that the respondents were not notified of the Supreme Court's decision. On March 7, 1991, the RTC dismissed the case without prejudice for the petitioners' failure to comply. However, on June 4, 1991, the RTC set aside the dismissal, reinstated the case, and approved the petitioners' request to serve a notice to file answer by publication in the Tagalog newspaper BALITA. No answer was filed, and on December 5, 1991, the RTC declared the respondents in default and directed the petitioners to present evidence ex parte.

On February 19, 1993, the RTC rendered judgment by default in favor of the petitioners, ordering eight respondents to pay jointly and severally to each of five petitioners ₱50,000 as temperate damages, ₱150,000 as moral damages, and ₱150,000 as exemplary damages, plus ₱200,000 to the petitioners' counsel. The claims of the remaining petitioners were dismissed, and the case against Capt. Pizarro, 1Lt. Ricardo, and 1Lt. Bacalso was dismissed with exoneration. The respondents' subsequent motions for reconsideration, omnibus motions, and petition for relief from judgment were all denied by the RTC. The respondents then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the RTC decision on July 31, 2003, finding four procedural errors that denied the respondents due process. The petitioners then filed the present petition before the Supreme Court.

• Validity of Default Declaration: Petitioner argued that the RTC did not err in declaring the respondents in default and in allowing evidence ex parte, because the respondents were represented by the OSG from 1983 until December 11, 1990, and the OSG was furnished copies of all court orders and pleadings during that period.
• No Obligation to Track Respondents: Petitioner maintained that once the respondents appeared through counsel by filing a motion to dismiss, the petitioners were under no obligation to track down the respondents' addresses, as the Rules of Court require that all notices and pleadings be sent to counsel of record.
• Service by Publication as Valid Substitute: Petitioner argued that substituted service was futile because the respondents no longer held their positions and could not be reached at the addresses in the complaint, making service by publication the only remaining option.
• OSG Negligence Binding on Respondents: Petitioner contended that the negligence of the OSG is binding on the respondents in the same manner that the OSG's initial success in securing dismissal was binding on them, and that it would be unfair to allow the respondents to benefit from the initial dismissal while later disclaiming the OSG's handling of the case.
• No Meritorious Defense or Excusable Negligence: Petitioner asserted that the respondents failed to establish the fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence that would warrant a new trial or relief from judgment.

• Defective Service Denied Due Process: Respondent countered that they were deprived of the opportunity to file their answer or responsive pleadings when the RTC issued a default order after a defective service of notice to file answer by publication.
• Unaddressed Procedural Errors: Respondent argued that the petitioners failed to address the four errors committed by the RTC as cited by the CA, namely the abandonment of proper modes of service, failure to avail of substituted service, unauthorized service by publication, and declaration of default without due notice.
• Nullity of Default Judgment: Respondent maintained that once a denial or deprivation of due process is determined, the trial court is ousted of jurisdiction to proceed and its judgment is null and void, regardless of the rule on meritorious defense in default cases.

• Due Process: Whether the constitutional right to procedural due process was properly observed or was unacceptably violated when the respondents were declared in default based on service of a notice to file answer by publication and the petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex parte.
• Binding Effect of OSG's Acts: Whether the OSG's withdrawal of appearance and failure to file an answer constituted negligence binding on the respondents.
• Validity of Service by Publication: Whether service of a notice to file answer by publication is a recognized mode of service under the Rules of Court.

• Due Process: No. The respondents were completely deprived of due process when they were declared in default based on a defective mode of service — service of notice to file answer by publication — which is not recognized under Rule 13 of the Rules of Court.
• Binding Effect of OSG's Acts: No. The OSG's cessation of representation was due to a change in government and the statutory prohibition in Urbano vs. Chavez, not professional delinquency or negligence; hence, its acts could not be imputed to the respondents.
• Validity of Service by Publication: No. Service by publication applies only to summons under Rule 14 and to judgments, final orders, or resolutions against parties summoned by publication under Section 9, Rule 13; it is not authorized for notices to file answer.

• Due Process: Procedural due process contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered. The RTC's August 17, 1990 order directing the petitioners to report the respondents' addresses was an attempt at personal service or service by mail — the preferred modes under Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 13. When the petitioners failed to comply, the RTC should have resorted to substituted service under Section 8 (delivery to the clerk of court with proof of failure of personal and mail service) before authorizing any other mode. Instead, the RTC skipped substituted service and authorized service of a notice to file answer by publication, which is nowhere mentioned in Rule 13. The respondents were not notified of the Supreme Court's April 15, 1988 decision remanding the case, the reconstitution proceedings, or the OSG's withdrawal. They were completely out of the picture until the RTC rendered its decision. Because the basic rules on modes of service are mandatory and must be strictly followed, the defective service rendered the default declaration and the resulting judgment null and void for lack of due process.

• Binding Effect of OSG's Acts: The petitioners argued that the OSG's negligence in failing to file an answer was binding on the respondents. However, the lawyer-client relationship between the OSG and the respondents effectively ceased after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, when the respondents lost their government positions and Solicitor General Mendoza was replaced. Former Solicitor General Mendoza manifested that his representation terminated when he ceased to hold office, and Solicitor General Chavez withdrew citing Urbano vs. Chavez, which prohibits the OSG from representing public officials in civil suits for damages arising from a felony. The records did not show that the respondents were furnished a copy of the notice of withdrawal or gave their conformity. The cessation of representation was due to extraordinary political circumstances and a statutory prohibition, not to professional delinquency, ignorance, incompetency, or inexperience. Consequently, there was no negligence of counsel to impute to the respondents, who were effectively left without counsel after the EDSA Revolution.

