Abela vs. Golez

A public prosecutor’s decision whether to file an information is discretionary and cannot be controlled by mandamus absent grave abuse of discretion. The fiscal may stand on his judgment that the evidence is insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, subject to the remedies available before the Secretary of Justice.

Quirico A. Abela was the City Fiscal of Roxas City; Agustin Almalbis was the private party who sought the prosecution of Virginia Anisco. The dispute implicated the fiscal’s authority to determine whether evidence warrants an information under the Revised Penal Code and the availability of mandamus to compel prosecution.

Sometime in 1967, Agustin Almalbis, who owned and operated several fishing boats and fishponds, entered into a business arrangement with Virginia P. Anisco. Almalbis sent fish by the tons to Anisco for sale at the Manila Divisoria Market. Anisco entirely supervised and controlled the sales; from the gross proceeds she received a four percent commission plus expenses she had advanced, and she had the obligation to remit the balance to Almalbis. The arrangement continued at irregular intervals of about two weeks to the satisfaction of both parties until Anisco became late and irregular in her remittances.

Remittances were mostly made through Anisco’s personal checks. When she became late, Almalbis proposed that Anisco give him a checkbook with each check pre-signed in blank, leaving Almalbis to fill in the amount and payee later as the value of each shipment was determined after sale. This was done and the business continued. Five checks drawn on the Prudential Bank and Trust Company of Manila were prepared and filled in by Almalbis: No. 378389 dated September 16, 1968, payable to Agustin Almalbis for P6,000.00; No. 392377 dated October 20, 1968, payable to Cash for P3,637.05; No. 392379 dated October 29, 1968, payable to Agustin Almalbis for P3,426.85; No. 392381 dated October 30, 1968, payable to Cash for P1,360.50; and No. 392380 dated October 30, 1968, payable to Cash for P3,000.00. All were signed by Anisco and all were dishonored for lack of funds when presented through the Roxas City Branch of the Philippine National Bank.

According to Almalbis, the five checks represented the net proceeds from sales made by Anisco. Check No. 378389 was hand-carried by Amador Anisco from Manila to Roxas City and delivered to Almalbis. Almalbis indorsed it to the Philippine National Bank, Roxas City Branch, where it was accepted for deposit only. Later a check was returned dishonored by the Prudential Bank and Trust Company for lack of funds; when Check No. 378389 found its way back to Almalbis, he left for Manila to ask Anisco why it bounced. Anisco begged for more time to obtain sufficient funds, but the funds never came.

Meanwhile, upon Anisco’s plea, Almalbis continued to make shipments of fish to her. As part of this new understanding, Anisco agreed to sign, as she signed, checks in blank and delivered them to Almalbis, who was to fill in the blanks with the amount and date corresponding to the sales reported by telegram. Under this arrangement, Checks Nos. 392377, 392379, 392381, and 392380 were made out by Almalbis from the pre-signed blank checks provided by Anisco. These checks also bounced for lack of funds or for the reason “Exceeds Arrangements.”

Almalbis placed these facts before City Fiscal Quirico A. Abela, who conducted the preliminary investigation on his letter-complaint of December 26, 1968; the complaint was filed on December 28, 1968. Abela dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. The CFI found that the five checks represented the net proceeds from sales and that Almalbis’s right with reference to Check Exhibit B was clear and certain. Almalbis then commenced a mandamus action in the CFI of Roxas City.

• No Deceit: Petitioner maintained in his Order that there was no deceit because the checks were pre-signed in blank and were prepared and filled in by Almalbis as to date, payee, and amount, leaving Anisco no opportunity to determine the sufficiency of her bank deposit or to replenish it.
• No Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d): Petitioner maintained that the dishonored checks were not issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the same time, citing People vs. Obieta et al.; the law contemplates one uninterrupted transaction in which the consummation of the transaction and the issuance of the check are concurrent.

• Prosecutorial Discretion and Mandamus: Whether mandamus lies to compel the City Fiscal to file an information for estafa after he dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.

• Prosecutorial Discretion and Mandamus: No. The fiscal’s determination whether to file an information is discretionary, not ministerial, and mandamus cannot control it absent grave abuse. The fiscal’s dismissal for lack of merit was not shown to be grave abuse.

