Abella vs. Commission on Elections

A candidate who is disqualified for lack of residence and registration qualifications cannot be replaced by the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes, because the votes cast for the disqualified candidate, who was voted for in the sincere belief that she was qualified, are not considered stray or void. The second-placer cannot be proclaimed winner as the electorate repudiated him.

The case involves the February 1, 1988 local elections for the position of Governor of Leyte. Petitioner Adelina Larrazabal was the wife of Emeterio V. Larrazabal, the original candidate of the Lakas ng Bansa-PDP-Laban, who was disqualified by the COMELEC on January 18, 1988 for lack of residence. On January 31, 1988, the day before the election, Adelina filed her own certificate of candidacy in substitution of her husband. The case was the fourth time the controversy relating to the Leyte gubernatorial election was elevated to the Supreme Court, with prior cases involving pre-proclamation and disqualification issues.

Adelina Larrazabal filed her certificate of candidacy for Governor of Leyte on January 31, 1988, substituting her husband Emeterio, who had been disqualified for lack of residence. On election day, February 1, 1988, Silvestre de la Cruz filed a petition to disqualify her for alleged false statements in her certificate of candidacy regarding her residence. Larrazabal won the election and was proclaimed governor, but the COMELEC later disqualified her.

The COMELEC found that Larrazabal was neither a resident of Kananga, Leyte, nor a registered voter thereat. Evidence showed she had established her residence in Ormoc City from 1975 to the present, and her attempt to change her residence one year before the election by registering in Kananga was not supported by the records. The COMELEC detailed numerous irregularities in her alleged cancellation of registration in Ormoc City and transfer to Kananga, including misplaced applications, inconsistent serial numbers, and certifications that she was not a registered voter in Kananga as of January 29, 1988.

The COMELEC also relied on the Family Code provisions that husband and wife are obliged to live together and fix the family domicile, finding no evidence that the Larrazabals maintained separate residences. The contract of lease with option to purchase identified the spouses as "residents of Ormoc City," and the acknowledgment indicated Emeterio presented a Residence Certificate issued in Ormoc City. The COMELEC found no evidence of animus revertendi to Kananga, as Larrazabal's occasional visits did not signify an intention to continue residence therein.

• COMELEC's Disregard of Prior Ruling: Larrazabal argued that the COMELEC completely disregarded the Court's pronouncement in G.R. No. 88004 by proceeding with a disqualification case not contemplated therein, instead of acting on SPC Case No. 88-546 under Section 78 of the Election Code.

• Residence Determination: Larrazabal argued that the COMELEC erred in relying on the Family Code to rule that she lacked the required residence, contending that under election law, the determination of residence is based on the principle of intention, the animus revertendi, rather than anything else.

• Registered Voter Status: Larrazabal insisted she was a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, based on her cancellation of registration in Ormoc City on November 25, 1987, transfer of registration to Kananga on the same date, and her voting on election day in Kananga.

• Ormoc City Voter Qualification: Larrazabal argued that her being a registered voter in Ormoc City was no impediment to her candidacy for governor of Leyte, submitting that while a component city whose charter prohibits its voters from participating in provincial elections is independent of the province, such independence is limited to administrative supervision and does not prohibit voters from running for provincial offices.

• Statutory Interpretation: Larrazabal argued that Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179, which states that Ormoc City voters "shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor," does not prohibit running for provincial elective office, and that the provision should have been phrased differently if such prohibition was intended.

• Nullity of COMELEC Decision: Larrazabal contended that the February 14, 1991 COMELEC decision was null and void because Commissioner Andres Flores' term had expired on February 2, 1991, and the President had no power to fix the terms of office of COMELEC Commissioners.

• Second-Placer Entitlement: Abella argued that the Frivaldo and Labo cases were misapplied, as SPC No. 88-546 was a pre-proclamation petition under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, and under Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate should not be counted, making him the winner as the second-placer.

• Residence and Registration: Respondents De la Cruz and Abella argued that Larrazabal was neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, but a resident and registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city independent of the province, thereby disqualifying her for the position of governor of Leyte.

• Prohibition Against Running: The COMELEC ruled that the phrase "shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor" connotes two prohibitions — one from running for and the second from voting for any provincial elective official.

• Residence Qualification: Whether Larrazabal possessed the required residence qualification to run for Governor of Leyte.

• Voter Registration: Whether Larrazabal was a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, as required by law.

• Ormoc City Voter Prohibition: Whether Larrazabal's being a registered voter of Ormoc City, a component city whose charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial officials, disqualified her from running for Governor of Leyte.

• Validity of COMELEC Decision: Whether the February 14, 1991 COMELEC decision was null and void due to the alleged expiration of Commissioner Flores' term.

• Second-Placer Entitlement: Whether Abella, who obtained the second highest number of votes, should be installed as Governor of Leyte after Larrazabal's disqualification.

