Abdula vs. Guiani

A warrant of arrest is void if the judge fails to personally determine probable cause and relies solely on the prosecutor's certification or report. Personal, independent evaluation of sufficient supporting documents is constitutionally mandated, and abdication of that duty nullifies the arrest order even where the prosecutor's finding of probable cause and the information itself are valid.

Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula was the municipal mayor of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao, married to co-petitioner Odin Abdula. Respondent Japal M. Guiani was then the presiding judge of Branch 14 of the Regional Trial Court of Cotabato City with jurisdiction over criminal cases arising from Maguindanao. Preliminary investigation of criminal complaints in the province was conducted by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor subject to the requirement of prior written authority or approval under Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

On June 24, 1994, a complaint for murder docketed as I.S. No. 94-1361 was filed before the Criminal Investigation Service Command, ARMM Regional Office XII against petitioners Mayor Bai Unggie D. Abdula and Odin Abdula and six other persons in connection with the death of Abdul Dimalen, former COMELEC Registrar of Kabuntalan, Maguindanao. The complaint alleged that petitioners paid the six other respondents P200,000.00 for the killing. Acting thereon, Provincial Prosecutor Salick U. Panda issued a Resolution dated August 22, 1994 dismissing the charge against petitioners and five others for lack of prima facie case, while recommending filing of an information for murder against Kasan Mama. An information was thereafter filed against Kasan Mama before respondent judge and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2332.

On September 13, 1994, respondent ordered Criminal Case No. 2332 returned to the Provincial Prosecutor for further investigation, noting that although eight respondents were involved, only Kasan Mama was charged without the resolution required under Section 4, Rule 112 showing how that conclusion was reached, leaving no basis to issue a warrant. Upon return, the case was assigned to 2nd Assistant Prosecutor Enok T. Dimaraw, who treated the matter as a refiling in light of two new witness affidavits and issued subpoenas. On December 6, 1994, petitioners submitted joint counter-affidavits and participated in the reinvestigation.

Thereafter, Prosecutor Dimaraw issued a Resolution dated December 28, 1994 finding a prima facie case for murder against petitioners as principals by inducement and against Kasan Mama, Cuenco Usman and Jun Mama as principals by direct participation. Provincial Prosecutor Panda added a notation inhibiting himself because he had previously handled the case with differing findings and because the victim was the father-in-law of his son, authorizing Dimaraw to dispose of the case without his approval. On January 2, 1995, an information dated December 28, 1994 signed by Dimaraw and bearing Panda's inhibition notation was filed before Branch 14 as Criminal Case No. 2376. The next day, January 3, 1995, respondent issued a warrant for petitioners' arrest.

According to petitioners, respondent orchestrated the charge out of hostility after they filed an Ombudsman complaint on October 6, 1994 accusing him and ten others of illegally ordering release of P1,119,125.00 in Kabuntalan municipal funds to a purported niece, and after the Ombudsman on December 12, 1994 found basis to proceed with preliminary investigation. They alleged respondent berated petitioner mayor in open court in the Maguindanaoan dialect, threatening to jail her within her term. Respondent, for his part, denied bias, profit from the funds release, and the alleged utterance, characterizing the graft complaint as harassment after petitioners failed to obtain funds he had ruled as belonging to municipal councilors. Upon learning of the warrant, petitioners filed an Urgent Ex-parte Motion on January 4, 1995 to set it aside as prematurely filed pending a Department of Justice petition for review, which they filed on January 11, 1995. Respondent did not act on the motion, prompting the present petition. Respondent retired on April 16, 1996 and no longer presides over Branch 14.

• Bias and Orchestration: Petitioner argued that respondent orchestrated the murder charge, citing five allegedly illegal orders in a mandamus case against petitioner mayor and extreme hostility after petitioners filed an Ombudsman complaint over the release of P1,119,125.00 in municipal funds, culminating in threats uttered in open court.
• Reinvestigation Authority: Petitioner maintained that respondent had no authority to motu proprio order reinvestigation after the August 22, 1994 dismissal, and that the September 13, 1994 return order was retaliatory and indicative of bias.
• Validity of Information: Petitioner argued that the information was null and void because it was signed only by Investigating Prosecutor Dimaraw without approval of Provincial Prosecutor Panda, in violation of the prior written authority or approval requirement.
• Validity of Warrant: Petitioner argued that the warrant should be recalled under Allado vs. Diokno because respondent did not personally examine the evidence nor call complainant and witnesses, issuing the arrest order on January 3, 1995 immediately after the January 2, 1995 filing without any order finding probable cause.