• Validity of Service by Publication: The only recognized modes of service for pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers under Sections 6, 7, and 8 of Rule 13 are personal service, service by mail, and substituted service. Service by publication is authorized only for summons under Rule 14 and for judgments, final orders, or resolutions against parties who were summoned by publication under Section 9, Rule 13. The notice to file answer is neither a summons nor a final order or judgment, and the respondents were not summoned by publication in the first place. The RTC's inherent power to control its proceedings cannot override basic procedural rules or the constitutional right to due process. Personal service was practicable under the circumstances, as the respondents were well-known persons who formerly occupied high government positions.

• Mandatory nature of modes of service under Rule 13 — The basic rules on modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers under Rule 13 are mandatory and must be strictly followed. Personal service is the general rule and the preferred mode; resort to other modes requires a written explanation why personal service was not practicable. Only three modes are recognized: (1) personal service, (2) service by mail, and (3) substituted service (delivery to the clerk of court with proof of failure of both personal and mail service). Service by publication is not a recognized mode for notices to file answer.

• Procedural due process in judicial proceedings — Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one's person or property. A default judgment rendered without proper notice and opportunity to be heard is null and void for lack of due process.

• Disfavor toward default judgments — Judgments by default are looked upon with disfavor and are contrary to public policy. Courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default, as default judgments may amount to positive and considerable injustice. The issuance of orders of default should be the exception rather than the rule, allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with the trial court's orders. Suits should as much as possible be decided on the merits and not on technicalities.

• Scope of service by publication — Service by publication is limited to: (1) service of summons under Rule 14, where the defendant's whereabouts are unknown or cannot be served personally or by substituted service; and (2) service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions under Section 9, Rule 13, but only against a party who was summoned by publication. It is not authorized for notices to file answer or other interim court orders.

• OSG's authority to represent public officials — Pursuant to Urbano vs. Chavez, the OSG is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. The cessation of OSG representation due to a change in government and this statutory prohibition does not constitute negligence of counsel that can be imputed to the client.

• "Procedural due process is that which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial. It contemplates notice and opportunity to be heard before judgment is rendered affecting one's person or property." — This passage defines the essential elements of procedural due process, establishing the constitutional standard against which the RTC's procedural lapses were measured.

• "Nowhere under this rule is service of notice to file answer by publication is mentioned, much less recognized." — This statement articulates the ratio decidendi: the RTC's authorization of service by publication for a notice to file answer was void because Rule 13 does not recognize such a mode, rendering the default declaration and resulting judgment null for lack of due process.

• "Definitely, Sol. Gen. Mendoza's cessation from holding office and Sol. Gen. Chavez's withdrawal of representation in the unique scenario of this case are not equivalent to professional delinquency or ignorance, incompetency or inexperience or negligence and dereliction of duty. Hence, there is no negligence of counsel in this case." — This passage clarifies that the OSG's withdrawal due to extraordinary political circumstances and statutory prohibition does not constitute negligence binding on the client, distinguishing the case from ordinary negligence-of-counsel doctrines.

• "The exercise of such inherent power must not violate basic court procedures. More importantly, it must not disregard one's basic constitutional right to procedural due process." — This formulation establishes that a court's inherent power to control its proceedings cannot override mandatory procedural rules or constitutional rights, limiting the scope of inherent judicial authority.

• Marcelino Domingo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 169122, February 2, 2010, 611 SCRA 353 — Cited for the rule that Section 11, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court is mandatory, requiring personal service whenever practicable and a written explanation when other modes are resorted to. The Court relied on this case to emphasize strict compliance with the modes of service.

• Solar Team Entertainment, Inc. vs. Judge Ricafort — Cited within Marcelino Domingo for the proposition that personal service is preferred to expedite resolution and minimize delays, and that strictest compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 is mandated.

• Urbano vs. Chavez, G.R. No. 88578, March 19, 1990, 183 SCRA 347 — Cited as authority for the rule that the OSG is not authorized to represent a public official in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. The Court applied this to conclude that the OSG's withdrawal was legally mandated, not negligent.

• Regalado P. Samartino vs. Leonor B. Raon, G.R. No. 131482, July 3, 2002, 383 SCRA 664 — Cited for the doctrine that default judgments are frowned upon and courts should be liberal in setting aside orders of default, as suits should be decided on the merits rather than on technicalities.

• Luzon Surety Co., Inc. vs. Jesus Panaguiton, G.R. No. L-26054, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 148 — Cited for the definition of procedural due process as that which hears before it condemns, proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after trial.

• Section 1, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Guarantees that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Applied as the constitutional standard against which the RTC's procedural lapses were measured; the defective service of notice by publication violated this right.

• Section 5(5), Article VIII, 1987 Constitution — Authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts. Served as the constitutional basis for the Rules of Court provisions on modes of service.

• Sections 5, 6, 7, and 8, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Prescribe the modes of service of pleadings, motions, notices, orders, judgments, and other papers: personal service, service by mail, and substituted service (delivery to the clerk of court with proof of failure of personal and mail service). Applied to hold that the RTC's resort to service by publication for a notice to file answer was not among the recognized modes.

• Section 11, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Mandates that whenever practicable, service and filing of pleadings shall be done personally, with a written explanation required when other modes are used. Applied to emphasize the mandatory and preferred nature of personal service.

• Section 9, Rule 13, Rules of Court — Governs service of judgments, final orders, or resolutions, allowing service by publication only against a party summoned by publication. Applied to distinguish service of final orders (where publication may apply) from service of a notice to file answer (where it does not).

• Sections 6, 7, 14, 15, and 16, Rule 14, Rules of Court — Govern methods of service of summons in civil cases, including personal service, substituted service, and service by publication. Applied to clarify that service by publication is a mode for summons, not for notices to file answer.

Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concurred.