• Residence Qualification: No. Larrazabal lacked the required residence qualification, as the evidence showed she established her residence in Ormoc City from 1975 to the present and not in Kananga, Leyte.

• Voter Registration: No. Larrazabal was not a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte, as her alleged cancellation of registration in Ormoc City and transfer to Kananga was not supported by the records and was marked by numerous irregularities.

• Ormoc City Voter Prohibition: Yes. Larrazabal's being a registered voter of Ormoc City disqualified her from running for Governor of Leyte, as Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179 prohibits Ormoc City voters from voting and being voted for provincial elective offices.

• Validity of COMELEC Decision: The Court did not pass upon the constitutional issue, but held that even if Commissioner Flores' term expired on February 2, 1991, his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 had color of validity, and his official acts were valid under the de facto doctrine.

• Second-Placer Entitlement: No. Abella, who obtained the second highest number of votes, could not assume the governorship, as the votes cast for Larrazabal, who was voted for in the sincere belief that she was qualified, were not treated as stray, void, or meaningless.

• Residence Qualification: The Court was bound by the COMELEC's factual findings as they were supported by substantial evidence. The COMELEC based its finding on evidence that Larrazabal established her residence in Ormoc City from 1975 to the present. Her attempt to change her residence one year before the election by registering in Kananga showed she considered herself already a resident of Ormoc City. The Court cited Faypon vs. Quirino for the principle that the determination of a person's legal residence or domicile depends upon intention inferred from acts, activities, and utterances. In this case, there was no evidence that Larrazabal temporarily left her residence in Kananga to pursue any calling, profession, or business; rather, she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband. The occasional visits to Kananga did not signify an intention to continue residence therein.

• Voter Registration: The Court found the COMELEC's detailed findings of irregularities in Larrazabal's alleged cancellation and transfer of registration to be supported by substantial evidence. These included the misplaced application for cancellation, the discovery only on Revision Day, the delivery of the voter's affidavit without endorsement, the preparation of conflicting minutes, the serial numbers of the voter's affidavits being far removed from other new registrants, and the certification that Larrazabal was not a registered voter in Kananga as of January 29, 1988. The Court held that the relative weight of the parties' evidence supported the thesis that Larrazabal was not a registered voter in Precinct No. 17, Brgy. Mahawan, Kananga, Leyte, and that she and her husband continued to be registered voters in Precinct No. 15, Ormoc City.

• Ormoc City Voter Prohibition: The Court held that Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit that component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. This independence carries with it the prohibition directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for provincial elective offices. The Court applied the principle from Peralta vs. Commission on Elections involving Olongapo City, a highly urbanized city, to Ormoc City. The Court also rejected Larrazabal's interpretation of Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179, applying the doctrine of last antecedent from Mapa vs. Arroyo to hold that the conjunction "and" between "shall not be qualified" and "entitled to vote" refers to two prohibitions — running for and voting for provincial elective officials.

• Validity of COMELEC Decision: The Court declined to pass upon the constitutional issue of whether the President has power to fix the terms of COMELEC Commissioners, citing Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals that constitutional questions are not decided unless absolutely necessary. Even assuming Commissioner Flores' term expired on February 2, 1991, his continuance in office until February 15, 1991 had color of validity, and his official acts were valid under the de facto doctrine, citing Leyte Acting Vice-Governor Aurelio D. Menzon vs. Leyte Acting Governor Leopoldo E. Perilla.

• Second-Placer Entitlement: The Court held that the nature of the proceedings was not compelling. The local elections proceeded with Larrazabal considered a bona-fide candidate, and the voters voted for her in the sincere belief that she was qualified. Her votes were counted, and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect was that Abella lost in the election and was repudiated by the electorate. The Court applied the rulings in Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections and Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, which held that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes cannot assume the vacated position when the winning candidate is disqualified. The Court re-examined and reversed Santos vs. Commission on Elections in favor of Geronimo vs. Ramos, which represents the more logical and democratic rule that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes, and the votes cast for a disqualified candidate who was voted for in sincere belief should not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless.

• Animus Revertendi — The determination of a person's legal residence or domicile largely depends upon intention which may be inferred from his acts, activities, and utterances. Mere absence from one's residence to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice a vocation is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. The party who claims that a person has abandoned or left his residence must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss. In this case, the Court found no evidence that Larrazabal temporarily left Kananga to pursue any calling, profession, or business; she established her residence in Ormoc City with her husband, and the animus revertendi was not present.

• De Facto Officer Doctrine — An officer who assumes office under color of a known appointment or election, and whose continuance in office has color of validity, is a de facto officer whose official acts are considered valid. The Court applied this doctrine to Commissioner Flores, whose term allegedly expired on February 2, 1991, but who continued in office until February 15, 1991, holding that his official acts from February 3 to February 15, 1991 were valid.

• Second-Placer Rule — The candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed winner when the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is disqualified, because the votes cast for the disqualified candidate who was voted for in the sincere belief that she was qualified are not treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The electorate's choice must be respected, and public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election.