• Absence of Bias: Respondent countered that petitioners' facts were misleading, the graft charge was harassment over funds rightfully belonging to councilors, no case by the vice-mayor was pending as alleged, and he never berated petitioner mayor and in fact lifted an arrest order against her on December 28, 1994.
• Prosecutorial Independence: Respondent argued, as echoed by the Office of the Solicitor General, that bias against the judge was immaterial because discretion to file the information belonged exclusively to the prosecutor, petitioners participated in reinvestigation, and pending cases between them and the judge did not establish prejudice.
• Validity of Warrant: Respondent maintained that written authority from the Provincial Prosecutor having been granted under Section 4, Rule 112, and with no reason to doubt the certification of preliminary investigation and probable cause, issuance under paragraph (a), Section 6, Rule 112 was proper and beyond judicial interference pursuant to prosecutorial control of prosecution.
• Personal Examination Not Required: Respondent countered through the Office of the Solicitor General that under Soliven vs. Makasiar the judge need not personally examine complainant and witnesses, enjoys wide latitude under Lim vs. Felix, that Allado vs. Diokno was inapplicable absent conflicting evidence negating probable cause, and that regularity of official duty was presumed.

• Bias and Disqualification: Whether respondent should be disqualified for bias and prejudice allegedly shown by orchestration of the charge and hostile conduct.
• Reinvestigation Order: Whether respondent gravely abused discretion in ordering return of the records for further investigation after dismissal as to petitioners.
• Authority for Information: Whether the information signed only by the investigating prosecutor without the provincial prosecutor's approval is null and void.
• Probable Cause for Warrant: Whether the warrant of arrest issued on January 3, 1995 is valid where the judge relied on the prosecutor's certification without personal determination of probable cause.

• Bias and Disqualification: No ruling on the merits, the prayer being moot and academic because respondent retired on April 16, 1996 and no longer hears Criminal Case No. 2376; disqualification in any event requires clear and convincing proof not discharged here.
• Reinvestigation Order: No. No grave abuse was committed, the order merely returning records for further investigation without directing whom to charge or selecting the investigator, leaving final say to the prosecutor.
• Authority for Information: No. The information is valid, the provincial prosecutor's written notation authorizing the investigator to dispose of the case without approval constituting sufficient compliance with the authority-or-approval requirement.
• Probable Cause for Warrant: No. The warrant is null and void, the judge having abdicated the constitutional duty to personally determine probable cause by relying solely and completely on the prosecutor's certification.

• Bias and Disqualification: Disqualification for bias requires clear and convincing evidence of acts clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice. Petitioners' allegations of orchestration and hostility were insufficiently proved, and the issue was in any event rendered moot by respondent's retirement, leaving no need for prolonged discussion.
• Reinvestigation Order: Chronology negated retaliation because the September 13, 1994 return order predated the October 6, 1994 Ombudsman complaint by about a month. Although the judge could have simply required forwarding of records, nothing in the bare order showed an illegal motive; it did not order filing against anyone or choose the investigator, consistent with Abugotal vs. Tiro and Lim, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals that filing discretion remains with the prosecutor, and petitioners were afforded due process through counter-affidavits.
• Authority for Information: Rule 112 requires prior written authority or approval of the provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor before filing or dismissal by an investigating fiscal. Both the December 28, 1994 Resolution and information bore Panda's signed notation inhibiting himself due to prior handling, differing findings, and relationship by affinity to the victim, expressly authorizing Dimaraw to dispose of the case without approval, which satisfied the rule.
• Probable Cause for Warrant: The 1987 Constitution deliberately requires personal determination by the judge, imposing greater responsibility than prior charters. Under Soliven vs. Makasiar and Ho vs. People, prosecutorial and judicial determinations serve distinct objectives — holding for trial versus necessity of immediate custody — so the judge must decide independently on supporting documents and cannot rely solely on the prosecutor's report or certification. Respondent admitted issuing the warrant because he saw no reason to doubt the certification, thereby adopting the prosecutor's judgment as his own. Faced with two conflicting resolutions charging different suspects and acting with inordinate haste from January 2 to January 3, 1995, independent examination of supporting documents was especially required.