• Prosecutorial Discretion and Mandamus: The SC held that the public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment and discretion in the appreciation of the evidence, and in the exercise thereof he may not be controlled by mandamus. Whether an information should be filed in court is a matter addressed to the sound discretion of the fiscal according to whether the evidence is, in his opinion, sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The fiscal cannot be compelled to act in a distinct manner, whether to prosecute or not to prosecute; he is allowed to stand on his opinion and conviction, subject only to the Secretary of Justice’s authority under Sections 1679 and 1689 of the Revised Administrative Code to temporarily relieve him by designating another prosecutor for the particular case. The SC distinguished the institution of an information from a motion to dismiss a case already filed in court: a judge may deny the latter where the record of the preliminary investigation shows sufficient evidence, because the case is already in court and within its discretion and control. For an offended party faced with a fiscal’s refusal or failure to file or prosecute, the remedies are to take the matter to the Secretary of Justice under Section 1679, file criminal and administrative charges against the prosecuting officer, or file a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code. The SC quoted Bagatua vs. Revilla: while the fiscal must prosecute persons shown by the evidence to be guilty, he is also bound to protect innocent persons from groundless, false, or malicious prosecution, and would commit a serious dereliction of duty if he filed an information despite not being convinced that the evidence warranted it. That duty involves discretion and cannot be controlled by mandamus unless grave abuse is shown; no such abuse appeared. The SC thus set aside the CFI decision compelling Abela to file the estafa charge.

• Prosecutorial Discretion — The fiscal has the judgment to determine whether the evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt and whether to file an information. The SC applied this to Abela’s dismissal of Almalbis’s estafa complaint, holding that the fiscal could stand on his finding of lack of merit.
• Mandamus Does Not Lie to Control Prosecutorial Discretion — Mandamus is available only to compel performance of a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. Because deciding whether to file an information is discretionary, the CFI erred in compelling Abela to file the estafa charge.
• Grave Abuse of Discretion Exception — Mandamus may issue to compel a fiscal only where he acts with grave abuse of discretion, as where the evidence clearly warrants a more serious charge but he files a lesser one. The SC found no grave abuse in Abela’s dismissal.
• Remedies Against Fiscal’s Inaction — The offended party may appeal to the Secretary of Justice under Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code, file criminal and administrative charges against the fiscal, or file a civil action for damages under Article 27 of the New Civil Code. The SC listed these as alternatives to mandamus.
• Filing Information vs. Dismissing a Filed Case — A fiscal’s decision to institute an information is discretionary, but once a case is in court, the judge may deny the fiscal’s motion to dismiss if the preliminary investigation record shows sufficient evidence. The SC drew this distinction to explain why mandamus was improper here.

• “The public prosecutor is entitled to use his judgment and discretion in the appreciation of evidence presented to him and, in the exercise thereof, he may not be controlled by mandamus.” — This is the SC’s core statement of prosecutorial discretion and the limit on mandamus.
• “Whether an information should be filed in court is a matter address to the sound discretion of the fiscal according to whether the evidence is in his opinion sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.” — This defines the standard the fiscal applies in deciding whether to file an information.
• “The prosecuting officer would be committing a serious dereliction of duty if he files the information based upon a complaint, where he is not convinced that the sufficiency and strength of the evidence would warrant the filing of the action in court against the accused.” — This explains why the fiscal may refuse to file despite a complaint.
• “This duty of the prosecuting officer involves discretion, hence, it cannot be controlled by mandamus unless there has been a grave abuse thereof which is not shown in the case at bar.” — This states the grave abuse exception and the SC’s conclusion that it was absent.

• Estrella vs. Orendain Jr., 37 SCRA 640 — Quoted for the rule that the fiscal cannot be compelled to prosecute or not prosecute and that the Secretary of Justice may designate another prosecutor in an appropriate case.
• Pañgan vs. Pasicolan, 103 Phil. 1143 — Cited for the remedy of taking the matter to the Secretary of Justice under Section 1679 when the fiscal fails or refuses to act despite sufficient evidence.
• Bagatua vs. Revilla, 104 Phil. 393 — Quoted for the fiscal’s duty to protect innocent persons and for the rule that mandamus cannot control prosecutorial discretion absent grave abuse.

• Article 315, paragraph 2(d), Revised Penal Code — The estafa provision invoked in Almalbis’s complaint; the fiscal found it inapplicable because the dishonored checks were not issued in payment of an obligation contracted at the same time. The SC did not resolve the estafa elements but upheld the fiscal’s discretion to dismiss.
• Sections 1679 and 1689, Revised Administrative Code — Cited to show that when a fiscal fails, refuses, or is unable to investigate or prosecute, the Secretary of Justice may, in the public interest, designate an acting fiscal or competent officer for the particular case. This supported the SC’s holding that the fiscal’s discretion is not controlled by mandamus.
• Article 27, New Civil Code — Cited as one remedy of the offended party against a fiscal’s refusal or failure to prosecute: a civil action for damages.

• Justice Aquino (Concurring) — Justice Aquino concurred, emphasizing that as a general rule mandamus does not lie to compel the fiscal to file an information because that duty involves the exercise of discretion and judgment and is not ministerial. He added that it is not fair to compel the fiscal to prosecute a person whose guilt may not, in his opinion, be established with the evidence submitted, but that mandamus may issue where the fiscal acts with grave abuse of discretion, as in Bernabe vs. Bolinas. He also noted that the remedy against unjust action or inaction of a fiscal is an appeal to the Minister of Justice or the filing of an administrative charge.