• Doctrine of Last Antecedent — Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless prevented by the context. The conjunction "and" is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. The Court applied this principle to interpret Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179, holding that the phrase "shall not be qualified and entitled to vote" connotes two prohibitions — running for and voting for provincial elective officials.

• "For the purpose of running for public office, the residence requirement should be read as legal residence or domicile, not any place where a party may have properties and may visit from time to time." — This passage defines the residence requirement for public office as legal residence or domicile, not mere presence or property ownership, and was central to the Court's finding that Larrazabal lacked the required residence qualification.

• "The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless." — This passage from Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections articulates the second-placer rule, which the Court applied to disallow Abella from assuming the governorship.

• "Husband and wife as a matter of principle live together in one legal residence which is their usual place of abode." — This passage, quoting the COMELEC decision, applies the Family Code provisions on family domicile to the determination of Larrazabal's residence, supporting the finding that she resided in Ormoc City with her husband.

• Faypon vs. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) — Cited for the principle that the determination of a person's legal residence or domicile depends upon intention inferred from acts, activities, and utterances, and that mere absence from one's residence to pursue studies, engage in business, or practice a vocation is not sufficient to constitute abandonment.

• Abella vs. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989) — The prior consolidated cases involving the same parties and the same election, which the Court quoted extensively for the antecedent facts and the directive to COMELEC to hear SPC Case No. 88-546.

• Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, 88 SCRA 251 — Cited for the principle that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to the COMELEC's course of action.

• Peralta vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 80716, December 10, 1987 — Applied to the instant case for the principle that component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province, and their registered voters are prohibited from voting and being voted for provincial elective offices.

• Mapa vs. Arroyo, 175 SCRA 76 (1989) — Cited for the doctrine of last antecedent in statutory interpretation, applied to interpret Section 89 of Republic Act No. 179.

• Alger Electric, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 37 (1985) — Cited for the principle that the Court does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless absolutely necessary to a decision of the case.

• Leyte Acting Vice-Governor Aurelio D. Menzon vs. Leyte Acting Governor Leopoldo E. Perilla, G.R. No. 90762, May 20, 1991 — Cited for the de facto officer doctrine, applied to validate Commissioner Flores' official acts.

• Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 174 SCRA 245 (1989) — Cited for the rule that the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot assume the vacated position when the winning candidate is disqualified.

• Labo, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections, 176 SCRA 1 (1989) — Cited for the second-placer rule, holding that the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes cannot replace the disqualified winner because he was obviously not the choice of the people.

• Geronimo vs. Ramos, 136 SCRA 435 — Cited as the more logical and democratic rule, holding that it would be repugnant to the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner.

• Santos vs. Commission on Elections, 137 SCRA 740 (1985) — Re-examined and reversed in favor of Geronimo vs. Ramos, as the Court found the latter represents the more logical and democratic rule.

• Article X, Section 12, 1987 Constitution — Provides that highly urbanized cities and component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are independent of the province. The Court applied this provision to hold that Ormoc City, whose charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial officials, is independent of Leyte, and its registered voters are prohibited from voting and being voted for provincial elective offices.

• Section 42, Title II, Chapter I, B.P. Blg. 337 (Local Government Code) — Requires an elective local official to be a qualified voter registered in the barangay, municipality, city, or province where he proposes to be elected, and a resident therein for at least one year at the time of filing the certificate of candidacy. The Court applied this provision to find that Larrazabal lacked the required residence and registration qualifications.

• Section 78, Omnibus Election Code — Provides for a verified petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy on the ground that any material representation contained therein is false. The Court directed the COMELEC to hear SPC Case No. 88-546 under this provision.

• Section 6, Republic Act No. 6646 — Provides that any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. The Court applied this provision in the context of the second-placer rule, holding that the votes cast for Larrazabal, who was voted for in the sincere belief that she was qualified, were not treated as stray.

• Section 89, Republic Act No. 179 — Provides that the qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte. The Court interpreted this provision to connote two prohibitions — running for and voting for provincial elective officials.

• Articles 68 and 69, Family Code (E.O. No. 209) — Provide that husband and wife are obliged to live together and fix the family domicile. The Court applied these provisions to support the finding that Larrazabal's residence was in Ormoc City with her husband, as there was no evidence they maintained separate residences.

• Section 1(2), Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution — Provides for the appointment and terms of office of COMELEC Commissioners. The Court declined to pass upon the constitutional issue raised regarding the expiration of Commissioner Flores' term.

• Section 15, Article XVIII, 1987 Constitution — Transitory provision regarding incumbent members of the COMELEC. Cited by Larrazabal in her argument regarding Commissioner Flores' term.

Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, and Davide, Jr., JJ., concurred. Fernan, C.J., took no part. Feliciano and Sarmiento, JJ., were on leave.

N/A — The case text does not provide any dissenting opinions.