• Personal determination of probable cause for warrant of arrest — The judge must satisfy himself personally and independently of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant, either by personally evaluating the prosecutor's report and supporting documents or, if no probable cause appears, by disregarding the report and requiring supporting affidavits. Reliance merely on the certification or report of the investigating officer constitutes abdication of a constitutionally mandated duty and voids the warrant.
• Distinct prosecutorial and judicial probable cause — The prosecutor determines whether reasonable ground exists to charge and hold the accused for trial, while the judge determines whether immediate custody is necessary to avoid frustrating the ends of justice. Even when based on the same evidence, the objectives differ, so the judge must have supporting evidence beyond the prosecutor's bare report, such as complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements, or stenographic notes, without necessarily examining the complete records.
• Disqualification for bias and prejudice — A judge may be branded biased and partial only upon clear and convincing evidence of acts or conduct clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice. The mere existence of pending cases between litigant and judge does not establish bias.
• Executive control of prosecution and judicial non-interference — The discretion to determine whom to include in an information lies under the exclusive control and supervision of the prosecutor. A court order merely returning records for further investigation, without directing filing against particular respondents or selecting the investigator, does not unduly interfere with that function.
• Prior authority or approval for information — No complaint or information shall be filed or dismissed by an investigating fiscal without prior written authority or approval of the provincial, city, or chief state prosecutor. A written notation by the provincial prosecutor inhibiting himself and expressly authorizing the investigating prosecutor to dispose of the case without approval is sufficient compliance.

• "and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce" — States the constitutional standard of Article III, Section 2 whose emphasis on personal determination underlies the invalidation of the warrant.
• "What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause." — Canonical formulation from Soliven vs. Makasiar defining the judge's non-delegable duty in issuing warrants.
• "The point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as Respondent Court did in this case." — Articulates the prohibition, elaborated in Ho vs. People, against deciding probable cause on the prosecutor's bare report without independent supporting documents.

• Soliven vs. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 398 — Followed as controlling on the judge's exclusive personal responsibility and the two options for satisfying probable cause, including evaluation of the report and supporting documents without mandatory personal examination of witnesses.
• Ho vs. People, 280 SCRA 365 — Followed and extensively quoted to summarize the distinct objectives of prosecutor and judge, the need for independent supporting evidence, and the rule that reliance solely on prosecutorial recommendation violates the Constitution.
• Allado vs. Diokno, 232 SCRA 192 — Invoked by petitioners to demand recall for failure to personally examine evidence; distinguished by the Office of the Solicitor General as involving conflicting documents negating probable cause, unlike the present record.
• Lim vs. Felix, 187 SCRA 292 — Cited for the judge's latitude in determining probable cause and that complete records need not invariably be examined, but supporting documents must enable independent judgment.
• Abugotal vs. Tiro, 66 SCRA 196 — Applied to sustain the return for reinvestigation, the court being barred from ordering filing against particular respondents or choosing the investigator.
• Lim, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 222 SCRA 279 — Applied for the principle that the prosecutor retains final say on whom to include in the information.
• Webb vs. People, 276 SCRA 243 — Cited for requiring clear and convincing evidence to disqualify a judge for bias.
• Aparicio vs. Andal, 175 SCRA 569 — Cited for requiring acts clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before branding a judge biased.

• Section 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution — Prohibits issuance of a warrant of arrest except upon probable cause personally determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation; applied to void the warrant based solely on prosecutorial certification.
• Section 4, Rule 112, Revised Rules of Court — Requires the resolution on preliminary investigation and prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city fiscal or chief state prosecutor; applied to uphold the reinvestigation return and the authorized filing by the investigating prosecutor.
• Section 6(a), Rule 112, Rules on Criminal Procedure — Governs issuance of warrant of arrest by the judge; invoked by respondent as basis for issuance but held unsatisfied for lack of personal probable-cause determination.
• Section 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court — Recognizes the prosecution's authority to initiate and control criminal prosecution; invoked to argue against judicial interference with filing discretion.
• Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court — Requires absence of appeal or plain, speedy, adequate remedy for certiorari and prohibition; noted but relaxed to decide the long-pending merits rather than remand to resolve the pending motion to set aside.

Melo, Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur. No separate concurring reasoning of significance was recounted.