Abella vs. People

Intent to kill in frustrated homicide may be inferred from the nature of the weapon used, the location of the wound inflicted, and the circumstances of the attack, notwithstanding that only a single blow was delivered and the accused subsequently desisted from further aggression; a hacking wound on the neck inflicted by a scythe constitutes a mortal wound that would produce death without timely medical intervention.

Fe Abella, who worked intermittently as a farmer, baker, and trisicad driver, resided in Sitio Puli, Canitoan, Cagayan de Oro City. On the evening of September 6, 1998, he engaged in a quarrel with Alejandro Tayrus and Dionisio Ybañes at a nearby store. His brother Benigno Abella attempted to pacify him and convince him to return home. Later, while Benigno was at Alejandro's house apologizing for the petitioner's conduct, the petitioner arrived armed with two scythes.

• The Incident: On September 6, 1998, at approximately 11:00 p.m., Benigno Abella was watching television at his residence when Roger Laranjo arrived and requested him to pacify the petitioner, who was causing a disturbance at a nearby store. Benigno and his wife Amelita proceeded to the store and found the petitioner fighting with Alejandro Tayrus and Dionisio Ybañes. Benigno successfully persuaded the petitioner to return home.
• The Attack: While Benigno and Amelita were at Alejandro's house apologizing for the petitioner's behavior, the petitioner arrived carrying two scythes. Benigno instructed Alejandro and Dionisio to flee, which they did. The petitioner attempted to enter the house, but Benigno blocked his path. The petitioner then pointed the scythe in his left hand toward Benigno's stomach and used the scythe in his right hand to hack Benigno's neck once. Benigno fell to the ground while the petitioner ran to chase Alejandro.
• Medical Evidence: Dr. Roberto Ardiente testified that Benigno sustained: (a) a hacking wound on the left lateral aspect of the neck measuring 11 cm; and (b) an incised wound on the left hand dorsal aspect measuring 4 cm. The wounds were extensive, big, and open, caused by a sharp, pointed instrument that was not sterile. Dr. Ardiente stated that complications and infections could have developed and that death could have resulted without proper medical attendance. Benigno was hospitalized from September 6 to September 23, 1998 (seventeen days).
• Defense: The petitioner interposed denial and alibi, claiming he was in Buenavista, Agusan del Norte from September 2, 1998 to October 2002, approximately four hours away from the crime scene. Witnesses Fernando Fernandez and Urbano Cabag testified that they saw the petitioner gathering woods and drinking tuba on the evening of the incident. The RTC found these testimonies inconsistent and accorded greater weight to the prosecution's eyewitness accounts.

• Lack of Intent to Kill: Petitioner maintained that the prosecution failed to prove intent to kill beyond reasonable doubt. The single hacking blow was accidental, not deliberate, particularly in light of the absence of motive to harm his brother. The fact that only one wound was inflicted, followed by the petitioner's pursuit of Alejandro rather than further attacks on Benigno, negated homicidal intent.
• Nature of Injuries: Petitioner argued that the wounds were not mortal. Citing Pentecostes, Jr. v. People, he contended that where an accused shoots the victim only once in a non-vital part, the crime constitutes physical injuries, not attempted or frustrated homicide. The neck wound did not involve a major blood vessel or vital structure, and the hand wound merely required cleansing and suturing. No complications developed, and Benigno's seventeen-day hospitalization indicated less serious physical injuries rather than frustrated homicide.
• Procedural Error: Petitioner asserted that the courts below failed to appreciate relevant facts that would justify acquittal or downgrade the conviction to less serious physical injuries.

• Factual Issues Beyond Review: Respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General, countered that the petition raised factual questions regarding intent to kill and the nature of the wounds, which are outside the scope of Rule 45 limited to questions of law.
• Presence of Homicidal Intent: Respondent argued that intent to kill is inferred from the use of deadly weapons (two scythes), the location of the wound (neck), and the sudden attack on an unarmed victim. If the petitioner merely intended to get Benigno out of the way, he could have used less lethal means or targeted non-vital body parts. The development of infections is not a necessary element of frustrated homicide; the test is whether the wound is mortal and capable of causing death without medical intervention.

