Abella vs. Sumayod

A probate court may pass upon the intrinsic validity of a will's provisions in the same proceedings when practical considerations so require, and a testamentary disposition of property not owned by the testator is intrinsically void.

Josefina Escosora Abella's last will and testament was admitted for probate by the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Paragraph 5 of the will bequeathed her share in certain properties, including the "Pawing, Palo Properties," to specific devisees. The will further purported to dispose of the shares of other individuals (Irene, Teodoro O., and Leon Abella) in those same properties to the predecessors-in-interest of petitioners Rizalino B. Abella, Teodoro C. Abella, and Romilda S. Amago. After the probate decision became final, petitioners moved for the appointment of a special executor and execution of this paragraph. The executor and a co-heir opposed, arguing the testator did not own the Pawing, Palo Properties.

• Probate of the Will: The last will and testament of Josefina Escosora Abella was admitted for probate by the RTC. The dispositive portion of the probate decision declared the will authentic and admitted it for probate, and ordered the issuance of a letter testamentary to the named executor, Atty. Sergio C. Sumayod.
• The Contested Provision: Paragraph 5 of the will bequeathed the testator's "just share" from the Pawing, Palo Properties to Cecilia E. Abella. It further stated that "the share of IRENE ABELLA will go to SOLEDAD AMAGO," "the share of TEODORO O. ABELLA will go to CONRADA C. ABELLA," and "the share of LEON ABELLA will go to ANESIA ABELLA & sisters." Petitioners are the heirs of Soledad, Conrada, and Anesia.
• Motion for Execution: In 2017, petitioners obtained a copy of the final probate decision. They contacted the executor and a co-heir to distribute the Pawing, Palo Properties per the will but were refused. They then filed a Motion to Appoint Special Executor and Execute the Will, seeking to enforce Paragraph 5.
• Opposition and Lower Court Rulings: The executor and a co-heir opposed the motion. The RTC denied the motion, ruling that Paragraph 5 was intrinsically void because the testator did not own the Pawing, Palo Properties. The CA affirmed, citing a judicial admission by petitioners that the testator was not the owner.
• Nature of the Properties: The Pawing, Palo Properties consisted of two parcels: (1) Lot No. 9760 titled in the names of several individuals including Cecilia E. Abella and Jane A. Pica; and (2) a parcel covered by an Original Certificate of Title in the name of the "Heirs of Jose Abella, represented by Josefina Abella."

• Extrinsic vs. Intrinsic Validity: Petitioners argued that since the will's extrinsic validity was conclusively established in the probate decree, its intrinsic validity could not be collaterally attacked via a motion in the same proceedings. They contended a separate action was required, citing Heirs of the Late Jesus Fran v. Hon. Salas.
• Trusteeship Capacity: Petitioners maintained that the testator acted as a trustee for the heirs of Jose Abella, giving her the capacity to dispose of the Pawing, Palo Properties through her will.

• Distinct Validity Issues: Respondents Atty. Sumayod and Jane Pica countered that extrinsic and intrinsic validity are distinct matters; the finality of the probate decree did not preclude a determination of intrinsic invalidity.
• Lessees' Non-Involvement: Respondents Annaliza Yu and Petron Corp. argued that as mere lessees of the properties, they were not privy to the inheritance dispute and no cause of action existed against them.

• Probate Court Jurisdiction: Whether a last will and testament admitted to probate can be declared intrinsically void in an order arising from the same proceedings.
• Testamentary Capacity: Whether Josefina Abella could validly dispose of the shares of Irene, Teodoro O., and Leon Abella in the Pawing, Palo Properties under Paragraph 5 of her will.

• Probate Court Jurisdiction: The probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity within the same proceedings when practical considerations demand it, to avoid the proceedings becoming an "idle ceremony." The general rule that probate courts deal only with extrinsic validity is not absolute.
• Testamentary Capacity: The disposition of the shares of Irene, Teodoro O., and Leon Abella in the Pawing, Palo Properties is intrinsically void. A testator cannot dispose of properties not belonging to them, pursuant to the principle of nemo dat quod non habet. However, the lower courts erred in invalidating the entire provision concerning the Pawing, Palo Properties without first determining if the testator, as a possible co-owner or heir of Jose Abella, had a disposable pro-indiviso share.

• Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet — One cannot give what one does not have. This principle was applied to invalidate the testamentary disposition of property shares not owned by the testator.
• Probate Court's Jurisdiction over Intrinsic Validity — While probate proceedings generally concern the extrinsic validity of a will, a probate court may exceptionally rule on intrinsic validity within the same proceedings when practical considerations so require, particularly to avoid superfluous litigation.

• "When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, the issue should be addressed, especially when the conduct of separate proceedings to determine the intrinsic validity of its testamentary provisions would be superfluous."
• "Since only the property owned by the decedent at the time of his/her death forms part of his/her estate, Josefina could not have donated the shares of other persons in the Pawing, Palo Properties to petitioners through her will."

• Dorotheo v. Court of Appeals, 377 Phil. 851 (1999) — Cited and distinguished. The Court noted that in Dorotheo, a motion to declare a will intrinsically void was filed long after the probate order became final, whereas here the issue arose during execution proceedings.
• Heirs of the Late Jesus Fran v. Hon. Salas, 285 Phil. 789 (1992) — Cited for the rule that a decree of probate is conclusive as to due execution and cannot be collaterally attacked, but held inapplicable to the separate issue of intrinsic validity.
• Spouses Ajero v. Court of Appeals, 306 Phil. 500 (1994) — Followed. This case similarly invalidated a testamentary disposition in probate proceedings where the testator admitted not owning the property.
• Gaspi v. Judge Pacis-Trinidad, 890 Phil. 819 (2020) — Cited to distinguish between extrinsic validity (authenticity and due execution) and intrinsic validity (lawfulness of the apportionment).

• Articles 774 and 776, Civil Code — Define inheritance as including all property, rights, and obligations of the decedent not extinguished by death. Applied to hold that only property owned by the testator forms part of the estate.
• Article 792, Civil Code — Establishes the principle of severability in wills, providing that the invalidity of one disposition does not affect others unless the testator would not have made them independently. The Court used this to critique the lower courts' blanket invalidation.
• Rule 75, Section 1, Rules of Court — States that the allowance of a will is conclusive as to its due execution (extrinsic validity).

• J. Leonen (Chairperson)
• J. Lazaro-Javier
• J. M. Lopez
• J. Kho, Jr.