• Reviewability Under Rule 45: Whether the petition raises questions of law proper for review under Rule 45, or questions of fact regarding intent to kill and the mortal nature of the wounds.
• Intent to Kill: Whether the prosecution proved intent to kill sufficient to sustain a conviction for frustrated homicide, or whether the single blow and lack of motive establish only physical injuries.
• Mortal Wound: Whether the hacking wound on the neck constituted a mortal wound that would have caused death absent timely medical intervention.

• Reviewability Under Rule 45: The petition was dismissed as it essentially challenged the factual findings of the lower courts regarding the existence of homicidal intent and the mortal nature of the wounds. These issues require a re-calibration of evidence, which is not permitted under Rule 45. The case did not fall under the exception where the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts or failure to notice relevant facts justifying a different conclusion.
• Intent to Kill: Intent to kill was sufficiently established. The use of a scythe—a deadly weapon—against the neck, a vital part of the body, demonstrated homicidal intent. The petitioner's claim that he could have inflicted more wounds had he intended to kill was rejected; the single hacking blow to the neck was itself potentially fatal and capable of decapitation. The analogy to Pentecostes, Jr. was found flawed because there, the victim was shot in a non-vital part (arm) and discharged the following day, whereas Benigno sustained an extensive neck wound requiring seventeen days of hospitalization.
• Mortal Wound: The wound was mortal. Dr. Ardiente's testimony established that the extensive, open wounds caused by an unsterile instrument could have resulted in fatal complications. That no complications actually developed was due to timely medical intervention, a cause independent of the petitioner's will. The seventeen-day confinement belied the claim that the injuries were merely slight or less serious.

• Intent to Kill in Frustrated Homicide: Intent to kill, the essential element in frustrated homicide, may be inferred from: (a) motive; (b) the nature or number of weapons used; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) the words uttered by the offender. The prosecution must prove this intent clearly and convincingly to exclude every possible doubt regarding homicidal intent.
• Acts of Execution in Frustrated Crimes: An offender is deemed to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance. Death prevented by timely medical assistance constitutes frustrated homicide.
• Scope of Rule 45: A petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is limited to questions of law. A question of law arises when the doubt concerns the correct application of law to a given set of facts, while a question of fact exists when the doubt concerns the truth or falsity of the alleged facts or the probative value of the evidence. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are generally conclusive upon the Supreme Court.
• Award of Temperate Damages: Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages may be recovered when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.

• "Intent to kill, the main element in frustrated homicide, may be inferred from the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim."
• "It does not require imagination to figure out that a single hacking blow in the neck with the use of a scythe could be enough to decapitate a person and leave him dead."
• "An offender is said to have performed all the acts of execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim without medical intervention or attendance."
• "A question of law arises when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity of the alleged facts."

• Pentecostes, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010, 617 SCRA 504 — Distinguished. The Supreme Court found the downgrading from attempted murder to physical injuries proper where the accused shot the victim once in the arm (a non-vital part) and the victim was discharged the following day. The Court held this inapplicable to Abella's case because the neck is a vital part and the wound required extensive medical treatment.
• Century Iron Works, Inc. and Benito Chua v. Eleto B. Bañas, G.R. No. 184116, June 19, 2013 — Cited for the rule that Rule 45 petitions are limited to questions of law and do not involve examination of the probative value of evidence.
• Colinares v. People, G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011, 662 SCRA 266 — Cited for the rule that intent to kill may be inferred from the means used and the nature, location, and number of wounds.
• Esqueda v. People, G.R. No. 170222, June 18, 2009, 589 SCRA 489 — Cited for the propriety of awarding temperate damages when actual damages cannot be proven with certainty but pecuniary loss is established.

• Article 249 in relation to Article 250, Revised Penal Code — Defines and penalizes homicide and frustrated homicide. Article 249 prescribes reclusion temporal for consummated homicide; Article 50 provides that the penalty for frustrated crimes is one degree lower than that prescribed by law.
• Article 2224, Civil Code of the Philippines — Provides for the recovery of temperate or moderate damages when some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot be proved with certainty.
• Rule 45, Rules of Court — Governs petitions for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court, limited to questions of law.

Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno (Chief Justice, Chairperson), Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen (Acting Member per Special Order No. 1545 Revised).